

# COLUMBIA JOURNALISM REVIEW

MARCH / APRIL 1976  
NATIONAL MEDIA MONITOR / PRESS • RADIO • TV

AMAILT427\*\*#10 03 CJ NOV76  
THOMAS FORD MAILLOUX  
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## CAMPAIGN COVERAGE: THE NEW MACHISMO

**The Joan Little industry**

Ruckus at The New Republic

**S.1—what's wrong with it?**

The natural gas 'shortage'

**Busing: handling a hot issue**

Supplement:  
DuPont Survey  
of Broadcasting



*National 4-H Forestry Award winners, front to rear:  
Jeffrey Little, John Pfeleiderer, Melinda Hadden, Craig  
Jerabek, Steve Welches, and David Doherty, Jr.*



# How six 4-H members became the proud parents of over 60,000 baby trees

**I**n the year 2000, Americans will use about twice as much paper and wood products as they use today. And the U.S. Forest Service predicts that America's commercial timberlands won't be able to keep up with the demand.

Our hope lies to a great extent in concerned *young* people — like these six teenagers who won the National 4-H Forestry Award and scholarship. These young people show just what can be accomplished. And that's why we're sponsoring the awards: to encourage people to start young — thinking about the future of America's forests and doing something about it.

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## Enough trees to keep a city going

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Together, Craig Jerabek, David Doherty, and Jeffrey Little planted over 57,000 of the 60,000 seedlings — enough to keep a city of 16,000 people supplied in paper for an entire year when the trees are grown.

Melinda Hadden's specialty is *Christmas* trees — she's planted 1,200 of them. She's also planted about 300 trees for homeowners whose trees were destroyed by a violent windstorm.

John Pfeleiderer has researched and fought Dutch elm disease — a killer which wiped out many of Greeley, Colorado's most beautiful trees. (John also taught himself grafting — and created new forms of trees.)

But there's more to a forest than just trees. Healthy forests are a complete ecosystem. That's why Steve Welches has planted over 1,200 shrubs for animal cover. And why David Doherty has built dens and brush piles for rabbits and small game birds. (And succeeded in bringing them back to land that was once ravaged by Hurricane Camille.)

Fortunately, these six teenagers aren't alone in their commitment. There are 100,000 *more* 4-H members also working in forestry.

And forest companies pulling on the same team.

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## International Paper shares the burden

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We've developed a Super-tree — a southern pine that grows taller, straighter, healthier, and faster than ordinary pines.

We're experimenting with a new machine that can harvest an entire tree — taproots and all. We're moving ahead

on projects like fertilization techniques. Tree farm programs. Forest research.

We'll show a private landowner how to prepare a site, plant, protect, thin, and harvest — at no charge. (In some cases, *doubling* his yield.) For this help, IP gets the right to buy a landowner's timber at competitive prices.

---

## More to be done

---

Will all this be enough to keep the world's fiber supply going strong? It'll help. But more must be done.

At International Paper, we believe forest products companies, private landowners and government should work together to develop more constructive policies for managing America's forests. The wrong policies can make tree farming impossible and force the sale of forest land for other purposes. The right policies can assure continuation of America's forests — a renewable natural resource.

If you'd like more information about what has to be done to assure the world's fiber supply, please write to Dept. 160-A, International Paper Company, 220 East 42nd Street, New York, New York 10017.



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# Some of the metals we mine are more precious than gold.

An ounce of cold steel can do wonders for a warm smile.

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We produce over 60 different alloys and alloying metals.

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No sophisticated tools.

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No computers, or lightbulbs, or television sets.

When you think of them this way, our alloying metals become very precious indeed.

Whether they're as far away as a rocket on its way to the moon. Or as close to your heart as a brace shaping a beautiful smile.



**Today, something we do  
will touch your life.**

# Biplane to Jet Plane: 50 Years of Airline Service

The bicentennial year of 1976 marks the 50th birthday of scheduled airline service in America. It all began with the Air Commerce Act of 1926. This Act and later legislation provided the regulation, financial stability and opportunity for expanded service, which attracted private investment to the field of commercial aviation. Within five years airlines were spanning the country.

Today, the airlines are the dominant intercity public transportation



system, with a record of safety, economy and dependability that is the envy of the world.

## Airlines and Growth

We've flown a long way in 50 years! After a first quarter century of steady growth, the airlines in 1950 carried 19 million passengers 10 billion miles. In 1975, scheduled airlines carried more than 200 million passengers 163 billion miles. This represents almost 80 per cent of intercity public passenger miles traveled in this country. Airlines also account for 93 per cent of travel to overseas destinations. The U.S. scheduled airline fleet in 1976 includes 2,200 jet aircraft worth \$18 billion, serving passengers and shippers in thousands of communities with 13,000 daily flights.

## Airlines and Fares

Airline travel continues to be a bargain, with many fares actually cheaper than travel by car, bus or rail. Today's fares are substantially lower in the U.S. than in Europe and in virtually every other country in the world. While the Consumer Price

Index since 1950 has risen 120 per cent, the average airline fare has gone up less than 30 per cent. In 1950, a Washington to Los Angeles flight cost \$171. In 1976, the same flight—more than twice as fast—costs just \$179. Discount fares can save up to 35 per cent.

## Airlines and Mail

In 1926, the Post Office helped the airlines get off the ground when

it contracted for scheduled air mail service. In 1976, more than 8 out of 10 first class letters will move by air between our cities. From biplane to jet plane, the airlines have carried the mail to help America grow.

## Airlines and Freight

Air freight now moves millions of tons of high-value commodities ranging from medicine, computers and electrical appliances to high-fashion clothes and fresh produce. The U.S. scheduled airlines provide more than a billion dollars worth of air freight transportation annually in jet freighters and in the underbellies of passenger aircraft.

## Airlines and Employment

The airlines in 1976 will pay over \$6 billion in wages to 300,000

employees and will make possible hundreds of thousands of other jobs in the aerospace and travel industries. And airline growth means airport growth. Airports have become small cities, contributing millions of dollars in jobs and to the strength of communities large and small.

## Airlines and Defense

A half century ago military pilots helped carry the mail. Today, the responsiveness and flexibility of the scheduled airline system, with its skilled professionals and world-wide facilities, constitutes a key reserve in the event of national emergency. The airline Civil Reserve Air Fleet saves taxpayers millions of dollars in readiness costs.

## Airlines and the Future

The next 50 years will see new advances in scheduled air transportation service. The Federal Aviation Administration predicts that airline passenger traffic will increase by 7 per cent in 1976, and about 6 per cent a year through 1982.

Competition under common sense controls has helped make possible the steady advance in commercial aviation since 1926. Improvements in airline regulation are needed, but before any radical changes are made in the air transportation system, let's ask:

Can we risk a national asset?

Can the nation afford to jeopardize a transportation system that is geared to the strength and growth of America?

A system that's working.



## THE AIRLINES OF AMERICA

Public Transportation  
at its best.

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*‘To assess the performance of journalism in all its forms, to call attention to its shortcomings and strengths, and to help define — or redefine — standards of honest responsible service . . . to help stimulate continuing improvement in the profession and to speak out for what is right, fair, and decent.’*

—Excerpt from the Review's founding editorial, Autumn 1967

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Columbia Journalism Review is published bimonthly under the auspices of the faculty, alumni, and friends of the Graduate School of Journalism, Columbia University. Volume XIV, Number 6, March-April 1976. 1976 Graduate School of Journalism, Columbia University. Subscription rates: \$12 a year. Add \$2 a year for foreign subscriptions. Please address all subscription mail to: Columbia Journalism Review, Subscription Department, P. O. Box 30, Farmingdale, N.Y. 11735. Editorial office: 700 Journalism Building, Columbia University, New York, N.Y. 10027 (212)280-3872. Business office: 601 Journalism Building (212)280-2716. Second-class postage paid at New York, N.Y. and at an additional mailing office. No claims for back copies honored after one year. National newsstand distribution: Eastern News Distributors, Inc., 155 West 5th Street, New York, N.Y. 10011. POSTMASTER: send Form 3579 to Columbia Journalism Review, P. O. Box 30, Farmingdale, N.Y. 11735.

# COMMENT

## Campaign talk: a hitch in the lingo

Wordwise, this year's presidential campaign is gaining momentum. To begin with, there is the field of "hopefuls" — adjectives posing as nouns posing as candidates. (The thought of a field is normally attractive, but not at campaign time: the over-stimulated grass roots keep erupting in ground swells.) We wonder: Do "hopefuls" who drop out of a campaign become "wistfuls"?

Politicians, of course, have long been famous for abusing the language. The hitch is that their lingo is catching. Journalists start out by quoting the stuff and many end up by using it themselves, thus passing it on to their readers. Soon, we're all spouting trash. There's "viability" and "credibility" and "electability," for example. As we recall it, "viable" means something like "capable of living" or "growing and developing." So, as far as we're concerned, any candidate who chooses to "throw his hat in the ring" and go out "on the hustings" is a "viable" candidate. He or she may not be "presidential timber" — presumably the sort that can be milled

into those planks that party platforms are made of — but almost all candidates are alive and capable of growing. And what does "credibility" mean to you? Well, yes, it means "believability" — an ugly-sounding compound — but don't you find that it usually creeps in when someone is trying to avoid putting something bluntly? Thus, "he has this credibility problem" is used in lieu of "nobody believes what he says anymore." But how about "his campaign lacks credibility"? Doesn't the word in this usage mean that no one believes the candidate stands a chance of winning? In our eyes, "credibility" has pretty much lost whatever credibility it had in the first place.

As for "electability," we'll let it pass — as jargon. But as one of a threesome, it does present problems. Can a candidate be viable but not electable? Or must he be both viable *and* credible to be electable? Haven't candidates who lacked credibility not only been viable but elected, to boot? A further question: If a candidate is fraught with viability, credibility, and electability and still manages to lose an election, what term should we use to label the disability that caused the defeat?

Is a policy of verbal reform — among politicians and journalists alike — a viable option during a campaign year? We remain hopeful.

## And now, an article from our sponsor


The first example of direct corporate sponsorship of a magazine article worked this way: Xerox paid Harrison E. Salisbury \$40,000, plus \$15,000 in expenses, for "Travels through America," a twenty-four-page article for *Esquire*. Xerox approved subject matter and author in advance, but played no role in the editing of the article. The company did reserve the right to with-

draw its name from the article if it disapproved of the final product. (Xerox approved, and two ads ran with the piece, one before, one after, in the February *Esquire*.) If the sponsor had decided to withdraw, it would not have recouped the \$55,000, but could have withdrawn from commitments to run \$115,000 in advertising in *Esquire* during 1976.

Everyone involved emphasized the purity of it all. "Xerox couldn't even give Harrison a phone call while he spent the six months it took to complete the assignment," Don Erikson, *Esquire's* editor, told *The New York Times*. Despite the cheerfulness at Xerox and *Esquire*, we can't see that corporate sponsorship of articles, or "journalistic funding," the term Arnold Gingrich, *Esquire's* editor-in-chief, says he prefers, can lead in the long run to much good for magazines. Such sponsorship could lead to more blandness and less venturesomeness, even if all the companies, magazines, and writers who might take up the practice in the future were as fastidious as the *Esquire*-Xerox-Salisbury triumvirate.

What will readers gain from all this? Still more intrusiveness from advertising. What do magazines gain? Money — but at a high cost. What do editors gain? Nothing but problems. The constant money worries that plague most magazines argue the attractiveness of article money from corporations. And the editor will be left to convince himself that he would have chosen the same article, and given it the same amount of space, even if it weren't sponsored; and that, yes, it really is the very best article that could be printed in that space, sponsorship or no.

Clearly, those who gain are the advertisers. They achieve more corporate visibility in their print advertising; more attention from readers, more public-relations results for their advertising dollars. And why should some advertisers



continue to buy “neutral” space when other companies are enjoying the role of corporate Medicis? The role allows companies to buy identification with a specific author and subject, as well as the right to withdraw their ads if they don’t like the resulting article. This is one “innovation” that magazines should ignore.

## The other Kennedy legend

It was like searching a suspect for deadly weapons and finding panties in his pocket. Are they evidence — and, if so, of what? Such seemed the reaction of the Senate investigators of the C.I.A. when they inadvertently found that Judith Campbell Exner, friend of two Chicago crime leaders, may also have been a “close friend” of President Kennedy. The story had serious implications, of course, and most news organizations stuck to them — the possibility that the woman had been a link between the Mafia and the White House, and that there may have been some tie to C.I.A. assassination plots. William Safire of *The New York Times* and Robert Sam Anson of *New Times* were both commendably persistent in exploring these ramifications of the relationship.

But the matter seemed to stir different juices in the editors of *Time*, who decided to revive the story that J.F.K. had been afflicted with incurable satyriasis. They offered a *Time*-style, slightly drooling summary of fifteen-year-old gossip about who had slept with whom and how. They also ran photographs of five women; of two of them *Time* could say only that they had been “linked with Kennedy in gossip columns.”

Should such stuff be printed? And if it’s being printed now, why wasn’t it being printed then? The most obvious answer is that it wasn’t news then and

perhaps isn’t news now by most standards of factuality; that is, the very nature of the activity made it all but impossible to report. Had Kennedy’s enemies in the press been able to obtain the proof during his lifetime they would have published it. As it was, they floated unsuccessfully two stories of this type — one about an alleged Kennedy first marriage, another a photograph showing a man roughly of Kennedy’s build leaving somebody’s house.

But what of those journalists who were close enough to Kennedy to have at least an inkling of his activities? Like Franklin Roosevelt, and unlike Richard Nixon, Kennedy all but subverted reporters with friendliness and favors. In Roosevelt’s case, the penalty for breaching the implied contract could be a terrible one; no other president was his equal in humiliating a reporter. No insider-journalist is known to have tempted the Kennedy wrath, a circumstance that almost speaks for itself.

**W**e may be seeing this kind of story now because styles in journalism have changed. Not only do general news publications approach sex less hesitantly, but they move swiftly into most former realms of individual privacy. In part, this is a consequence of new trends in reporting — the novelistic use of personal detail, idiosyncrasy, and habit, sometimes in place of more difficult abstractions. To a point, this documentary technique is praiseworthy; the best biographers have always drawn on the full range of evidence about their subjects. But it can also trivialize; *Time* tells of a woman’s undergarment found in a White House pillow case.

But the fault does not lie entirely with journalists. J.F.K.’s activities are subject now to the gossip-column treatment because he was, and remains, prime raw material for gossip — that is, a celebrity. The news media did not work

alone in turning the Kennedys into celebrities; the Kennedy administration itself fashioned Camelot, a landmark in converting politics into entertainment. It is ironic that the celebrity system the Kennedys once tried to manipulate has fed upon them ever since.

## Orphan Annie and other hostages

A quiet move by the Justice Department last December was reported rather quietly by the press: the government was dropping its antitrust suits against three of the major feature syndicates. At issue had been the cozy arrangement by which syndicates grant to newspapers the exclusive rights to a particular feature in a given geographical area.

To examine this practice in the economic light of restraint of trade is to overlook the larger issue that the press usually so conspicuously embraces — the public’s access to information and the free flow of ideas. For as everybody in the business (and few outside it) knows, a newspaper, for any number of reasons (tight space, want of reader interest, its own political biases), may choose simply to hold a feature and not to print it. The potential misuse of this kind of power may be seen in situations which have been described in Congressional testimony, in the University of Missouri’s “F.O.I. Reports,” and in a thoughtful paper presented at the recent convention of the Association for Education in Journalism. The *Milwaukee Journal* may contract for the New York Times News Service and then sit on much of its Vietnam coverage. The *St. Louis Globe Democrat* may own the exclusive rights to the Jack Anderson column, but seldom print it. The *Los Angeles Times*, like a possessive lover who no longer desires his inamorata but who doesn’t want anybody else to have her either, can hold Little Orphan Annie in-

communicado, a silent hostage to the fear of competition.

To be sure, newspapers are a business, and as such, can be expected to employ the usual business practices. But in a journalistic enterprise, territorial exclusiveness has special dangers. When journalism stifles free speech in the pursuit of profits, it's time to read, not the Sherman Act, but the First Amendment.

## Writing for the Record

Who cares about Angola, anyway? The question sounds mildly foolish now that U.S. involvement has caused a bitter controversy. But it didn't sound so foolish last November, when author John Marks tried to break the story of the secret U.S. intervention. Marks, currently an associate of the Center for National Security Studies in Washington, says he tried to peddle his article to two magazines and two newspapers in late November, but was turned down for a variety of scheduling and policy reasons. Mainstream journalists, including those at *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post*, jumped on the story early in December. We were finally able to read Marks's piece on December 16, after Congressman Andrew Young decided to play publisher by inserting it in the *Congressional Record*. The congressman's news judgment warrants high praise. Too bad the *Record* doesn't pay for articles.

## Darts and laurels

*Dart:* to the *Chicago Tribune* for gullibly printing a rumor that a Soviet nuclear reactor in Siberia had exploded, leaving a huge crater. SOVIET A-REACTOR BLAST FEARED; CRATER SIGHTED was the headline. It turns out that there was no blast and no crater. The story, by the *Tribune's* environment editor, Casey Bukro, bit too hastily on speculation that a U.S. satellite passing over the area had detected the crater. The satellite, Bukro "learned," had even detected bodies and fallen trees.

*Laurel:* to Burton Wolfe and the weekly *San Francisco Bay Guardian*,

for beating out their more affluent competition, including the *San Francisco Examiner*, to win the San Francisco Bar Association's Jane A. Harrah Memorial Media newsprint division award, for an investigative series on the San Francisco court system.

*Dart:* to the *Syracuse Post-Standard*, for failing to mention criticism of the paper in its report about a city council meeting. A councilman claimed that the paper did not have an affirmative-action hiring program. (The *Post-Standard's* sister Newhouse paper, the *Herald-Journal*, reported the criticism.)

*Laurel:* to *The New York Times*, public television, and ABC, for making special efforts to bring news to the handicapped. The *Times* publishes its *Large Type Weekly*, and the ABC *Evening News with Harry Reasoner* becomes the *Captioned ABC News* for the deaf on stations around the country, thanks to public-TV station WGBH, Boston.

*Dart:* to the editorialist of the *Philadelphia Daily News* who wrote a blood thirsty editorial urging that a convicted murderer be executed. "It's about time for Leonard Edwards to take the Hot Squat," the paper said. Edwards also was referred to as "human crud." "Fry him," the editorial concluded.

*Laurel:* to the *Charleston (West Virginia) Gazette* for doing what all newspapers should do when they report on the fund-raising activities of charities: ask where the money goes. When actress Joan Fontaine came to Charleston for the Arthritis Foundation, she was asked by a *Gazette* reporter how much money the foundation raised annually, and how much of it went for patient care, as opposed to professional education and administrative costs. She said she didn't know (although one of her companions did).

## Reporting the tube campaign

Television has caused a revolution in American politics, and some candidates understand this better than we of the writing press.

Most polls show that a heavy majority

of the American public gets its news — and its perceptions of political figures — from television, and more specifically, from television news programs.

The candidates have learned how to stage media events that will land them on the tube. One result is that the public sees only a highly condensed portion of the campaign, often far different from the campaign that print reporters see and write about.

This came home to me one day in 1972 when I covered a luncheon in Chicago that Mayor Daley gave for Senator McGovern. All of the aldermen, the ward bosses, and the local candidates were there in a great show of party unity. Whenever a speaker said something good about McGovern, everyone stood up and cheered. One came away with the impression that, for his own good reasons — largely the election of state and local candidates — Daley had decided to play ball with McGovern.

But Mayor Daley was busy on the other side of the street that day, too. When I phoned my wife that night to tell her of this hopeful sign for the McGovern campaign, she scoffed and told me what she had seen on the network news: Mayor Daley, walking down Michigan Avenue in the Columbus Day parade, with Mrs. Nixon at his side. "You can't tell me Daley is for McGovern," my wife declared. "He's for Nixon."

In fact, Daley was playing it both ways, trying to help his local ticket in the face of what he probably knew would be a Nixon victory. But all the public saw was Daley and Mrs. Nixon. They "knew" which side he was on. We might have suspected it. But we had been covering the "real" campaign, not the one the public was seeing.

There is a more recent example of the impact of television news. When President Ford stood up in the White House East Room last November 3 and denied there were differences between Secretaries Kissinger and Schlesinger, few reporters in Washington believed it. Many of us wrote that the Cabinet shake-up was in fact due to their well-known rivalry — and that the president's willingness to accept Vice-President Rock-

efeller's withdrawal from the 1976 G.O.P. ticket was related to his desperate effort to head off Ronald Reagan.

When the polls came in on the public reaction, they showed a sharp November drop in the president's ratings, perhaps indicating that the public believed our explanation, rather than the president's. The reason for the drop, I believe, was that by the time President Ford finally delivered his explanation, the public verdict was already shaped by television.

For twenty-four hours, the millions watching television news programs had been told the real reasons for the shake-up. The president, by delaying the official announcement, had lost his chance to influence the response. That may be why one of those all-wise taxi drivers we like to quote told me, a few days later, "The president didn't seem like himself. He seemed like he was lying."

If the impact of television news is as great as I believe it to be, we may have to change our traditional ways of covering the presidential campaign in 1976.

We will have to take more account in our writing of the kind of campaign the public is seeing.

This would suggest an even greater need than in the past to do voter sampling, as well as to require political reporters to spend part of their day in front of a television set.

Some papers in 1972 assigned reporters to watch political commercials on television. But it is the news programs, more than most commercials, that are the dominant influence.

From a practical standpoint, this presents real problems. Few news organizations, even large ones such as the Associated Press, *The New York Times*, or the networks, have the manpower to cover eleven Democratic candidates, three or four Republicans, the campaign organizations — and still spend time in front of a television set. But I believe a judicious balance of all of these things is necessary if we are to understand and report accurately on what is really happening in the campaign.

It would be useful too for the candi-

dates, not just their advisers, to arrange schedules so they can watch television accounts of major campaign developments. (The one candidate who will have full access to TV news developments will be President Ford, since the internal White House news summary, originated during the Nixon years, is heavily geared to TV.)

An adviser to George McGovern once told me he knew Thomas Eagleton was finished as McGovern's running mate when he watched a television news account that featured a simulation of the shock treatment administered to Eagleton. If McGovern had seen the show, the adviser said, he never would have said a day later he was 1,000 percent behind Eagleton. And he might have handled better the incident that probably put the final nails into the coffin his campaign became.

CARL P. LEUBSDORF

*Carl P. Leubsdorf, a member of the Baltimore Sun's Washington bureau, is covering the 1976 presidential campaign.*

## For help on insurance stories, call State Farm.







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# ★ The new ★ campaign journalism

As the 1976 campaign begins, journalists have more power than they may want to keep

by EDWIN DIAMOND

**E**arly in January, Ronald Reagan was recorded throwing snowballs in New Hampshire. Campaign '76 was "officially" under way, with a photo opportunity. James Reston, in *The New York Times*, somewhat indulgently called it "vaudeville . . . the last road show in America." In 1976 the vaudeville will be quite different from previous years, and a good part of this difference will be due to the press's newly expanded role in the act.

First of all, an apparent shift in political power is taking place. On the one side, the traditional party nominating system is being strained by the overload of new primaries, new campaign rules, and new candidates. There are thirty state primaries this year, beginning with New Hampshire in late February; in 1972 there were twenty state primaries. In addition, there are hundreds of district elections and caucuses to select convention delegates. There are literally hundreds of new rules governing everything from delegate selection to fund-raising practices. ("It's possible," says one campaign manager, "to go to jail in 1976 for doing things that were considered routine in 1972.") And there are the announced candidates, Democratic and Republican, eleven at last count and still counting.

The overloads are the product of such well-intended measures as the Campaign Finance Act of 1974 and the changes engineered in the Democratic party rules at the 1968 and 1972 conventions. These "reforms," meant to curb the power of the big contributors and the party leaders, have succeeded — perhaps too well.

This year we may be seeing the beginning of what the political scientist Walter Dean Burnham describes as "politics without parties." The traditional political parties have been weakened by population shifts, by the breakdown of

old coalitions, and by the growing emphasis on mass-media campaigns. They may finally be swamped by the wave of "reform." Burnham, and others, believe that third and even fourth parties are a possibility during this election or the next. As the old parties flounder, the role of mediating among factions and building up one or another of the candidates has been shifting elsewhere, principally to the press.

In the bad old days, a candidate had to reach a relatively small number of fat-cat givers and power brokers. Now, each candidate must win over hundreds of delegates, potential campaign workers, and many small contributors; he must convince them that he is indeed a "viable" candidate. In a crowded field, each candidate must look for ways of appearing "viable" by attracting the press's eye. A magazine cover is one way, an appearance on *Face the Nation* another. "Viability" means: *the press is taking the candidate seriously; so should the voters.* A generation ago, a power broker like Illinois' Colonel Jake Arvey could "make" an Adlai Stevenson. Now a good interview with Barbara Walters might mean fifty delegates. The press, Burnham says, may be taking over the nominating process.

**I**ncreasingly, too, the press does more than give or withhold ink and air time; it also analyzes and interprets events (something its critics have always been urging it to do!). The more complex and crowded the election process, the more important interpretation becomes. Interpretation becomes power when the press declares that Ronald Reagan ran "strongly" — or "failed" — in New Hampshire, or when Walter Cronkite concludes an interview with Fred Harris, as he did last December on *The CBS Evening News with Walter Cronkite*, by saying: "Harris is the most radical presidential candidate occupying a position in the Democratic party's far left."

The powers of assessing and anointing are shifting to the press at a time when its own institutional forms are undergoing severe changes as well. The 1976 elections will be the

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first “post-Watergate” presidential election. Fatuous as that may sound, it is important. Over the past few months, executives and editors of the national news organizations have been meeting to discuss their plans for coverage of the 1976 campaign. Every four years, editors and executives meet to proclaim to one another their intentions of doing the election job in a fresh, distinctive, and professional way. This time around, however, there appears to be greater resolve than usual.

Most reporters and editors acknowledge that the press did a poor job of covering the 1972 presidential campaign. (When these journalists are pressed to say what the media did well then, they usually cite the investigative work of Carl Bernstein and Bob Woodward and — with surprising frequency — the warts-and-all sketches of the press-campaign process itself in Timothy Crouse’s *The Boys on The Bus*. Interestingly, neither “Woodstein” nor Crouse were doing strictly political or campaign reporting.)

Three failures of performance are usually mentioned. First, there was the widespread failure to recognize, and take seriously, the early rise of George McGovern. In part, this happened because the implications of the then-new rules for selecting convention delegates (fashioned by, among others, George McGovern) were not widely appreciated. While underplaying McGovern, the press overplayed the candidacy of Edmund Muskie. Most journalists took the Muskie press releases about the senator’s endorsement strength at face value. Muskie “won” the nomination and McGovern was initially written off — in part because the pollsters were calling the field like track announcers.

Transfixed by the horse race, the press was tardy with many of the issues of the campaign — a second failure in performance. It was not until late May, for example, that McGovern’s \$1,000 “demogrant” proposal received any close scrutiny, and it happened then mainly because of Hubert Humphrey’s prodding attacks in the last days before the California primary. The same was true of McGovern’s national-defense program.

Finally, there was the notorious failure to flush out Richard Nixon and the entire Nixon campaign. The huge sums of illegally raised money, the activities of CREEP, the full dimensions of the Watergate break-in and cover-up, the personal demeanor of the candidate for reelection himself — all remained largely hidden. “We thought that Nixon would eventually come out and campaign and we would have access to him for questions,” *The Washington Post*’s David Broder recalls.

This failure was particularly galling not only because Nixon-CREEP was *the* story but also because every political reporter had been thoroughly Theodore White-washed by 1972. Reporters worked hard to dig out the color, the quotes, the scene-setters just as White had done in his narratives. The McGovern campaign allowed the press inside, and reporters knew — and endlessly retold — what Frank Mankiewicz had done to Gary Hart (or vice versa). Unfortunately, Maurice Stans wasn’t offering the same access.

The determination to do a better job in 1976 — “The media want to get their manhood back,” says one observer

— is admirable in itself. Like analysis and interpretation, grit is a quality the critics value. In 1976, the press’s manhood is being stiffened by another post-Watergate attitude, the strong anti-politics mood of the country. Our own eyes and ears, as well as the polls, inform us of the steady decline in public trust of national leaders and governmental institutions. Ever sensitive to trends, the press has understood the message. But how are politicians to be covered in the age of anti-politics?

Not so long ago, the national politicians and the national press were linked in the friendliest of embraces. “The audience could see them together at news conferences and other public events,” says Gary Hart, McGovern’s campaign manager in 1972 and now a senator from Colorado. “In effect, they had their arms around each other’s shoulders. . . .” The correct stance toward authority these days is more than arm’s length; the press wants distance between itself and the candidates.

The plans of the national news organizations for coverage of the 1976 campaign reflect a lot of soul searching. Since one of the “lessons” of 1972 was that the press generally missed the significance of the early McGovern campaign, one approach is to take *all* the candidates seriously this time. *The New York Times*, with its customary thoroughness, began a comprehensive series on the presidential candidates in late December, proceeding from the announced contenders to the unannounced, such as Hubert Humphrey.

Since another lesson of 1972 was that the political reporting was distracted by the horse-race psychology of the press, a number of strategies have been devised to get at what are invariably called the “real issues.”

At CBS News, the “real issues” have been defined as those that public-opinion polling shows are on people’s minds. Beginning in mid-November, CBS News broadcast a series of interviews called “Campaign ’76: the Candidates and the Issues.” According to Walter Cronkite, who did the on-camera interviews with candidates, CBS “set out to find what will most concern the voting public” and then sought out the candidates to get their “hard answers to [these] hard issues. . . .” The CBS News poll, conducted by a telephone survey of 1,126 persons of voting age during the week of October 6, determined that “the most often-mentioned issues” were “inflation,” “unemployment,” “crime control,” and “the energy crisis.” Cronkite then asked each of the major declared candidates where he stood on the issues. One of CBS’s premises, according to Robert Chandler, who is in charge of the network’s campaign coverage, was that the public, rather than the candidates, ought to define the issues.

NBC News is also committed to extensive polling. On the first Sunday of the new year, NBC aired *What America Thinks*, a poll of attitudes on such subjects as President Ford’s performance, abortion, drugs, and sex education in schools. NBC News will return to the American voters’ concerns periodically and will also make use of the public-opinion analyst Richard Scammon.

In the 1972 campaign, ABC News designated Columbus, Ohio as an “ABC city” and broadcast regular reports on Ohioans’ attitudes on the ABC *Evening News*. This year

there will be five ABC cities to serve as pulse beats for the electorate.

*Newsday* and *The Boston Globe* probably will be using the services of the Tubby Harrison group to do polling during the election year. *The New York Times* expects to do some of its own in-house polling, use an outside firm, and cover the continuing story of the polls in the campaign. For individual television stations that can't afford a polling operation, a Washington syndication service is offering twice-weekly film reports by Louis Harris.

Also, since the "money" story was missed in 1972, a number of news organizations have assigned reporters to follow the fund-raising activities of the candidates ("to find out where the money came from and where it is going," as



**'The press is like the military —  
always ready to fight  
the next war with the weapons of the last.  
In 1976 everyone  
is geared up to do money'**



one afternoon newspaper editor explained). And since the "real" Richard Nixon was so hard to find in 1972 (and in 1968, and 1960), analyses of the characters and personalities of the candidates figure in the coverage plans of several organizations. Maynard Parker, *Newsweek's* national-affairs editor, speaks of "conveying a sense of the man and what he is really like and not just simply how he stands on abortion or détente." *Time* is following a different strategy, according to Robert Ajemian, the magazine's national political correspondent. *Time* did a "first-round introduction" of the candidates — "where Fred Harris has been, who he is, and what his record is" — but will hold off on the personalities and private lives of candidates until after the primaries "when the field begins to thin out."

Finally, several news organizations will be looking at the role of the press in the campaign. *The New York Times* and *Newsday* have assigned reporters full-time to the "media" story. They will not be alone as they watch the watchers who are watching the candidates. The Ford and Markle foundations and the Social Science Research Council have made the study of the media-candidate "interface" the number-one research project of the campaign, funding some of the best political scientists in the country in a cooperative venture. "Money," "polls," "organization," "personality," and "media" are what is known as *sidebar* stories — accompaniments to the day-to-day running story of what the candidates said and did. In 1976 the running story is suspect. After all, the press has a new sophistication about how candidates are always trying to manipulate cameras and coverage.

One problem with all this is that the "sidebars" may squeeze out the substance. In its renewed zeal to give the inside dope and the "feel" of the campaign, the press may

learn about the temperature and upholstery of the studio where the candidate appeared, the last-minute details of who wrote his speech, and the gaffes in his delivery — everything except what the candidate *said*.

Supposedly, the wire services will give us this daily bread and butter of the campaign. But they also have grown restive about merely covering what the candidates said and did. In November, H. L. Stevenson, editor-in-chief and vice-president of United Press International, reported that U.P.I.'s Washington bureau was discussing "how to change traditional coverage patterns. . . ." U.P.I.'s client newspapers, according to a survey by Clayton Kirkpatrick, the editor of the *Chicago Tribune*, want "new approaches and new techniques" in U.P.I.'s political reporting. As Kirkpatrick reported:

Wrapups and interpretive stories are in strong demand. . . . Texts of speeches and official papers are seen by most editors to be of little value. Investigative reporting is highly prized. . . . It is not enough to follow candidates around taking down their speeches and putting them on the wire. Interviews with the candidate's staff, gathering in-depth reactions from crowds, reports on opposing candidates' positions on issues, wrapping up a few days of speeches in a single story, are devices that client editors recommend.

Where does this new aggressiveness leave the candidates, and their plans? Every political campaign can be seen as a struggle for control between press and candidate, in the sense that each has its own needs (for example, the "favorable" news vs. the "real" news, the speeches vs. the "in-depth reactions"). If we are to believe the press's own press notices, political journalism should be more aggressive, more wary, and more independent of the candidates in 1976. Successful politicians, however, successfully adapt to changing conditions. If traditional politics are out and anti-politics are in, then it's a safe bet that some politicians will be anti-political. In the 1974 governor's race in California, the quintessential "media state," Edmund G. Brown, Jr. won with a campaign strategy of being as quiet as a yogi in lotus position.

And if investigative reporting is in, then by all means serve up scandal. In Boston, incumbent mayor Kevin White had served for eight years; last year, he faced what looked like a weak challenge from Joseph Timilty, a relative unknown. The major newspapers and the Boston-area television stations began the campaign unexceptionably, with carefully balanced coverage. But in the final weeks of the campaign, an investigative reporter at one of the Boston TV stations suddenly produced evidence of an alleged shakedown — in 1970! — of real-estate people by the city assessor, a White appointee. *New Times* magazine, based in New York, also ran the same "corruption" story (it turned out that the Timilty campaign had suggested both the writer and the story to the magazine).

The White counterattack proceeded on about the same level; his police commissioner was the apparent source of a story depicting Timilty as the candidate of organized-crime interests opposed to the reform-minded, incorruptible mayor. White won, in a surprisingly close race. To Frank Tivnan, the director of communications for the mayor, the

lesson of the press coverage of the campaign was that “a politician is guilty until proven innocent. . . . Woodward and Bernstein were fine investigative reporters and they did the country a great service,” he says. “But, journalistically, they have spawned a batch of poor, carbon-copy ‘investigative reporters’ in a business that is nakedly imitative. . . .” Tivnan, naturally, is not an unbiased observer. Patrick Caddell, the Cambridge public-opinion analyst and a Timilty campaign strategist, saw what he judges a brighter side to the coverage: “There are certain standards we are beginning to expect in politicians and the press is becoming the arbiter of these standards.” The important fact, however, is that in Boston even the newly “investigative” interests of journalism turned out to be vulnerable to “news management” politicians.

A related problem is that the new skepticism of the campaign reporters may not be tempered with any new political wisdom. One of White’s campaign officials solemnly assured me that some reporters, particularly the younger ones, disdained to read the candidate’s speeches and position papers because they were “press releases,” and therefore somehow tainted. As diligent and hardworking as the best political reporters are, they may just not know as much as the politicians inside the campaign. Mark Shields, a Democratic party strategist who has worked in both national and state campaigns, once remarked that the press is like the military — always ready to fight the next war with the weapons of the last. Everybody wants to cover the “real issues,” says Shields; but in 1972, a good part of the press thought the campaign was about social issues — the “three As” of acid, abortion, and amnesty — when, as Shields points out, the real story was about illegal money. This time around in 1976, everyone is geared up to do — money.

My own hunch is that the media may be a major story this year (indeed, I’m one of the foundation-funded watchers), but not in the terms most commonly discussed. For reporters to tell us that Fred Harris’s camper trip across the country was a “media event” is merely to touch the surface of the candidate-press relationship. Deeper down is more vital material that has to be uncovered — how the press is using its power. I happen to think the press today is not prepared for political power. As the political writer Richard Reeves has pointed out, the press is essentially an immature institution, something like “a lovable little child. . . . It has trouble concentrating on more than one thing at a time. . . . It is not an institution consciously and consistently dedicated to accumulating the exercise of control over other institutions or other people’s lives.”

One step toward maturity would be a heightened awareness of those powers the press does possess — and perhaps a new interest in relinquishing some of them. The press could begin by giving part of the campaign back to the candidates, even at the risk of some manipulation. Toward this end, it is worth considering why the “manipulation” began. “If you want to give a traditional speech” instead of a media event, says Gary Hart, “they’ll ask you if it’s worth turning the cameras on.” During his Colorado Senate race, when Hart planned to make policy statements about water pollution or the need for housing, he knew he would get

very little attention if he invited the reporters to chat with him in his office. So, like candidates everywhere, he walked along riverbanks and visited housing sites to make his points. When a candidate issues a twenty-page “position paper” on “American Schools and Basic Educational Values” (I’m making up the title), it is considered a “room emptier,” worth fifteen seconds on the evening news or four paragraphs in the back of the paper. For real media attention, he has learned that he must go to the front steps of South Boston High as classes are dismissed and say something “punchy.”

Another step toward maturity might be for the press to cut down on the polling and give some of the issues back to the candidates. Richard Salant at CBS News and Richard Wald at NBC News would quite properly be offended if they were told to put on the evening news only those stories the audience wants to hear about. It is a strange anti-elitism that substitutes counting noses for examining ideas. It is also not enough for journalism. None of the polls about the “issues” conducted last fall was able to uncover what proved to be the first real issue of the 1976 primaries — Ronald Reagan’s \$90-billion revenue magic. An issue, according to one political definition, is something the other candidate does not want to talk about. While they can be useful indeed, polls are no substitute for such political and intellectual analysis of issues.

**F**inally, there is much to be said for extended exposure in the media of politicians themselves. For the past six months some of us in the News Study Group at M.I.T. have been looking at the appearances of the presidential candidates in such diverse television formats as news conferences, talk shows, and panels such as *Meet the Press*, *Face the Nation*, and *Issues and Answers* (as well as appearances on the network evening news shows). We found a certain pattern developing: newspaper and magazine articles and television news coverage quickly tends to pin a label on the candidates (“The Populist,” “The Gunslinger,” “The Can’t-Win Candidate,” and, in the extreme, “President Klutz”). But the *Meet the Press*-style appearances enable candidates to deal with these confining labels, and sometimes to break free of them. It is not that the questioning is soft — it usually is quite tough. Rather, it is the opportunity to address the audience directly and in an obviously unscripted format. Other television formats that would permit candidates to do more of this — debates, news conferences, or longer panel shows — ought to be encouraged. More newspaper access can be arranged as well, although readers, unlike the television audience, are more likely to be given a homogenized, staff-prepared article, rather than a direct sense of the candidate.

Such access does indeed mean that the press is allowing itself to be “used” to some extent. But more air time and more print space for the candidates, and for lively scrutiny of the issues, is the kind of use the voters need in political campaigns. The challenge for the press is to get Ronald Reagan and the other candidates out of the snowbanks and housing sites and into television studios, where they can make their points and answer questions. ■

# NATIONAL NOTES

## The florists' crusade

The general public probably doesn't realize it, but one of the most effective anti-dirty-language campaigns of all is being waged by, of all people, the florists of America. The dirty words the florists fight so strenuously consist of such phrases as "in lieu of flowers," "please omit flowers," or, to mention the most unmentionable phrase, "don't send flowers."

Such terms, which occasionally appear in the paid obituary notices, come from people who say they want simple funerals. That may be what the bereaved *think* they want, but the florists say such people are succumbing to a "philosophy dedicated to the elimination of sentiment and ceremony in the funeral service," to quote a brochure published by one of

their trade associations.

The florists' efforts to ban "please omit" phrases from newspapers are usually characterized by moral fervor. First of all, say the florists, someone who asks for "please omit" is anti-business because he's telling people *not* to buy something, and in fact he is asking them to boycott a specific product — flowers. Worse yet, the florists say, he's insulting friends and other mourners — a "please omit" is usually accompanied by a request that contributions be made to a specific charity, which is clear evidence that the survivors are dictating *how* friends should express their sympathy.

One explanation for such fervor: as much as two-thirds of the florists' revenues comes from funeral flowers.


Of three recent "please omit" con-

troversies, the florists clearly won two. And the third may indicate that a way has been discovered to please both the florists and those who want flowerless funerals.

At a recent Rotary Club meeting in Tullahoma, Tennessee, Howard Anderson of the Society of American Florists gave an impassioned speech about "Do Not Buy" campaigns, ominously warning the Rotarians that the anti-business propaganda directed against florists in obituary notices could conceivably be directed against their businesses too. So successful was the speech that one member of the audience declared he agreed one hundred percent and he was going to do something about it. That was Morris Simon, the publisher of the twice-weekly *Tullahoma News*. Right after the speech, Simon banned "please omit" in the *News* and in three other papers he runs in Winchester, Manchester, and Elk Valley.

The florists' second victory, in Pittsburgh, was an especially sweet one, since it was a clear and very public rebuff of a consumer group, the Alliance for Consumer Protection, which had been complaining about the long-standing "please omit" bans of the *Press* and *Post-Gazette*. They were unable to get John Troan, the editor of the *Press*, even to meet with them to discuss the ban. Nor would Troan offer comments to the *Review* — but a spokesman said, apparently with a straight face, "The 'please omit flowers' term urges a boycott, just like 'don't buy grapes,' and we don't permit that. This group is trying to inflate a phantom issue into a grave problem."

*The Washington Post*, though, may have found a diplomatic way around the issue. An official there told the *Review* that the paper has quietly rescinded a 1973 ban on "please omit" phrases. But the paper has never formally called



Caulfield & Shook

the change to the attention of funeral directors, who place most obit notices. Although a recent look at the *Post's* obituary pages showed no "please omits," a *Post* spokeswoman says that such terms do appear, if infrequently.

In a time of increasing vulgarization of the language, it appears the florists are at least holding the line against the dirty language of the flowerless funeral crowd.

*Francis Pollock*

## Sharp conflict, blurred issue

SAN FRANCISCO

The increasing influence of corporate money on public-television programming has produced some spirited skirmishing at several stations around the country. But in a recent battle over board seats at the local public broadcasting station, preliminary infighting had stirred up so much dust that the important issues at stake were almost completely obscured.

The election, which pitted KQED board nominees against a write-in slate sponsored by the independent Committee to Save KQED, took place in December. The infighting started last summer when SAVE was formed by a group of disgruntled station subscribers.

Through biweekly meetings and frequent mailings, the group of teachers, community workers, consumer activists, and media reformers sought to raise the question of who owns public television and whether or not the station in fact served the community. Calling for open meetings of the board of directors, full and complete disclosure of the station's finances, and an end of "corporate control . . . which increasingly overrules public priorities," the fifty-member SAVE committee put up its own candidates to run against the existing board. SAVE's goals included expanding the nightly "Newsroom" into a newspaper collective (with on-air staff acting as editors and reporters), discouraging corporate underwriting of programs, and allowing recall actions against any director of the station.

The main problem confronting SAVE

was how to place its concerns before all of the station's subscribers. In early November, the group went to court, seeking access to KQED's 102,200-member mailing list. The station, however, countersued, saying that the committee had stolen a smaller list (about 10,000 names) during the summer. From that point on, the debate about the future of public television in general, and KQED in particular, degenerated into an acrimonious exchange about the personalities of the board candidates. SAVE talked darkly about the "corporate mentality" of the station's candidates; KQED, for its part, ran ads urging its members to send in their ballots, but did not mention the candidates or the issues. When 33,290 ballots were returned by the December 19 deadline, they comprised the largest mail vote return in the station's twenty-two-year history. The result: candidates nominated by the station's board of directors won by solid margins.

"The election hasn't been a defeat because we weren't allowed to campaign," said Henry Kroll, who is a member of SAVE's executive committee and also the librarian for KQED's news department. "This election is just a signpost along the way in our campaign to make the public aware of their participation in public television. We're going to have to work that much harder to prevent the theft of our station by a corporate elite. Our goal will be to stimulate greater public involvement in public broadcasting."

Station president William Osterhaus thinks that such stimulation has already happened. "It's the greatest outpouring of participation by members of a public broadcasting station in the country," he says of the election. "People were determined to support the station as it was managed and run."

Still, the issues did get pushed aside in the election; neither SAVE nor current management seems to have answers to the serious questions that were raised.

*Mary Alice Kellogg*

*Mary Alice Kellogg is a writer for Newsweek. Francis Pollock is a free-lancer specializing in consumer affairs.*

# Down to

## The symbolic language of TV commercials

by JEFF GREENFIELD

**W**hy is Karl Malden wearing that hat? For months now, American Express has been running a series of commercials in which the dreams of vacationers are shattered through the loss or theft of their cash (one of them features a husband reassuring his wife that they can afford an expensive meal even as a thief is stealing his wallet from their car). In the last half of these ads, actor Karl Malden sternly warns us, "Don't carry cash!" and preaches the virtue of travelers' checks.

And in every one of these ads, Malden is wearing a hat. It makes no difference where he is: inside an imposing, high-ceilinged, old-fashioned bank, or standing by a desk in a contemporary office. That hat is planted firmly on Malden's head.

Why? A brief Socratic dialogue will answer that question. Who wears hats in this bare-everything day and age? Detectives and F.B.I. men, that's who. And what character has Karl Malden been playing on the ABC television network these last few years? Tough, crusty, but lovable Mike Stone, police lieutenant on *The Streets of San Francisco*, that's who. And what sort of figure would inspire confidence in the minds of prospective travelers, worried about the possible loss of their vacation money? A tough, crusty, but lovable police lieutenant, that's who.

Now you, as a viewer, are not supposed to notice this detail; you are not supposed to turn to your beloved and say, "Hey, Martha — what's that idiot doing with a hat on in the middle of a stuffy bank?" No, no, no. Instead, you are supposed to absorb the general impression of the commercial: the sense that an authoritative figure with close ties to a law-enforcement agency is putting his word (and perhaps a few patrol cars) behind the promise of security

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# the last detail

through travelers' checks. Every detail of this thirty-second drama is designed to surround you with an aura of confidence in the rock-like strength of these travelers' checks. And Karl Malden's hat is one more detail. It is, in fact, a fine example of the *kind* of detailed planning that goes into the shap-



ing of big-budget advertising: planning that has significant social consequences.

There are three things worth remembering about advertising: they are a) money, b) money, and c) money. According to *Advertising Age*, \$26.7 billion was spent on advertising in 1974. Television alone accounted for \$4.85 billion of that money. To bring it down to numbers that are (slightly) less staggering, if you want to sell something to the American people and want to reach tens of millions of them — once — it will cost you nearly \$60,000 for thirty seconds of network TV time in the middle of a top-rated show such as *All in the Family*. If you want to reach the attention of one big city — New York, say — to introduce a new product or politician, then you had better be prepared to spend \$50,000 or more a week to make a dent in the market.

And those numbers represent only the cost of *time*. They do not include the massive cost of writing, designing, and shooting a commercial. When you count the cost of lights, sets, costumes, talent fees (up to \$250,000 in the case of a Laurence Olivier for Polaroid's SX-70 camera), market research, and the amortized cost of \$50,000-a-year copywriters and art directors, the production cost of a single thirty-second commercial can exceed \$200,000.

So what? Look at it this way. A two-

hour movie that costs \$6 million to shoot averages out to \$50,000 a minute, or \$833 a second. A television commercial, by contrast, can cost more than \$6,000 a second, without even counting the far more expensive cost of time. Similarly, a network will pay a little less than \$300,000 for a single one-hour episode of a television series — call it \$5,000 a minute, or about \$85 a second. Perhaps you begin to see the point: measured by money (which is the only sensible standard in such enterprises), the television commercial is by far the most valuable, and valued, production. And that is why so much attention can, and must, be paid to every single detail.

One former advertising agency employee, who worked on a major beer account, recalls the degree of preparation and detail involved in the shooting of one thirty-second commercial.

"The 'pour' shot is the key to a beer ad," he says. "How the beer looks going down the glass; whether the glass is completely clean and suggests ice-cold beer; how the bubbles look; whether the head on the beer is big enough, but not too big. Our standard order for a 'pour' shot was ten cases of beer — 240 cans. And it wasn't overdoing it. I remember one pour shot which took 124 takes before the beer looked exactly right."

And it is not just the beer (or chicken, or car, or detergent, or soap) that must look exactly right. *Everything* must look exactly right. Are you selling to an "upscale" audience (more affluent and educated)? Then make sure the furnishings, the home, the clothes, the haircuts, the accessories, the dishes, the books on the shelves, all look appealing to that audience. Are you trying to reach the blue-collar, lower-middle-class audience? Make sure the announcer has a tough, no-nonsense voice, and put a few people in the ad who look like they work with their hands. Are you selling Ajax dishwashing liquid with a "professional dishwasher" who can make the lowliest hausfrau feel superior? Don't take chances; black out one of the dishwasher's front teeth to strip him of any pretense of sophistication.

In its use of money and talent, the

world of advertising resembles the process for making diamonds (I am here referring to process, *not* to the intrinsic value of the product). So much effort, so much money, so many minds, are focused on the development of thirty seconds of film or tape, that, like a piece of coal subjected to intense pressure over long periods of time, the commercial becomes crystallized into a miniature drama reflecting not just an attempt to sell a product, but an effort to harness attitudes, biases, tastes, life styles. It seems absurd to ascribe so much to so short a device as a commercial. But when thousands of dollars go into the planning of every second of what we see and hear, that effort becomes a lot less ludicrous, and a lot more feasible.

**F**or the most remarkable fact about advertising is that it *works*. Call it offensive, puerile, insulting to the intelligence, barbarous, intrusive, anti-humanistic, but the damn thing moves the goods. I have no doubt that the Charmin bathroom tissue commercials (they can't bear to call it toilet paper) will be a contributing factor to the fall of American civilization, should that happen. But those commercials carved out a substantial share of the market for a product that had nothing unusual to offer except a public impression formed from advertising. So compact are commercials, so frequently seen, that they can create not just new products but new personalities and folk figures within a few weeks: think of nature-loving Euell Gibbons and Post Grape Nuts; Alice Playton as the heartburn-inducing new bride in the Alka-Seltzer commercials. Think of the portly Southern sheriff in the Dodge Rebellion ads, Josephine the Plumber for Comet. These characters and situations, even more than the characters and TV shows of the networks, are the products of massive amounts of research, market testing, and above all, cold cash. And because advertisers can spend so much — so much talent, so much money, so much time — on every detail of every second, they can create a market by literally buying their way into our minds. ■

# S.1

Would the new bill amount to an official secrets law — and could it work?

by BENNO C. SCHMIDT, JR.  
and HAROLD EDGAR

Throughout its history the United States has operated with a bare minimum of secrecy laws that unmistakably govern press coverage of foreign policy and military matters. This absence of explicit legal prohibitions was tolerable to the government because the press so rarely tested the limits of its right to publish; secrets were kept because people in and out of government with access to military and diplomatic secrets shared basic assumptions about national aims. The Vietnam war changed all that. The radical perspective of I. F. Stone (“Every government is run by liars and nothing they say should be believed”) became an accepted premise in reporting about the war. The Pentagon Papers dispute symbolized the passing of an era in which journalists could be counted on to work within understood limits of discretion in handling secret information.

Several stories have appeared in recent months whose publication a few years ago would have shocked not only government leaders but publishers and journalists as well. Disclosures of the covert activities of the C.I.A. have not been limited to past practices in Cuba, Chile, South Vietnam. Current secret activities in Italy and Angola, among other places, have been revealed despite the protests of the president, the secretary of state, and the C.I.A. director that such disclosures severely hamper the conduct of foreign policy. A small publication put out by disaffected former C.I.A. and other government employees has disclosed the names of undercover C.I.A. agents working abroad. The assassination in Greece of one agent so named has aroused official indignation. Meanwhile, *The New York Times* runs a story about how to tell which members of American embassies abroad are really C.I.A. agents. Another recent story reveals that U.S. intelligence teams ventured into Soviet waters to tap communications cables. Jack Anderson implements the public’s right to know not only about the C.I.A.’s efforts to raise a sunken Soviet submarine, but also about our eavesdropping on the telephones of Soviet leaders’ limousines.

This frenzy of revelation has the bless-

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ing of some of the press’s most respected spokesmen. Ben Bagdikian, on the op-ed page of *The New York Times*, ridicules the notion that the press should be “responsible,” if that term means that the press should withhold publication of military, intelligence, or foreign-policy secrets. Arthur Sulzberger, the *Times*’s publisher, tells a conference of federal judges that it is not the press’s job to help the government keep its secrets. Such spokesmen are comfortable with the notion that the press can and should evaluate for itself the rare instances when the national interest requires withholding of information. On the other side, our chief disarmament negotiator protests that the arms limitations proposals the United States can accept from the Soviets are substantially reduced by the likelihood that secret means of checking up on Soviet compliance with their promises will be revealed in the press, thus allowing the Soviets, perhaps, to block supervision.

In this atmosphere compounded of official anxiety about the need to keep secrets and the press’s strident commitment to divulge just about everything, a major battle is shaping up in the Senate over press disclosures of national-security secrets. The occasion is the proposed revision of the entire federal criminal code that has been reported by the Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Procedures to the full Senate Judiciary Committee. Known as S.1, this huge bill — more than 700 pages long, it is said to be the lengthiest ever introduced in Congress — contains many features that are highly controversial. Most controversial of all are the provisions dealing with the protection of classified information and defense secrets. To its critics, the press foremost among them, S.1’s national-security provisions would clamp an Official Secrets Act on reportage about foreign affairs and defense issues. Discussion of national-security problems, it is said, would depend on the sufferance of the Executive. Thus, the people would be barred from information critical to the exercise of democratic responsibilities concerning any aspect of military policy or foreign relations that the Executive wished to keep to itself. Critics charge that the proposals represent a


radical break with our legal tradition.

Senator John McClellan, who chaired the subcommittee that approved S.1, denies that the bill's provisions dealing with defense secrets would have such dire consequences. Indeed, he has charged prominent journalists and newspapers with misleading the public about S.1's scope. "Distortion," "calculated to deceive," "patently false," and "viciously absurd" are a few of McClellan's opinions about commentaries that have appeared in *The New York Times*, *The Wall Street Journal*, the *Chicago Tribune*, and the Newhouse News Service, among others. To McClellan and other S.1 supporters, including both the Nixon and Ford administrations, the national-security provisions are merely an updating of existing law, no more harsh than the laws controlling publication of defense secrets that have been on the books since 1917.

Their views on current law thus lead both sides to radically different conclusions about S.1. This is hardly surprising since, depending upon which legal materials you emphasize, it can be argued either that the United States has virtually no laws restricting publications of defense secrets, or that it has stringent laws prohibiting, if not publication, at least conduct necessary prior to publication.

#### Current law

The laws causing most of the confusion are broadly framed provisions of the Espionage Act of 1917, enacted when the United States entered World War I. One prohibits communication of national-defense documents and information to persons not entitled to receive them, as well as retention of such documents. Another makes it criminal to communicate to foreigners "information related to the national defense" if done with "intent or reason to believe that the information is to be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of a foreign nation." This prohibition has served as the legal basis for prosecuting nearly all post-World War I cases of espionage. Yet its scope is not explicitly limited to spying. Our leading newspapers are read by foreigners, and publishers surely have "reason to believe" that whatever national-defense information they print will be used by foreigners



to gain whatever advantage they can.

Since the courts have used the espionage provisions only in prosecutions directed at spies and their sources, they have tended to put broad constructions upon those provisions. Thus, for example, national-defense information has been held to encompass virtually anything secret relating to the military or to military preparedness. Because these rulings are as broad as they are, the press often publishes unauthorized revelations concerning United States military affairs that would result in espionage convictions had the material been transmitted by a spy. If, for example, a serviceman had sold to the Soviets the information that the United States was trying to raise a sunken Soviet submarine, he could — and probably would — have been convicted.

**T**hus, if the press is immune from these statutes, it is not because of the *kind* of information the law seeks to protect. Rather it is because the statute barring the communication of information to foreigners does not appear to cover such communication that results from general publication. Yet, even if publishing is not denoted by the statutory term "communicate" — a difficult reading, we think — the fact is that all publication involves prior retentions of information and prior "unpublished" communications to unauthorized persons. The prohibitions, phrased in terms of

communication of defense information to persons not entitled to receive it, and retaining such information without proper authority, seem to cast a net broad enough to take in both such retentions and communications. There are technical constructions of these prohibitions that would exclude journalists from the law's coverage, but no court has ever ruled on them.

These statutes have, of course, never been the basis for prosecutions of the press; indeed, the aborted prosecution of Ellsberg and Russo was their first use against government employees who were not conduits to foreign intelligence services. The absence of prosecutions, however, is more a reflection of the traditional discretion with which American journalists have handled defense secrets, and the political costs of attempting to prosecute them, than it is evidence of any clear-cut immunity for the press from the existing espionage provisions.

Most analysts have assumed that the espionage provisions in current law have nothing to do with the press. The conclusion rests upon the espionage statutes' legislative history. Congress in 1917 rejected an attempt by the Wilson administration to make it a crime to publish national-defense information in violation of regulations to be issued by the president. It would be bizarre to suppose that Congress, having refused to make unauthorized publication of such information a crime, intended to make criminal steps necessary prior to publication.

*continued*

This understanding is supported by legislative history after 1917, as well. While the executive branch has repeatedly sought additional authority to protect defense information against press disclosures, Congress has consistently rejected broad prohibitions. It has, instead, passed laws limited to particularly sensitive categories of defense information or particular classes of persons upon whom special restrictions might properly rest. One such statute prohibits federal employees from publishing or disclosing diplomatic transmissions obtained as a result of their employment by the government. Another prohibits the communication or publication of classified information about codes, cryptographic systems, or communications intelligence activities. A third prohibits government employees from communicating classified information to agents of foreign governments or Communist organizations. (Atomic energy secrets have been protected under a separate law.) When broad prohibitions have been rejected and narrow prohibitions on publication have been enacted, the claim that the 1917 laws all along applied to general publication and discussion of defense secrets appears shaky. Yet the fact remains that there is a wide discrepancy between congressional intent and the apparent broad scope of the general espionage statutes.

### S.1's proposals

What would S.1 do to this confused picture? In three sections covering espionage, disclosing defense information, and mishandling defense information, it seemingly restates present law. The bill, however, explicitly resolves the ambiguities in existing law in favor of the government and against the press. All three sections are built upon a broad definition of national-defense information — a term defined to include, among other things, information that relates to the military capability of the United States or an “associate nation,” to military planning of the United States, and to intelligence operations, activities, plans, estimates, analyses, sources, or methods of the United States.

This definition of national-defense information is somewhat broader than present law. The addition of “intelligence operations” as a category of defense infor-

mation, without explicit limitation to military matters, raises the question, for example, whether covert C.I.A. support to Italian politicians would be deemed national-defense information under S.1. The definition of communications and cryptographic information to include information obtained from documents that were sent in code also widens coverage.

It is not so much in these potentially controversial additions to the law that S.1 breaks with the past. The crucial difference lies in the fact that the bill not only uses the broad national-defense formulation where appropriate, as in espionage, but creates general offenses applicable to the press or a citizen as well. The broadest of them, mishandling national-defense information, makes it a felony for any person in possession or control of national-defense information from doing anything that causes its communication to another person who is not authorized by rule or regulation to receive it. Communication is defined by S.1 to mean imparting information by any means, including making it public. Thus press publication and citizen commentary are clearly covered.

More serious penalties await publications that communicate defense information to unauthorized persons by publishing it, knowing that the information “could be used to the prejudice of the safety or the interest of the United States, or to the advantage of a foreign power.” This “advantage” clause is a potent threat, for even if a journalist believes that the United States will ultimately benefit from revelation of a military secret, he must often know that a foreign nation can derive an “advantage” from the disclosure. Finally, the press might be subject to prosecutions for espionage proper which, depending on the circumstances, can call for the death penalty. The bill defines espionage as communicating defense information to a foreign power, obtaining it or collecting it knowing that it may be communicated, or entering into a restricted area to get it. As with those found guilty of “disclosing” information, the espionage offender, too, must know that the information could be used to prejudice the safety or interests of the United States or be to the advantage of foreign powers. The question of press liability turns on whether knowledge

that a newspaper reaches foreign eyes suffices as a communication to a foreign power.

Thus, under S.1, anyone who communicates national-defense information to another who has not been authorized to hear about it is guilty.

There is one important limitation, however. Information regarding the military capability of the United States is not protected if it has been previously made available to the public by the authority of Congress or by the lawful act of a public servant. The declared intent of this feature of the bill is merely to codify and preserve a defense the courts created to protect even spies who collected defense materials from public sources; but this provision makes the national-defense portion of S.1 look like an Official Secrets Act. Because it is impossible to write about national-defense matters without including material that ostensibly relates to the “military capability of the United States,” the only way for a journalist to be safe under S.1 would be to stick to matters made public by the authority of Congress or lawful acts of public servants. Otherwise some legal risks are run.

**A** final provision of S.1 that deserves attention is the one which makes disclosing properly classified information a crime. Current law does not protect classified information as such except in limited instances — codes and transfers by government employees to Communists or foreign agents. S.1 expands that protection, but far less than earlier versions of the bill; they made criminal all disclosures by current or former government employees even if the information had been improperly classified. While that Draconian proposal would not have been directly applicable to the press, it might have had a major impact on press sources. In a significant concession to critics of the bill, improper classification has been made a “bar to prosecution.”


Would S.1 amount to an Official Secrets Law? Not literally. With the abandonment of the provision making unauthorized disclosure of classified information a crime regardless of whether it was improperly classified, the administration would no longer be able to control in-

formation simply by putting a stamp on it. Nor, broad as it is, is the national-defense definition able to embrace such things as the details of a highway construction program, on the theory that highways are important in defense emergencies. Thus, press claims that the scope of S.1 is virtually unlimited are clearly exaggerated. Enactment of the bill, however, would clearly make it easier for future administrations to suppress reporting of the details of defense and intelligence affairs.

### The Hart-Bayh amendments

In the full Senate Judiciary Committee, a half dozen or more liberal senators — Hart, Kennedy, Bayh, Tunney, Burdick, among them — plan concerted opposition to S.1's provisions on defense secrets. Two sets of amendments have already been proposed, one by Hart (joined thus far by Muskie, Cranston, and Kennedy); the other by Bayh. The Hart proposal would eliminate the possibility that the press might be covered by the espionage or the disclosing provisions. Those crimes are made to cover "transfers" rather than "communications," and "transfer" would be defined to exclude publication and acts of information gathering and communication preparatory to publication. However, under the Hart amendments, the press could be punished for publishing "special classified information" or "vital defense secrets." The former covers classified information concerning communications intelligence, codes, and code-breaking, "information describing current intelligence sources," or descriptions of nuclear weapons or related research. The provisions would not apply to any information in these categories not properly classified, nor to information disclosed to congressional committees, nor to revelations pointing to "a probable violation of law." Vital defense secrets are defined as national defense information the communication of which causes direct, immediate, and irreparable injury to the defense of the United States.

The Bayh amendments would go even further in relieving the press from controls by limiting the espionage and disclosure offenses to conduct whose purpose is to injure the United States. Bayh's provision covering classified in-



formation would apply only to government employees who transferred information directly to a foreign power.

S.1, we believe, goes much too far in protecting national-defense information from press disclosure. Indeed, in purporting to protect just about everything, S.1, if enacted, would probably not protect much of anything. The press would not obey such broad strictures; the act would not be consistently and generally enforced. Any limited enforcement of such broad prohibitions would be seen as highly selective, playing politics with the criminal law. The notion of legitimate secrecy would be discredited.

The Bayh amendments go to the other extreme. Not only would the press be free to reveal defense secrets, but government employees would not be restricted from leaking secrets to reporters. This approach, in our opinion, would also have unfortunate results. The consequence of refusing to legitimate any secrecy is that those in political authority will provide full and accurate information only to the few whose political loyalty is beyond question.

Thus, we think both S.1 and the Bayh amendments have serious drawbacks. The Hart amendments seem to us a defensible middle ground, giving weight both to the needs of secrecy and to the claims of freedom of expression. That is particularly so in that the amendments treat differently the very different problems of spying and press disclosures.


The Hart amendments also protect Congress's power to obtain information necessary to exercise its important oversight of executive operations.

If neither the advocates of S.1's strict controls nor the forces that wish to see few or no controls on the press can win a clear majority, the likely compromise would be simply to reenact the existing espionage statutes. Each side could maintain its polar views on the extent to which current laws limit the press's right to publish defense secrets, leaving to the courts the task of making sense of these confused statutes if a newspaper or a broadcast station, a journalist, or a government employee is prosecuted for revealing defense secrets.

The question posed by the controversy over S.1 is whether the nation can still afford to live without clear-cut laws governing defense secrets. On the whole, the indeterminacy of existing law has been a good thing. The confusion has certainly made the government think twice before testing whether the espionage statutes prohibit publication of defense secrets. And perhaps the press, too, has seen in the law's ambiguities grounds for an appropriate caution before rushing into print with the latest security breach. But only a strong and cohesive society can afford such a delicate posture for its laws governing defense secrets. In the wake of the Vietnam war, questions of the press's freedom and obligation may not be allowed to continue unresolved. ■

# Doctor Arnold Arms believes the air bag saved his life.

Arnold Arms, M.D.  
Kansas City, Missouri



Dr. Arms' 1975 Oldsmobile after head-on collision with a bus. He described his injuries as "minor." Dr. Arms was not wearing a seat belt, but his car was equipped with air bags. (See arrow.)

## How the air bag works:

Doctor Arms didn't intentionally buy his car with air bags. He took them because the car—a 1975 Olds—had all the other features he wanted.

But at 6 p.m. on October 7, 1975, he was glad the car came with air bags. On his way to a house call, after a long day in his office, he lost control of his car and smashed head-on into a bus.

In the doctor's words: "I never saw the air bag inflate or deflate, it was so fast. I had a feeling of numbness. However, I was perfectly conscious and found myself alive after the impact. A policeman was at the scene of the accident within approximately two or three minutes. His comment was that he did not see how I was alive.

"I did have a ligamental strain on the knee and I had a hematoma (bruise) on the inner side of my leg below the knee joint. I felt comfortable other-



In a serious crash the air bag automatically inflates in a split second, protects, and then deflates.

wise . . . and was able to look at a passenger who was in the bus and make sure that she was safe.

"The next day, I went to the dealers (to buy another car). . . . They did not have a single car available in Kansas City

with air bags. . . . I ordered one with bags, so that I'd have one when they were available. I feel very insecure driving without the bags.

**"I honestly think that air bags should be . . . mandatory in all cars. . . ."**

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# The new regime at The New Republic

Or, much ado about Martin Peretz

by ROBERT SHERRILL

**M**artin Peretz, a very wealthy young man who has used his money sometimes wisely and always enthusiastically but not always with satisfying results in politics, contributed to the last campaign of Senator Ralph Yarborough. Yarborough had courageously tried to be an authentic liberal all his life, but because the effort had had to be made within the twisted and often oppressive confines of Texas politics, he had himself become somewhat twisted and paranoid. He hated intensely and he admired intensely; and after receiving his money from Peretz and talking with him for a while, over beers, Yarborough slammed an arm around his new patron's shoulder and expressed his admiration: "Marty, I like you. I like you lots. Your motivations in politics are the same as mine — spite and revenge."

Peretz enjoys telling that story, and one gathers that by telling it he acknowledges the accuracy of the old politician's judgment. Peretz is also intense in all that he does, and this intensity has, not surprisingly, got him off to a controversial start — sprinkled with a bit of intra-office spite and revenge, perhaps — in his new career as owner of *The New Republic*, the sixty-year-old "Journal of Politics and the Arts" published in Washington, D.C. He lives in Cambridge, Massachusetts, where he teaches an occasional course in nineteenth-century social thought at Harvard, and flies to Washington for a short week as publisher. "I'm an interesting teacher, not a scholar," he has said of himself, and others have made a somewhat similar appraisal of his abilities as a patron/adviser in politics. His is a name familiar in several of the recent stormy political campaigns, particularly Eugene McCarthy's of 1968 and George McGovern's of 1972. Judging from what one hears here and there, he did not pass through these camps unnoticed.

Peretz has the appearance of one who could slip almost unobtrusively into the vortex of a controversy and then explode. He is a small person, neat and restless and quick. His face is the prototype of Dickensian Jewishness: a bit swarthy, hooked nose, and lots of beard of the sort that cartoonists around the turn of the century liked to put on anarchists. He is, at least at first meeting (which is the only meeting I had), friendly and open but without making any great effort to "prove" that he is friendly and open. If I sensed a touch of craftiness, it may have been just the in-

fluence of the beard. It was fun to just sit and look at him, fluttering around in his office rocking chair like a captive bird, and it was fun to listen to him gossip, which he does easily and entertainingly. *The New Republic* these days is a nice place to visit, but I should imagine that working there would be as exhausting as working for the Borgias.

**G**ilbert Harrison owned *The New Republic* for twenty years. Like Peretz, Harrison is a Jew but unlike Peretz he made no big point of being one. Like Peretz, Harrison is wealthy because his wife is wealthy. And, like Peretz, Harrison is not the easiest man to serve. Men such as Murray Kempton and Alex Campbell left his employ muttering imprecations on his head. Some who remained muttered, too. He was often cranky and arrogant, just as he was often charming and thoughtful.

But even those who despised Harrison acknowledged that he was a good "pencil" editor. Some said he was among the best in the business. And some who worked for him were grateful for the freedom he gave them. It was, however, a freedom that the writer had proved himself "worthy" of by seldom venturing beyond the perimeters of Harrison's own biases and imagination. For better or worse, Harrison *was* the magazine. If in recent years the product sometimes seemed gray and listless, it was perhaps because Harrison had entered a gray and listless period of life and was no longer so interested in *The New Republic*.

He had loved those times when he was part of the establishment, chiefly the Kennedy era. When the capital city found out that Kennedy not only subscribed to but actually read *The New Republic*, all the smarts of Washington rushed out to subscribe. If Kennedy wasn't really very liberal, no matter; neither was *The New Republic*. It wasn't ideological; it did try to be the conscience of the establishment, but never so demanding a conscience as to rankle those in power. Thus Harrison would sometimes set aside articles that might have embarrassed Kennedy. Sometimes he did it voluntarily, sometimes at Kennedy's request — the most notable example being his suppression of an article about the impending Bay of Pigs invasion. But then came L.B.J., and the phone calls from the White House dropped off drastically. Then came the Republicans, who ended all communications from on high. And that's when Harrison became listless.

In the spring of 1974 he sold the magazine to Peretz:

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Robert Sherrill is Washington correspondent for The Nation.

\$380,000 for the mailing list and about a quarter million for the real estate. In selling to Peretz, Harrison was to some extent fudging on an informal agreement he had had with one of his editors, Walter Pincus. At least that's what Pincus says — and others at *The New Republic*, including Peretz, bear him out. Pincus had gone to the magazine in the fall of 1972 believing that when Harrison finally pulled out, which he was then planning to do after the '76 election, he could buy the magazine. But in the summer of 1973 Harrison had some informal discussions with Peretz about selling the magazine, and Harrison told Pincus that he might sell sooner than he had previously planned. Harrison reaffirmed that Pincus could have first shot at it but said he would like to hear Pincus's proposals. However, Pincus didn't get the feeling from Harrison that there was anything pressing about the matter, so he let it rock along. Which was a mistake, because the next thing he knew Peretz had made an offer that Pincus had no real chance, or time, to counter. Pincus expresses no resentment toward Harrison for dealing the cards so swiftly. Pincus's resentment, as will be detailed later, was aimed at the new man.

The drawn-out transfer of power (Harrison intended to hang around as editor through 1976) was a disaster all around, both in the Harrison-Peretz relationship and the Peretz-staff relationship. To be sure, by one hard-nosed standard it wasn't a disaster for Peretz, for he would end up sweeping all his enemies out the door. It could hardly have resulted any other way, since he had the money. But he also had some savvy. He came in oohing and aahing and calling himself a modest "apprentice" (in the early days he used the word all the time) — but he also came in with an iron-clad contract that made it very easy for him to switch over instantaneously to the master's role when he became angry.

Peretz's objectivity can be trusted on this point:

"Harrison had a three-year contract but my lawyers had hedged it in two ways. It was hedged in a way that was psychologically untenable to him. It said, in effect, that he really had to share the editorial decision-making with me. Impossible. It said he had ultimate authority, but that he had to serve my best interests. That's like the elastic clause in the Constitution. So when it was clear that we were not working together, I simply said I wanted him to go, and he resigned."

With anyone, it would have been exceedingly difficult to string out a division of authority for three years; with Harrison it was impossible. Harrison simply went on running the magazine as he always had. He told Peretz very little. He almost never asked his opinion. And when Peretz protested against being shut out, Harrison smothered the protest with gentility.

"All through this time of some tension," Peretz recalls, "we would have those very pleasant lunches. Gil always took me to — what's the name of that place on Twentieth Street? La Provençal. I'd always have to carry a tie in case he asked me to lunch. It was a sign of his rigidity — you couldn't get him to go eat anywhere else. It was always La Provençal. I once dragged him across the street to The Palm and it was a little too rough-and-tumble for him. He'd talk about Gertrude Stein. I'd talk about my children or my

horse. We'd talk about Gene McCarthy a lot. He would reminisce about Walter Lippmann. We *never* talked about the magazine. Never. I tried. I would say, 'You know that piece last week wasn't really very sharp.' He'd say, 'Well, you often have to run pieces that aren't sharp.' There was no way of connecting. It was punching a pillow.


"I never said to myself, 'Goddamn! Three hundred and eighty thousand, and this is all I get!' But I did say to myself, 'Goddamn, I own the magazine and I bought it because I wanted to have some impact and I'm not.' Yeah, I finally started saying that to him. He'd answer, 'Well, Marty, you come to all the editorial conferences.' The editorial conferences! We'd sit around and he'd ask people what they were writing and that'd be the conference. We wouldn't have a substantial discussion of anything."

The showdown came when Peretz wrote an unsigned editorial for the December 14, 1974 issue of the magazine lambasting UNESCO for excluding Israel from its European regional activities. Harrison didn't like the editorial; he said it wasn't accurate. He especially didn't like Peretz's claim that scholars were deserting UNESCO. Peretz doesn't think Harrison's objections were to what he said, really, but to the fact that he had dared write anything at all and had failed to write it in what Peretz calls "Gil's hospital prose." In any event, when Harrison reached for his blue pencil and starting slashing, Peretz didn't bother taking the pencil away from him — he just took the magazine.

**T**he second thing he did was fire Doris Grumbach, who had been literary editor since September 1973. Grumbach had almost total freedom under Harrison, subject only to his blue pencil. And her contact with him was "extremely good." For a moment, she says, she had hopes that Peretz would be an acceptable boss, too. That brief hope came on the night Harrison left. "Peretz took us to an elaborate dinner. All of us. He told us that Gil's absolutist ways were not his and the magazine would be run in a collegial manner and he had a great deal of respect for the individual talents of all of us. And, you know, we bought it. I think everyone thought we should give him a chance, because although clearly he seemed stupid, maybe he wasn't."

But the conflict began almost at once. Peretz didn't like the books she reviewed and didn't like her reviewers. He didn't like the name of her column ("Fine Print"), saying it sounded like something at the wrong end of a legal document. He didn't like many of her ideas and he often didn't like the way she expressed them. Furthermore, he definitely did not feel she was listening to his suggestions at all. "I was frozen out," says Peretz, "just as I was frozen out by others at the magazine — and I was the owner! She treated me as if I were intruding on a baronial situation."

"Every time he asked to have a book reviewed," says Grumbach, "we reviewed it. Of course, they were always the same kind — books by Harvard people, and all friends. And he wanted them reviewed by friends. The most notable example was when he first came on the scene he asked me if I was going to review a book called *Black Fiction*. I said, 'Oh, yes. I have already assigned it.' He said, 'That's fine.



'He came in oohing and aahing and calling himself a modest apprentice, but he also came in with an iron-clad contract that made it very easy for him to switch over instantaneously to the master's role when he became angry'

Martin Peretz,  
new editor of  
The New Republic

To whom did you assign it?' I said, 'I assigned it to Barbara Smith, who is book editor at the *National Observer* and is doing her Ph.D. in black fiction.' He was very dubious about that because he didn't think a black could review a book that had been done by a white critic. I stuck to my guns on that, and then every day for the next month he would come in and ask if I had received the review. And I hadn't. He asked thirty or forty times. Finally I sat down with him and asked, 'Marty, why is it that you are so nervous about this book?' Well, the book is by Roger Rosenblatt. He confessed to me that Roger Rosenblatt is a very close friend and had written the book in the attic of his house — Peretz's house — in Cambridge. Also, it was published by the Harvard University Press. Books published there have a peculiar appeal to him. As it turned out, Barbara Smith liked the book and said so, and I was madly relieved. I don't know what would have happened if she hadn't."

But once she wasn't so lucky. Her reviewer for Stephen Themstrom's *The Other Bostonians* didn't like that book. This made Peretz very unhappy. According to Grumbach, Peretz took the galley proofs of the review home to Cambridge and showed them to some friends at a party, ridiculed the review, and wound up turning the galley proofs over to Themstrom himself, from whom Peretz obtained a very scholarly critique of the review and presented it to Grumbach as his own. (Peretz has denied all of the above.) Anyway, the review never appeared in *The New Republic*.

Their bickering ran the gamut from style to money. Grumbach was unhappy that Peretz cut out the personalized stationery and she considered him niggardly for requiring her to pay established reviewers eight cents, rather than ten cents, per word.

Peretz ended the agony by firing her, which was the last word that counted, although Grumbach had some last words of her own, the soul of which was that "he has no redeem-

ing features as a human being. He is egocentric. He can be nasty. Mostly, he is evasive."

Of quite a different opinion of Peretz is her replacement, Roger Rosenblatt, the author of *Black Fiction*, formerly an English instructor at Harvard and former director of the division of education programs at the National Endowment for the Humanities.

**T**he axe next took Stanley Karnow, foreign editor. A highly regarded reporter who had made waystops at *Time*, *The Washington Post*, and NBC (as a consultant), Karnow joined *The New Republic* staff in September 1973. "thereby," as he points out, "increasing the staff by twenty-five percent." He had quit the *Post* because "I didn't have the latitude that I wanted — too many walls, too many guys telling you what to do, too much concentration on what I thought were little chicken-shit stories. I thought there wasn't the proper amount of investigative reporting being done in the field of foreign affairs compared to what was being done domestically."

At *The New Republic* he found just the opposite — a heavy emphasis on foreign affairs and plenty of opportunity to approach his job the way he wanted to. Karnow, who had known Peretz for several years — distantly — observed the transfer of power with some sympathy for the new man: "So here they were, these two guys [Harrison and Peretz], and it was like mixing oil and water. Marty is very easily hurt and Harrison hurt him — there's no question about that. Marty would write a piece and Harrison would tear it up and throw it away or send him a routine rejection slip.

"Harrison tries to approach things from a very rational viewpoint. Peretz, by contrast, is a very emotional guy. He has certain great passions in life, one of which is Israel. I hate to keep bringing in the Israeli thing, because I consider myself just as pro-Israel, but it colored his whole view of the world. Once he called me up — this was before the In-

dira Gandhi coup d'etat — and said, 'Let's do a piece denouncing India.' I said, 'Jesus, there's nothing like kicking a dead horse. Why are you mad at the Indians?' And he said, 'Didn't you see that India allowed the P.L.O. to open an office in Delhi?' "

Still, Karnow was not unhappy that Peretz was taking over, because "he was interested in foreign affairs, much more than Harrison was. He was going to spend some money letting me travel, which I welcomed."

As Karnow tells it, their relationship began unraveling when he mentioned to Robert Myers, who is on the masthead as publisher, that he was unhappy about the firing of Grumbach. Myers promptly passed this along to Peretz, and the next thing Karnow knew he was listening to Peretz yelling at him over the phone, "How dare you complain to Myers about my behavior!" It was an attack that Karnow describes as "frenzied, weird," and he marks that occasion as the beginning of the end.

Peretz tells the story of their falling-out differently. "After I fired Mrs. Grumbach he immediately called [*New York* editor] Clay Felker to give him the story. Stanley Karnow denies it, but I know it because the girl that Clay Felker is going with was with Clay when the call came. Moreover, Karnow told [*New Republic* managing editor] David Sanford that he had done it and he told Doris Grumbach he had done it, and she came in and told me, 'Look, I'm not responsible for that story.' That's really where the fight started, over that leak to Felker."

There were other clashes — "squalid little donnybrooks," Peretz calls them — and eventually some of them found lodging in Alexander Cockburn's column in *The Village Voice*; and, again, Karnow was blamed. "Cockburn is kind of a nasty guy," says Karnow, "and he wrote a nasty column saying that *The New Republic* reminded him of his days on the *New Statesman* — 'the *New Statesman* was a lot of shit and *The New Republic* is a lot of shit,' that kind of thing. Anyhow, Peretz had been away, again in Israel, and when he comes back and sees the piece he accuses me of planting it. I told him that wasn't true but he said bullshit, it was true. I kept saying, 'Look, Marty, you are now a magazine owner, a public figure. People are going to take cracks at you. I'm not going to sign a loyalty oath. If I don't like something you do, I'll tell it to you and I'll tell it to other people.' He's a very paranoid guy. After that he was constantly accusing us of planting stories behind his back. Then he began feeling we were ripping him off, making long-distance calls to our grandmothers, you know. Everybody does that."

The end was inevitable, and the particular is of no great importance. But it happened to be the *Mayagüez* episode — when the American cargo ship was boarded by armed Cambodians. It occurred on top of *The New Republic*'s deadline and Karnow got to write only a few lines. He wanted to follow up with a more rounded discussion the next week but Peretz refused to let him, arguing that Karnow would probably be critical (which Karnow admitted) and "I think I'm rather in favor of what the government did." In any event, nothing was written for the following issue, "so that, with the accumulation of all sorts of personal things," says Kar-

now, "made me decide to hell with it. I told Peretz I just didn't think he knew how to run the goddamn magazine." (A tolerant, if not heavily pro-administration, discussion of the *Mayagüez* episode, written by John Osborne, did appear in the June 7, 1975 issue of *The New Republic*; and an anti-administration article was written for the June 14 issue by Roger Morris, who would soon join *The New Republic* as a contributing editor.)

Karnow's position of foreign editor remains vacant. But Tad Szulc joined the masthead as a contributing editor. Szulc is, of course, well known as a former *New York Times* foreign correspondent and as the author of a dozen books.

**W**hich left Peretz with only one to dispose of, his most hated (by him) employee, Walter Pincus, executive editor. It was largely an honorary title. Pincus can claim his share of friends in the Washington press corps, especially in the upper echelons of the *Post*, many friends in the Kennedy-type circles, and a deserved reputation as a bulldog investigator. He also has something of a reputation as a social climber, at least among those who don't like him.

At first Pincus thought Peretz would not get in his way. "At first," he recalls, "we danced around about my title and about the question of whether I would succeed Gil as editor. The end result was that I was given the title executive editor, which implied I would succeed Gil when Gil quit. Peretz made no commitment to that, but there was a basic understanding. It was during that time that he gave both Gil and me the enormous song and dance about how he was just going to be an apprentice, didn't know anything about publications, wanted to spend three years just learning at the foot of the great master, that he would not get involved in the running of the editorial part of the paper. He said his interests were all in the back of the book anyway.

"And then, once he came in, that all changed — slowly at first, but with a quickened pace. He got more and more involved, and then in the summer of '74, when Gil went away on vacation, he literally came down and put out a couple of issues. In the midst of that he wrote a piece on the Democratic party which was hopelessly naive. There was an effort to make it the lead piece of the magazine. I was the only one to discourage it, which didn't help things."

Did Peretz seem to feel that Pincus and Harrison were ganging up on him? "Oh yeah," says Pincus, "and to some degree that's true." Inside the office or out in the community? "Probably both. Certainly while Gil was there Gil to a degree had a sort of conscious policy to keep him out. Gil ran the magazine himself. And, in fact, I think that's the way the magazine ought to be run. I think that's the way Peretz should run it, if he could. There was great truth to the fact that Gil to some degree and me to some degree and Stanley to a degree shut him out on substantive issues."

Peretz recalls their early relationship much more bitterly. "I knew I'd have a fight with Pincus, knew that when I saw that guy's face . . . shit, you know. I don't think I've ever seen him smile. I used to walk into that office and my stomach would tighten. He treated everyone like a wart on



'He had loved those times when he was part of the establishment, chiefly the Kennedy era. . . . But then came L.B.J., and the phone calls from the White House dropped off drastically. Then came the Republicans, who ended all communication from on high'

Gilbert Harrison,  
former editor of  
The New Republic

his left wrist. I knew him a tiny bit before I started negotiating for the magazine. I also knew that he wanted the magazine. A lot of his friends around this town are sore at me because I got the magazine and he didn't. All this bullshit in *The Washington Post* about what I've done to the magazine is because Walter didn't get it.

"I think Walter's a very good investigator, but he can't write for beans. Everything in *The New Republic* went through Gil's or Dave Sanford's hands. Dave would spend four hours straightening out one of Walter's pieces. And I didn't always think his ideas were immaculate. We got into some sharp words on one thing. He had done a piece on why congressional debates should be televised. In fact, he had written several pieces on that. He returned to that pressing subject three times [one should read considerable sarcasm into "pressing"]. The third time, I put a line under the article which said that Mr. Pincus is a consultant to NBC, because I thought we owed it to our readers to know that. And he thought I was trying to suggest there was a conflict of interest. I said to myself, 'Oh shit, he's coming back to that subject — I think we owe our readers an explanation.' He had bad-mouthed me all over town and it wasn't pleasant, but that was not my impulse in putting that line in."

Late in 1974, in the midst of the Watergate impeachment mess, Pincus signed with Viking to do a book on tactical nuclear weapons. He had done a great deal of writing on Watergate and wanted to get it out of his system by taking on an entirely new topic. As part of the book he was going to write about the result of fallout from the bomb tests in the Marshall Islands in 1954. Harrison had been willing to split the cost with Viking for his trip to the South Seas, in exchange for several articles. But before Pincus got started Harrison departed the magazine and Peretz said it was a lousy idea and he wasn't at all keen to pay for the trip. So Pincus sold the idea to *The New Yorker*. That meant he

would be away from *The New Republic* three weeks, would reserve most of his reportage for Viking and *The New Yorker*, and Peretz would have to settle for a couple of short pieces.

How did Peretz react? "Walter met his obligation for three weeks' salary by sending these boring shit-ass pieces, and I began to feel that I was being taken. I just felt I was being taken for granted. I think both Pincus and Karnow were absolutely certain that I was so insecure in this town that — I think whenever there is a new situation you test it to know how far you can go, and they tested it, I think, with the wrong estimation of my own reactions and an overestimation of their own indispensability."

The Marshall Island excursion wasn't the reason Peretz fired Pincus, however. The reason was that in an interview with a *Time* reporter Pincus described Peretz as unprofessional and on an ego trip. The reporter suggested to Pincus that he might like to say that off the record, but Pincus replied, "You might as well quote me on that. Peretz would know where it came from anyway."

Showing more than his usual quantum of cool, Peretz waited two days after *Time* hit the newsstands before firing Pincus.

Pincus's post remains vacant. He had done very little executive editing anyway. His specialty was reporting, and the political part of that has been taken over to a great extent by a new member of the staff, Ken Bode, formerly director of the Center for Political Reform.

## EPILOGUE

Doris Grumbach is finishing a long-postponed novel, reviews books for *The Washington Post*, writes for *The New York Times* "Arts and Leisure" section, and holds a professorship at American University.

Pincus is back at *The Washington Post*, principally assigned to keeping an eye on Congress. He got a one-year

extension on the book from Viking, and at last count had finished about 30,000 of the 40,000 words *The New Yorker* is waiting for.

Karnow is doing a once-a-week column that the Des Moines Register and Tribune Syndicate is handling. The last I checked with him, most of his energies were going into an American foundation dealing in international affairs.

**P**eretz seems to have settled in comfortably at last. But for a while, he admits, the vacuum left by Karnow and Pincus made his ears ring — a vacuum created not really by their departure but by breaths being sucked in all over town.

“I came in from the outside, very much an outsider,” Peretz explains, “with a reputation both for irascibility and unpredictability. Whatever failings and virtues I have, one of my characteristics is not to be excessively reverent. But the first week after Pincus and Karnow had gone I literally wondered if I had gone too far. I really began to wonder if I could ever put out a magazine without those two people. In a strange way, they had psychologically got to me. I began to sense around town that people thought I had done some dastardly thing by ridding myself of them. And I began to doubt myself. Can *The New Republic* live without Pincus and Karnow? And I got nervous when someone told me Mrs. [Katharine] Graham [owner of *The Washington Post*] thought *The New Republic* was going to the dogs. If the Godmother has said a bad thing about you — well!

“But something else was happening at the same time that eased my mind. First of all, within a couple of hours after the news hit the street that they were gone, their closest friends were on the phone, saying, ‘Hey, I heard Tommy died — can I have his skates?’ ”

In the Pincus days, *The Washington Post* often picked up pieces from *The New Republic*. It doesn’t now. But *The Washington Star* regularly runs T.R.B. and often runs Tad Szulc pieces. “If *The Washington Star* can do something for us and we can do something for the *Star*,” says Peretz, “that’s the kind of symbiotic relationship I’d like to have. The *Post* is the smuggest collection of. . . .” He has had the pleasure of running a couple of highly critical pieces about *Post* management’s conduct during the strike; one of the pieces reportedly prompted Mrs. Graham to call *The New Republic* and complain that she had been portrayed as “a witch” — a story Peretz enjoys telling.

Peretz still does not live in Washington. He commutes from Cambridge. He says he never accepts dinner invitations except from longtime friends, that he limits his social contacts to “some congressional staff people I know a little bit, some lawyers, a couple of writers. A good friend of mine who works for *The New York Times* told me that I’ve gotten the reputation of being snot-nosed because I turn down invitations. But I’m glad to be an outsider.”

As for the magazine itself, the front does not seem to me to have changed greatly. There is an ideological rut and a momentum that opinion magazines cannot easily veer from. The humane and wry tone of T.R.B. does not change when ownership changes; for that matter, Richard Strout, *The Christian Science Monitor’s* Washington correspondent

who writes that column, may not yet know there is a new owner. He seldom bothers to come by the office. John Osborne’s solid analysis of the White House spoor is just as independent of editorial direction as T.R.B.’s.

In the back of the magazine, there are more essays that stand by themselves, without being pegged to a particular event or a particular book. Instead of scattering random poems, Rosenblatt has started running eight or ten poems of a single writer accompanied by an essay on that writer. He has introduced a new type of review, in which a book that was panned or ignored when it first came out but made its own way to the top is given a second look. If there is a Harvard bias at the back of the magazine, it escapes my hayseed eye. Few books from the Harvard University Press have been reviewed since Peretz won undisputed control. Since I wouldn’t know a Harvard reviewer unless he were identified as such, I asked Rosenblatt for an honest-injun count of how many from those hallowed halls he had used in the last six months. He estimated twenty out of 150 reviewers.

Judging strictly by quantity, the magazine’s coverage is today about what it was six months before Harrison left: heavy on foreign affairs (but no heavier on Mideast matters than in Harrison’s time and certainly no heavier than one might expect, given the tensions in that area), and a fluffy and mixed bag of domestic coverage. I thumbed through a year and a half of *The New Republic* counting “social issue” stories and found this rough profile:

	Last 6 months of Harrison	First 5 months of Peretz with Pincus and Karnow	First 7 months of Peretz minus Pincus and Karnow
Environment	2	1	1
Health	1	4	3
Poverty	2	1	1
Work/Unions	4	3	7
Justice	6	8	5

Which really doesn’t prove anything, one way or another. But the count does seem to suggest that at no time during that year and a half was *The New Republic* exactly consumed by controversial topics of the sort that might make Joe Hill rise from the grave. Both Pincus and Karnow disavowed calling it a liberal magazine, and to the extent that liberal has come to mean grabbing a problem by the gonads and squeezing until somebody yells ouch, they were right. Unlike *The Nation*, older and meaner and more careless of orthodoxy, *The New Republic* has never won *Time* magazine’s lasting accolade — “a pulp-paper pinko weekly.” Except among the kook-a-boo farthest right-wing, *The New Republic* (slick paper) has always been acceptable. And despite the new owner’s personal feistiness, there is nothing in the magazine as yet to indicate it will not maintain its reputation as solid, decent, thoughtful, cautious, unadventurous — often exasperated but seldom outraged, loyal when committed but withholding commitment until a consensus of Nice People has cleared the way. The most passion that has been evidenced at *The New Republic* in recent years was in this office upheaval. And now it has settled down again. The future is clear. ■

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
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# READER'S FORUM

## Reflections on Joan Little

by MARK PINSKY

They haven't announced when the first Joan Little bubble-gum cards are going to be released. Or when the new line of Joan Little action figure dolls (with an optional pincushion of Clarence Alligood, her jailer) will be introduced. But ever since the trial began last July, when the North Carolina Black Panther party started selling T-shirts which featured a drawing of an ice pick, dripping blood, with the inscription "Free Joan Little — Power to the Ice Pick," the questions of commercialization and the limits of good taste were never far from the courtroom. A parade of five nonfiction books based on the case is scheduled to begin shortly and a deal has been signed with Universal Studios for a "film treatment." There is an off-Broadway play in the works and a 45 r.p.m. record available. Three of Little's attorneys have concluded lecture tours.

Meanwhile, back in the real world, Joan Little has returned to Women's Prison in Raleigh to serve the balance of her seven- to ten-year breaking-and-entering sentence (which landed her in the Beaufort County jail in the first place), and her defense attorneys' law firm in Durham has disintegrated.

Now seems an appropriate time to stand back and take a look at the coverage of the Joan Little case in particular, and cause coverage in general. And maybe I am the appropriate person.

For six months I have been trying to write about the trial, its place in history, its meaning, and the quality of the mass-media coverage it received. As a

story, it had everything — race, sex, and violence, with a small town Southern backdrop. Professionally, there is a great deal at stake for any young journalist when a case like this takes place in a state like North Carolina, outside of the major media centers. For stringers and free lances like myself, it means more money in the form of more regular reporting work, national-magazine assignments, books, and screenplays. For young reporters, filing every day for the "A" wire, or two or three times a day for a network, offers enough exposure to make a name for oneself.

As a free-lance political journalist, I made the most of the opportunity: I helped break the story in the national media; four times before the trial I interviewed the defendant — twice in prison and twice after her release on bail; and for five weeks I sat in Superior Courtroom 2 in the Wake County Courthouse, covering the case for two major daily newspapers, two radio networks, and a wire service. I still am unable to decide how I feel about the Joan Little case — not only as a free-lance journalist, but also as a radical and feminist who tries to serve both a political cause and the cause of journalism.

In all the press accounts I read (and several of the ones I wrote) the case was seen as a symbol of "Southern Justice on Trial — Again." This is not surprising, considering the facts of the case: the prisoner, a young black woman; the jailer, an elderly white man; evidence of a sexual interchange in the heat of an August night; and a bloody ice pick. The Joan Little story has become almost a set piece in American journalism, superseding even the Scottsboro boys or Leo Frank, other blacks accused of violent interracial sexual crimes. And despite the fact that as a theme it was both tired and unoriginal, the senior journalists covering the trial preferred it, pointing out that the evidence supported this ap-

proach and that black people in the South on the receiving end of injustice were still finding it very real, despite the unoriginality.

It now turns out that the defense at the trial intentionally fostered this view of the case. In an interview with Wayne King of *The New York Times* in October, the chief defense counsel, Jerry Paul, boasted that "you must orchestrate the press. This country works that way. And that fact is this country's weakness." Paul went on to say that his press strategy included having Joan Little attend court every day carrying a dog-eared copy of *To Kill a Mockingbird*, and casting himself, whenever possible, in interviews with reporters, in the role of Gregory Peck in the film of the novel.

A number of reporters, as well as a number of Little's radical supporters, were upset by Paul's comments. (King — who covered the trial for the *Times* — whittled the rotund defense attorney down to size by allowing Paul to hang himself in a noose woven of his own egomania.)

Still, you did not have to be taken in by Paul (and most of us were not) to agree with him. Journalists who covered the trial shared two assumptions about the case: regardless of how he got there, or why, Clarence Alligood should not have been in Joan Little's cell at 2:30 A.M. on the morning of August 27, 1974; and his penis should not have been in her mouth in the instant before he died. There were other themes: resistance to rape, overcrowded Southern prisons, the death penalty — all of which were intimately involved in the Joan Little case. On the basis of the evidence plus force of habit, sexism lost out to racism in the reporting, but on the whole that reporting was not therefore inaccurate.

Of course, there were "special problems" in reporting the Joan Little trial,

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*Mark Pinsky is a free-lance writer based in Durham, North Carolina.*

problems common to many “political” cases. I had a considerable edge in covering the Joan Little case (as well as other political trials in North Carolina) over state and national correspondents, because during the 1960s I went to school with, or worked in various political movements with, many of the defense attorneys and defendants in such trials. They have known me for ten years and they trust me, and as a result they tell me things they don’t tell other people. The reason they trust me is because they think that we are on the same side. In the best newspaper tradition, I do nothing to discourage this feeling, and in this case they are right.

In the course of this relationship I have learned to avoid asking a defendant/attorney/friend — before or during the trial — “Did you really do it?” In the case of Joan Little, as sometimes happens, I came into some information I chose not to report and eventually it became common knowledge among reporters before the trial was over, and they too chose not to report it. This decision, by the press was political — there is no other word for it.

For example, the great untold (or unreported) story of the Joan Little trial, which I first learned from members of the defense law firm and the defense committee, was the role of the Communist party, through its National Alliance Against Racist and Political Repression, in controlling the entire (and considerable) political movement surrounding the case. Angela Davis, a leading figure in both national organizations, became the most frequently quoted movement figure and constant companion of Joan Little. The party press was consistently favorable in its coverage of the case. Party members were visible and influential on the defense committee, and the party frequently set up rallies of support around the country.

The anomaly was that straight reporters did not report this situation, out of a concern that the information might be used in red-baiting anyone associated with the case who did not belong to the party. Reporters representing leftist, feminist, and black publications, frustrated by what they considered to be the National Alliance’s extremely conserva-

tive political strategy, felt unable to openly criticize the Communist party for much the same reason.

Was this information important to an understanding of the case? Probably not. The only thing it may have demonstrated was that if the Communist party can’t bring about revolution in our lifetime, it may at least be able to run an efficient public-relations operation.

Then there was the matter of sex. Like political bickering on the defense committee and office politics in the law firm, star-fucking represents a seamier (but not unusual) side of big-time political trials. The situation got so bad at the Joan Little trial that one source referred to a principal white member of the defense team, saying “the only difference between \_\_\_\_\_ and Clarence Allgood was the choice of weapons,” observing that the former preferred a salary to an ice pick.

**I**n a case made so symbolic of the evils of sexism and racism, this kind of information was more difficult to put aside, especially for the more political publications. Likewise the persistent charges of large-scale mismanagement and misappropriation of money raised in the name of Joan Little. (The defense refused to provide hard information on the subject during and after the trial.)

There were some larger questions involved in the decision not to report information of this nature. Would such reporting in the course of the trial jeopardize the fate of the defendant, who may know nothing of any wrongdoing? More conventionally, would publication close off all future sources of information from the defense? As a matter of political strategy would it be better to print the information first and put it in perspective, or ignore it and risk having an unsympathetic publication stumble onto it and blow it out of proportion?

About the matter of commercialism. I will confess to no small amount of ambivalence in building both a bank account and a reputation in journalism on the Joan Little case. Still, I don’t feel as though I helped create any kind of monster by helping to bring the case to national attention, even if she was guilty of

the formal charges (premeditated murder and escape). But I’m not writing a book on the case for one reason more than any other — and that is that after five weeks of daily coverage I still don’t know whether she *was* guilty. Consider this: there is a nationwide rape epidemic. Rape laws (except in the South, for all the wrong reasons) are outdated and ineffective. Police generally are unwilling or unable to apprehend rapists. Juries are notoriously narrow-minded in dealing with rape victims who prosecute. Even when the evidence against the defendant is overwhelming, prosecutors and judges are altogether too eager to bargain away lengthy prison sentences in exchange for cheap guilty pleas.

So saying, it follows that if two or three women charged with killing their alleged rapists — like Joan Little and Inez Garcia and Deborah Kanteng — are ultimately freed after highly publicized trials, then perhaps more women will resist, future juries will listen more sympathetically to rape victims, and — somewhere, sometime — as a result of all this a few potential rapists may decide not to rape.

Innocent or guilty, Joan Little was a symbol, and a useful one politically.

Was it wrong to make *her* the symbol? I don’t think so, for as I said before, her jailer had no business being in her cell, no matter what drew him there. Still, I have kept asking myself whether or not she was guilty of cold-bloodedly killing an old man with a family who loved him, after enticing him into her jail cell. I spend much of my time covering cases like Joan Little’s, and wrestling with the dilemmas of political journalism. If the truth and accuracy of such a story would be politically detrimental, I won’t lie. My view of accuracy and professional standards is to that extent like that of most journalists. But then, unlike them, I won’t write the story at all. If my research and journalistic instincts tell me one thing, my political instincts another — which they did not in the Joan Little story — I won’t fudge it, I won’t bend it, but I won’t write it. In my kind of political journalism, as in others, accuracy makes a difference. Not all the difference, but enough. ■

# Whatever happened to the

The press isn't geared to handle the complexity of resource management

by ROGER MORRIS

**G**AS SHORTAGES IMPERIL JOBS, FORD WARNS, ran the front-page headline of *The Washington Post* on July 11, 1975. The story repeated what the *Post* and most of the media were reporting regularly last summer — warnings by the Ford administration and others that the nation faced a serious natural gas shortage in the winter of 1975-76.

Five months later, the *Post* featured a very different front-page story. GAS 'SHORTAGE' EVAPORATES, the paper headlined on December 7, feeling obliged to qualify now in quotation marks the term it evidently took for granted the previous summer. The crisis had not materialized, according to the story by Thomas O'Toole, "partly because producers are selling gas they didn't tell anybody they had to sell." Between the lines of O'Toole's article, and only between the lines, was the hint of a big story — that the crisis may have been exaggerated or fabricated by the gas industry to prompt the passage of a bill that would deregulate the price of natural gas.

The two *Post* stories are symbolic of the confusion that prevailed as journalism confronted the natural gas "crisis" (quotes necessary again) in the last half of 1975. Throughout the summer the overwhelming impression from the coverage of a dozen major papers was that somehow we had unavoidably run out of natural gas, as we had earlier

out of oil. Higher gas prices and unemployment were going to follow as surely as the sixty-cent gallon of gas had followed the petroleum shortage. (White House projections last summer indicated the loss of 100,000 jobs because of gas shortages this winter.) The cause, as conveyed in Ford administration statements reported largely without analysis or background, was that excessive government regulation had stifled production. Few reports indicated that the gas problem was not necessarily so "natural." Then, as summer turned to fall and the Senate began considering a bill to deregulate interstate gas prices, coverage of the shortage took on a now-you-see-it, now-you-don't quality that left pressing questions.

First, what, in fact, had happened? Was there or was there not a shortage in our single most important energy source? If there was, why had it developed? Then there was the question of public policy. What is the problem and what alternatives do we have to deal with it? In failing largely to respond to these questions (or sometimes even to acknowledge them), coverage of the natural gas issue posed yet another and more difficult question: is American journalism equipped to report adequately the intricate and fateful issues of resource politics and management facing the country? Flaws and omissions in the natural gas coverage indicate that part of the problem is a lack of the training and background needed to grasp the complexities of public policy issues that have too long been understood only by business or government technicians. But beyond that obstacle is another, perhaps more formidable. To put it as a question, does the conventional definition of "news" as what's happening today blind journalism to the truly critical events in resource management, in which today's crisis is the product of industry or government decisions made years earlier?

The natural gas story is the sort of story that one might have expected the press to go after in a big way. After all, natural gas provides nearly one-third of

the total energy consumed and about 50 percent of non-transportation needs — more than double the amount provided by oil or coal. It fuels half the energy for industry — again, twice the use of other fuels. According to the Federal Energy Administration, industrial use consumes some 46 percent of marketed gas, commercial users and electric power another 46 to 47 percent. The remainder goes to residential use in forty million homes, most of it for heating. How much gas we have, then, and the price we must pay for it are not exactly peripheral issues. Nor, considering the millions of people who work in gas-related industries or live in houses heated by gas, can one write the gas story off as one that wouldn't sell papers.

The story of the natural gas "shortage" — and of deregulation, too — begins with the price producers can command. Through the mid-1950s, both interstate and intrastate gas sold at roughly comparable prices. In 1954, however, a Supreme Court decision held that interstate producers, or those selling nationally, should charge only a "fair and reasonable" price, and empowered the Federal Power Commission to oversee interstate gas prices. A federally-regulated ceiling of fifty-two cents per thousand cubic feet was ultimately placed on interstate gas, while the unregulated intrastate price rose as high as two dollars. Producers have thus been going mainly after the gas they can sell for the higher price in the intrastate markets. Meanwhile, the residential and industrial interstate demands created during the boom years of gas production from the twenties to the sixties — in markets where prices and profits are subject to public regulation — have been receiving a steadily declining share of new gas.

**R**ecent coverage of the gas story falls into two blocks — summer stories about the so-called crisis, and fall and winter stories concerned with Senate passage of a natural gas bill.

From last June through August, *The New York Times* and *The Washington*

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# natural gas crisis?

*Post* together averaged nearly a story every other day on some aspect of the natural gas problem. Both newspapers, chosen here as representative of the reporting done throughout the summer, gave extensive coverage to public statements by the administration, from the industry, and in the Congress; the reporting, however, rarely questioned either the fact of the shortage or the prevailing official explanations. For example, on July 3, under a two-column headline reading FORD WARNED OF LACK OF NATURAL GAS, the *Post* recounted the White House view that the shortage was “due to price controls.” but left its readers no hint of what exactly those controls were, how the industry and its regulation worked, or even indeed how wide and significant the shortage would be. A July 9 *Post* editorial headlined NATURAL GAS AND NEXT WINTER did little more to lift the veil. “The troubles are all related to the way the Federal Government regulates gas prices,” it argued without further elaboration on the subject of controls or production. *The New York Times*’s reporting on the subject over the summer was somewhat more detailed, but the additional information was perhaps offset by the *Times*’s tendency to consign stories on natural gas to that reporters’ and readers’ nether world which lies beyond page thirty.

In late October the Senate passed a natural gas bill and sent it to the House. The legislation would allow interstate pipelines to purchase intrastate gas at its higher price to avert the assumed shortage. The most publicized provision, however, was an amendment by Senator John V. Tunney, of California, that called for the gradual removal of all price controls on natural gas while retaining controls on interstate gas already under sales contract.

The practical effect of the Tunney amendment would be to postpone direct price hikes for many industrial and most residential consumers for the next four or five years. The savings for consumers, supporters of the bill claimed, would be \$5 billion by 1980. But this

“savings,” widely reported by the press, was authentic only if one accepted as inevitable and necessary the much higher price of gas to be brought about by deregulation. In any event, the bill would soon mean millions (some sources say billions) in higher costs bound to be passed on to all consumers in various forms by the gas-using industries, which would pay the temporarily higher intrastate prices for interstate gas and eventually the decontrolled price for

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natural gas problem  
to begin with’**

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all gas. A host of products would be affected — food (because of gas used for feedstock and fertilizer production), electricity, chemicals, oil, primary metals, paper, coal products, and on and on.

The coverage of the Senate passage of price decontrol provided a revealing glimpse of regional perspectives in journalism, but added little more analysis or public understanding to the issue. The *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, publishing in a major consuming area, stressed that the bill would “delay for several years the major consumer price increases expected. . . .” For its readers in a producing and pipeline center, the *New Orleans Times-Picayune* printed a three-column headline over an A.P. dispatch which pointed out that the bill “eventually would mean sharply higher prices for the natural gas used to heat American homes and to run U.S. factories.” The *Albuquerque Journal*, serving a gas-producing area, celebrated the news of passage with a five-column banner. Consistent with its previous equanimity on the subject, *The New York Times* re-

corded the Senate bill on page fifty-seven, noting without explanation that the bill was “unlikely to cause a sharp, sudden rise in gas bills” (emphasis added).

Almost no reporting was done on the politics behind the scenes of the Senate debate — the lobbying, the personal pressures and biases that can determine national energy policy. More importantly, superficial coverage had obscured or missed altogether the essential story of why there was a natural gas problem to begin with.

One of the first reporters to provide some analysis of the issue of industry responsibility and exploitation was Joseph A. Lastelic, Washington bureau chief for *The Kansas City Times*. In consecutive stories on October 2-3, Lastelic reported that gas “is not available because the producers do not want to sell it at the low price made mandatory by the Federal regulators.” His dispatches also referred, though without the elaboration they deserved, to charges on the Senate floor “that companies are curtailing and withholding production in expectation of higher prices. . . .” In late November, Morton Mintz of *The Washington Post* reported a Library of Congress study showing that natural gas producers had “a strong profit motivation” to withhold available gas in the expectation of congressional deregulation of gas prices and windfall profits. A follow-up story by Mintz revealed that a House investigation had found two major producers deliberately curtailing drilling for natural gas in Bastian Bay, Louisiana.

There followed the *Post*’s December 7 story headlined GAS ‘SHORTAGE’ EVAPORATES mentioned earlier. It reported that producers had unexpectedly diverted gas to the interstate market at intrastate prices, under an emergency provision of the Federal Power Commission, the regulatory agency for natural gas. Over the last few months of 1975, some 32 billion cubic feet of gas was sold to customers in New Jersey, New York, and other needy states for \$82 million, which is three times what the gas would normally cost in the in-

terstate market. Whether this gas had been withheld from the market until the resulting prospect of shortage brought these higher prices, or whether, as the producers claimed, the gas simply became available when intrastate markets did not need it, reports in the *Post* and elsewhere did not explain.

With a sense of relief — and no doubt some puzzlement — readers were thus told that a “shortage” that had been front-page news had simply gone away

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**‘What have we learned, after nearly a century of government regulation of business, about the mix of economic control and liberty?’**

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while no one was looking. What was distilled from the process, however, were much higher prices that were supposedly necessitated because there was so little gas.

What *had* happened? With a subject rich in history and controversy, not to mention the enormous economic and social stakes, editors and reporters might have probed any of several possible scenarios — each with supporting evidence, some newsworthy revelations, and the ingredients of a major story on the politics and economics of energy. The following, in very brief capsules, are three possible scenarios.

□ *The government regulation is the villain scenario.* This is the position of the Ford administration, the natural gas industry, and many in Congress. The history of F.P.C. regulation shows it a dismal failure since gas supplies have dwindled precisely in proportion to government ceilings on gas prices. So long as the unregulated intrastate market offers higher prices, “producers would be fools,” as one company executive put it, to sell gas in the interstate market.

According to the industry’s Potential Gas Committee, there are only 1,146 trillion cubic feet of gas left to be developed, or about twenty-eight years’ supply at current production rates. Yet

regulated prices make it impractical to exploit that gas adequately. A Sun Oil study shows that drilling expenses require a price of three times the current interstate average.

Low rates stimulate demand but lower supply, while costs to consumers go up anyway because of underuse of pipeline capacities, etc.

It is absurd to say that producers are deliberately withholding gas to await deregulation. Congress passed a deregulation bill in 1954, but any company withholding then for higher prices would have had to wait twenty-one years, and would be long gone.

No, companies are producing by honest market forces of capital, supply and demand. A Harris poll shows that a majority of the public favors deregulation. Natural gas is another example of what we’re rediscovering in so many areas: government mismanagement creates crises which government is supposed to solve.

□ *The corporate rip-off scenario.* This is more or less the story believed by congressional liberals, consumer groups, some independent public gas utilities, and, privately, some officials. Regulation has been a failure because it hasn’t been tough enough. The F.P.C. is ruled by political appointees friendly to the gas industry and operates with a sluggish bureaucracy. F.P.C. rates have fluctuated so widely and enforcement has been so spotty that producers have thought they could always get better prices if they cried “shortage,” which they’ve been doing since 1954. If the F.P.C. had established prices forcefully, we’d have all the gas we need.

A U.S. geological survey shows more than 2,500 trillion cubic feet of gas reserves, better than 100 years’ supply. The problem isn’t supply of gas; it’s corporate greed. Congressional hearings have revealed that producers report only one-half to one-tenth their reserves. Industry profits are secret, as are exploration costs; but known cash-flows, an index of capital availability, have been high. Anyway, industry executives have testified they wouldn’t put windfall profits back into exploration, but rather into increased dividends for stockholders.

The natural gas industry is an oligopoly, ruled by huge oil companies

interlocked with banks, pipelines, utilities. They now want interstate deregulation because most new gas will come from federally-owned lands, in large part offshore, and thus can be sold only on the interstate market.

The gas “shortage,” as this winter’s experience shows, is a fabrication of the gas industry to bring deregulation and fat profits; it’s one of the major scandals of our time.

□ *The public ownership/regulators-and-industry are both wrong scenario.* The industry’s history is of steadily rising prices (and undoubtedly profits) at public expense. Regulation, subject to political influence and bureaucratic inconsistencies, is pointless. The problem is that industry and government are behaving as industry and government usually do.

Gas is too vital a resource to leave to corporate profitability and shifting political interference.

Now, no one knows how vast or limited our gas reserves really are or how much it actually costs to exploit gas. What we need in natural gas is a major independent public utility, like the T.V.A., to produce and pipe gas to a large share of the market. Like T.V.A., it could be a “yardstick” to measure competing industry.

The alternative is ever-mounting prices, perhaps until customers are forced to find another fuel. Gas can be a relatively cheap, plentiful fuel. If we don’t control it, the nation will suffer needlessly.

**E**ach of these formulations is, of course, fragmentary and necessarily simplified. But it is a mark of the difficulty and importance of the natural gas question that a searching journalism would find that none of the contradictory statements above is easily refuted on the evidence. As with an increasing number of public policy questions, the task is to probe in depth the paradoxes, the conflicting truths on all sides, with which public understanding must grapple.

Of all the writing on gas over the last six months of 1975, only one article that I came across — a *New York Times* column by William V. Shannon on August 31 — provided a glimpse into a wider, more thoughtful policy view of the is-

*continued on page 51*

**IF YOUR FILES ON THE  
PRESCRIPTION DRUG INDUSTRY  
DON'T INCLUDE THE  
INFORMATION IN THIS FOLDER,  
YOUR FILES MAY BE INCOMPLETE.**

This material contains information about the prescription drug industry for reporters, editors, broadcasters and columnists. Here are the kinds of facts often needed in a hurry. The bulk of the material, however, is explanatory; it is indeed a discourse in advocacy since it delineates industry positions and viewpoints and reflects industry consensus.

Why this insert in this publication? Because we respect your vital role in communicating to the public, and because no matter what perceptions people have about the prescription drug industry, its future is basic to every person who will ever need drug therapy, a medical device or a diagnostic product to diagnose, prevent, cure or alleviate disease.

The industry needs more attention from the press if it is to reach its potential in contributing to the betterment of the human condition. So we hope this material will be useful in your reporting and interpretation. If we can answer questions, or if you wish additional data or supportive matter, please call or write me.

*William C. Cray*

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### Subject 1:

## BRANDS/GENERICS

Should doctors prescribe drugs by brand name or by generic name?

That decision should be the doctor's. About 90 percent of prescriptions today call for a specific brand, yet the second most frequently prescribed drug, ampicillin, is usually prescribed generically. Generic prescribing has grown twice as fast as the overall rate of prescription growth since 1967; however, the proportion of generic prescriptions has risen slowly--from 9 to 11 percent in the past five years.

Why, then, all the hullabaloo? The issue is not whether doctors should be allowed to prescribe generically. They can do that now if they wish. The real issue is whether they should be compelled to. Some believe that if generic names only were used, important savings would be achieved. In fact, though, the consumer often is better off if the doctor orders an economical brand name product. In any event, the consistent quality of the product is the key--not whether it is prescribed by generic or brand name.

Questions of relative costs aren't the only flaws in the all-generic argument. There are distinct differences in competence among drug firms, some of which operate with a narrow product line and concentrate on the fast-moving drugs, while others rely on sales of their widely used products to offset the relatively small margins, or even losses, realized on infrequently needed formulations (e.g., for botulism, iron poisoning).

The broad-line firms commonly finance their research out of the sales of their established preparations whose records of superior clinical performance may bring higher prices. Just as important, drug product formulation failures occur, even among antibiotics certified as safe and effective, batch by batch, by the Food and Drug Administration. FDA has an impressive surveillance capability, but it is not adequate to assure that all manufacturers are equally competent.

Given the uncertainties about both economy and therapeutic value, the prescriber faces a basic question: who is responsible if the therapy fails? When a doctor has confidence in the pharmacist and in the overall quality of suppliers of the drug, he or she may prescribe generically, whereupon the pharmacist selects the specific product to be dispensed. There is really no such thing as a "generic" drug; somebody made it and should be responsible for it.

If the doctor is aware of drug product failures, and there is no way of knowing where the prescription will be filled, the brand name system--besides being simple and convenient--offers a distinct advantage. It identifies the product and the maker. In most states the pharmacist is legally bound to fill the prescription as specified.

Brand-name prescribing and dispensing make sense for reasons that go well beyond professional familiarity. The research-based companies that invest heavily in the discovery and marketing of new drugs take pride in the efficacy and safety of all their products. They assign on the average one out of every six production workers to quality control. They spot--and report--defects that less qualified firms are less apt to discover. They also develop most of the standards that the FDA and the United States Pharmacopeia (USP) make official.

Most drug recalls come from the lesser-known companies that make a minority of the drugs. In one 1974 study, 25 research-based firms accounting for more than 70 percent of the sales had only 12 percent of the recalls. The recall figure would undoubtedly be higher for the less qualified producers if the FDA could inspect all of the hundreds of

known firms as frequently as they do the major ones.

In a 1973 report to Congress, the General Accounting Office stated, ". . . FDA has not enforced compliance with good manufacturing practices by many of the drug producers it has inspected." It said that some manufacturers lack the incentive to improve their practices and that FDA does not have the means to make the number of inspections required by law.

In 1975 a Congressional subcommittee noted that FDA adequately inspected only 3,000 out of 8,000 registered drug firms for compliance with good manufacturing practices. Because of this record the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association has proposed new federal legislation to tighten inspections. (See PMA POLICY POSITIONS.)

The root of the drug quality problem and its relationship to the brands/generics issue lies partly in the term bioavailability: the degree and rate of absorption of the active drug ingredient, which determines the amount available at the target site in the body.

Bioavailability is affected by inactive as well as active ingredients. Therefore, tablets and capsules made by different manufacturers may vary in purity, potency, uniformity of the mix, disintegration time, weight, size, dissolution time, stability, compression and in various other characteristics that determine whether a drug product will perform satisfactorily.

Total acceptance of drug product quality is not possible until bioequivalence (similar levels of bioavailability among multiple versions of a drug product given to individuals in the same dosage form) can be assured. A 1974 report on drug bioequivalence by the Office of Technology Assessment, U.S. Congress, stated, ". . . neither the present standards for testing the finished product nor the specifications for materials, manufacturing process and controls are adequate to ensure that ostensibly equivalent drug products, are, in fact, equivalent in bioavailability."

Are these differences among different companies' formulations rare and unimportant? That is, if two products are more or less similar, won't

either get the therapeutic job done? Often, yes. But with some drugs, no. And for many more, no data exist.

It is essential, in our view, that every manufacturer be required to document chemical and biological equivalence of each product to ensure that there are no significant differences between the original product and similar products introduced later. When that is done, more widespread confidence in the reliability of the overall drug supply may be justified, and purportedly equivalent products may gain more acceptance. In the meantime, it seems to us that selective use of brand names--or at least identification of the source--is the best means of assuring the patient safe, effective and economical therapy. That approach works with other products, and it obviously is even more important in selecting medications, where health and even life itself may be at stake.

The justification for a higher priced brand (or generically labeled drug for that matter) lies in the value being delivered by innovative companies that provide assurances of quality, consistency and service. Lower-priced versions can and do compete--as they should--but only when doctors, pharmacists and patients have satisfactory experiences with them

## Subject 2: PRICES

Moderation has prevailed in prescription drug prices for more than three decades, despite price variations for some drug products at both wholesale and retail levels.

A diversity of marketing factors leads to varied prices that are also affected by other products and therapies and by physician and consumer preferences. Each producer brings unique qualities and requirements to a market that embraces technological, product, service and price competition.

The 1974 average price per new prescription was \$4.70. To be sure, some prescription prices can be relatively high, and the outlay for persons with chronic diseases can be substantial. Here averages may not mean much.

Nevertheless, the price record is

favorable as verified by accurate yardsticks. The government's Consumer Price Index for prescriptions was only 2.9 percent higher in 1974 than in 1967--while the overall Index rose more than 16 times as much, to 147.7 (based on a 1967 base of 100).

More broadly based indexes are prepared for PMA by Professor John Firestone of the City University of New York. His index, covering more than 1,000 prescription drug products, shows that 1974 retail prices were 5.2 percent above those of 1967. Wholesale drug prices (1967=100) rose to 109.3 in 1974 in the Firestone study and to 104.2 according to the government. Meanwhile, the government's overall wholesale index for all goods in the same period jumped to 160.1 (1974).

Although relatively modest, recent rises in drug prices reflect severe inflationary pressures created by shortages of energy and raw materials and by substantial increases in labor and other operating costs.

Manufacturers and pharmacists can share credit for the long-term trend of declining drug prices during the 1960's and of lower than average increases in the first half of the 1970's. For example, prices of the major brands of eight leading multi-source products declined at wholesale by 40 percent between 1969 and 1974.

In 1960, the average retail price of a new prescription was \$3.22\*. By 1974, the number of doses in the average prescription had increased 52 percent, but the price per dose declined in 14 years about 4 percent in current dollars. During the same period, the average employee's hourly take-home pay virtually doubled. Therefore, even with the advent of many new products, it now costs an American only about half as much work time to buy a given quantity of prescription drugs as it did in 1960.

The relation of drug prices to the industry's vital research function is especially critical. Research costs are borne by the income from a broad range of products, not simply from patent-protected drugs, which comprise only a minority of most firms' products. Any system that would force prices toward basic commodity levels--as some suggest--

would shrink the sources of research funding.

The social balance sheet on prescription drug prices leans strongly toward the stimulus, initiatives and disciplines of the competitive market system, and above all away from any experiment with central government coercion and price controls as economic monitors.

\*IMS, Ambler, Pa.

### Subject 3: PROFITS

By conventional accounting standards, the pharmaceutical industry has been consistently among the top three or four manufacturing industries in profitability for more than 20 years.

If the industry's objective, however, is to report lower profit levels, it should build new production lines to make old products rather than searching for new products to make old ones obsolete, since money spent on R&D is treated, for accounting purposes, as a current expense, while money spent on building plants is treated as an investment.

The firm that spends \$10 million in developing a new drug is certainly investing in the economic sense, in that the payoff may not occur for many years, if at all. And a research team may be a more valuable asset than a battery of fermentation tanks. But it does not appear this way in the financial statements. In contrast to a firm in another industry which invests the same amount in new plant and equipment, the pharmaceutical company's asset base is understated, so that its rate of return is overstated.

The Federal Trade Commission says that treating R&D and promotion costs as expenses rather than capital investments "usually leads to an overstatement of profitability, with the overstatement increasing with the intensity of R&D effort."

According to the National Science Foundation, the pharmaceutical industry is the most research-intensive; it has the highest ratio of company-funded R&D to sales of any industry. It must also bear the entire cost of marketing. Since both R&D and marketing are treated by accountants as expenses rather than

as investments, the accounting bias mentioned by the FTC overstates the true economic rate of return.

But there are other reasons for the profit differential, among them a relatively high rate of growth. Typically, high growth industries earn higher than average rates of return.

Still another factor is productivity. The drug industry increased its output per employee at an average annual rate of 4.2 percent between 1963 and 1973 and by 5.7 percent in 1974 alone. These gains are well above the average rate of increase for industry as a whole. Any industry with rapidly growing productivity will typically experience above-average profitability. Since there is an absence of excessive concentration, of government subsidies and of illegal restraints and monopolies, these cannot explain the favorable rates of return in the pharmaceutical industry.

A key relationship exists between profitability and productivity, between satisfactory price levels and productive research. That relationship merits public acceptance. It has resulted in virtually all of the progress in drug therapy, and it holds the seeds of much more.

What are the average rates of return of the drug industry under conventional accounting? According to FTC reports, the drug industry typically earns about 12 percent on sales each year. On stockholders' equity, it usually realizes about 18 or 19 percent.

The after-tax rate of return on equity is generally the preferred measure of profitability. For the drug industry in 1974, this was an unremarkable 1.6 percentage points higher than the average for all non-durable manufacturing industries. In 1972 it had been 8 percentage points higher.

If the industry appears to be heading toward an average rate of return, that's an ominous trend in light of future medicinal needs.

In the pharmaceutical industry, according to FTC data, dividends in 1974 took only 31 percent of net after-tax earnings. This low payout ratio means that a relatively high share of earnings is retained and reinvested in the business.

The industry, virtually debt-free

a few years ago, has changed to the point where most of the major companies are borrowing to help finance growth. They have not generated enough internal cash to meet expected growth demand, to satisfy capital needs and to expand the quest for new products.

Dangers to progress exist when we have a massive overemphasis on the regulation of innovation and not nearly enough on cost-benefit assessments; when we have a failure, in both government bureaus and in the Congress, to recognize the links between sound profitability for innovative industries and the fulfillment of unmet needs in the world community; and, finally, when we have an excessive concern over drug company profits unrelated to the critical need for still better drug therapy tomorrow.

Fortunately, many factors still undergird the ability of the industry to sustain essential growth and profit levels. Among them are further development overseas where enormous needs exist, aging populations requiring more medical care, expansion in such related fields as animal health, medical devices and diagnostic products, a measure of immunity to business cycles and a record of adapting to complex regulations and advancing technology amid an abiding commitment to research.

#### Subject 4: PATENTS

The protections and incentives of the U.S. patent and trademark system spur the quest for new medical products. The safety and efficacy of a new drug, of course, must be established prior to marketing. As a result, the effective life of a drug patent is markedly reduced because of the lag between the date of patent and the date of marketing. A 1972 PMA study showed that 7 years of a new product's 17-year patent life, on average, will have expired by the time the product reaches the pharmacy.

As Michael Cooper explains in his Prices and Profits in the Pharmaceutical Industry: "The most crucial role of patents is . . . to stimulate and maintain competition. Patents are, in reality, no longer the reward for innovation but rather

the rewards for teaching the discovery to others, by making findings public and allowing one's competitors to use and build on this knowledge rather than duplicate effort or shroud progress in secrecy. Few first drugs have remained the best . . ." As Cooper suggests, this typifies the history of the pharmaceutical industry.

Under the present U.S. legal-judicial system, if the patent grant is misused, the federal courts may order a variety of remedies, including compulsory licensing, either with or without a royalty paid to the patent holder. Judicial remedies are always invoked on a case-by-case basis.

Newly patented drug products usually offer certain medical advantages and may well be introduced at higher prices than mature multiple-source products competing in the same therapeutic categories.

This is logical, since these breakthroughs--in this industry as in others--carry the principal hope for income to cover not only R&D, but other essential expenses of full-line, service-oriented operations.

However, new drugs under patent reflect competitive prices, since there are few patented products that do not compete with other therapies treating the same diseases. Also, the new, patented product does not normally stay at the introductory price. More typically, the wholesale price is cut several times during the patent lifespan.

One price index\* shows that the decline in the overall wholesale price index from 1955 to 1966 took place entirely in patented products, which fell from a base of 100 to 75.2.

The industry opposes discriminatory legislation that would undercut prestige, quality assurance, brand loyalty and prescriber confidence--factors that with drugs, as with all products, give some advantage to innovators over imitators.

There are two reasons--apart from those of equity--why such discriminatory treatment would be unwise: First, drug product quality is not always uniform, and differences in quality may have serious consequences. (See BRANDS/GENERICS.) Second, as the costs of R&D esca-

late, (See RESEARCH) there simply are not enough new patentable drugs to provide the income base for the continuing R&D and full-service burden.

Patent protection varies around the world in kind, degree and length. Only a handful of countries, notably Italy, have no patents at all for drugs. Compulsory licensing provisions, common to many nations, are aimed primarily at protecting home markets from foreign domination. In fact, however, this form of licensing in pharmaceuticals has not been employed much in any of the more developed countries.

An exception is Canada, which has had such licensing since 1969. Only 2 of 125 applications have been refused, and 92 licenses have been granted for 35 different chemical entities, including most of the largest selling drugs "protected" by Canadian patent. Lower overall retail drug prices have not resulted. Rather, the law has led to some proliferation of low quality, substandard imports and copies on the Canadian market, as well as to a decline in R&D.

In Europe, 21 Western European nations in 1973 signed the European Patent Convention to establish European patent rights and a uniform 20-year patent term for new drugs. This treaty is in the process of ratification.

In summary, to the extent that patent experience of other countries is at all relevant to the U.S., the trend is to strengthen protection for pharmaceuticals. Industrialized states rarely weaken their patent systems and thereby undercut incentive for their own R&D. For the U.S. to do so would be to place this country on a par with the least technologically advanced nations who must await research breakthroughs elsewhere because they lack the resources to sustain a modern R&D capability of their own.

\*Firestone Testimony, Monopoly Subcommittee, Senate Select Small Business Committee, Dec. 19, 1967.

### **Subject 5: RESEARCH**

For the past three decades, the American pharmaceutical industry has dominated the quest of science for new pharmaceutical agents to fight disease. It has attained success in many areas, yet the range of health

needs still to be met remains massive. Hence the direction and magnitude of the industry's R&D efforts--its fundamental dynamics--are of critical social importance in an increasingly complex scientific and regulatory climate.

The industry commitment to R&D is both major and unique. The 23,000 scientists and support personnel in the 70-plus companies that do drug (and much of the device and diagnostic product) research in the U.S., comprise an enormous national and world asset. It is a fully integrated technological resource built up over many years for developing the medical products of tomorrow.

Industry R&D expenditures in 1974 surpassed the \$1 billion landmark. About 80 percent of this money went into basic research and into R&D on new therapies, primarily in the difficult cancer, cardiovascular and central nervous system areas. The remainder was spent on seeking improvements in existing products, i.e. reducing side effects, new dosage forms requested by doctors, etc.

The chemistry of living systems is tremendously complicated; hence the search for new drugs is complex and not always predictable. Even a very small change in the configuration of a molecule can make a profound difference, and long series of minor steps with few giant strides mark the history of drug progress.

Most of today's drugs are molecular modifications of earlier, less safe and less effective compounds. For example, some 300 variants of the sulfonamides followed the original breakthrough, and they are still being modified. Sometimes a slight molecular variation can be important not only within one therapeutic category, but across others. For example, thiazide diuretics, which changed the outlook for hypertension, have sulfa drugs as their ancestor compounds.

Pharmaceutical company R&D remains the key source of new products. In 1973 and 1974, 35 of the 37 new chemical entities introduced to medicine came from industrial laboratories,\* even though it now takes on the average about \$11 million and 7 years (1972 estimate) to bring a new entity from discovery to market

ing (compared to \$1.2 million and two years in 1962). And this figure does not include the cost of failures.

The patent and the trademark are the instruments that protect innovation and thereby stimulate new product development. Such protection is indispensable if the concept of industrial research is to have meaning to management, to investors and to society at large. (See PATENTS.)

The relation of drug prices to research is also fundamental. Attempts to drive down drug prices at any cost, if successful, would exact another social cost--diversion of private investment from R&D into other activities. Government, which now devotes little attention to the new drug area and contributes only about 1 percent of the industry's R&D expenditures, is not in a position to fill the gap.

Fortunately, there are favorable facets to the future of drug research, primarily the continuing commitment of the industry and the slow but steady growth of new knowledge about disease entities and therapies that are or could be treating them.

But there are unsettling aspects as well. Impediments to the skillful management of innovation carry their own social and economic costs; therapy delayed is therapy denied.

Government activities and regulations profoundly influence pathways to constructive research. In no other field of technology does regulation affect the innovative process so early in the research sequence. Too much regulation tends to force abandonment of interesting compounds at the first sign of difficulty. Increasing stringency at every stage, layers of constraints added over the years, have fostered a decade of slowdown in new drug introductions.

The blame, if blame there is, rests on many factors, involving not only regulation but a shift in focus to the more intractable diseases, the advancing sophistication of drug research and higher R&D costs.

Despite extensive animal toxicity studies and trials in man, there prevails at times an overly conservative insistence on something close to "absolute" safety--an unobtainable ideal--and hence to a

waste of valuable scientific time and money.

The sensitivity of regulatory decisions is multiplied many times over as, repeatedly, a judgment must be made that includes balancing risks against benefits. This is why the industry approves many steps the Food and Drug Administration has taken and is continuing to take to broaden the base of expertise at its command by making more use of external advisory groups and consultants. Also essential is constant communication between drug firms and FDA.

Shrinking research productivity remains a troublesome concern, especially since better drug therapy holds the highest promise of reducing costs in the more expensive areas of health care delivery. Moreover, when a new drug's approval is delayed or denied because of some potential risk, older drugs that may be less safe or effective will still be used.

Whatever the reasons, sponsorship of new drug research is narrowing and shifting. The number of firms introducing new drugs in this decade is two-thirds less than a decade ago. From 1940 to 1970, U.S. firms originated 70 percent of the new drugs introduced in the U.S. From 1971 to 1973, they originated only 37 percent.

Moreover, the German, Swiss, British, Japanese, French and Swedish pharmaceutical industries are rapidly increasing their R&D investments. R&D spending abroad by U.S.-based firms has more than doubled since 1971 (for cost and regulatory reasons). In 1974 many of the first clinical trials of American-originated drugs were being conducted outside the U.S., particularly in the U.K. and Germany.

Government, industry and the scientific community share a common need to improve the inherently slow and cumbersome process of drug research, particularly in its clinical phases. No one questions the need for a comprehensive system of ethical principles, regulations and controls, or of sets of values that must prevail among sponsors, investigators, involved institutions and government. Despite the constraints placed upon drug innovation, there exists no socially acceptable alter-

native in the U.S. to the present system of drug regulation.

However, such an elaborate system, relatively new to science, must not become entrenched in its own orthodoxy. It should remain flexible and open to incremental improvements that do not violate the essential unity of the research process, or needlessly prolong the time required to develop and approve new medicines, devices and diagnostic products.

\*Paul DeHaven, Inc.

## **Subject 6: PROMOTION**

In America today prescription drug product promotion is perhaps the most carefully scrutinized and regulated form of promotion. It is closely monitored by the Food and Drug Administration. The FDA exacts heavy penalties, including "corrective" ad campaigns and special letters from advertisers to doctors, to rectify what it considers to be infractions of its regulations.

Promotion is costly. Marketing costs tend to be heavy for industries characterized by high technology, strong competition, many products, and frequent innovation in an open, pluralistic information system. The pharmaceutical industry meets all these criteria.

In 1974 one audit of marketing expenditures\* totalled \$499,618,000, composed of \$115,245,000 for medical journals ads, \$36,568,000 for direct mail and \$347,804,000 for detailing to the health professions. Another survey\*\*, covering additional expenses, estimated a grand total of \$682,074,000 for 1972.

Demand for prescription drugs has been rising much faster than promotional expenditures. Domestic sales climbed 66 percent, from \$3.7 billion to \$6.7 billion between 1967 and 1975, while direct promotional expenditures\*\*\*, in rising from \$434 million to \$501 million, increased by only 15 percent.

Drug companies are required--by law, regulation and medical ethics --to dispense an unusual volume of complex technical information to critical and highly trained audiences that are under relentless demands to stay abreast of the knowledge explosion. New drugs tend to be more sophisticated and more specific than medicines of the past; hence physicians, dentists, pharma-

cists and nurses require more information about their use.

Estimates of promotional costs per physician are often exaggerated, however, by ignoring other elements of marketing, including promotion to pharmacists and other health professionals.

The entire cost of prescription drug promotion is carried by the manufacturer. Unlike many other industries, there is no sharing of advertising costs by retailers or wholesalers.

Marketing budgets also include varied company programs such as teaching films, a great many with little or no direct product reference; books, atlases, brochures, monographs, learning systems, patient aids, manuals, audio cassette tapes and other materials that contribute to the continuing education of health professionals; and symposia, seminars, meetings and exhibits, or other education aids, all advancing medical knowledge.

Drug firms use modern techniques to achieve every possible savings in the marketing mix, while still providing essential information.

Computer technology, for example, has sharply improved direct mail and sampling efficiency. Data storage systems can catalog physician interests and preferences proficiently; hence the circulation of an average mailing was reduced from about 55,000 in 1959 to under 20,000 by 1974.

Total volume of direct mail advertising declined by 64 percent from 1959 to 1973. The typical busy practitioner received an average of 3.4 pieces of some kind of medical mail per day in 1974--probably less than his other commercially oriented mail. Surveys show that more than 50 percent of all medical mail is read.

Over the past five years, there has been a dramatic decrease in unsolicited mail samples. Total mail sampling volume decreased from nearly 82 million sample packages in 1969 to 38 million in 1973.

While dollar expenditures for journal advertising increased 18 percent from 1966 to 1970, the number of advertising pages carried by medical journals decreased 22 percent in the same time period.

In recent years, the training

required of sales representatives has intensified with the continuing development of company standards, better learning systems, the growing sophistication of drug products and the needs of health professionals. (PMA guidelines on the training of sales representatives are available on request.)

Promotion makes possible a highly competitive marketplace. It sharply reduces the time needed to inform the health professions about new products, or to provide new information about old products. It enables companies to convey their extensive expertise about their own products--a major factor that aids physician and patient. It enhances the two-way flow of information between research laboratories and the professions. It adds another dimension to postgraduate education in many areas, especially in the field of drug and device therapy. It provides physicians with knowledge of alternative therapies, which is so essential to good medical practice.

\*IMS, Ambler, PA.

\*\*Professional Market Research, Philadelphia, PA.

\*\*\*Excludes Market Research and Administration

#### Subject 7:

### INTERNATIONAL

The international sales of the U.S. pharmaceutical industry have been growing faster than domestic sales for several decades. More than 30 leading U.S. pharmaceutical companies serve scores of markets overseas. Smaller firms to varying degrees engage in export, licensing, manufacturing and distribution in many lands.

About 35 percent of the total sales volume of PMA companies now flows from business outside the U.S. About 15 percent of U.S. industry R&D now takes place abroad.

Few American industries contribute as much to America's global commercial role in proportion to their size as does the pharmaceutical industry. Yet basic questions arise:

1. Why invest overseas? U.S. drug companies produce and/or market their products in some 145 nations. Foreign tariff or nontariff barriers, the peculiarities of local demand and competition from third country and local laboratories frequently make it mandatory that these

companies either manufacture abroad in accordance with local requirements or abandon the markets.

Remittance of earnings from sales made abroad, payments for bulk ingredients shipped to foreign subsidiaries, other exports, royalties derived from the licensing of technology and fees for management and other services contribute impressively to the U.S. balance of payments. Pharmaceutical exports provide a four-to-one positive balance of trade. Thus the U.S. drug industry overseas serves the national interest.

2. Are U.S. jobs exported? Not by the pharmaceutical industry. On the contrary, thousands of domestic jobs are created by foreign operations. Exports to subsidiaries and to third parties account for 18.6 percent of foreign sales (1974). Plants overseas import parts and equipment from the U.S.—plus such intangibles as patent rights, manufacturing and technical know-how and other knowledge that, together with the necessary machinery, embody the term "technology transfer."

3. Does foreign investment serve the host economy? While the U.S. economy obviously benefits, the economies of the host countries, where the subsidiary plants are located, benefit as well. The host countries gain employment and technological and business training which helps other sectors of the economy. They obtain immediate access to medicines essential to their health programs, often (though not always) at a saving of foreign exchange required to import finished drug products. Their tax revenue increases, and their supply and service industries grow.

4. What about drug prices overseas? It is certainly true that they differ, sometimes markedly, from country to country and from prices in the United States. So do the prices for everything else, from bread to automobiles. Drug prices in each country are affected by variables ranging from tariffs and taxes to wage rates and distribution costs. In many instances, government agencies decide profit limits, foreign equity ownership, operation control, product licensing and other factors that enter into price-setting procedures.

Affiliates and subsidiaries must market medicines at prices geared to local incomes or government programs—no small feat amid worldwide inflation.

Prior to 1971 when the dollar was overvalued abroad, foreign prices of identical products were lower, on the average, when expressed in dollars. Two devaluations (1971 and 1973) increased the dollar equivalent of foreign prices. One major U.S. drug firm reported in 1973 that the average of the prices for the same products in all foreign markets was higher than its U.S. prices, when translated into dollars at the new exchange rates.

Even where prices are lower than in the U.S., every purchase helps to keep U.S. prices down by contributing in some measure to the cost of research and other overhead.

5. Are drug industry operations overseas beyond government control? Hardly. They comply with the laws of every country in which they do business. U.S. companies observe U.S. antitrust laws in their overseas operations (a constraint some other developed nations do not impose). For the drug industry, individual laws on research, registration, marketing, advertising, labeling and other facets of business are innumerable, and vary as widely as social, commercial and medical customs in health care.

Many non-U.S. multinational companies are active and growing. Astute foreign governments give every advantage to their own multinationals, notably in the tax treatment of foreign earnings, which is generally more liberal than in the U.S. tax code. U.S. multinationals are now subject to taxation in the country in which the profit is earned and in the U.S. when it is repatriated.

Some critics insist that the United States impose the full U.S. tax on unremitted foreign earnings, thus making the U.S. the only country not allowing the right of deferral until earnings are actually received. Others propose abolishing the credit on taxes paid to other countries, which would result in substantial double taxation.

These issues are complex, yet perhaps no single allegation is so misplaced as that of the so-called

"exploitation" of developing countries. Ironically, the drug industry brings to these nations the latest products to cure and contain disease. About 60 percent of its plants overseas can be found in the less developed countries, where medical needs are greatest.

#### Subject 8:

### ADVERSE DRUG REACTIONS

In hearings of the Senate Health Subcommittee in 1974 on the quality of medical care, allegations were made that:

- Adverse drug reactions cause 30,000, 75,000, 100,000 or even 140,000 deaths each year in U.S. hospitals.
- 1,500,000 hospital admissions annually are caused by adverse drug reactions, most of them avoidable.
- A basic factor in these alleged deaths and hospitalizations lies in "over-promotion" of prescription drugs and consequent "irrational" or "excessive" prescribing.

So we have two questions: How many deaths actually occur annually due to preventable adverse drug reactions, and to what extent can they be attributed to "promotional excesses of the drug industry?"

The estimates of 30,000 to 140,000 ADR deaths appear to be based on a single study, that of the Boston Collaborative Drug Surveillance Program, extrapolated in erroneous ways.

Most of the deaths reported in the initial Boston study involved critically, even terminally ill patients. Estimates of these deaths were extrapolated to total hospital admissions (30 million annually) rather than to the logical universe of admissions to the medical services (one-fifth the total, or approximately 6 million.)

With 6 million medical service admissions annually, deaths associated with ADRs may fall somewhere between 6,000 and 11,000, based on the sample in the Boston study. However, at least two-thirds of the patients in that sample had critical or terminal illnesses. It would therefore appear reasonable to suggest a qualified annual estimate of 2,000 to 3,000 drug-related hospital deaths in patients suffering from apparently nonlethal diseases.

(Statistics published in 1972 by the National Center for Health Statistics show that almost 1,900 out of a total of 2,352 deaths resulted from accidental poisoning, with "Surgical and Medical Complications and Misadventures" accounting for only 466.)

The estimate of 1.5 million hospital admissions annually due to ADRs was originally derived from a limited study. However, in 1969 the Commission on Professional and Hospital Activities reported that the number of patients admitted ". . . with a final diagnosis explaining admission" of "adverse effects with medicinal agents" was 53,119. This study was based on records from admissions to a third of all U.S. hospitals. This would compute to approximately 160,000 yearly hospitalizations--not deaths--for drug induced illness, one-tenth of a widely quoted estimate.

In weighing the thesis of industry promotion as a cause of ADRs, these factors should be considered:

- The overwhelming majority of ADRs involve not only older drugs but those that are rarely promoted.
- No evidence was reported in the BCG study that use of any drug involved was inappropriate.
- Physicians balance risk vs. benefit of the drug therapy with the nature or degree of illness.
- Heroic measures are sometimes tried to assist critically ill patients.
- Promotion for prescription drugs is confined strictly to FDA-approved claims.

Further restrictions on pharmaceutical promotion would have little or no effect on ADR incidence. In the October 12, 1974, New England Journal of Medicine, a member of the BCG, Hershel Jick, M.D., stated,

"We conclude that, despite some alarming gross numbers, most drugs are remarkably nontoxic. We do not have an urgent epidemic of drug toxicity requiring crash programs of correction."

In reaching this conclusion, Dr. Jick noted:

"In hospitalized medical patients, adverse reactions result from about 5 percent of drug exposures. The majority are self-limiting and of little consequence to the clinical course

of the patients. Serious adverse reactions are uncommon . . ."

A study on "Adverse Drug Reactions in the United States," undertaken by a group of distinguished pharmacologists under the sponsorship of Medicine in the Public Interest, was published in December, 1974.

Its conclusions:

1. Current estimates of the magnitude and cost of the adverse reaction problem are completely unreliable because they are derived from a data base that is incomplete, unrepresentative and uncontrolled . . .
2. The majority of reported ADRs are minor functional gastrointestinal disturbances . . .
3. The available data fail to identify the underlying factors that lead to ADRs . . .
4. Many fatalities allegedly attributed to adverse reactions occur in gravely ill patients . . .
5. Most reported fatal drug reactions seem to be due to older, standard drugs.
6. Hospitalizations associated with legitimately used drugs are probably less frequent than hospitalizations from alcohol abuse, illicit drug usage, suicide attempts and accidental poisoning.
7. Most reactions are difficult to categorize unequivocally as to cause . . .

The pharmaceutical industry and the medical profession have an abiding interest in defining both the scope and the nature of the ADR problem and in finding ways to reduce this threat to patient well-being. Even one death resulting from an adverse drug reaction is one too many. Thus educational and other efforts to solve the problem are expanding.

The PMA Foundation, for example, was established in 1965 to promote the betterment of public health through scientific and medical research, with emphasis on encouraging research and careers in clinical pharmacology and related fields. The Foundation is almost entirely supported by the voluntary contributions of PMA member companies--\$6.5 million since 1965. (Copies of the PMA Foundation Annual Report are available on request.)

#### Subject 9:

### THE MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE COST CONTROVERSY

"It rests on a foundation that is unsupportable in science, defective in economics and capricious in law."

That is the way the PMA expressed its position on a three-part regulation--published in final form by the Department of HEW on July 31, 1975--to establish price ceilings for certain drugs reimbursed under some federal programs. PMA has stated that the proposal, the Maximum Allowable Cost (MAC) plan, would not be feasible or lawful and would "unmistakably work against the public interest" because:

1. Chemically equivalent products are not always therapeutically equivalent.
2. FDA cannot assure the quality, safety and effectiveness of all formulations of currently marketed multi-source drugs that would come under the program; the agency lacks the resources to inspect all drug plants regularly and to do quality checks on any substantial number of drugs.
3. Professional prerogatives are poorly protected under MAC.
4. In the long run, research and quality-based manufacturers and other responsible elements of the pharmaceutical complex will have difficulty in operating efficiently and innovatively under a "lowest price" reimbursement system.
5. Direct and indirect costs of such a system could exceed any possible savings.

Recognizing that economy in government is desirable, PMA suggested an alternative plan that would:

1. Provide doctors and pharmacists with meaningful retail and manufacturers price data, in given locales, to stimulate more price competition.
2. Provide doctors and pharmacists with drug product quality and service information to aid them in prescribing and dispensing.
3. Institute a system of peer review of drug prescribing and dispensing to monitor prescription drug services under HEW programs.

The MAC philosophy appears to be

based on the acceptance of minimal standards. It overlooks the values of new product research and the need to encourage excellence in producing and improving existing drugs, as well as the quality and service elements provided by wholesalers and pharmacists. The American approach to drug reimbursement should offer rewards for excellence. If the marketplace is not allowed to give preference to the products of known quality over those which purport to meet only minimum standards, there will be no incentive to excel.

In June 1975, FDA proposed sweeping new regulations aimed at setting standards for all drugs and officially gave notice that such standards may be needed for at least 193 drug dosage forms. The process of developing such standards of drug quality and manufacturing competence, and the capacity to enforce them, will consume many months--and more likely, years.

Two days after the MAC regulations were published, the FDA was permanently enjoined from permitting "me-too" drug products to reach the market without approved new drug applications--a verdict the PMA supports. The U.S. District Court noted there are an estimated 5 to 13 imitators on the market for each original product with an approved new drug application.

A major concern has been expressed repeatedly by the pharmaceutical industry over the effect of the proposed MAC regulations on incentives to research, develop and improve its products. If the government forces the market to rely only on the least expensive drugs and devices available, the research-based segment of the industry will eventually be hard-pressed to carry on its \$1 billion-a-year R&D effort. Enactment of the proposal would, in time, tend to push the industry toward commodity supplier status, with a diminishing capability to perform innovative research.

Such a complex and controversial approach as MAC, unprecedented as it is in national health programs, faces severe opposition from those most affected--not only from pharmaceutical firms but also from medicine and pharmacy.

Any MAC plan by itself will have little overall short-term impact on

the economics of the industry. Even HEW estimates of supposed savings apply only to a miniscule portion of the market. Nevertheless, MAC represents a significant departure from the Ford administration's stated intent to avoid the creation of new bureaucracies and to make competitive forces work more effectively in the marketplace. In that sense MAC represents a new order of unacceptable, excessive federal regulatory control.

(Copies of an extensive PMA critique of MAC are available on request.)

#### Subject 10:

### THE ANTISUBSTITUTION CONTROVERSY

Why are there campaigns in various states to repeal patient protection laws that require pharmacists to dispense the particular brand of drug prescribed by the doctor?

Primarily, elements of pharmacy, the consumer movement and labor have advocated repeal of these laws based upon three suppositions: (1) that consumer savings will result; (2) that the FDA can assure the quality and equivalence of multi-source drugs; and (3) that the professionalism of the pharmacist will be enhanced by allowing him, instead of the doctor, to make certain product selections.

In general, the medical profession, the pharmaceutical industry and some segments of pharmacy support antisubstitution laws and statutes that were passed--mostly in the 1950's--to protect consumers against unauthorized changes in prescriptions.

As of the fall of 1975, 42 states had antisubstitution laws or regulations. In the last few years, Michigan, Maryland, Massachusetts, Kentucky, Oregon, Arkansas, Minnesota and California have repealed or modified their statutes to permit some form of drug substitution without the consent of the doctor.

Such changes are unwise for a number of reasons. The pharmacist is highly knowledgeable about drugs in general, but the doctor has highly developed clinical experience with specific products and knows the patient's condition as well. Hence it is advisable for the choice of both the drug and the particular

product to remain in the doctor's hands.

Physicians welcome the advice of pharmacists in choosing specific dosage forms, in avoiding incompatibilities and in selecting economical products from quality sources. In consultation with pharmacists they normally permit changes, but few wish to relinquish their prerogative to consent or reject in advance.

Even most advocates of repeal agree on the basic principle of physician control over drug product selection and would allow doctors to specify "no substitution," or "dispense as written" in their own handwriting on the prescription form. However, such a provision is cumbersome and negative, requiring the prescriber to reaffirm an obvious intention. The doctor seeks to guard against variations in bio-availability which may be caused by physiologic differences in patients or by variations in manufacturing processes or ingredients. Mere failure to act in some cases would permit the pharmacist to substitute unilaterally and run counter to the traditional cooperation of the two professions and to the welfare of the patient.

A fundamental flaw in the repeal argument concerns drug equivalence.

While the overall quality of the nation's drug supply is excellent, experience and competence vary among producers and distributors. No longer is there any doubt that important therapeutic differences exist among some drug products with the same active ingredients marketed by different firms. The FDA lacks the capability--now and in the foreseeable future--to assure the uniform quality of all available drug products.

Regardless of what transpires in law or regulation, doctors and pharmacists will insist that patients get the highest quality medicines and will prescribe and dispense accordingly.

Finally, the promise of savings to consumers is illusory. Purchasers already benefit by price competition among producers of multi-source products, and the competitive market system--not the freedom to substitute--will continue to keep prices at moderate levels. After all,

these prices have remained moderate for decades, on average, because of price and therapeutic competition. (See PRICES.)

Exaggerated claims of potential savings are usually based on comparisons between the highest and lowest list prices of some multiple-source drugs. For a variety of reasons, such comparisons are poor guides for potential savings at retail.

Moreover, no consumer savings have been documented where modifications of the law have been in effect for some time. Canada has had even longer experience with drug substitution, with no apparent savings.

Other cost factors cannot be dismissed, either. Some substitution legislation creates its own offsetting bureaucratic expenses, such as developing and distributing lists of supposedly equivalent drugs--thereby adding to taxpayer burdens.

In short, the repeal of these consumer protection laws would inevitably increase patient risks, erode physicians' control over the precise products they determine their patients need, and save little or no money for consumers.

#### Subject 11:

### THE UNDERMEDICATED SOCIETY

It's hardly news that this country has had a drug problem for some years--the excessive use of illegal and even certain legal drugs in city and suburb alike. But another drug problem continues to exist largely unnoticed: not enough use of necessary, even life-sustaining drug therapy in these same places. Lives and health are lost either way. Drug abuse continues to be a serious social problem, but the nonuse problem needs attention, too.

Many Americans today are under-medicated, even un-medicated.\*

- \* Of an estimated 25 million Americans with hypertension, only 15 to 25 percent receive drugs in adequate amounts.
- \* Of an estimated 4.4 million Americans with diabetes, more than 1.6 million are not even aware they have the disease.
- \* Of 50 million Americans with arthritis, only one in four is even under a doctor's care.
- \* Of an estimated 2.5 million cases of venereal disease, well over a

million are untreated.

- \* An estimated 20 million Americans suffer from some form of mental or emotional disorder, yet only 10 to 15 percent are receiving treatment. Mental hospital readmission rates for patients who do not remain on medication are four times as great as for those who take medications as prescribed.
- \* Polio immunizations in pre-school children have fallen from their one-time high of 88 percent to 63 percent, and only 43 million youngsters have been immunized against rubella.
- \* Each year, thousands of adults contract mumps--yet a single shot of a vaccine can prevent mumps and its side effects.

This undermedication phenomenon, which is not unique to the United States, exists for a variety of reasons. Some people do not seek medical attention because they do not recognize disease symptoms, are concerned about the cost of care or lack access to a physician. Language barriers and cultural or religious beliefs deter still others from seeking help.

Noncompliance with physicians' instructions--another cause of undermedication--results from such factors as poor communications between doctor and patient, misunderstanding or non-comprehension, carelessness or just plain forgetfulness.

Statistics have frequently been misinterpreted by those who contend the American people are overmedicated. For example, overall production and consumption increases for prescription medicines do not automatically point to greater usage by individuals. On a per capita basis, Americans received an average of 6.5 prescriptions in 1973, compared to 5.7 in 1960. This increase is unremarkable in that people are receiving more medical treatment because of (1) more sophisticated diagnostic procedures and new drug entities to treat previously untreatable conditions, (2) more publicly funded programs, bringing care to people who had little or none, (3) more persons in age groups that require the most treatment, (4) changing patterns in treatment, from in-patient to out-patient care or (5) changes in federal regulations to require

new prescriptions instead of refills.

Current production of pharmaceuticals or numbers of prescriptions, therefore, may not be providing all Americans with anywhere near optimal medical care--not when millions of persons suffer incapacitation and risk of premature death because they are untreated. For many of them, medicines would be an important part of treatment.

\*Source: All to be provided on request.

#### Subject 12:

### PMA POLICY POSITIONS

A long prevailing myth is that the prescription drug industry opposes needed legislation. Actually, the industry endorsed the landmark 1962 legislation requiring premarketing proof of efficacy, and it worked with the Drug Research Board of the National Academy of Sciences to design and implement the review of the effectiveness of pre-1962 drugs. It supported the drug abuse control laws of 1965 and 1970. It currently supports pending legislation governing medical devices and diagnostics. In 1974 and 1975, PMA proposed tougher federal standards for manufacturing, quality assurance, clinical research, service and marketing operations.

Thus PMA supports federal legislation that would:

1. Outlaw prizes, premiums or items of value given to the health professions as incentives or rewards for the prescribing or dispensing of a manufacturer's products;
2. Outlaw inspection of prescription files by company representatives;
3. Assure that samples of prescription products are distributed only on written request, with rigorous recordkeeping;
4. Require that a manufacturer's facilities be inspected and certified before any products are shipped, that they be recertified through inspection each year, that all products carry expiration dates and whenever feasible a firm's identifying mark and that FDA certify company recordkeeping, product recall capabilities and adverse drug reporting systems;
5. Require documentation in matters of bioavailability and thera-

- peutic equivalence;
6. Require that the name of the manufacturer appear on every product label when it differs from that of the distributor. (As provided in S.2621, 94th Congress.)

An increasingly complex regulatory system governs clinical research, which also involves ethical imperatives of the highest importance. PMA endorses the fundamentally sound objectives of federal regulations and has formulated policy positions within this regulatory framework.

On July 11, 1975, PMA submitted to the Health Subcommittee of the Senate Labor and Public Welfare Committee 13 recommendations on clinical research. The statement included:

- A group of operational guidelines designed to ensure the protection of subjects of clinical investigations, including prisoners and company employee participants.

- A series of proposals to facilitate the research process constructively without jeopardizing the subjects of clinical trials.
- A recommendation that two specific studies, by multi-disciplined panels, define policies governing human participation in drug research.
- Identification of aspects of the innovative process and its regulations which need systematic study to improve procedures where the optimum course is not evident now.

PMA has taken other measures designed to advance the proficiency, standards and technology of the industry. Among these is the establishment of a nine-member commission representing pharmacy, medicine and the industry which has prepared guidelines for training programs for companies' professional representatives.

(Complete copies of PMA Policy Positions are available on request from PMA)

## THE PHARMACEUTICAL MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION

The Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association is a nonprofit scientific and professional organization representing 131 companies that have been responsible for the introduction of more than 90 percent of the significant pharmaceutical products developed over recent decades in the U.S. and Western Europe.

## Whatever happened to the natural gas crisis?

*continued from page 34*

sue. There had been a puzzling Peter Hart poll, reported Shannon, showing that although 81 percent of the American people rejected "socialism," they had thought by 44 percent to 42 percent that "public ownership" of oil and natural gas was "a good idea." It was one of the thorny, confusing issues we faced, but Shannon was then on to other matters. Few reporters or editorial writers seemed interested in going after the several questions left dangling. Have our most vital natural resources been somehow pirated by corporations? If not, why the public plurality, at least in the Hart poll, to expropriate them if no one else? What have we learned after nearly a century of government regulation of business, from Grover Cleveland to Gerald Ford, about the most productive and publicly equitable mix of economic control and liberty? Do necessary exploration and exploitation have to mean spiraling prices? What are the alternatives? Would "public ownership" end up costing as much in tax money as we now pay into corporate budgets, and what would it gain us? What are other countries doing, in Europe, Latin America, Asia, to husband their natural riches? What more do we need to know to decide these questions? How is the decision likely to be made if we make it in the manner we usually employ for these issues?

But behind these questions was one basic to all: what is the natural gas "shortage," how and why did it happen, and who is responsible? To that question and the others there was, and has been, no answer; or virtually none. (A recent exception is Robert Sherrill's "The Natural Gas Swindle," which appeared in the January 24 issue of *The Nation*.)

The natural gas coverage left serious doubts about the media's basic capacity to deal with such sensitive and complicated resource issues. "We've been dismayed," said one senator with experience in journalism. "When you start debating an issue like this, nobody in the press seems to know or care what you're talking about." A press secretary to another senator, one of the principal protagonists in the debate, gave an even

sharper verdict. He recalled having to "brief" reporters prior to his senator's press conferences. "You had to sit down with these guys for thirty minutes beforehand just so they could even ask a question. I know that's a kind of manipulation, but they'd come to me asking 'What is this stuff, anyway?' If I didn't brief them, I had the impression they'd never have written anything."

One reporter recalled that his editors had treated the issue with a kind of weary resignation produced by the oil shortage. "Nobody got very excited," he said. "It was just one more part of the energy squeeze." For those editors and many others whose editorials often linked the oil and natural gas problems as if they were identical, it seemed to make little difference that natural gas was not in the hands of Persian Gulf sheiks or the Shah of Iran, but of American corporations, working largely on federal land, responsible to U.S. law and the public interest.

**T**here were also more alarming judgments from within the media about the failure to cover the gas problem. In some quarters, for example, there is an apparent condescension toward the public that may create or at least rationalize shallow journalism. "I don't think our readers could absorb all the detail you're talking about here," said one editor, "and furthermore I don't think they want to." At least one well-known reporter, who insisted he not be quoted by name, thought some of the failure went to the heart of his profession. "You have to remember," he said, "that there's basically a community of interest between great newspapers and networks and big business. They all fear federal regulation. I'm not saying papers are overtly pro-business; they're not. But they don't feel comfortable crusading on a problem like this." Another reporter, who works for a paper that took a firm editorial position advocating deregulation, added: "There wasn't a lot of incentive in the newsroom to go after the corporate fraud angle, if you know what I mean."

In most cases, however, the lack of analysis and investigation in the gas

issue is probably due to more banal factors — the tendency to ask only "what's happening today?", to trim stories at the expense of background information, to rely too much on official statements. Then there is the considerable problem of too few journalists with the economic experience or training, as well as the fortitude, to pursue sometimes dry and twisting trails through official statistics or corporate reports — journalists who would not have to ask the Senate aide, "What is this stuff, anyway?"

There is still time for the media to give the gas problem the coverage it deserves. That means a sweeping investigation of the gas industry, the regulatory bureaucracy, and the tangled politics of price decontrol from the 1954 Supreme Court decision to the 1975 Senate bill. Reporters will have to seek out independent sources, experts at universities, and perhaps the ex-officials and former company executives now in retirement, who know the trends, the people, the practical problems in the production of our most important fuel. And they will have to scrape past the partisan surfaces for the inside sources, the dissenters and quiet consciences who are the potential whistle-blowers for the public interest inside both government and business.

"News" in this age of resource crises can no longer be what happens today in Congress or the White House, which is something like the images of light reaching earth from a distant star. The issues in the Senate debate were results of decisions and events that occurred in the gas industry years ago, and visible to the naked eye, without the magnification of good journalism, only now. So, too, tomorrow's energy and resources crises are being shaped by what happens today. For journalists to wait for those events to have their perhaps irremediable effect on all of us is to fail in a basic responsibility to the public.

The stakes are vast. The prizewinning stories are almost certainly there. But they will be gotten only if journalism can break out of the conventional approach and negligence that have thus far given the coverage of the natural gas "shortage" those embarrassing quotation marks. ■

**R**eporters who question politicians on busing have a great effect on public understanding. Some questions they ask raise the level of understanding. Some lower it. It may be helpful to provide some questions not now being asked.

There are at least three questions that lower the level of public discourse.

□ "Are you for busing, or against it?"

Two assumptions are reinforced by such a question. The first is that busing is a matter of absolutes. *Yes* or *no*. As if the issue involved in different cities, in different circumstances, can be covered with one across-the-board answer. The second assumption is that a *yes* or *no* answer provides a litmus test that measures sympathy for the black struggle.

It is a mistake to equate opinions on busing with racial sympathy, or liberal-conservative politics. A Gallup poll in the late summer of 1975 showed that over 60 percent of all who call themselves liberal opposed busing. Busing arose as an "instrument" of integration (to quote from the Democratic party platform of recent years). Normally, instruments are judged according to how they work. Practicality, not ideology, is the standard.


□ *Is your present position on busing consistent with your past position?* In a brief interview, this question seems designed to expose political hot air. Yet new evidence has been pouring in each year on busing. The nation has had twenty-two years of experience since the *Brown* decision of 1954. Much research has been concluded. Much more is known than was known in 1954. The continuing black migration northward has dramatically changed the character of many school systems in the two decades since 1954. An old saying is especially true on this issue today: consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds.

□ *Do you agree with Governor Wallace on busing?* This is a loaded question. Why not ask (to name another critic of busing), "Do you agree with Harvard social scientist Nathan Glazer on busing?"

George Wallace is fond of intimating that at last, after ten years, the mainstream is joining him. But those op-

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*Michael Novak, who teaches moral philosophy, writes on social and cultural subjects.*



# BUSING RECONSIDERED

Journalists, politicians, judges, and lawyers have bought the conventional wisdom. What if it is wrong?

by MICHAEL NOVAK

posed to busing are a larger and different group than those supporting Wallace. The white European immigrants of 1880-1924 whose families today strongly oppose busing have traditionally been progressive voters, mainly Democrats or independents. Primarily, they were Jews and Catholics, groups that have been relatively resistant to Wallace: in November 1968, George Wallace won barely 1 percent of Jewish voters, and only 7.7 percent of Catholic voters, but 16 percent of all Protestant voters. Again in the 1972 primaries, Wallace characteristically did better among Protestant voters, often rural, than among Catholics and Jews (though

it was newsworthy for him to get as many non-Protestants as he did). Wallace and his voters carry a cultural tradition that worries Jews and Catholics. It makes them suspicious of Wallace, as if he might turn on *them* next. In South Boston, according to soundings taken last fall by Patrick Caddell and reported by Evans and Novak, anti-busing Catholics were distinctly cool to Wallace as a presidential candidate.

Unlike stories of the Freedom Riders or the C.I.A. hearings, busing is a story that does not center in one place. Busing is a local story, affecting courts and school districts one by one, in different ways, at different times. Yet national

reporters sweep from scene to scene in fifty seconds or a few paragraphs. We miss the continuous scrutiny, the cynical and investigative coverage of decision makers (including pro-busing decision makers) that is present in national reporting at its best. Without such coverage, the local story seems cast merely as black vs. white. Except in local and seemingly partisan conflicts, there is seldom much attention paid to the new evidence on busing — evidence about school achievement, racial attitudes in the schools, and the daily experience of the black and white families involved.

In few stories is the distinction between local and national perspective so crucial to the actual events — for the busing story is often a story about the difference between what we think we are doing in lofty national terms and what is actually being done in local neighborhoods to real people, black and white. Journalists are not alone in ignoring the messy realities and negative evidence involved in busing; political leaders, academic experts, and vested interests (pro and con) prefer clichés to actual happenings. But journalists can report the less than lofty side of the story, and they should, I think, if only to make it easier for politicians, courts, and legislatures to acknowledge openly, without name calling and without fear of name calling, the facts of social structure, race, national origin, and class in America's diverse communities.

**T**here are four different regions and social structures in which busing has been ordered in the United States. The first is that of the slave states. The second is that of the border states, in an arc around the Deep South, from Texas through Kansas, Missouri, southern Illinois, and eastward through West Virginia and Maryland. The third includes those regions of the central states and the West, in which the twentieth-century migration of blacks brought them largely into the newer Anglo-American cities, from Minneapolis to Denver, Seattle, and most of California. The fourth consists of the older cities of the Northeast, heavily stratified by ethnicity and class, in which most of the power is old-family WASP and most of the citizens are Catholic (and Jewish) ethnic. In each of

these environments, the black experience has been quite different. The proportion of blacks has been different, the time of black migrations has been different, and the social structure of the cities to which blacks have migrated has been different.

At first, the busing decisions of the Supreme Court seemed to be aimed at the first two areas. In these areas, black students had been bused right past neighborhood schools to special black schools. The first effect of the busing decision was, therefore, to *cut down* on busing. It was commonly reported, in Alabama, for instance, that there was *less busing* after integration than before.

A second stage in the logic of the Supreme Court was reached when, as in the 1971 decision concerning the Charlotte-Mecklenburg school district in North Carolina, the Court felt busing was required to remedy historic patterns of residential and school segregation. These patterns had a base in earlier local law (*de jure* segregation) which the courts judged had caused the present-day segregation. The judges were now making empirical judgments about social history and social structure, rather than about specific and current official acts.

A third stage was reached when the courts dealt with cities like Denver, in which there had been no prior history of *de jure* segregation. In many cities in the third area, in other words, blacks, usually arriving in significant numbers only in the twentieth century (mainly after World War II), found themselves segregated once again, in fact (*de facto*) if not by law. In this third area, blacks were not the only ethnic group so segregated; Chicanos, American Indians, the Chinese, Koreans, and Japanese, and some others were also segregated. The structure of the cities in this area was, by and large, not as pluralistic as in the Northeast. The mainstream culture was very largely white, more permeable by various white ethnic groups than the Northeast had been. Mostly by choice, but also as a result of some official acts, blacks and some other cultures of color were not as thoroughly integrated as white ethnic groups.

Sometimes, segregation was based on discernible legal or political acts: gerrymandering of school districts; real es-

tate and banking practices, officially indulged, which maintained segregation; and other illegal or extralegal political devices that kept segregation effective. Here, in ordering busing, the courts took a great empirical step. First, they had to judge that such segregation as existed was based on official or institutional practices, rather than on choice. Secondly, they had to judge that harm befell blacks, but not others (or at least not all others), through such segregation. Third, they had to judge that busing was an effective remedy in eliminating such harm. These empirical judgments are not, on their face, obvious or easy to sustain. They committed the courts to a rather large, extended position.

In the fourth geographical area, in the older cities of the Northeast, the courts have moved out still further into difficult empirical terrain. In cities like Boston, Buffalo, Cleveland, Providence, etc., it is quite easy to discern relatively segregated ethnic neighborhoods for virtually every ethnic migration into these cities during their long history. In such cities, it is difficult to show empirically that blacks are more segregated than whites of the same social class; or that in funding, administration, or quality of teaching, predominantly black schools are inferior to those of whites; or even that, if allowance is made for the date of migration to the city, blacks are less economically successful than whites. (The rapid rise of young married blacks must also be compared with other young persons raised in families of comparable economic class).

The main difficulty faced by the courts in this fourth region of the country is how to be certain that they rule for blacks in due equality to what the law has ruled over the decades, and still today, for all other citizens. As Peter Binzen points out in *Whitetown, U.S.A.*, the urban schools of white ethnic working-class whites are not superior in quality to black schools. If the courts command busing only because of the disadvantage of blacks, but do nothing to help working class whites overcome disadvantage, race seems to have become a decisive reason for judicial discrimination. The social structure of the northern cities has for decades meant relative educational deprivation, by class and ethnicity, in the various neigh-

borhoods of every city and suburban area. The class structure is built into the very fiber of the educational structure; the one is almost defined by the other. But class and ethnicity are intricately linked. If one separates "white" into its most significant ethnic components in a given area, it will be found that whites are ranked ethnically along a wide spectrum in terms of years of schooling and educational attainment. It may also be found that by some measures blacks rank higher than some white ethnic groups: for example, in the proportion of those aged eighteen to twenty-four presently in college, and not least in the prestigious colleges.

What are the reasons that lead people to prefer to live with people of at least relatively similar culture? Are the interventions of the courts, by singling out blacks but no other ethnic group, standing the Constitution on its head? Are the courts forcing discrimination by race in a way conducive to future tolerance or future bitterness? Are the courts certain that northern schools are a key source of black educational disadvantage, if segregated, and, if integrated, a key remedy for that disadvantage? Have the courts adequately apprised themselves of the unique history and social structure of the school systems of the fourth geographical area? Do they believe they are treating everyone equally under the law?

I would not write this way, of course, if I did not believe the courts were seriously in error. Whether my own views are correct or not, the general public has a right to have such questions answered to its satisfaction. Journalists have the duty to air them thoroughly, one by one. Only so can law proceed in an orderly fashion, respected by all, even in disagreement on particulars.

The judgment of the Supreme Court in *Brown* was based on the judgment that separate education is "inherently unequal." Emphasis was placed on empirical evidence showing that separate education resulted in lower achievement scores. But in the twenty-two years since *Brown*, this empirical base has evaporated. It does not seem possible to show that black achievement is of higher quality in integrated, rather than in all-black or predominantly black, schools.\* As a consequence, the argument in favor of integrated schooling has recently

been placed on new ground, namely, the claim that integration will bring "intangible" benefits, like fellowship, tolerance, the breakdown of stereotypes, new role models, etc.

These matters, too, may one day undergo empirical verification. Some researchers suggest, for example, that integration *reinforces* stereotypes, indeed strengthens them by verifying them in experience; that such integration alters the self-esteem of blacks in a negative way; and that, while placing whites and blacks under the same roof, it actually increases the depth of psychological segregation in cafeterias, seating patterns, and freely chosen activities.

Professor David Armor of Harvard raised some of the central questions in an interview for a book about busing:

The theory that says contact in school will improve race relations has yet to be proven. The research I did in [suburban] Boston and the research that has been done in another study in New England has found just the opposite of what was hoped for. The Boston Study found that *the longer black students were in the busing program, the less contact they had with each other, the less enthusiasm they expressed for the busing program, and the more hostile they became to whites in general.* The issue has not been studied extensively, and further research is urgently needed. But from what one can read about developments elsewhere, such as the well-publicized black-only high school in Berkeley, it is not clear that separatism is being reduced by school integration; it may, in fact, be quite the opposite.

From *The Integration of American Schools*, by Noreen Harris, Nathaniel Jackson, and Carl E. Rydingsword (Allyn & Bacon, 1975)

**A**lready there are signs that yet a third and a fourth justification for mandatory busing are in preparation. Educational writer John Holt stated recently that the "real purpose" of busing in Boston was not to raise the quality of education for blacks, but to reduce the racism of whites in South Boston. That aim, too, might be subjected to testing; on December 10, 1975, in *The Boston Globe*, the distin-

\* See for example, Nancy H. St. John, *School Desegregation: Outcomes for Children*, published by John Wiley, 1975. Also, articles in the Summer 1972 and Winter 1973 *The Public Interest*.

guished Harvard historian Oscar Handlin wrote eloquently of the social damage he saw being wrought in communities like South Boston precisely in this respect.

Meanwhile, the Court has begun to make race the sole relevant factor around which to command a "remedy" for segregation. If a school is 90 percent Jewish, or 87 percent WASP, or 70 percent Irish, the Court does not consider it "segregated." Only black, apparently, counts as segregated. From a position of "color-blindness," the courts have seemed to become preoccupied solely and entirely with color.

"Everybody" concedes — perhaps too quickly — that blacks suffer from special injustices not of their own making. There are, after all, liberal forms of racism, as well as "hard-hat" forms. The distinguishing feature of liberal racism is the image of the black as always less than free, responsible, and independent. The liberal racist prefers to regard the black as a victim, in need of liberal compassion and assistance (to be rendered in exchange, perhaps, for black votes). Some blacks tolerate this form of racism for the sake of the tangible benefits it promises (and may or may not deliver), while overlooking its hardly veiled insults.

Intellectual racism has the same emotional structure as liberal racism. Its distinctive feature is its unwillingness to countenance any hypothesis which shows blacks to be responsible, in whole or in part, for a given predicament; its insistence on attributing every difficulty faced by blacks, singly and in sum, to the "racism" of others; and its eager search to justify and to approve whatever blacks do. The motive behind intellectual racism is manifestly moral; its latent function, however, since its aim is not truthfulness and responsibility, is to hold blacks, and policies proclaimed to help blacks, to a lesser standard of criticism and cynicism than one insists upon for whites.

Journalists, in particular, who pride themselves on their cynicism and their objective standards, are threatened most by liberal racism and intellectual racism. In the pretext of not "giving comfort to racists," one practices racism — of a more sophisticated sort. Or one may assume that any person working to bring

greater justice and opportunity for blacks is a moral person. One does not usually show so little cynicism when race is not involved.

A number of black writers have suggested that the assumption behind busing, under present conditions, is inherently racist. The assumption is that blacks cannot learn unless they are with whites; that there is some sort of "white magic" possessed by the children and parents of South Boston, but not by the children or parents of Roxbury, which will rub off on the latter. Sometimes the assumption is that blacks cannot manage their own schools, or organize themselves politically in such a way as to gain proportionate control over local school boards. "The only way to bring our schools up to white standards," some blacks say, "is to hold white children hostage in them; that's the only way whites will care." But this, too, is an attitude of dependency. In fact, blacks can do whatever whites can.

It is not beyond reach that blacks can create schools in black neighborhoods at least as good as the white schools in neighborhoods like South Boston or South Philadelphia — and, indeed, much better black schools already exist. There is some evidence that black schools attract more idealistic volunteer teachers, certain special federal funds, and far more college recruiters than white working-class schools in such districts. The quality of schooling tends to follow class lines. The quality of a local school is often the best index of class status. Neighborhoods are frequently classified by realtors according to the quality of the local schools. Dr. Lillian Rubin, who studied integration in Richmond, California in her book *Busing and Backlash* emphasizes the centrality of the class factor: "There is no educational advantage to moving black and white students together if they're of the same socioeconomic class."

One white friend of mine, married to a black man, explained to me through the eyes of her grown son, a black, one reason for busing I had never heard expressed. "There is," she said, "an almost metaphysical inferiority felt by a black child. Even from liberal, intellectual whites, he always faces a kind of condescension. He is made to feel so different, so inferior, that 'prejudice' or

'racism' are words too weak to convey the reality. It affects one's very *being*, that look in the eyes of others." Her view is that integration, by whatever means, is essential to overcoming the feeling of being separate, cast aside, rejected. I think of her view as the metaphysical justification for busing.

Yet in this respect, too, the situation of most blacks is not different from that of many whites. The potent culture of America is not merely "white." It is, specifically, Protestant and Anglo-

**'It does not seem possible to show that black achievement is of higher quality in integrated rather than in all black or predominantly black schools'**

American. (I have just been reading Ellery Queen, Ross Macdonald, John D. MacDonald and John O'Hara. My God! Their world is WASP.) Power, money, intellect, and cultural articulation in virtually every city of the land are far more concentrated than the word "white" properly describes. The gate is far more narrow than that. Journalists in cities like Pittsburgh, Buffalo, Detroit, Cleveland, Chicago, and other places will have no difficulty in noting the scarcity of southern and eastern Europeans in television especially, but also in the print media. Blacks are, in fact, likely to be considerably better represented on television and in print than the millions of southern or eastern Europeans. A similar situation prevails in every institution of cultural or economic power: in the corporations, universities, state boards of regents, trustees of museums and galleries, etc. Only in sports, on some levels of politics, in crime, in show business, and in creative departments in advertising and the arts, are "the ethnics" represented in due proportion. (Observe the credits on television shows.)

The North differs from the South in this respect. In the South, a monoculture prevailed, segregated by race but united in one mutually shared symbolic world.

Few non-WASP immigrants entered the South; it was hostile territory. The North was pluralistic. Segregation by ethnic group, tacitly enforced in part and in part voluntarily chosen, was the universal pattern. In every major city, the migratory pattern of the Jewish community may be clearly traced. At Cleveland State University, the "corridors" by which other immigrant groups have moved from their locations of original settlement to certain fairly specific suburbs have been clearly drawn on a map. Of course, even the original neighborhoods were not perfectly homogeneous; a group with a plurality of 30 percent or so sufficed to give a neighborhood its chief character. Similar patterns of partial homogeneity are discernible in the suburban communities of Long Island, New Jersey, and in the circles of suburbs around Boston, Detroit, Chicago, and other cities. Nathan Kantrowicz of Kent State University, the closest student of such matters, calls the northern pattern of life "relative segregation." Every ethnic group is involved in it. Blacks are not always the most segregated group; when one attends to factors of class, blacks are no more segregated than others; remarkable mobility and patterns of relative segregation are characteristic of all groups.

In sum, I believe that journalists should explore social facts that the courts, in trying to assess the degree of segregation in northern cities, have neglected to note. Among these are:

1. The relative segregation of every ethnic group;
2. The pluralistic residential, culture, and educational structure of the northern social system;
3. The class stratification, affecting mobility, residence, school quality, entrance into "mainstream culture," etc.;
4. Variation in ethnic group skills, preferences, priorities, strategies, historical patterns, etc.;
5. Length of time of a given ethnic group in a northern city or given neighborhood, reflecting historical patterns of mobility;
6. Differential achievement over time, in economic, social, intellectual, and other terms.

Each of these factors has bearing on the social standing of an ethnic group. For example, if 80 percent of the blacks

in Cleveland have arrived there since 1945, one may consult the experience of other ethnic groups thirty years after their arrival in Cleveland. In residential segregation, economic advancement, and educational achievement, how long did it take the Slovaks, the Ruthenians, the Italians, the Hungarians, and others to show measurable advance? Over a thirty-year period, in what ways is the black experience in Cleveland different, and in what ways similar? It is probably true that a far higher proportion of blacks is going to college sooner after migration to Cleveland than did the Slovaks or others (except the Jews). It may be true, as well, that a higher proportion of blacks is drawing a higher relative family income sooner than was achieved by white immigrants to Cleveland. It may also be true that blacks have achieved more rapid success in politics than did the eastern Europeans. Finally, it may be true that as many blacks of middle class status are going to the higher-status high schools of Cleveland as are middle class eastern Europeans or Italians. In a word, the situation of blacks, given their more recent arrival, may (a) compare favorably with that of some white groups; or (b) show characteristics only relatively less advanced than those of other groups at a comparable period of their history in Cleveland.

Journalists should lead the way in bringing such issues as these before the public understanding. The damaging effect of the myth of the "melting pot" was not that it injured the psyche of those who tried to become what they were not, but that it kept the public from forming an accurate picture of our society, at least in the northern cities. To some extent, the myth of the melting pot is true. Successful members of every ethnic group have taken advantage of American opportunities to rise to public eminence. And every group has affected the common culture, so that our culture is not solely Anglo-American but quite distinctively more passionate, more various, more paradoxical, and more complex than that. Still, like other myths, the myth of the melting pot disguised as much as it revealed. It disguised the true margins of private community, separate cultural spheres, differing behavior, and internalized symbolic systems of different parts of our northern urban popula-

tions. Even five or eight generations after immigration, our Italians are not Irish, nor are our Polish Jews statistically to be profiled like our Polish Christians, nor are our Slavs or Ukrainians like our Chicanos and Puerto Ricans. Mass-produced clothing, mass communications, and many other homogenizing forces make us less conscious of differences. Still, our aspirations, insecurities, disciplines, and perceptions are remarkably social, remarkably differentiated by our cultural inheritances, and enormously promising for the future creativity of the nation.

Integration is a primary goal of our society. The courts could help in several ways. First, a system of incentives is needed to make residential integration economically beneficial and socially stable; at present, neighborhoods that integrate usually suffer institutional deterioration. Secondly, school lines can be gerrymandered, and new buildings and new programs directed, to increase integration. Third, the number of magnet schools and voluntary programs for working-class children, black and white, in better suburban schools should be increased. Fourth, a fixed dollar "transportation allowance" can be offered to lower-income parents who voluntarily bus their children to a school beyond the neighborhood, increasing integration. Fifth, "reading enrichment" programs can provide families with books, magazines, and tutorial assistance, so that home as well as school is strengthened — both to ease emotional insecurities and to affect achievement directly. In a word, busing is not the only, nor the most promising, strategy of integration.

What are the questions journalists should be asking politicians about busing? The following may be the most significant ones.

1. What is the purpose of busing? If it is an integrated school system, what evidence is there that placing bodies in the same building brings about integration? Where has it worked, and under what conditions did it work? Where has it failed? Why?
2. Do you see a difference between different types of cities, based on their past history and social structure? What are the differences?
3. What significance do you attach to

class factors — to differences in the quality of schools based on social class? Do such differences exist? Should they? How do they affect the busing issue?

4. Why do you think that the average black child is one-to-three years behind his white counterpart in educational achievement? What is your program to do something about it?

5. When programs for voluntary busing are effected, how many parents, especially black parents, take advantage of them? What is your proposal for making voluntary programs more successful? What incentives would you set up?

6. Suppose the courts halt busing, what are your alternatives to busing? Where have they proven their effectiveness?

7. What programs do you propose for making residential integration more attractive, peaceful, and speedy?

8. What similarities do you see between the situation of white immigrants fifty years ago and that of black migrants to the northern cities in the last thirty years? What is your overall design to make urban and suburban integration creative and successful?

The press must take some of the blame for the busing crisis that afflicts the nation, just as the press took some of the blame for the long delay before the story in Vietnam assumed its ultimate shape. Conventional wisdom may be defined as whatever the press takes for granted, reports unquestioningly, flows along with. The conventional wisdom on busing — that busing is simply an extension of traditional civil-rights activity, a moral cause, certain to benefit blacks and whites alike — has been bought by many an editorialist, many a politician and judge and lawyer. Graceful withdrawal is difficult. There is a temptation to ignore the critics, to skate blithely ahead. But what if, as I believe, the conventional wisdom on busing is wrong — as wrong on busing as it was on Vietnam? The press is responsible for transmitting the conventional wisdom — and for challenging it.

The busing issue has become important to the moral life of the nation. Those opposed to it for moral reasons, and those in favor of it for moral reasons, deserve the best possible reporting. For busing affects millions of citizens through something very dear to them — the lives of their own children. ■

# The bad news from UNESCO

## More conflict looms between the Third World and the Western press

by JOEL BLOCKER

**T**hat the news from UNESCO these days is bad is no news to anybody, journalist or layman, in the West. Like the United Nations itself, its Paris-based Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization is now a principal battleground for the growing confrontation between the industrial and ex-colonial worlds in which the state of Israel is both a concrete focal point and an emotionally charged symbol of larger antagonisms. With each new clash — and there are more, many more, to come — UNESCO makes headlines, loses credibility, and is perceived as staggering toward moral bankruptcy and possible implosion. Dimly recognized, in the halcyon days before the 1973 oil crisis, as an imperfect but essentially benevolent instrument of international cooperation, UNESCO's "image" in a goodly portion of Western public opinion is sinking to the status of a bad joke or a dirty word.

But there is equally bad and at least as significant news of how the organization responded to the crisis of its life, a story barely explored by Western media, although they and the public they serve are among the protagonists. For the first time, the Western press became the object of a sustained and fundamental attack by a high-ranking international civil servant whose origins and deepest sympathies lie in the Third World. Its significance is two-fold: certainly this will not be the last such running battle with the Western press (in 1975, the U.N.'s Food and Agriculture Organization and

Environment Program were taken over, respectively, by a Lebanese and an Egyptian); and probably it portends wider warfare soon to come, in the form of an intensified offensive by the "poor" countries against what they consider the "rich" nations' control and abuse of international media in particular and information in general. Which makes it a story worth telling here

To begin with, there was an extraordinary coincidence. UNESCO changed leadership in mid-November 1974, at the very moment when its biannual General Conference of member states (its supreme governing organ) was making page one around the world as the first U.N. representative body to adopt anti-Israel resolutions in what has since become a system-wide pattern. The man on the spot was the new director-general, Amadou-Mahtar M'Bow, at fifty-three a handsome, personable Senegalese Moslem, a former professor and government minister who had been UNESCO's assistant director-general for education during the four previous years. M'Bow was said to be a "moderate," to have worked behind the scenes — unsuccessfully, it is true — to soften the controversial resolutions and, because of his African roots and French culture, was thought by many to be an ideal mediator. In interviews he granted before taking office, M'Bow showed a conciliatory, open nature and an awareness of the press's importance to UNESCO.

The director-general's first major statement of policy, made at the General Conference's concluding session one week after his installation, served to confirm these hopes: a neutral, statesmanlike appeal to avoid "serious dissensions" and "systematic confrontations [that] cause great bitterness." It

was well reported in the press. Then, abruptly, M'Bow went publicly mute for a full two weeks, crucial days during which protests against UNESCO that had begun in France spread throughout Western Europe, to North and South America and even to Japan. When he spoke up again, the above-the-battle tone was gone: in its place, there were polemics and anger — anger particularly at the press's coverage of the General Conference's actions.

To air his complaints, M'Bow chose *Le Monde*, France's best daily and probably the Western newspaper most consistently sympathetic to Third World aspirations, for a lengthy philippic. (When the *International Herald Tribune* asked for a shorter, original piece by M'Bow a day later, it was turned down and told it could cut and publish the *Monde* article; the paper declined.) "Reports carried by press, radio and television . . . have frequently been lacking in accuracy and even objectivity," he wrote, ". . . and on the basis of information that is, to say the least, incomplete and often distorted, some eminent personalities have thought fit to

**'M'Bow said flatly that the press had been "racist" in its treatment of both UNESCO in general and himself personally'**

Newsweek/Burton Bernmsky



UNESCO's Amadou-Mahtar M'Bow

*Joel Blocker, a former correspondent for Newsweek and CBS News, was the director of UNESCO's Public Information Office from early 1974 until he resigned in December 1975.*

adopt uncompromising attitudes. . . .” The core of his argument was that the press had misinterpreted, perhaps willfully, two key resolutions on Israel: one denying the state the membership it had sought in UNESCO’s European regional group, the only member to be so deprived; the other sanctioning it for alleged continuing abuses in Jerusalem. “Israel,” M’Bow contended, “has neither been ousted from UNESCO nor from any regional group [and] is in exactly the same situation it was prior to . . . the General Conference.”

By suggesting that the press had not reflected but created the controversy, M’Bow’s literalist reasoning raised more questions than it answered. Had press coverage truly been distortive? Except for one late-hour, deadline-scarred agency dispatch that spoke of Israel having been “expelled” from the European regional group, quickly changed to “barred” after the error was noted, wire-service and daily accounts of both resolutions were by and large accurate and balanced. Was the second wave of press comment, on radio and television, in the weeklies and in editorials, less precise in its reporting? Yes, but no more than usual. Perhaps, then, journalists who followed the debates were expected to disregard remarks such as “Israel is a state which belongs nowhere because it comes from nowhere,” made by a Lebanese delegate? Or to ignore the patent political animus behind the resolutions? Was not M’Bow objecting, in the last analysis, to that basic measure of interpretation which, by Western standards, separates reporters from tape recorders?

**S**till, for all its revealing overtones, the *Monde* article might have been dismissed as typical institutional defensiveness had M’Bow been content to stop there. He was not, and what followed went far beyond the occasional letting off of steam that is an occupational hazard for international civil servants as well as national politicians. As protests and boycotts against UNESCO mounted over the next several months, M’Bow escalated his own rhetoric, lashing out time and again against Western media and public opinion. Among the most telling episodes were these:

□ In a late January 1975 interview with a Reuters correspondent in Peking, where he was on an official visit, “the Director-General of UNESCO accused the United States and West European press of conducting a campaign of misrepresentation over Israeli participation in the world body.” Now, in blunt, un-diplomatic language, M’Bow was charging *deliberate* distortion and a *co-ordinated media* attack: “I believe a campaign against UNESCO is being waged by the Anglo-Saxon press.”

□ A month later, M’Bow was even more outspoken, this time in a well-publicized official UNESCO document sent to the governments of all member states as well as to hundreds of affiliated organizations.\* Citing “tendentious,” “slanted” information disseminated by the press, he described “a campaign of protest and vilification on the part of various prominent persons and institutions.” In a passing reference, he alluded to the “discriminatory tone of some of the remarks made about peoples once under foreign domination,” the first — but not the last — time M’Bow openly intimated that the “campaign” against UNESCO was really directed at the Third World and, by implication, at him personally. No Western nation publicly challenged these notions, nor was there any echo of them in the press.

□ Two statements made in June by M’Bow rounded out his view of Western media. In the first, addressing an assembly of diplomatic representatives to UNESCO in Paris, he worried that the press tended to “chloroform” the public. Some of its practices, he said, are “against public morals, against social

morals.” At a second large meeting, with secretariat members, he spelled out a horrific and — some of his listeners felt — almost paranoid vision of what was motivating the organization’s critics. “I weigh my words,” M’Bow said solemnly. “The purpose of the campaign is to destroy UNESCO.” That seemed to make all the protesters, by now a fairly distinguished list, either conspiratorial agents or dupes, and left one wondering who, in M’Bow’s mind, was directing the conspiracy?

**N**o answer was ever forthcoming from M’Bow and, by the fall, he had begun in any case to temper his public remarks. UNESCO’s executive board, which supervises the organization between General Conferences, had recommended rule changes that *might* facilitate Israel’s inclusion in its European regional group later this year. M’Bow, who had lobbied hard for the change, spent some days in New York at the end of October meeting with American journalists. The effort earned him a two-column interview in the international edition of *Newsweek*, where he was described as “widely considered to be one of the Third World’s political moderates,” though by then the word “moderate” was in need of redefinition.

Whatever good will M’Bow managed to create was soon buried by subsequent events. On November 10, the U.N. General Assembly passed its resolution equating Zionism with racism. And when, five weeks later, a UNESCO inter-governmental meeting on mass media voted in effect to endorse the resolution, thereby provoking a new round of headlines for the organization, M’Bow’s response was instinctively aggressive. In an interview on French television, he angrily denied that the decision was any more than that of a “committee of experts,” even though close to eighty governments attended the debates and twelve Western delegations walked out after the vote. More to the point, he accused the press of “pure and simple bad faith.”

How to explain Amadou-Mahtar M’Bow’s apparent animadversion for Western media? Politics alone does not provide an answer. An experienced, as-

\* Although the document (the annual “Report of the Director-General”) was not published until April, M’Bow’s remarks were written in late February. It would be disingenuous of me not to mention that they also contained criticism of “certain shortcomings of our own information services . . . which contributed in no small measure to exacerbating the misunderstandings from which UNESCO has suffered.” As director of those services, I was never able to ascertain what the “shortcomings” were. My private record, in any case, adds little to an understanding of M’Bow’s attitude toward Western reactions, and I prefer to confine myself for the most part to his public declarations, which are far more important.

tute African politician, M'Bow surely realized how little was to be gained by quarreling with the press at a time when UNESCO needed Western support to survive intact. True, he was scoring points among the Arab and other Third World nations to whom he eventually turned for loans necessary to keep the organization afloat while the U.S. holds back its contribution. But with so much at stake for the Third World, he would have had the money in any event.

Whatever political strategy there might have been in M'Bow's posture toward the press, it counted for far less than his own personal makeup and passionate identification with Third World grievances. There was no guile in his tirades against the media: his resentments were honest, his anger genuine. When M'Bow berated journalists for lack of "objectivity," he was quite sincere. For him objectivity means strictness and literalness — in short, "official news" in the language of Western newsmen. "The director-general believes the press ought to be orderly, controlled, sedate," notes a UNESCO official who has worked closely with M'Bow. "He has no grasp at all of how a liberal press functions — it strikes him as 'irresponsible.' He comes from a continent where that kind of thing is not appreciated, and despite his Western façade, he doesn't appreciate it either."

It would be a mistake to assume that M'Bow's attitude is shared only by "extremists" and "militants" in the Third World. The idea that a "free" press is a mischievous and "irresponsible" press has, of course, long been an attractive one to elites in the developing nations, but it now seems to have attained much wider acceptance. One U.N. expert who has spent several years working with journalists and information officials in Africa, Asia, and Latin America believes "it reflects opinion in 80 percent of the Third World today, and most of the other 20 percent is in Latin America." With India and Nigeria having recently tightened government control over their media, it is hard to foresee any reversal of the trend.

If M'Bow's notion of the liberal press's "irresponsibility" is representative of much of Third World sentiment, so too, perhaps, is his tendency to respond to Western criticism by associat-

ing it with the color of his own skin. More than once during 1975 M'Bow startled his interlocutors by suggesting that he, not the Israelis, was the aggrieved party in the dispute. To a journalist in New York who asked about his attacks on the media, for instance, M'Bow said flatly that the press had been "racist" in its treatment of both UNESCO in general and himself personally. Pressed for an example, he could only cite an article in the far right-wing French weekly *Minute*; entitled "L'Unesco ou le Negresco," it was in fact scurrilous but of no significance beyond the tabloid's marginal readership. Similarly, of the thousands of protests received by the director-general in the months immediately after the anti-Israel resolutions were passed, the one chosen as typical by his aides was a vicious letter of personal invective from a West Coast chapter of the U.S. United Nations Association. It was signed by a Jew and listed a majority of obviously Jewish names on its letterhead. "Who is racist?" then asked an anonymous UNESCO staff member in an article first published in the liberal *Nouvel Observateur*, later reprinted in the secretariat's house organ, and clearly approved of by M'Bow. Who indeed?

In some of M'Bow's denunciations of the press, there was also a quality of religious fervor. He is a practicing Moslem and those who see him regularly say that has a lot to do with the strict, moralistic stance he takes toward media conduct. A high U.N. official who has known M'Bow for a decade puts it this way: "For him, the press is immoral, sensationalistic, decadent, without ethics. He believes that it is in the nature of the press to sell itself, that it is open to manipulation by monied interests. He never quite says 'Jewish' money and would be shocked if told there was anything anti-Semitic about his views. Of course, they are emotional and irrational — we would say 'puritanical'; but he would say they are 'objective.' " Objective or not, with the current resurgence of Islam as a political force in international affairs, M'Bow's "Puritan" views are sure to find echoes and sympathetic ears elsewhere.

Finally, there is an ideological element basic to M'Bow's hostility toward Western media. Along with much of the

ex-colonial world, he sees in them a prime support of a system he wants to change. By now, informed opinion in the West has made serious acquaintance with the developing nations' demands for a "new international economic order" that will, its partisans say, correct injustices and inequalities by redistributing the world's wealth and resources. Less well known, although it has been an integral and explicit part of the same package since the early 1970s, is their insistence on ending the industrial countries' "domination" of information. For the Third World, the nature and flow of news, access to scientific and technical data, satellite usage, the whole range of what is now the fashion to call "informatics" (computers, soft-ware, etc.), are all part of an ideological struggle.

**M**uch of the verbal scuffling on these issues will continue to take place in the international forums that provide the Third World's best platform. But the rhetoric will not be hollow or without consequences. The idea of "free flow of information," for example, enshrined in both UNESCO's constitution and the U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights during the late 1940s, is gradually undergoing subtle redefinition. More and more, the talk is of "regulating" or "limiting" the flow, rather than encouraging it, and the idea itself is now seen as an "ideological weapon." The notion of an international code of ethics to which the media would be expected to subscribe is rapidly gaining popularity, and a text could be voted within the next few years.

The bad news from UNESCO may be of some use in preparing for the coming international struggle over the press. What is at stake, clearly, is not only *who* will control the media but also what *kind* of control will be exercised. However one evaluates the Third World's critique of Western supremacy and of the liberal press's conduct, the alternative being offered, to judge from M'Bow's case, is hardly more attractive. For all its faults, the Western press's distinction and pride lie in its mandate for scrutiny, its critical, independent role. Precisely those qualities are now being challenged, and with a passion and determination that it would be folly to underestimate. ■

# Chile: why we missed the

A reporter who was there questions his colleagues

by ROBERT SCHAKNE

**T**he facts were indisputably newsworthy and headline-making. As the Senate Intelligence Committee reported it, the United States over a ten-year period as a matter of conscious policy actively interfered in the domestic politics of Chile, financing one election campaign, promoting at least one coup d'état attempt, covertly financing opposition newspapers and political parties, overtly and covertly conducting an economic warfare campaign to "destabilize" a constitutional government, and "laying the seeds," as a C.I.A. official put it, for the successful coup d'état that finally did take place.

But for all its news value, this was a story that went largely unreported, in print or on the air, while the events in question were taking place. This was a story left untold until C.I.A. officials confessed their role to a congressional committee and Representative Michael Harrington, in turn, made that testimony public; by then it was testimony about a *fait accompli*, a year after the Allende government had been overthrown.

Americans reading newspapers or watching television reports about Chile during the turbulent Allende years were not told a clearly important part of the story. It is fair to argue, and many do, that Allende would have been in trouble no matter what the United States did, that covert U.S. activities were secondary rather than central factors in Allende's downfall. But it is indisputable that U.S. policies were part of the picture and that a story without mention of these policies was incomplete.

A good many journalists who spent time in Chile during the Allende years, and I was one of them, find the report of

the Senate Intelligence Committee disturbing in a professional sense. How did we, collectively and individually, miss the story?

The answers, in a sampling of correspondents and foreign editors, are varied. In hindsight, too few of us looked hard enough; too many of us accepted the bland denials of the U.S. embassy. Most American correspondents were nonresidents, usually making visits of one or two weeks, without the time to dig deeply. In the complicated mosaic of Chile, visiting journalists tended to view the U.S. role as a marginal story, and preferred to spend their limited time on other aspects of Chile's experiment with Marxism.

But the Chile experience suggests a more fundamental problem. When the United States government chooses to keep its policies covert, journalism is not likely to uncover them, and certainly is not likely to uncover them quickly. The Senate committee report states that "covert action programs as costly and complex as several mounted in Chile are unlikely to remain covert." But the record, and the experiences of U.S. journalists in Chile, indicate otherwise.

It is worth noting that the story of U.S. involvement in Chile, when it finally was told, had a Washington dateline. None of the revelations was a product of reporting from Chile; none among the platoons of U.S. journalists who visited Santiago has ever come up with a definitive, substantial story from Chile about covert U.S. activities.

To *New York Times* foreign editor James Greenfield, the lesson of Chile is that more digging is essential in Washington. Greenfield says the foreign location is rarely the place to uncover the story of U.S. policy; the proof isn't there but in Washington.

Louis Diuguid, the longtime Latin American correspondent for *The Washington Post*, says he looked long and hard for evidence of U.S. involvement in Chilean affairs because of a history of known C.I.A. activities in the 1960s — but that for all the rumors and unverified reports, there was little sub-

stantial he could nail down. Diuguid recalls discovering and identifying the right-wing coup plotters involved in the 1970 assassination of the Chilean army commander, General René Schneider, and he recalls as well being told that there was a C.I.A. connection. But hard as he tried, he never could come up with corroboration and verification to establish the C.I.A. connection as anything more than an unproven allegation.

The Allende government, for all its accusations of C.I.A. complicity, didn't have the proof, either. When Jack Anderson in Washington broke the story of the I.T.T.-C.I.A. plots to prevent Allende from taking office, Diuguid approached Allende government investigating agencies for corroborating evidence; he was shunted from one agency to another, from one official to another, but found nothing useful.

"I ended up telling them more than they could tell me," Diuguid recalls. "I reported everything I could nail down, but it wasn't much. It was a tough one because there were troublesome aspects

*September 1973 (below): after the fall of the Allende government, loyalists are taken into custody in front of the presidential palace.*



Gammal/Liaison

*Robert Schakne is a correspondent for CBS News.*

# story

of the story that ran the other way.”

Martin Houseman of the United Press International, perhaps the most well connected and best informed resident U.S. correspondent until he was expelled from Chile, puts it this way:

“There was widespread surmise of U.S. involvement, which is a far cry from substantiated knowledge for publication. Even the suspicion was mitigated by the Marxist sector’s continual shouts of wolf.

“The operations were so well covered that they never would have surfaced had it not been for the Washington revelations. The agency has so many potential conduits for black funding that I doubt that the U.S. government connection would ever have been discovered.”

*The Wall Street Journal’s* Everett Martin once discovered a Chilean courier who had brought \$200,000 in U.S. currency from Paris to Santiago to

help finance the anti-Allende opposition during a congressional election. But Martin says he could never establish the source of that money; he suspected the C.I.A. but could not prove it.

At CBS News, this reporter in New York and colleague Frank Manitzas in Santiago spent several frustrating weeks in 1974 attempting to trace the unusual financing of expensive modern television equipment supplied a year earlier to an anti-Allende television station. Even though the C.I.A. by this time had admitted providing financial support to opposition media, we were unable to establish that the obscure Milwaukee-based foundation purchasing the equipment had a C.I.A. connection; the foundation officials in Milwaukee and the television station executives in Santiago claimed the funding came from private Catholic organizations, and we could not prove anything to the contrary.

Besides the difficulty of proving the existence of covert activities, foreign correspondents face the problem of rationing their time. In the view of many

*September 1975 (left): William Colby, then the director of the C.I.A., is sworn in prior to testimony before the Senate Intelligence Committee.*

reporters in Chile, searching out the U.S. role in Chile more extensively would not have been worth the time.

“I am not convinced the U.S. role was all that big,” notes Diuguid of *The Washington Post*. “Even at this late date, I have a hard time saying just what the U.S. role was.”

A similar view is offered by Everett Martin of *The Wall Street Journal* who thinks it “would have been wrong if we had spent all our time on this aspect.”

James Goodsell of *The Christian Science Monitor* is convinced he should have spent more time searching out the Yankee connection; in hindsight he is upset by stories he didn’t follow up. But he notes: “There were so many other things to do, an extraordinary social change, the question of land reform, the fevered politics.”

(To put the C.I.A. covert action in context, it is worth noting that according to the Senate Intelligence Committee a total of \$8 million was spent for covert activities in Chile in a three-year period. Although that sum has been described as “massive,” it hardly appears impressive when compared to the \$19 million given Chile in U.S. economic aid — mostly Food for Peace — in the same period, or the \$33 million in military aid. In the single post-coup year of 1974, U.S. military and economic aid totaled \$123 million, or fifteen times what was spent for clandestine activities in the whole Allende period.)

Goodsell emphasizes the problem of a correspondent who may visit a country two or three times a year, spending one or two weeks during each visit. “We don’t spend enough time in these countries,” Goodsell notes. “The three- or four-day visit, the rushing in and out. Part of the problem is what is built in to the American system of journalism.”

Indeed, for all the headlines about Chile, the lapses in reporting are partly due to insufficiency of coverage. No reporter visiting a country briefly and rarely is likely to dig deeply; whatever his talents, he doesn’t have the time. Network coverage of Allende was sporadic: the immediate period of Al-



Wide World



lende's election and inauguration, the Fidel Castro visit, the occasional crises precipitated by anti-government demonstrations. During much of the Allende period, NBC's Latin American correspondent was in Southeast Asia and CBS News had no resident correspondent in the area at all.

In retrospect, it would appear that visiting U.S. correspondents spent less time than they should have cultivating sources within the U.S. embassy, spent less time than they should have observing the Chilean military structure and its relationship to the United States, spent less time than they should have and wrote less than they should have about U.S.-Chilean economic relations.

While it is true that covert activities can effectively be hidden, clues about the real U.S. policy abounded in the relationship between U.S. military attachés and Chilean military officers, in the extent of U.S. military aid (it expanded while economic aid declined), in the cutoff of economic credits to Chile and other forms of economic reprisals, in the background expressions of opinions hostile to Allende by U.S. officials in Washington and Santiago.

There was a notable Henry Kissinger background press briefing in 1970, the day after President Nixon had secretly ordered the C.I.A. to organize an anti-Allende coup. Among other things, Kissinger said an Allende presidency would "present massive problems for us. . . . [It would be] one of those situations not too happy for American interests." Before Allende's expropriation of U.S.-owned copper mines, U.S. ambassador Edward Korry told visiting correspondents that such action could lead to economic retaliation against Chile.

None of the clues directly proved that there was a policy of U.S. intervention against Allende. Indeed, U.S. officials publicly were denying such involvement. President Nixon denied it in his 1971 State of the World message, State Department assistant secretaries denied it in testimony before Congress, and embassy officials in Santiago were constantly denying covert activities. But certainly, under all the circumstances, there might have been more skepticism.

To be sure, from time to time published and broadcast reports did note suspicion of C.I.A. activities in Chile

but without strong substantiation. A week after the assassination of Chilean army commander Schneider in 1970, I broadcast that there was "a widespread belief within the Chilean left that the C.I.A. was already plotting against Allende and had a hand in the assassination of the army commander." *The New York Times* reported similar information with more detail, and later reported that Allende government officials and pro-government newspapers accused the C.I.A. of financing anti-government strikes. *Time* magazine in mid-1973 reported there was C.I.A. money behind the truckers' strike that paralyzed the Chilean economy just before the coup d'état. But there were no headlines in these fragmentary reports; usually they were buried within longer stories. The kind of hard proof which was to surface with the C.I.A. admissions before Washington congressional committees was absent in the reporting from Chile.

**P**erceptive journalists also paid attention to Chile's economic difficulties with the United States. Diuguid in *The Washington Post* and Martin in *The Wall Street Journal*, among others, reported the economic conflict. What was absent in the face of Washington's denials was the documentation, the proof, that the economic problems of Chile were the product of deliberate Washington destabilization policy. That proof, the kind that did make headlines, also came only in the form of C.I.A. admissions before Congress well after the fact.

There is a school of thought, centered in the academic community, which holds that the U.S. press, as an institution, was so deeply biased against Allende, so attuned to expressing official Washington views, that there was no real possibility of uncovering the CIA's covert activities. John Pollock of Rutgers, a leading proponent of this point of view, wonders why the U.S. press never explored the allegations and accusations by the Allende government against the U.S. multinational corporations and the C.I.A.

The record of American publications and networks in reporting the C.I.A. connection, once the evidence surfaced in Washington, refutes the basic Pollock criticism. There isn't a single journalist I

know who worked in Chile who would not have rushed into print or on camera with the C.I.A. story had it been provable in the field. But the Pollock argument is more convincing when he states that Allende's viewpoints were insufficiently reported and rarely followed up, that the role of multinational corporations in Chile was insufficiently explored.

From the opposite pole, there is the accusation by ex-ambassador (and ex-journalist) Korry that the U.S. press — and *The Washington Post* and *The New York Times* in particular — engaged in a massive cover-up of news about Allende's duplicity, his threats to civil liberties, and his failure to honor agreements. Korry is incensed at what he says is the press's failure to report his efforts to reach accommodation with Allende in 1971, an effort that foundered when Allende refused compensation to the copper companies.

Korry concedes that he instructed U.S. military attachés and C.I.A. officers to have no contact with the U.S. press. He argues that to have done otherwise, to have made public the secret subsidization of the opposition press, would have ended the program and in his view would have meant the end of civil liberties in Chile.

On balance, the story of Chile suggests the limits of what journalism overseas by Americans can accomplish. If the American government chooses to dissemble, to keep its real purposes hidden and its activities covert, it is very likely to get away with it. It fails only when the activity becomes massive, visible, and overt — as in the Dominican Republic or the Bay of Pigs.

The Chile experience suggests that U.S. journalists overseas should spend more time exploring the activities of U.S. embassies, military attachés, and economic missions, and that they should pay more attention to economic relations as clues to real U.S. policy. More than anything else, the experience of American journalists in Chile suggests that foreign reporting may begin at home, that the sources, the leaks, and the documentation are more likely to surface in Washington than abroad. U.S. policy originates in the White House and the State Department and that is where the story frequently is to be found. ■

# BOOKS

## Plenty of tube

**Tube of Plenty:**  
**The Evolution of American Television**  
by Erik Barnouw. Oxford University  
Press. \$14.95

The pervasive influence of radio and television on our national life this last half century is almost impossible to overstate. It has undermined regional accents, humor, and tastes and shrunk the continent into a village. It has helped to concentrate our economy into a relatively few hands, changed the way we choose and judge our presidents, kept us off the streets and inside our houses, helped to divide parents and children. Curiously, there is little enduring scholarship about this medium, despite the flood of books and articles that attempt to dissect it.

Indeed, there may be only one utterly indispensable work for someone wishing to learn about the formation of the radio-TV empire in America. That is Erik Barnouw's three-volume *History of Broadcasting in the United States*. With an uncanny blend of scholarship, wit, and detail, Barnouw's history takes us from the beginning of the wireless age to the modern age with effortless grace. Now, Barnouw, a professor emeritus at Columbia University's Film Division, has condensed and updated his material in a one-volume work almost wholly devoted to television. And while the three-volume history is too good to be reduced without substantial loss, *Tube of Plenty* is still the most important single-volume work available on the television industry.

Barnouw is no academic neutral. He is clearly critical of the economic structure of the broadcasting industry, where huge private concerns sell air time to other huge private concerns under the protection of an unshakable government

monopoly and timorous government regulation. But Barnouw's gift is his capacity to make his points by example rather than by pontification. Whether he is demonstrating television's affection for violence, or its cowardice in the face of the blacklist, or its craven obedience to sponsors' wishes, he uses the words of the practitioners to make his points.

Thus a producer for an ABC action show would write to one of his craftsmen that "I like the idea of sadism, but I hope we can come up with another approach to it." Thus Ed Sullivan would write an obsequious letter to an ad agency to apologize for his hiring of Paul Draper, the notorious subversive dancer, and would use blacklist organizers to "clear" talent. Thus Reginald Rose, a superior writer of first-generation TV drama, was forced to change a drama about racial prejudices because the advertiser would not let a Negro family in a hostile neighborhood become the focus of the play. (Rose solved the problem by deliberately avoiding any mention of *why* this particular family was feared and hated.)

Barnouw has an economy that enables him to cover a lot of ground quickly. In discussing the conflicts between writers and sponsors, he cites Paddy Chayefsky's marvelous TV plays about ordinary people grappling with life, and then notes that, despite high ratings, advertisers hate them.

The reasons are not mysterious. Most advertisers are selling magic. Their commercials posed the same problems that Chayefsky drama dealt with . . . But in the commercials there was always a solution as clear-cut as the snap of a finger: the problem could be solved by a new pill, deodorant, toothpaste . . . [Chayefsky's complexity] was often convincing — that was the trouble. It made the commercial seem fraudulent.

*Tube of Plenty* has so much to touch

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on — Murrow and broadcast journalism, technical innovations and debates, government policy — that it cannot wholly succeed. Barnouw's discussion of television news, while adequate, is far outshone by his deadly insights into the motivations behind programming decisions and the constant reminders of the business judgments that lurk behind the nonsensical incantations of public interest. It is here, when Barnouw traces the movement of movie studios into television production, the rise and fall of the quiz shows, that the book becomes fascinating and at the same time instructive. And it is by citing specific after specific that Barnouw can claim ample evidence for his conclusion that American television had "spread the message of limitless plenty, merchandised the life-style of plenty, preached the gospel of plenty . . . [and that] an attack on [American problems] was an attack on the financial pillars of its temple."

Of course, a lot of fascinating material had to be dropped to push three volumes into one. I particularly missed some of the details about programming in the heyday of big-time radio, and Barnouw's account of the furies that were unleashed when an F.C.C. commissioner in the late 1940s dared to investigate excessive advertising and broken programming promises among broadcasters. For a reader obsessed with the power and foibles of commercial broadcasting, the three-volume Barnouw is the place to be. For someone who wants a solid, entertaining grounding in how broadcasting got to be what it's like today, *Tube of Plenty* is fine. Would that all teachers combined this much information with this much entertainment. Come to think of it, would that television did!

JEFF GREENFIELD

*Jeff Greenfield is a free-lance writer and political consultant.*

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Robert A. Diamond, editor.

Congressional Quarterly, Inc. \$48.50

Congressional Quarterly, the Washington-based research service, has won the gratitude of any journalist, scholar, or hobbyist who has struggled through stained government documents, dusty legislative manuals, or piles of punch cards in search of past election results. For CQ has printed in clean, clear type the major holdings of the country's most important collection of voting records, the historical archive of the Inter-University Consortium for Political Research at the University of Michigan. And what a treasure it is — the results, both in raw numbers and percentages, of all available popular votes for federal and governorship elections for 151 years — from the victory of Louis McLane, Federalist, in Delaware in 1824, to the defeat of Jeff La Caze, Democrat, in Louisiana's Sixth District in 1975. There is more: summaries and crucial ballots of major party conventions, results of presidential primaries (did you know that Ronald Reagan was the G.O.P.'s biggest primary vote-getter in 1968?), and encyclopedia-style essays on such topics as the American party system, reapportionment, and the electoral college. Considering the time and travel that this volume can save investigators, the price, although nearly \$50, is cheap. Specialists should note, incidentally, that the *Guide* does not contain ward- or county-level returns of the type included, for recent years, in the estimable *America Votes* series by Richard Scammon, as well as in compilations issued by state universities in Kentucky, California, Michigan, and Illinois.

JAMES BOYLAN

*James Boylan is a contributing editor of the Review.*

# LETTERS

## 'Nick'd' by time

TO THE REVIEW:

Incredible. There in the copy of the screaming liberal invoking incisive invective against the "burbles from Olympus" lurked the incognizant evil — age prejudice.

Nicholas von Hoffman, in his article on the pap that passes for television news commentary [*CJR*, January/February], revealed his gerontophobia not once, not twice, but six times in five pages. First and most crucially, he equated mindlessness with old age:

The most striking thing about what our commentators said was that they said nothing striking. You probably could have heard stronger opinions in the nation's nursing homes.

Surely Mr. von Hoffman and the *Review* must recognize that the elders who are forced to live in nursing homes are not all incapable of intellectual activity. Having spent considerable time in nursing homes, I can assure you that many of the abandoned people in them are eager and articulate, if anyone is willing to listen.

But to Mr. von Hoffman, the staid Severeid is "the voice of old age," "white-haired," "Eric the Cloud-Wrapped" speaking "from his perch in the clouds." That is criticism? No, that is agism.

JANE DAUGHERTY  
St. Petersburg Times

## Hurrahs and harrumphs

TO THE REVIEW:

I can already hear the squeals of outrage from the Florida Publishing Company over the publication of "Boosters in the Newsroom: The Jacksonville Case" [*CJR*, January/February], but from newsrooms across the country I can also hear a round of applause for Sean Devereux from a small army of ex-*Times-Union* reporters.

Congratulations to Devereux for telling it like it was — and still is — in the *T-U* newsroom (see *Editor & Publisher*, January 3, 1976, "Reporter is Fired for Giving TV Station Spiked Photograph").

TOM LONGHURST  
Ignacio, Colo.

The latest issue of the *Review* carries a story which alleges that "Florida Publico newspapers" employed "boosterism" in their news columns to support the Offshore Power Systems floating nuclear power plant manufacturing facility's location: here.

As a reporter who has always followed a policy of presenting the news fairly, I resent the article's implication that the *Journal* displayed the same degree of advocacy of the project as our morning competitor, and that I made a point of emphasizing the proponents' point of view.

At no time did any *Journal* editor ever suggest to me that I deviate from our normal policy of reporting news even-handedly and presenting pros and cons of any controversial issue we encounter.

I also resent the implication that news material on the subject was "handed" to me by proponents, without the use of initiative on my part. I pursued the O.P.S. story when it fell within my beat of the Jacksonville Port Authority and the waterfront and did not wait, hat in hand, for anything which might be tossed my way.

I am afraid that Devereux, in building his case, fell into his own trap by failing to delineate the difference in approach in the news columns of the *Journal* and the *Times-Union*, thus presenting the idea that both papers adopted without question the "chamber of commerce" slant.

JOE CALDWELL  
Jacksonville Journal

Sean Devereux replies: *Mr. Caldwell may be quite correct in asserting that never did a Journal editor pressure him toward favoritism in his reporting of O.P.S. events. To a man, Journal reporters defend the integrity of Journal managing editor Elvin Henson. These same reporters, however, recall instances of pressure from levels above Henson, specifically pressure from Florida Publico executive editor (of both papers) John Walters to present a favorable "balance" to the biological assessments of the project. In a 1975 interview, Caldwell acknowledged these direct pressures from the joint management of the two papers, although he insisted that he personally resisted them.*

## Double standard?

TO THE REVIEW:

In Harry Rosenfeld's unconvincing rebuttal to Jason Berry's piece ["The I.R.S. vs. Civil Rights Workers," *CJR* January/February] the writer states: "Making judgments on the basis of the sound of someone's voice over the telephone . . . is not the mark of a good reporter or even of a mildly competent one." Unfortunately, that same rebuttal finds Rosenfeld saying, "The personal impression Berry made over the phone contributed to our feeling that we had to make doubly sure of his material. He spoke very agitatedly."

SYL JONES  
Assistant Editor of Publications  
General Mills Public Relations  
Minneapolis

Harry M. Rosenfeld's reply to freelancer Jason Berry is more than adequate, but I can't help wondering why Berry believes that a story on the NBC television network would provide coverage that was less national than that provided by a story in *The New York Times*, *The Washington Post*, or *Los Angeles Times*.

ARNIE MATANKY  
Publisher  
Near North News  
Chicago

## Who judges journalism?

TO THE REVIEW:

Usually fair and objective, you develop blind spots on the fair trial-free press issue. In the otherwise unexceptionable "Gag Order on a Gag Order" (January/February), you say that journalists, not judges, should defer publication if it can be shown that reporting pre-trial details will inflame the community, and that journalistic decisions can be reversed more quickly and with less danger to the public.

To whom would it be shown that reporting would be inflammatory? The press itself, sitting as judge, jury, and prosecutor in the same case (something you don't like when government officials do it)? In view of your argument that it is unclear that pre-trial publicity affects jurors, what is it going to take to

# LETTERS

continued

show inflammatory effects? Further, those with a vested self-interest — true of the media, as you so often report — seldom reverse their actions and, when they do, it isn't quick. Judges at least have "superiors" — appellate courts — to whom we can turn; where does one turn for an appeal from journalistic over-reporting? Not to the public, regularly fed the "gory details."

The issue is not danger to the public but to the *individual defendant*; even if his trial is delayed to reduce the effect of improper publicity or his conviction later reversed (requiring retrial), he has been forced to suffer, while the press suffers no penalty. We must remember that the public, always used as a reason to balance away rights of individual citizens, would be well served by fair trials, even if the press were to feel temporarily "put upon."

STEPHEN L. WASBY  
Professor of Political Science  
Southern Illinois University  
Carbondale, Ill.

## If wishes were autos . . .

TO THE REVIEW:

Robert Meyers's excellent article, "The Dale Tale" (*CJR*, November/December) neglected to mention the fact that the general news media were not the only ones taken in by Liz Carmichael's high-pressure sales pitch for her nonexistent car. The automotive press fell for it as well.

I interviewed Michael/Carmichael for *Motor Trend* in November 1974, just as the Dale p.r. push began, and although I thought the car had a snowball's chance in hell of going into production, I didn't even consider the possibility that the whole operation was a con. Automotive history is so full of "miracle cars" that never got past the prototype stage — the Tucker, the Airmobile, the Fascination — that the Dale didn't look like anything new.

I think the main reason for the widespread reluctance to blow the whistle on the Dale is that we all *wished* it could work.

JOHN PASHDAG  
Los Angeles

KABC reporter Larry Carroll's explanation of how he had the wool pulled over his eyes by Ms. (or Mr.) Carmichael is absurd.

"It happened," Mr. Carroll is quoted as saying, "as a result of the way TV news works. We just don't have time to check things out."

Bull! That may be the way KABC works, but it is *not* the way TV news has to work. Cop-outs like that supply sure-fire ammunition to those who claim that TV news is a medium with little to offer.

Deadline pressure, broadcast or print style, is no excuse for a reporter who fails to check his facts and deceives his public.

SCOTT GURVEY  
WBBM-TV News  
Chicago

## Attacking evil

Several darts or javelins to the *Review* for its cheap piece about "The Guns of Autumn." I have never understood that an evil must be universal in order to justify an attack in the press or on television. For it to be usual or general would seem to be enough. The fact is that wherever hunting or killing for sport exists, so do the abuses shown in "The Guns of Autumn."

Come to Massachusetts some time where it is good sport to shoot a deer the size of a collie or a golden Labrador.

Incidentally, I think the *Review* should be reminded occasionally that it is godlike only in relation to journalism and not all subjects.

If the writer of the "Guns of Autumn" piece is not already a member of the National Rifle Association, as I assume he is, he should receive honorary membership forthwith.

HENRY BEETLE HOUGH  
Edgartown, Mass.

## Forearmed

TO THE REVIEW:

Barry Mitzman's account ("Too Much Privacy," *National Notes*, January/February) of the "great Oregon news blackout" was accurate as far as it went. From a press performance standpoint, it omits one salient point.

Although almost all of the Oregon media were not given access to criminal informa-

tion news, there was one exception. In Medford, *The Mail Tribune* went to court the day before the law went into effect, and, citing constitutional grounds, obtained from a clear-headed local circuit judge an injunction against enforcement of the law by the Medford Police Department, the local office of the Oregon State Police, the district attorney, and the county sheriff's office. Thus, while other newspapers contented themselves with publishing the startling results of the gag law, *The Mail Tribune* continued publishing criminal news as usual during the four days before the law was repealed.

ERIC W. ALLEN JR.  
Editor  
*The Mail Tribune*  
Medford, Ore.

## Safety is our only message

TO THE REVIEW:

The article by Robert Samuelson, "Is It Time to Bury the Holiday Death Watch?" (*CJR*, November/December) presents a good reason and an excellent forum for a factual explanation of the National Safety Council's holiday traffic fatality and injury estimates.

The entire article emerges from a proposition that these statistics "may be" wrong. Samuelson pulls this supposition from some "calculations" of someone in an insurance companies-sponsored organization to show that holidays "are probably no more unsafe than most weekends." The calculations contain a simple error.

In trying to prove that holiday fatalities are no higher than "average daily weekend deaths same month," the calculations *average in* the holiday fatalities with the non-holiday fatalities instead of comparing one with the other, as was the stated purpose of these calculations. Even using this same method, but separating holiday fatalities — as should have been logically done — from "average daily weekend deaths same month," the results show an average holiday fatality increase of 5.5 percent as opposed to the "just about equal" statement Samuelson uses to sum up the "calculations" when the figures are "lumped together."

It is hoped that the following simplified il-

illustration will clarify the issue:

Consider a three-day holiday (e.g., Friday, Saturday, and Sunday) and a family planning a trip during that time. By comparing the holiday period to the same three days a week earlier or a week later, we are attempting to illustrate the difference in risk to that family making the *same three-day trip* on the holiday weekend as compared with a week earlier or a week later. If one compares a holiday period with a simple weekend (even on the basis of average traffic fatalities per day), there is an implicit difference in the kind of trip contemplated. Two variables are then altered at once, which distorts the effect of each. By holding the kind of trip constant, we are changing only one variable (when the trip is taken) and measuring the effect of that variable only.

Separating holiday periods from comparable non-holiday periods, we find that the number of traffic fatalities that occurred during Memorial Day, Fourth of July, Labor Day, Christmas, and New Year's Day over the three years 1972-1974 averaged 18 percent higher than what would have been normal for equivalent non-holiday periods at the same time of the year.

The holiday traffic fatality and injury estimates help focus attention on traffic safety and the terrible toll that traffic accidents claim. The other major point that the estimates make is that the projected toll can be significantly reduced if common safety practices were observed while driving. Holidays present a dangerous period for driving and a high-visibility period for a safety message, which acutely brings home the realization that a significant number of lives can be saved not only on holidays, but every day.

With this letter, we would like to call on all the media to help us save the lives of their readers, listeners, and viewers by not only alerting the public to the increased dangers of driving on the holidays, but by running with the estimates the council-included safety methods of reducing the number of lives lost on our roadways.

GEORGE V. BUDREAN  
Director of Public Information  
National Safety Council  
Chicago

## Default and *The New York Times*: an exchange

TO THE REVIEW:

Martin Mayer's article, "Default at *The New York Times*," in the January/February *Review*, contains so many inaccuracies, distortions, and omissions that it is impossible to believe he bothered to read the stories he is criticizing. Virtually every piece of information that he says did not appear in the *Times*, did, in fact, appear in the *Times* and often only in the *Times*.

The *Times*'s coverage of New York City's fiscal crisis has been, among other things, voluminous, perhaps more than the average reader could absorb in its entirety. So it is understandable that many readers might have missed major stories the paper printed during the year. But it is hardly understandable for the same to be true of someone writing an article for the *Review*. Either Mr. Mayer's subscription lapsed along the way, or he deliberately left out evidence that would have undermined his sanctimonious theories. If the latter is the case, one wonders about the seriousness and even the honesty with which he approached his subject.

Mr. Mayer repeatedly criticizes the newspaper for publishing information "without comment" and then praises the editorial page, by contrast, for providing comment. Here we see a common misunderstanding of the separate functions of a paper's news and editorial-page divisions. It is certainly strange to find it perpetuated in the *Columbia Journalism Review*.

These are some of the general failings of the Mayer article. They can be understood best in the context of the following examples (as well as several others deleted because the *Review* has limited the space for this reply).

Mr. Mayer discusses details of the city's accounting gimmickry as if he were disclosing them for the first time. Every detail he mentions was reported and analyzed thoroughly in the *Times*. He cites, for instance, the problem of delayed state-aid payments "forced" on the city by Albany. This was discussed all during the year by the *Times*, and a 1,700-word article on accounting gimmickry on April 7 pointed out that some of these payments — far from being

"forced" on the city — were the result of mutually beneficial deals between former Governor Rockefeller and former Mayor Lindsay.

The *Times*, Mr. Mayer says, accepted the city's "preposterous bookkeeping." The truth is that when Mayor Beame presented his budget last year, the *Times* ran "news analyses" that repeatedly pointed out that Mr. Beame was overestimating his revenues, underestimating his expenditures — including welfare expenditures — and employing a range of budget-balancing devices disguising the fact that he was relying on borrowing to pay expenses. Mr. Mayer either didn't read these stories or deliberately ignored them.

Mr. Mayer discusses how the city used accounting devices to incorporate eighteen months of revenue from sewer and water charges into one year's budget. This technique was pointed out early in the crisis by the *Times* and repeated in subsequent analyses. He also cites the city's use of a device that siphoned away payments from the pension system, as if this, too, did not appear in the paper. Apparently Mr. Mayer feels that information does not appear unless it is accompanied by what he terms "editorial treatment." At another point, he reports that the city managed to build up \$358 million in its "end-of-the-year general fund accruals" and that it employed this practice "without objection from the *Times*." But in April, the *Times* pointed out that the end-of-the-year accrual fund — money that the city says accrued in the last quarter of its fiscal year, but which cannot be collected until afterward — had quadrupled since 1969.

Mr. Mayer would have readers of the *Columbia Journalism Review* believe that the *Times*, as he says, "never investigated" these techniques. Apparently, in his view, unless such an investigation is accompanied by advocacy on the paper's part, it might just as well have not appeared.

Another device Mr. Mayer mentions is that of the city "rolling over" expenses into the next fiscal year. Again, this has been reported repeatedly. It would have been more

interesting — and certainly less misleading — if Mr. Mayer had confined his inquiry to the question of why the public, and public officials, went ahead and used these devices even though it was well known that they were questionable. But that would have been a different article.

The “distant thunder” of collapse was sounded in October 1974, Mr. Mayer says, when banks found they could not market the New York City securities they had agreed to underwrite. This fact, Mr. Mayer says, “was not immediately reported.” It was not “immediately reported” because it took time and effort to dig it out. A major investigation by the *Times* produced the story only one month later. It was based on scores of interviews with banking, investment, and government officials who documented the information for the first time. The *Times* thus became the first newspaper to uncover the failure of underwriters to sell city securities.

More to the point, the story ran 2,500 words, on the top left-hand corner of page one, with the headline: “Experts Fear Growth in Costly City Debts; Erosion of Both Credit Rating and Budget Cited as Dangers.” It said that financiers had been watching “skeptically” as the mayor tried to eliminate his budget deficit, quoting one expert as saying that “New York has balanced its budget for years with deficit financing.” It compared the city’s debts with other governments, showed how the city had used long-term borrowing to pay for expenses in the capital budget, and remarked that city bonds were “piling up on the dealers’ shelves and threatening them with substantial losses.”

Prophetically, the story quoted some people as predicting that “one day banks would simply stop lending money to the city.” This was November 1974 — *months before the fiscal crisis broke into the open*. It was followed week after week by stories that repeated the theme. Mr. Mayer says “nobody who read the news stories could have discovered how bad things were.” The most charitable thing to be said about his comment is that it is disingenuous.

The “most remarkable story in the whole zoo” ran October 23, Mr. Mayer says, because it noted how Mayor Beame “struck an optimistic note . . . by asserting that the city’s credit position had improved. . . .” How strange of Mr. Mayer to select for this

distinction a 300-word article about a statement by the mayor. Even in its headline (“Beame Defends Credit Position”), the story pointed out that Mr. Beame was making his statement because others were saying that the city’s credit position had been deteriorating. Mr. Mayer ignores this. He also ignores the fact that the rise in interest rates on city note and bond sales all during 1974 were page-one stories each time. More specifically, Mr. Beame was answering questions raised by Controller Harrison J. Goldin the week before — another page-one story, ignored by Mr. Mayer. Mr. Beame’s statement was a defense. It was reported in the paper as such. But Mr. Mayer criticizes the *Times* because “there was no mention in either Beame’s statement or the *Times* report of the accelerating pension obligations.”

This is an incredible criticism, especially because the *Times* has been writing about spiraling pension costs for years. *Times* reporting began to call attention to the pension problem as early as 1971. All during last year, in page-one stories, the *Times* continued to discuss the pension problem in the context of the fiscal crisis. Mr. Mayer tells your readers that the *Times* ignored this problem, using as evidence the fact that it was left out of one 300-word story.

Mr. Mayer goes on to cite a *Times* “news analysis” in October containing the statement that “the city cannot be run like a business because it is not a business. . . . It is organized to provide services that are so essential they must be provided no matter how high the costs.” Using this out-of-context quotation, Mr. Mayer tells your readers that the article condones the city’s overspending. This is a distortion. The statement he quotes merely describes the fact that the city has some costs — welfare, debt service, and pensions — that are mandated by law and can’t be cut unilaterally. It goes on to quote experts as saying that the city’s budget deficit may be as high as \$1 billion, that the city engages in “profligate budgetary policies,” and that it engages in “reliance” on “heavy borrowings for expenses.”

Mr. Mayer says that in the fall of 1975, the *Times* quoted Bank of America officials as offering “statesmanlike utterances” about the need for federal assistance without pointing out the bank’s role in marketing and purchasing city securities the year before. This is another unbelievable criticism. Where was

Mr. Mayer during this time? Does he not remember that the entire year of the fiscal crisis consisted largely of criticisms of the banks that they were merely trying to protect their own involvement in New York City? These criticisms were reported and examined so many times that it is impossible to list them all.

Mr. Mayer says that the *Times* failed to uncover the story that the city was borrowing in anticipation of receiving nonexistent revenues from real-estate taxes. There were accusations — duly reported — that this was going on last spring, but they could not be reported as fact until proven as fact. And they were not established as fact until the early summer. At that point, the *Times* became the first newspaper to report that auditors had just uncovered the deception.

As the crisis began in February and March, Mr. Mayer says, the *Times* reported “without comment” that bankers were demanding affidavits that there were valid anticipations of future receipts to pay off city notes. What could be meant by this criticism? The bankers’ demand was not a part of the public record — the *Times* reported it exclusively. It also reported, *exclusively*, that Mayor Beame’s layoffs were not taking place on schedule, that some personnel he announced as being laid off had actually been dismissed the year before, that various savings he proclaimed because of specific economy moves were not being achieved, that the mayor was using federal public-service employment funds for political patronage, and that a secret internal budget bureau memorandum was predicting that the city’s budget deficit in the next year was going to be twice the size of the current year’s deficit. These stories — ignored by Mr. Mayer — were also reported “without comment.” Someone ought to tell Mr. Mayer how to read a newspaper.

Mr. Mayer accuses the *Times* of not telling its readers in one article in April that financial experts were afraid of a default. But the *Times*, from the very beginning, told its readers that investors were worried about the safety of city bonds and notes, contrary to what Mr. Mayer charges. A “news analysis” in March, for example, pointed out in the lead that bankers were asking the city “the kind [of questions] that are usually associated with bankruptcy proceedings.” It quoted an official at First National City Bank

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
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as saying that investors were convinced that, if the city's money ran out, the city would pay its employees rather than its creditors. Another story in March quoted a fiscal expert as saying that investors feared that the city, like the State Urban Development Corporation, would "float belly upward."

Mr. Mayer criticizes the *Times* for "permitting the state as well as the city to pretend for months that an insolvency problem was really a cash-flow problem." Why does he ignore the story in May with the headline: "Is Cash Flow Crisis Real or Only Budget Jargon?" In it, the term "cash flow" — which had come into public use a couple of weeks before — was defined. It quoted critics as pointing out that the city was closing deficits by disguised borrowing, and that it was paying off its borrowing by borrowing some more. Mr. Mayer says the *Times* never examined the "magnitude" of the impact of these techniques. Once again he is wrong. An exclusive *Times* article in June disclosed that an internal city memorandum found that they accounted for \$1.5 billion of the city's \$5.7 billion in short-term debt.

To say that the *Times* "permitted" state and city officials to persist in viewing the crisis as a "cash flow" problem reflects an unreal sense of what a newspaper can do. Mr. Mayer says, for instance, that "not until mid-November did the state begin to explore ways of cutting down on the city's future debt service and pension payments." Mr. Mayer is not the only person in history to feel that politicians should have heeded certain warnings and taken certain steps. It is a rare critic, however, who distorts the record by saying that the warnings were never there.

Mr. Mayer notes that New York City was going into the month of December "without the cash to pay for power and light, or food for the school lunches, or welfare grants, or salaries." He says "the *Times* noted the cash shortage in an editorial, not in its news columns." It is literally inconceivable that Mr. Mayer could have been reading the news columns at this time. The *Times* printed cash shortage projections on a weekly basis. It began mentioning the specific problem of the December shortfalls early in the fall. A 1,000-word story in October, for example, pointed out that the newest projections by Controller Goldin showed that even if the city stopped payment on all its maturing debt obligations, "it will still have a 'cash shortfall' of \$1.2 billion within the next four

months [after December 1]. That is, it will need to borrow that much to meet payrolls, payments to contractors, welfare and other items." Again, why did Mr. Mayer ignore this article, and others subsequent to it? No other news outlet was printing comprehensive cash-flow information on a regular basis.

The day after Mr. Mayer testified in Washington, last October 18, he was disappointed to see that the *Times* relegated Congressman Reuss's "intelligent legislation" to "a sidebar rather than, as it should have been, the focus of consideration." Perhaps this was because the *Times* ran a page-one story about the Reuss bill when it was proposed on October 7. Evidently, when Mr. Mayer found out about it ten days later, it was news to him. The readers of the *Review* are entitled to more than this.

Mr. Mayer's distorted discussion of the *Times*'s coverage ran aground, in part, for one of the reasons he cited in his own criticisms — the inherent complexity of the story. But in part it was his misunderstanding of a newspaper's role — the fact that even though politicians may make simplified statements, the newspaper is in no position to censor their statements, as Mr. Mayer apparently advocates. Finally, he aggressively overlooks all the stories that did, indeed, place the statements of all officials in their proper context, which is the responsible way of approaching any story.

The *Times*, he says, mistook the "manual labor of digging out information" with "the mental process" of putting the information together. From his armchair, Mr. Mayer won't see that the fiscal story required both. The accounting techniques, the budgetary deceptions, the early warnings, the secret moves by the banks, the churning political developments — all the things that Mr. Mayer now cites as being obvious in hindsight — in fact required "digging."

The assertion, moreover, that the *Times* did not piece the information together, discuss the implications, and analyze the consequences, collapses under the weight of the evidence. His is a theory that recklessly strips the facts.

Mr. Mayer writes about the record by ignoring it. He also fails to understand what a newspaper does. A newspaper cannot present supposition and allegation as fact, as Mr. Mayer himself did in an article he wrote for the *Times*'s op-ed page in May.

It said flatly that banks control 51 percent

of New York City's liabilities. This was a pure guess, stated as fact, because no surveys had been done at the time. Subsequent studies by the Federal Reserve, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the Controller of the Currency showed the figure to be more like 15 percent.

It quoted, without double-checking, the Citizens Budget Commission assertion that a wage freeze would save \$600 million annually. Had he checked, he would have seen the savings was more like half this figure.

And it contained several other statements about intricacies of the bankruptcy laws that eventually proved erroneous.

These assertions by Mr. Mayer illustrate an important point: people like him in the business of expressing their opinions have a license to state what they think is true. The *Times*'s news pages must state what it *knows* is true.

It is unfortunate that this distinction was not more carefully respected in Mr. Mayer's article. He has done grave disservice to the public record and to the readers and reputation of the *Columbia Journalism Review*.


STEVEN R. WEISMAN  
FRED FERRETTI  
JOHN DARNTON  
*The New York Times*

**M**artin Mayer replies: *I had, of course, read everything to which your correspondents make reference, as it appeared and again in preparation for writing the Review article. And I have now done so yet again, with some irritation at the waste of my time and at the manners in controversy represented by the authors of the preceding letter.*

*We seem to be dealing both with a general dispute and with certain specific allegations. The general dispute, though a technical professional question, can probably be settled by majority vote. The Times can invite to stand on its side all its readers who were not surprised when the credit markets closed permanently to the city, not surprised when the MAC "solution" collapsed, not surprised when the state's credit disappeared in the aftermath of its intervention to help the city, not surprised when two-thirds of the noteholders expropriated by the legislature in November refused to acquiesce in their own defrauding by accepting a swap of MAC funds. All those readers who, on the basis of what the Times had told them, were sur-*

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prised by these entirely predictable – inevitable – developments can come stand on my side; then we can count noses.

I believe I do owe two partial apologies. I should have made it more clear that I was writing only about the coverage after January 1, 1974, when the city's slide to ruin accelerated. And I could have spared a kind word for the story that ran on April 7, 1975 — two pages from the back of the paper. It was late, incomplete, and wrong in its confident assertion that the city was about to sell some more notes (the market in fact had closed by then); but it was not contemptible.

Readers will have observed that this April 7 piece is almost the only one identified by date in the Times's reply. I fear there is a reason for this. Take for example the 2,500-word page-one story headlined "Experts Fear Growth in City Debts," which the Times now claims foretold the collapse of the city's finances. The date of the story is November 25, 1974. Paragraphs two and three read as follows:

Bankers and brokers who are experts in city affairs are not worried that New York will be unable to pay off its debt commitments. There is no doubt that the city can and will do that.

But the financial community is concerned that the city's debt is growing too fast for its good. . . .

And yes, early in the carry-over section there does indeed appear the quote that "New York has balanced its budget for years with deficit financing." But the next sentence of that quote, in the same paragraph, reads, "I don't see why this year should be different."

The quote, "one day banks would simply stop lending money to the city" does not appear in the edition duplicated by the Times microfilm service. The closest I come to it is the following, about three-quarters of the way through the piece: "I can imagine a day coming when the bankers say to us — like they did in the Depression — that they won't lend us any more money until we change our ways."

I find no "page-one story" about Controller Goldin's allegations in the week before Mayor Beame's cheerful announcement about the easing of the city's debt burden. "The story in May with the headline 'Is the Cash Flow Crisis Real or Only Budget Jargon?'" — the date is May 15, 1975 — does not do what the complainers claim. The question in the headline is answered with the

comment that "as is so often the case when there is a political cast to things, the answer depends on who is making the assessment." The closest I come to a hint of insolvency is a charge by the Citizens Budget Commission that the city's cash shortage was "a symbol of living beyond its means" — immediately answered by a quote from Jim Cavanagh that "The receivables are out there." And that it was perfectly all right to borrow against them.

The others are more of the same.

I alluded to two specific pieces of information that appeared in the editorial column rather than in the news columns. One was the shocking fact (reported eight months late) that the state legislature had made the city's 1975 budget come out right by authorizing the city to steal three years' worth of "excess interest" from the pension funds. No rebuttal is offered here. On the other item, the end-of-the-year cash crisis, I agree that I could have put more weight on the running account of week-to-week prospective December deficits; but I cannot accept the claim that news stories detailing Controller Goldin's estimates of the cash shortage in the operating budget equate to the editorial that for the first time totaled the combined shortfall of operating and capital budget cash. The editorial writers understood what these reporters and their sources at City Hall still do not, that when you can't borrow at all there is no longer any distinction between the purposes for which you would like to borrow. Neither editorial writers nor reporters understood, unfortunately, that the cash shortage was a self-inflicted wound resulting from the insolvent city's insistence on using every available penny to pay off its wealthy noteholders as their notes came due.

My argument was not that the Times failed to report the facts, some of which Times correspondents did, as I wrote, uncover; I accused the paper of failing to tell the story. Nothing in the Times to this date has related the underfunding of the pension system and the city's borrowing, though the two are merely different forms of debts. On the protestors' objections that "news analysis" does not and cannot express opinion as an editorial does, I refer the reader to the example I cited ("the city cannot be run like a business," etc.) and to the reporters' defense of it.

The correspondents' objection to my

op-ed piece is an interesting example of their incomprehension of the terms of art in this field. The estimate by the regulatory agencies that the banks "own" 15 percent of the city's debts does not for a moment contradict my assertion that counting the instruments in trust, agency, and advisory accounts the banks control 51 percent of it, and the men charged by the Times with covering a financial story should know better than to think it does.

The Times is still not covering this story properly. Let me suggest three items that might more profitably occupy the time of the paper's correspondents:

□ The city's payroll is being reduced by the early retirement of senior employees. The Kinzel Commission study of the pension plans reported that each retirement at age fifty-five (rather than age sixty-five) requires a roughly 50 percent increase in the reserves that must be set aside for that individual's pension. What are the actual dimensions of this cost to date, and is it being considered in the city's calculations? Also: to what extent will the pension funds have to use money from the reserve for those already retired (which includes the retirees' own contributions) in purchasing the unmarketable MAC bonds to be issued in the three-year plan?

□ What proportion of the state's anticipated \$4-billion spring borrowing must be secured not by future state revenues but by the city's own promise to repay? Will these notes be offered separately, and if so, who is expected to buy them?

□ On Saturday, November 10, 1975, the governor's advisers agreed to go to the legislature the next week to secure a moratorium on the repayment of city notes coming due after December 1. Full principal and interest were then paid on a note issue due November 12. To whom were the checks written on November 12?

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# BROADCAST JOURNALISM SINCE WATERGATE

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## The Alfred I. duPont-Columbia University Survey of Broadcast Journalism Interim Report

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*Moments of Truth?*, the fifth DuPont-Columbia Survey of Broadcast Journalism, covering the twenty months of Nixon's truncated second term, was published by Thomas Y. Crowell in March 1975. The sixth survey is scheduled to be issued early in 1977. The following supplementary report concerns the period from the summer of 1974 to the fall of 1975 and is based in part on comments from the 1,500 news directors and ninety DuPont correspondents canvassed by the survey during the year.

Marvin Barrett

Richard Nixon's resignation and departure from Washington in August 1974, broadcast live on radio and TV from coast to coast, wrote a palpable finish to that confrontation between the president and his opponents which had become known as Watergate. Preeminent among the president's adversaries, whether or not they wished to be so distinguished, were the nation's broadcasters. From the outset their part in bringing down the embattled administration was obvious, particularly to the potential victims, who identified the networks as their principal

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tormentors far in advance and spoke and acted accordingly. (See *Moments of Truth?*, pp. 1-65.)

Still, the broadcasters after the first flush of victory behaved as if the whole business was an embarrassment as much as a vindication.

To begin with, congratulations were not completely deserved. Broadcasters, like their counterparts in government, were slow to pick up the first evidences of misbehavior uncovered for them by the print media. Even at the height of the affair they were capable of being distracted from full attention by lesser considerations. Their function, crucial though it was, had more to do with amplification than with exploration and discovery.

But the discomfort arising from a failure to render the best service possible to the public was minor compared to the realization, repeatedly and bitterly affirmed by the vanquished themselves, that when the broadcasters chose to exert their muscle, they and their "unelected" spokesmen were more powerful than an administration swept into office by the greatest landslide in history.

Once again, and in a manner difficult to ignore, the networks and individual stations had been reminded of their formidable capability, perhaps even their duty, to inform and arouse the public and to move the government to action.

What did they intend to do with this prodigious privilege and power? The answer, judging from the months following Watergate, was — nothing they hadn't done before, and in some instances less than that.

In the immediate wake of Watergate there was no evidence of increased commitment to serious news and public affairs on any of the three commercial networks. The hours regularly allotted to journalism in the prime-time schedule remained where they had been for the past several years — at zero. That broadcast journalism might have actually lost ground became apparent over the next several months.

ABC, traditionally the weakest of the three networks in news and public affairs, after a heartening burst of vigor a year earlier showed alarming signs of backsliding.

*A.M. America*, ABC's attempt to compete with CBS's exemplary *Morning News* and NBC's highly successful *Today*, went on the air in January 1975. Unfortunately, instead of representing an increase in the network's commitment to serious news and public affairs, it gave the first overt entry into a network news operation to Frank Magid Associates of Marion, Iowa — the most conspicuous of the nation's news consultants — a negative landmark of considerable importance. Despite Magid's expensive advice and a very large initial investment the show steadily lost ground until the following November when it took a new name, *Good Morning, America*, and a new format that even more slavishly followed Magid's recommendations, further cementing the uneasy marriage of news and entertainment.

Another indication of the network's shaky commitment to news and public affairs was the departure of *The Harry Reasoner Report*, an ABC weekend documentary series which had grown steadily in quality throughout the last two seasons and which was dropped without ceremony from the network schedule in June 1975.

However, the worst piece of news for anyone concerned

about the future of broadcast journalism came when the network announced in the fall of 1975 what had been rumored for some time — that it intended to cut back by 50 percent its monthly *Close-Up*, for two seasons the most consistently outspoken network documentary on the air.

The reasons suggested: too much money spent on *A.M. America*, large future commitments in time and money to coverage of the 1976 campaigns and the Olympics, the fact that the conglomerate of which ABC Television was a part had suffered sizable losses, thanks mainly to bad debts attributed to the failure of W. T. Grant and Company.



Whatever the cause, the cutback of *Close-Up* seemed to be another instance of broadcast journalism's peculiar susceptibility to the vagaries of its own and other people's business. For years news and public affairs had been the first to bear the burden of declining profits near at hand at individual station or network. Now it was ticketed

the "first to go" to make up for mistakes and losses anywhere under the corporate shelter more and more frequently shared with other enterprises. The low priority given to news and public affairs, the best sacrificed for the least, had seldom had a crasser demonstration.

Finally, the *ABC Evening News*, rated third among the networks, was making desperate attempts to catch up. Some of these attempts bore an uncomfortable resemblance to local news, which too often substituted attention-getting tricks, brevity of individual items, and soft items for hard news judgment. The double squeeze ended in the resignation of Av Westin, who in happier days had been in charge of both *Close-Up* and the *Evening News*.

CBS, which had shown up strongly during the Watergate months, gave little immediate indication of a new commitment to news and public affairs commensurate with its frequent courage under heavy administration attack. The investigative unit, which was responsible for the controversial two-part evening-news segment credited by no less an authority than Ben Bradlee, *Washington Post* executive editor, for making Watergate finally indelible, as well as for the admirable series on the Russian wheat deal, was reduced from four to one in August 1974. The unit's head, Stanhope Gould, was one of the three let go. Gould's two essays, prime examples of what could be done with difficult subjects in a half-hour newscast, were not duplicated.

Under a covering barrage of enthusiastic press releases Dan Rather departed his front-line post in the White House, where he had come to personify the anti-Nixon presence, for a more stately assignment in one of Ed Murrow's old slots as the top presence on *CBS Reports*. There he was promised ten to twelve hard-hitting shows to ride herd on each season.

Fourteen months and eight *CBS Reports* later Rather was moved into the third slot — alongside Morley Safer and Mike Wallace — on *60 Minutes*. Although the network announced the program would be pushed forward into prime time on Sunday evenings, where it would be visible fifty-

two weeks a year, it was hard to look on Rather's new assignment as a promotion for bravery under fire.

The *CBS Special Reports*, a series of excellent programs on important news developments which demanded more time than the evening news could afford, continued to be put together with impressive rapidity and expertise and then, in most instances, relegated to a time slot after the late night news (in some markets this was as late as 2:00 A.M.), where they competed for the attention of the nation's insomniacs with Johnny Carson and the late late movie, and had a third the potential audience they could have had earlier in the evening.

CBS's long-standing plan to increase its network news from thirty to forty-five minutes or a full hour once more did not materialize, reportedly discouraged by affiliates who, if their own commitment to profitable local news steadily grew, demonstrated no taste for an expanded national news service which might cut into their own more profitable newscasts. Walter Cronkite was quoted as describing his evening half hour as "a front page, bulletin, afternoon news service. And that's all it is." If Cronkite's statement indicated that perhaps he wished things might be otherwise, there were many who felt that higher aspirations were hubris. Al Korn, vice-president of programming for RKO/TV, wrote to the survey,

Electronic journalism was never meant to be anything more than a reporting digest to the public of daily fast news events. Those persons who are interested in a more in-depth comprehensive awareness about a particular story should read a newspaper, magazine, listen to his radio, listen to his political party candidates, and then make up his mind what the truth really is.

Despite the demonstration of Watergate and the figures that each year put TV news farther and farther ahead of other media as the nation's primary and often singular source of news, Mr. Korn's minimal "no win" attitude continued widespread, particularly among management spokesmen.

One CBS attempt to give its viewers more than a digest of fast news events, *Magazine*, an excellent and innovative daytime hour aimed at informing rather than distracting the nation's women, stayed on the air for a second season although the seasonal time allotment was kept to five hours.

Nor did electronic journalism get much of a boost on NBC. A thirteen-hour ceiling had been set for scheduled prime-time news and documentaries for the season, less than half that allotted five years before. As on CBS, when the network put together a special report to give the public necessary information on an important news event, it was more often than not stuck at the fag end of its schedule. Relegated to the same slot was *Weekend*, the heir to the network's high-class magazine *First Tuesday* which used to command two hours of prime time once a month. Allotted ninety minutes and stuck into the schedule at 11:30 on Saturday night, the program, under the talented supervision of Reuven Frank, network news president emeritus, was still turning out some of the best and most stylish news essays on the air, frequently outpacing its high powered competition, the more fortunate *60 Minutes*. There was no sign

that its many virtues would be rewarded by a more accessible and expensive spot on the network schedule. *Today*, which during Watergate reached its peak as a broadcast newsmaker, reverted to business as usual.

The evening newscasts, even without Watergate to kick around anymore or, after April, the Vietnam War, still did not take advantage of the released time to tackle more demanding and important subjects at greater length. NBC came closest to it with an occasional series of mini-documentaries, the most successful of which was Tom Pettit's six-part sequence on feeding the American poor, which gave vivid substance to the disturbing statistics of national malnutrition.

Indeed the most conspicuous example of an increased network commitment to news came from radio, for decades a disaster area as far as broadcast journalism was concerned. In June 1975 NBC started its new National News and Information Service with a \$10-million initial investment and a staff of over 250. It offered twenty-four-hour service to a network which as of the fall of 1975 stood at fifty-seven subscribers, bringing the national total of all news radio outlets from fourteen to seventy-one.

But even this good news had its drawbacks. In some markets where the new NBC service was added, competing stations were reported to have used its arrival as an excuse to give up news and public affairs. Furthermore, with the competition increasing, CBS radio, which owned and operated six all-news stations, was reported relying heavily on market research to find out exactly what the public wanted and then giving it to them, an apparent departure from CBS News president Dick Salant's admirable dictum, issued at a recent affiliates' meeting, that "our job is not to please people, but to inform them."

**T**he commercial networks chose not to follow through on Watergate with a larger and more serious commitment to broadcast journalism. Public TV, having persisted in covering both Senate and House committees when its rich commercial counterparts rotated or abandoned coverage completely, failed to press its advantage. News and documentaries on public TV continued to lose ground. NPACT, the production group responsible for public TV's exhaustive coverage of Watergate, was snubbed in its efforts to expand its activities in serious investigative journalism by the interconnection of public TV stations and individual backers alike. Its operating budget, which during its first year was \$2.8 million, was down to \$1.7 million for the 1974-75 season with two-thirds earmarked for "special events" and no budget for individual documentaries or new documentary series.

Nor was the declining status of journalism elsewhere on public TV reversed in response to its spectacular Watergate performance. The market plan which was supposed to decentralize public TV and give the local stations more of a say in the national product effectively eliminated from the air big budget documentaries or investigative reports which the local stations hadn't the money either to produce or buy. In a trend which preceded and paralleled the Watergate de-

bacle, a long procession of outspoken and talented journalists left non-commercial TV, not to be replaced. Journalistic enterprises, both local and network, disappeared for lack of support. This was all the more ironic since Watergate coverage had brought in the largest flood of individual voluntary contributions to local public TV stations coast to coast in history.

Another threat to quality fare of any sort was implicit in the attack by F.C.C. Commissioner Benjamin Hooks, who complained that the highly educated middle-class white community received disproportionate attention from public TV. Hooks chose to overlook the obverse of his argument, which was that more common public tastes, white and black, were more than adequately served by commercial channels and that the really deprived, regardless of race or class, were those in search of quality fare.



Actually there seemed less and less justification for Hooks's anxieties concerning highbrow public TV. In the fall of 1975 several former ornaments of commercial broadcasting showed up on the fourth network. The most conspicuous, along with Lowell Thomas and Jacques Cousteau, were the National Geographic specials which after several seasons on CBS and ABC had been turned down by the commercial networks. Retribution occurred when the first of the series, *The Incredible Machine*, boosted by the formidable promotion budget provided by its bankroller, Gulf Oil, beat popular entertainment shows on all three networks in the ratings in the important New York market. Exhilarating as this was for public broadcasters, their obvious attention to ratings underscored the growing resemblance between public and commercial TV in corporate psychology as well as in what they put on the air, a convergence unwelcome to anyone who hoped to see at some later date the return to public TV of first-rate journalism. Finally, there was the distressing news that what had appeared to be a first-class example of documentary art had included filmed segments in which the anatomical features of animals were substituted for those of humans without any signal to the viewer. Similar practices in the past had led to threats of punitive action from both Congress and the F.C.C.

As for Watergate's impact on local public TV journalism, few stations reporting to the survey this year echoed the sentiments of the news director at KUID, Moscow, Idaho, who wrote:

Public TV's gavel-to-gavel coverage really helped establish this station as a place to go for public-affairs programming. We've augmented and continued strong public affairs — and viewer response has been favorable.

Most were of the opinion of KCET, Los Angeles, which commented on the aftermath of Watergate:

It appears to have resulted in a news slump — much more indifference to news coverage by the public. . . . There is much concern that the journalism aspect of the business is being downgraded financially.

WETA, Washington, D.C., the home base for NPACT, after reporting, "We received thousands of letters favoring our gavel-to-gavel prime-time broadcasts of the complete Watergate hearings," added:

Lack of adequate funding for public broadcasting has hindered broadcast journalism from developing the way it should on public television. Public radio's "All Things Considered" in my view is an excellent daily example of broadcast journalism at its best. We should have this kind of daily news program on public television, but can't afford it. Documentaries for public TV are not being produced due to lack of funds. Without adequate, insulated funding, the future of broadcast journalism on public television looks bleak.

The bleakness had several causes. Although the departure of controversial journalism from public TV was in part the result of a conscious attempt by the Nixon administration to decentralize power in all broadcasting and leave homeless its more troublesome talents, there were other factors at work. The decision of the Ford Foundation, which had favored public broadcasting in its generous grants, to phase out of the public TV scene was one. Another, even more serious factor — was the growing importance of big business as the underwriter for prime-time public TV fare.

Twenty percent of the total funding of WNET in New York City, the public station heretofore most involved in producing controversial TV journalism, now came from corporate sources. Eight national underwriters plus some local ones brought in more than \$3.1 million. *Newsweek* estimated that corporations and corporate foundations, nationwide, provided nearly one-third of the \$38 million spent on widely distributed public TV programming.

If on commercial TV the same corporations were unwilling to sponsor controversial material for their hard sell and had thus for decades been an inhibiting factor in the growth of prime-time news and public affairs, they proved no more willing to associate their corporate names with such programming on public TV. Their skittishness was echoed by some government agencies which had recently been backing public TV fare, most notably the National Science Foundation, which had been reported upset by the contents of a couple of segments of the excellent if usually non-controversial *Nova* series.

Without the support of local stations, without support from its well-heeled industrial and governmental angels, with the phasing out of Ford Foundation help, the old style hard-hitting public TV documentary, which for many seasons had set the pace for its commercial counterparts, was in danger of becoming extinct.

In the 1974-75 season some of the best public TV journalism still came from WNET, which aired Frederick Wiseman's latest essay *Primate*. The show, an unblinking look at one example of scientific research — the Yerkes Primate Research Center — caused an uproar in the scientific community with its harsh and controversial subject matter. WNET also was responsible for an excellent example of experimental TV journalism, long an endangered species, in TVTV's witty four-part series on *Gerald Ford's America*. These programs, however, were paid for from the station's discretionary funds without outside corporate help.

No discretionary funds were available for *Behind the Lines* and *Assignment America*, two valuable WNET series, which fell victim to an increasing emphasis at the station on blockbusting entertainment. As on the commercial networks, safe, soft documentaries prevailed more and more over anything remotely controversial.

WNET's reputation for journalistic innovation, if not its staff's morale, was saved by the introduction in the fall of 1975 of *The Robert MacNeil Report*, a half hour of commentary and discussion which followed immediately the network newscasts and explored at length news reported there in briefer form.

Solid public TV reporting still surfaced outside of New York. One conspicuous example was WGBH's *Arabs and Israelis*, seven programs devoted to the optimistic premise that two of the earth's apparently most implacable enemies still had much in common. For all its human surprises and deep insights the series seemed to have little the most timid backer could take exception to. Still, the total cost of \$500,000 was paid for out of the station's unrestricted funds, supplemented by a contribution from an anonymous foundation which had withdrawn direct support under unspecified pressures.



Across the country there were a number of scattered examples of public TV doing a good job. Among the outstanding accomplishments of local PTV during the season were the Iowa Educational Broadcasting Network's straightforward and hopeful treatment of mental retardation, *The Others*, WNJT Trenton's lyrical essay in favor of *Work, Work, Work*, KCET Los Angeles's *Game* series, an audience-participation format led off by some first-rate reporting on such subjects as bank red-lining, health care, and the trials of the recently bereaved. An informed and thorough inquiry into the vagaries of the First Amendment as it applies to individual reporters came from KUID, Moscow, Idaho (population 14,000) in the excellent *According to an Unnamed Source: the Jay Shelledy Case*, probably the single best example of a commodity rare anywhere in the media — self-examination.

The most heartening phenomenon in public TV coast to coast, which at least in part could be attributed to Watergate, was the expanding coverage of local and state government. During the season the number of stations reporting extended legislative coverage to the survey more than doubled. In every instance the contention that such coverage would encourage the nation's legislators to play to the grandstand and waste the taxpayers' time was dramatically disproved.

Despite this demonstration of the benign effects of exposure added to the examples of the Watergate hearings in the Senate and House, Congress in the fall of 1975 had yet to open its main chambers to TV cameras during working sessions, although approval had been voted. If past performance was any indication, public TV would probably be first to take advantage of such a breakthrough, provided the

money was forthcoming.

The on-again, off-again romance between Congress and the commercial broadcasters seemed to be hotting up. Many of the same legislators who showed no inclination to insulate public TV from governmental interference seemed downright eager to protect commercial broadcasters, not only from official interference or regulation but also from an increasingly critical public. Legislation sponsored by approximately 170 different senators and congressmen to extend station licenses from three to four or five years was still before Congress.

Meanwhile, special-interest groups from gun lobbyists and ethnics to parents and feminists had accounted for a jump in petitions to deny licenses from two in 1969 to 180 in 1975. In a few instances such challenges had led to settlements guaranteeing a redress of the challengers' alleged grievances. But in most instances the licensees were simply issued a temporary authority to broadcast pending further action by the F.C.C. (Several stations had had as many as two of these permits and were approaching their third, and the backlog of cases went back to 1968.) To date, one commercial TV station, WLBT in Jackson, Mississippi, and the Alabama Educational Network were the only TV broadcasters to have had their licenses actually revoked for reasons of programming. Still, several protective measures were proposed by the industry-oriented F.C.C., and there was continued agitation for legislative relief from any sort of regulation which broadcasters might claim as a violation of their First Amendment rights and a deterrent to decent broadcast journalism.

A concerned news and public-affairs director for a commercial station in Virginia wrote to the survey:

Broadcast journalism is doing a remarkably good job considering the federally imposed strictures under which it now must operate. For the future of the nation, however, it must be made independent so that it can realize its full potential. It is terrifying to contemplate the fact that 200 years after the founding of the nation we find the very First Amendment to the Constitution denied and disregarded, and even worse ignored by all three branches of government. Why do we allow this? Why are we breaking faith with our forefathers? How can we sleep nights when we have federal bureaucrats with the power to substitute their judgment for the judgments of editors? Nothing is more important for the future of broadcast journalism and the nation as a whole than to place broadcast news totally out of reach of government.

Despite the obvious good faith of such complaints there were news directors who had other and equally serious concerns about the future of broadcast journalism. From Montana one wrote:

Broadcast journalism is improving on the national level, but there is still too much show biz and too little information for information's sake. On the small-market level, it's a tough existence with almost every station controlled by general managers with sales backgrounds and little else. If it sells — it's good. If it doesn't — it's public affairs. These people don't really care about the viewers . . . about fair codes . . . about honesty . . . about truth . . . about anything, except BUCKS!

To the proponents of continued regulation of the broadcast industry, the irresponsible owner who, freed of any

possibility of retribution, would simply eliminate all public-affairs programming, remained a much more real threat than the governmental busybody. In this view, extending licenses, or eliminating them completely, as some legislators recommended, would certainly reduce the possibility of harassment by officials and public alike, but it would be a boon mainly for broadcasters who deserved harassment.

In the absence of the desired protective legislation, other legislative and administrative changes had been proposed and instituted to placate the broadcasters. Unfortunately, most of these moves could be interpreted as being not only pro-broadcaster but also anti-public interest. Matters were further complicated by the fact that the principal enemies of broadcasting's higher self, which included its dedication to good journalism, were within broadcasting and not outside it. Because of the medium's dual nature as the public's principal entertainer and informer, broadcast journalists frequently found themselves pitted against the more profitable entertainment side of their stations or networks. They seldom won out in such confrontations.

The removal of controls from the business as a whole in many instances could weaken rather than strengthen the position of those most concerned for the quality and seriousness of broadcast fare.

**T**he problems involved were eloquently put forward in a November 1974 speech by Judge David L. Bazelon of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia which *The New York Times* called "the most outspoken attack on television since Newton Minow, then chairman of the F.C.C., called the media a 'vast wasteland' in 1961." Bazelon said: "The programming executives and their advertiser clients must stop their single-minded purpose to achieve higher ratings, more advertising, and greater profits, and stop to consider what greater purposes television should serve. And they must do it soon if we are to preserve our First Amendment values for telecommunications."

It was an interesting comment on the broadcasters' customary complaint that they had no First Amendment privileges and at the same time a potent criticism of the practice of putting the advance of profits and ratings ahead of the adequate handling of news and public affairs.

Complete deregulation of radio also was proposed, the assumption being that, at least in the larger markets, open competition without government intrusion would result in improved quality. Unfortunately, there had been no indication in broadcasting's past that freedom would do anything but increase the speed with which individual stations reverted to the latest money-making formula.

The F.C.C.'s exemption of news conferences and political debates from equal-time restrictions, another ruling hailed as a stride forward for the industry which would serve to increase political coverage on the air, was followed almost immediately by two networks' decision to ignore the president's request for prime air time, and by the blacking out of the next presidential news conference by the only network which had covered the speech.

Such declarations of independence, understandable in the light of the manipulation and bullying that broadcast journalists had been subjected to in the past, might have been more convincing if the time freed had been used for something other than the usual fare the president had tried to preempt. The principal motivation and result of these acts of defiance had to be assumed to be the preservation of network ratings (and profits), the same justification which was given in the past for the elimination of broadcast journalism from prime time.

Another move in favor of broadcasters from which journalists might or might not benefit — but which would unquestionably diminish the public's access to what used to be considered the public's air — was the F.C.C.'s forbidding of agreements between public groups and broadcasters in exchange for withdrawing license challenges. Although this would protect broadcasters from some irresponsible harassment, it could also remove an effective tool from groups which frequently had genuine grievances. Further relief from the obligation to serve the public could also be found in the proposal to ease community ascertainment requirements and to exempt smaller stations from the Equal Employment Opportunity program.

Responses to a DuPont survey on the subject of the employment of women and the treatment of them on the air suggest that the exemption was premature, to say the least. Perhaps the most significant fact was that 95 percent of the answers to the questions which were addressed to news and public-affairs directors came from men, 5 percent from women — figures which coincided with industry lists of top management positions, although F.C.C. figures claimed that women in top job categories — managerial, professional, and technical — rose to 11 percent from 6 percent four years earlier.

In lower job categories 33 percent of the survey's sample reported changes in hiring practices that favored women, while some 50 percent reported no change. Many stated that change was unnecessary inasmuch as they adhered to the E.E.O. policies and all qualified candidates were considered. Seventeen percent ignored the question. Among the comments:

*San Bernardino:* "... if qualified, women are considered . . ."

*Lawrence, Kan.:* "... we hire the best candidate."

*Riverside, Calif.:* "If they qualify, they are hired."

*Champaign, Ill.:* "We did actively seek women for a part-time opening, without success . . ."

*Springfield, Mo.:* "This year we hired our first woman reporter ever. She quit . . . difficult to find qualified men OR women."

*Augusta, Ga.:* "No restrictions in hiring; currently no woman is used as a stringer."

*Las Vegas:* "No woman ranks above reporter."

*New City, N.Y.:* "No change since the station had a woman owner/operator, a woman night editor, and about half our reporters are women."

In responses to questions about treatment of women's news and news concerns, the breakdown was identical with the above. About half reported no change; 33 percent reported more sensitivity in the coverage of women's news; 17 percent ignored the question.

The DuPont correspondents, 40 percent of whom are women, gave some illuminating insights into the situation:

*Spokane:* “. . . each station has one token woman.”

*Orono, Me.:* “. . . menial jobs . . .”

*Chicago:* “. . . sometimes gutsy stories, but their big stories tend to be breast cancer, etc.”

*Sacramento:* “The anchorwoman here is really part weather/part news . . . most of the local stations give housewife-type stories.”

*Raleigh:* “. . . other than reporters and on-camera personnel, few if any women in news management.”

*Salt Lake City:* “. . . tendency on part of news director to assign women to women’s news.”


*Honolulu:* “. . . best political reporter on TV is a woman . . .”

*Jacksonville:* “. . . occasionally uses woman as weekend anchor.”

*St. Louis:* “. . . light features . . .”

*Springfield, Mo.:* “. . . general attitude deprecatory . . . tokenism . . .”

*Orlando:* “Anchorwomen are employed during morning when viewers are primarily women.”



Although it would be unfair to say that there were no signs of improvement in the treatment of women and of minorities, the assumption that vigilance could be relaxed would obviously be premature. There is still considerable dissatisfaction among women employed in the industry. At the fall 1975 meeting of Women in Communications, Inc., the complaint was registered that the barriers to women achieving parity do not begin at job-entry level. Rather, they begin when women want to move into decision-making roles. Also it was pointed out that the small stations to be relieved of their E.E.O. requirements were the very ones where women and minorities were most likely to receive the kind of training which would prepare them for advance management positions in the larger, more influential, major-market stations.

Those who claimed improvement in minority coverage had a few outstanding examples to point to during the year. Jackson, Mississippi’s WLBT, at one time rated the worst station in the land so far as racial matters were concerned, had, under the guidance of a community board, run up one of the best records in the Deep South for minority employment and on-the-air attention to minority concerns.

Farther north, WBTV in Charlotte, North Carolina produced a sixty-minute report on local school integration entitled *Swann vs. the Board of Education — 10 Years After*, a follow-up that was both exhaustive and objective and indicated a new realism in the coverage of race relations in the South.

Another follow-up after a decade was undertaken by WHEC, Rochester, which devoted months of research and three hours of prime time to its impressive *The Riots Plus Ten Years*, which recorded some gains, some losses, and some holding operations in a northern city’s fight for racial equality.

As for the fairness doctrine, long a center of controversy, its complete elimination was proposed in four pieces of legisla-

tion before Congress. Meanwhile, the F.C.C. had suggested that radio stations in large cities might be permitted to experiment with the suspension of the fairness doctrine. Also, in September 1974, the U.S. Court of Appeals had reversed the F.C.C.’s finding that NBC’s *Pensions: The Broken Promises* violated the fairness doctrine. This reversal was hailed by many as the beginning of the end for the fairness doctrine as well as a victory for broadcast journalism. However, it had yet to be established that the disappearance of the fairness doctrine would be allowed to benefit news and public affairs in particular and the public in general. Once a weapon used by liberals to discourage bigots from misusing the air waves, the doctrine had been recently discovered by conservatives as a means of silencing challengers of the status quo.

One conclusion to be drawn from all these attempts to regulate and deregulate was that in broadcasting, as elsewhere in society, virtue could not be legislated.

In 1974, despite general financial distress, the commercial broadcasters continued to record substantial gains in sales and profits.

The one area where profits had not kept pace with the industry as a whole or with their own former performance was the network owned-and-operated stations, which in the past had been the single most profitable area of broadcast activity. Still there was little reason for complaint since even with only a slight increase in net profits, the returns in terms of depreciated investment from these properties remained astronomical.

Nonetheless it was at the network “o-and-o’s,” presumably justified by their disappointing profit performance, that formerly excellent news and public-affairs programming seemed most consistently under fire.

WCBS, the flagship of the CBS network and for years assumed to be the most profitable individual TV station in the world, tried to win back falling ratings by leading off its newscast night after night with a catalogue of fires, crimes, and accidents. Attempts at genuine investigative reporting were inhibited by budget pressures and the risk of expensive libel actions.

Reports from stations with a fraction of a WCBS’s income and resources indicated that such was not always the rule.

From Florida a news director wrote:

Heavier investigative reporting leads to increased pressures . . . threats of suits . . . and in some instances the filing of legal actions that occupy our time and strain our resources. But we have not lost a case yet.

From Utah:

Our reporting, particularly investigative reporting, has been considerably tougher in the last year; this brings a corresponding increase in the abuse level — sponsor complaints, bureaucratic complaints and threats of suit. One libel suit has been filed and is now pending. Once our reporters adjusted, however, the greater abuse caused little problem.

From a former DuPont Award winner in Louisiana:

Investigative reporting places a tremendous responsibility on management in the area of accuracy and credibility and oftentimes a tre-

mendous amount of expense in lawsuits and attorney fees. The year in which we won the award, we were sued for over a million and a half dollars but we won all the suits.

The other network flagship stations in the nation's largest city missed setting the example of quality and innovation one might have hoped for from them. WNBC, with two hours at its disposal and a policy of avoiding the contaminating influence of news consultants, still employed some of the most flagrant attention-getting devices in the news consultants' repertoire. WABC had long since given itself over to the advice of consultants and market researchers.

**R**eports from Los Angeles and Chicago, where all three networks also owned and operated stations, were equally distressing. In Chicago, CBS's WBBM had developed a team of young, energetic reporters which had delivered some of the most interesting journalism the station had carried in recent years. Most of them left in the spring of 1975 after a newly retained "motivational researcher" had recommended, according to the DuPont correspondent, "nudity, drying blood on the pavement, and a fairy-tale, narrative story approach." All three of Chicago's network owned-and-operated stations were reported under the sway of outside experts who were increasingly calling the local news shots.

In Los Angeles it was the CBS station which once again was the focal point of a disturbed TV journalism community. KNXT, for a long time one of the pacesetters for the nation in local TV news, was reported staggering under new policies which involved slashed budgets and a desperate effort to attract ratings and additional income. One casualty was documentary reporting, which all but disappeared from the air. The DuPont correspondent's comment:

It's too bad that it seems to take catastrophe and upheaval — on an order of magnitude like Watergate and Vietnam — to bring out the best performance record in broadcast journalism. . . . In this "un-eventful" last nine months, broadcast journalism seems to exacerbate the public mood of "not much is going on, and even if it were, what's the use of worrying about it."

And so we have institutionalized myopia — refusal to encourage the viewer to look beyond the end of his own nose, and instead feeding his preoccupation with himself by self-help gimmicks: how to stop smoking; how to grow vegetables; how to avoid heart attacks; how to diet; how to exercise (all done serially on local nightly newscasts within a one-month period this season).

Asked to comment on the current status of broadcast journalism, an executive at one of CBS's owned-and-operated stations responded:

It stinks. Because broadcast stations aren't in the business of news but are in the business of entertainment, there is a serious lack of commitment to news. There's no emphasis on hiring qualified reporters as opposed to pretty faces or mellow voices. News departments are acutely understaffed and the priorities of most stations are anywhere but on the news department.

Time limitations naturally lead to superficial coverage and most stations will not make additional time available to go into a topic in depth. When the time is allotted, usually only to fill an F.C.C. re-

quirement, it's often Sunday night or very early in the morning. Some stations which do allot time exercise no judgment in terms of community priorities in what they do cover.

Unfortunately the situation he described was not limited to big stations in big markets. Reports of solid news operations being subverted in favor of cash came in from small and medium-sized communities in Washington state, Kansas, Nebraska, Wisconsin, and Maine.

In most instances news consultants were pointed to as the instrument, if not the cause, of this decline.

Some news directors reported that they had recovered from the shock of the news consultants' intrusion and were managing to combat and correct the more trivial and demeaning of their suggestions. At other stations, consultants had been fired and barred from the premises.

Reports coast to coast ranged from "They are a horror," "I think the whole concept of news consultants is an outrage . . . They violate the very principle of a responsible local editor who knows his community," to "I have found them very helpful." A representative cross section:

News consultants are neither a good nor a bad thing by definition. They can be used to improve news coverage and to entice more viewers to watch. Or, they can use us.

I found them considerably less villainous than I anticipated. Smarter. And less vulgar. Of course, their research and advice coincided with my views. Where they did not agree with me, I gave them bad marks.  
Providence, R.I.

The CBS affiliate has gone to a tabloid, top-40 format. Very short stories, fleeting bits of action film, lead with cop/fire events, sexual innuendos by anchorman, reading fast rate, overly dramatic and self-serving production open and close newscast. Consultant is Frank Magid and format clearly result of his advice. But still third in ratings.  
Milwaukee

There is a continuing trend to find the most cosmetically acceptable means to present a news program as opposed to what is simply the best use of the medium for news dissemination. Stations in many parts of the nation are experimenting with multiple anchor teams (getting numerous newscasters on the same program) and with high story counts, just to see how fast-paced a program can be. These experiments have in some instances reduced sound in-field reporting as more and more of the newscast originates from the studio.

"News Images" continue to be packaged like the newest soap product for promotional purposes.

News at the local level, thus, seems to be increasingly something that is being "hyped" to attract attention. Flash all too often is overpowering substance. And the news selection process is evolving into one of a question of what is most popular as opposed to what is most significant.  
Miami

Our impact on our community seems greater than ever before, and I imagine this is true in other markets. And an encouraging number of shops still seemed engaged in good, straight news reports. However, as our newscasts become more important, those of us in the business seem to be less and less innovative and more susceptible to every fad that might have a rating point attached. Thus, "Newsreel" could sweep the continent like a dread disease.

A competitor in our market now leads each newscast with a collection of one-liners, including pictures of traffic accidents, serious or not, which occurred within easy reach. The scary thing is, their

audience increased in the most recent rating period.

We know junk will get audience in television programming, including news. What we have yet to prove on any wide scale is that an honest, thorough news report can survive in local market competition. We're attempting to prove it in our operation, and are finding that it is not only a gamble, but a difficult and expensive gamble.  
Salt Lake City

Consultants, per se, are neither good nor bad. But how a station deals with its consultants can be judged. For instance, a station that turns over responsibility of news programming to an outside consultant is relinquishing the publisher role and is therefore abandoning its public responsibilities. Consultants are of value because they can provide the market research and make the proper recommendations to help a station maintain its ratings — and these ratings are very important until we devise some sort of noncompetitive news system. We maintain what I would consider a responsible relationship with a consultant — in which we take what we need and discard the rest, keeping in mind that we are the final judge of what is responsible TV journalism. This has been the attitude that has evolved here over the past four years or so.

St. Paul

I think there is a danger of big-market journalism becoming nothing more than a rating game, reaching the lowest common denominator because of the influence of news consultants. This would be tragic in view of the fact that most people rely on broadcasting for their news. But there's a real potential now in rural markets like ours. With the spill-over from the schools of journalism, we can get quality people who weren't available before. This combined with recent technical advancements makes the future brighter than ever before for solid, responsible journalism in even the smallest markets.  
Jonesboro, Ark.

Further evidence of the impact of the consultants on the nation's news operations was indicated in the tabulations of the information coming into the survey from broadcast news directors, particularly in the increase in the number of news items per broadcast reported by almost two-thirds and the increased use of film and tape on TV newscasts by four out of five. Also attributable, at least in part, to news consultants were the four out of five stations which increased their total news budget, and the nearly two-thirds of those reporting an increase in the size of their news staffs and the amount of time allotted to local news. In too many instances, however, these increases were tied to implementing a news consultant's ideas for popularizing the news rather than improving coverage.

Meanwhile the balance had shifted from a substantial majority against to three to five in favor of news consultants in the latest survey. Even more threatening to those who felt news consulting was the beginning of the end of responsible broadcast journalism were the reports that all three networks were attending more and more closely to what their market researchers were telling them about news and public affairs and that the ceiling for maximum length of single items on networks' newscasts was slowly lowering.

Probably the most conspicuous new development in broadcast journalism, and one explaining the increase in expenditures at many stations, was the arrival in force of electronic

newsgathering gear. The advent of portable tape cameras and miniaturized relay equipment gave local TV staffs the capability of covering breaking news live. E.N.G. was hailed both as the possible salvation and the ruination of broadcast journalism but few in the business were indifferent to it. Some comments:

The most interesting development in St. Louis television news in the past year has been the competition between the two leading stations — KSD-TV and KMOX-TV — over use of the mini-camera. KMOX-TV is . . . the first television station in the country to be doing all of its reporting by use of mini-cameras. Anyway, the stations have been in a furious rating war for the past few years — they're almost even — and both have been touting the use of their mini-cameras. The problem is that the stations will grasp at nearly anything to be able to air a live mini-camera report. The latest was a report — ironically, outside a hospital — in which its mini-camera was trained on a pool of blood supposedly left less than thirty minutes before by the victim of a street crime. Nearly every night, one newscast or both is graced with a report of a fire. The mini-cams can be very good on a decent police story, coverage of a night meeting, or any legitimate news event. But there are relatively few of those that make good visual stories.  
St. Louis

Two stations got mini-cams and briefly were mini-cam crazy, to the point that they argued on the air about which was being honest about how they used the mini-cam and whether they were 'live' when they said they were "live" and whether they were "first" when they made the claim. In general, neither station was completely truthful in this promotional competition.  
Albuquerque

I seriously wonder if all the new equipment (E.N.G.) isn't becoming a promotional excuse to cover the superficial — stations will spend hundreds of thousands for mini-cams but nothing for an investigative reporter. I see the public beginning to demand that news shows, like entertainment, ought to entertain and come up with new twists all the time. I see good, strong news stations threatened by obviously inferior ones and being forced economically to do things they don't really believe in.  
Louisville

I'm worried about the current trend toward the so called "live" mini-cam coverage. If we're not careful in our use of this new equipment . . . newsmakers can use us to their own advantage. I'm also against using these units in an effort to substitute videotape for film. Film is much more versatile and more creative and more satisfying for the newscast cinematographer. It is his ability as an artist that has moved our industry to a high level of effectiveness. I don't want to lose the art. Lastly, the great need in our business is to hire and develop more competent and truly professional reporters. I would much rather see us spend the money we're spending on mini-cams on the hiring of more reporters. Because that's what we need. Let's not get hung up on the glamour of elaborate and sophisticated new equipment. Getting the story and more of them are the important things in our business. Give me more reporters.  
Atlanta

The advent and impact of the mini-cam is changing the news gathering concepts of TV news. At present, the mini-cam would seem to represent both a step back and a step forward in news coverage. The step back is evident in the newscasts of stations that have gone all mini-cam and are allowing the technical limitations of the equipment to dictate how the story is covered. However, once broadcasters learn the most effective ways to use electronic cameras and the technology develops and becomes even more

sophisticated the future potential is almost unlimited.

Baton Rouge

We're on the threshold of an exciting period: "electronic journalism." It will revolutionize the way we gather news and change many established deadlines. With "live" capabilities we can go directly to the scene of a developing story. But with this comes increased responsibility on the correspondent to make his story accurate, interesting and concise. Once we learn how to properly use this new news gathering tool effectively, television news will have come of age.

Charlotte, N.C.

In Cleveland a reporter was quoted as stating flatly, "If a riot broke out, this city would be in ruins in two days because of the mini-cam's influence — it would incite rioters. It robs the TV reporter of any chance for reflection, for assessing situations, and we have little time for that now."

If Watergate did not usher in the Golden Age of TV journalism, as some might have hoped, neither did it produce the backlash which pessimists had anticipated. In the months after Nixon's departure two out of three news directors reported that their coverage of Watergate had a noticeably favorable impact and only one in twelve reporting labeled local reaction unfavorable. Also, broadcasting credibility was reported up by two-thirds. Investigative reporting, for many the real hallmark of a first-rate operation, continued to increase in popularity in the third season after Woodward and Bernstein, although it was more and more frequently being channeled into mini-documentary series on regular newscasts rather than into thirty- or sixty-minute prime-time slots. Even with this limitation the DuPont jurors this year reported a conspicuous growth in the incidence and quality of the investigative reporting submitted for awards.

Two outstanding examples were Don Harris's "Prison Gangs," done by KNBC-TV Los Angeles, which demonstrated that given space and encouragement, network "o-and-o's" were still capable of first-rate work. Another example was Brian Ross's series on "Teamster Power," aired on the evening news at o-and-o WKYC in Cleveland. Both treated potentially sensational subjects with a firm hand, backed up by solid research.

Among smaller stations, WPLG-TV, Miami and WCCO-TV, Minneapolis showed praiseworthy initiative in uncovering local hanky-panky. Clarence Jones, crime reporter for the Miami station, in a market growing more and more remarkable for the energy of its TV news operation, outflanked the formidable competition with his bulldogging of gangster activities on the Miami waterfront as well as his persistent pursuit of day-to-day malefactors aired on the regular feature, *Crime Watch*. The Minneapolis station's David Moore who, with his team has for years been filling a prime-time Sunday evening spot with good reporting, outdid himself with a two-part essay on the new Minneapolis government center, a towering twenty-four story boondoggle. WCCO Radio, a totally distinct news operation, continued to serve the Twin Cities with first-rate coverage of the local scene on a day-to-day basis, as well as being one of the few remaining stations in the nation to regularly

schedule substantial documentaries every week. Particularly successful was an investigation of prostitution in Minnesota, which took WCCO reporters all the way to New York to confirm that 30 percent of the hookers in the big city came from their home state.

Although radio continued to consolidate its hold on the U.S. public's early morning and emergency news attention, there were not many optimistic views of the future of radio news submitted to the survey this year. One of the few came from the DuPont correspondent in Iowa:

I have a strong impression that radio news staffs at small market stations in Iowa are becoming more professional, both in background and in attitude. While most such stations have either one-man or very small news staffs, the number of college graduates (including those holding journalism degrees) is noticeably increasing and there is a steady trend toward serious participation in professional organizations. Related to this is the apparent willingness of recent journalism graduates to consider small-market radio — in part, of course, because of problems in finding jobs elsewhere.

TV's growing employment of E.N.G. was seen as a threat to radio news.

Television news is moving into a new phase with electronic news-gathering. Mini-cams coupled with microwave equipment make live news coverage possible on a continuing basis even in smaller markets. This will permit television news to compete with radio news in immediacy at a time when radio news is steadily losing ground as a viable news media.

Oklahoma City

Radio news had better begin exploring new horizons for broadening its scope and impact. Increased and improved investigative reporting would be one excellent improvement. I suggest this because it won't be long before radio's one major advantage, immediacy in the coverage of breaking news stories, will be overshadowed by television's new capability with electronic news-gathering equipment.

Phoenix

Perhaps the most enthusiastic communication of all, although it indicated a decline elsewhere in the broadcasting picture, came from a newsman who presided over a four-hour daily morning news block in Indianapolis.

I recently left a successful career as a television anchorman where the emphasis had shifted from quality reports to show business and came to radio news where it seems journalism is more honest. I hated to do it but had to for self-respect. The future of radio news seems unlimited.

Indeed the messages that the nation's broadcasters beamed to the American people were paradoxical and difficult of application. Embedded in a continuum of trash, the signals of the journalists were all too brief and frequently adulterated by their surroundings. Still, the same journalists had helped bring to light and terminate the national scandal of Watergate, the international horror of Vietnam.

Now, lacking a subject of such dramatic proportions, they were once more occupying themselves with the continuing failure of the republic to cope with the country around it, its deteriorating environment, its shrinking resources, its floundering economy, its old, its mentally and

physically handicapped, its criminal and violent, its minorities, its poor.

On the fringes and in the interstices of the most massive attempt to distract and anesthetize a population in recorded history, on the eve of the Bicentennial of the wealthiest and most powerful nation in the world, American TV and radio journalists continued to nudge and prod us in their annoying, persistent way, telling us that perhaps we could be spending our time more profitably than crouched silently intent before our TV sets. When, in the fall of 1975, prime-time TV viewing was reported to have declined by 6 percent, the news ratings, significantly, remained firm.

Whether it was a rear-guard action or the beginning of a new, more enlightened era, was impossible to foresee. Perhaps the best way to conclude this report is to let the journalists give their own opinions:

Viewers seem more cynical about the performance of all institutions. Inasmuch as we are part of the institutionalized life of the nation . . . we are suffering from that same cynicism. I have faced many more challenges to news judgments this past year than earlier. I am convinced this is a healthy situation. We can no longer afford to take the quick and easy look at daily events. We are working harder to provide background and perspective . . . and to do it as honestly and effectively as possible. Just as a skeptical press has been a watchdog for government . . . a skeptical news audience can be a highly effective watchdog for the news media.

KREM-TV, Spokane

I think broadcast journalism has done much to expand news definitions . . . something which I think is long overdue. Yes, there have been excesses . . . the happy talk, the newscasters in clown suits. But I think much good has been accomplished. In Houston, TV stations cover the news a lot more aggressively than the newspapers. Yes, stories are short and many stories are ignored, especially stories that do not lend themselves well to the medium. However, I think TV journalism is still developing. We have broken away from our print roots. We have learned that some things work well . . . and that others do not. And we are still learning. For me, the one regret is the absence of regular documentaries . . . well produced and researched . . . the in-depth stories that we cannot do within the limitations of daily news.

KHOU-TV, Houston

Television news has become a gutter medium, tackling increasingly complex and controversial subjects and making some sense of them. I think there has been an increase in responsible reporting, and this in turn has triggered a greater sense of believability and credibility among the viewing public. Many are still skeptical of what they see and hear, but generally they are more believing.

To some extent, I think broadcast journalism is on a plateau, regrouping if you will. The pressures of Watergate and the war have eased, and I think both the public and broadcast journalists are taking a breather. There is more time to spend examining local issues and lifestyles, and more time in the newscasts to report them. At the same time, local television is on the edge of a technical revolution — with the advent of *live* electronic journalism. I think most of us are studying the possibilities and the pitfalls of the new technology, and are proceeding with some hesitancy. I think the period of reassessment and retrenching has been healthy; it has been a tumultuous few years and all of us in the media needed to stop for a moment, and look at where we are, and where we're going — both journalistically and technically.

WCCO-TV, Minneapolis

News organizations are taking a closer look at what they do . . . how well they cover the news. At least we are. More in-depth, investigative reporting is expected and is occurring. The public . . . is demanding the right to know more than ever before. However, while the public is demanding to know, it is at the same time shying away from knowledge. Watergate seems to have opened a wound . . . and while some news is a salve, other news seems to simply tear the wound open . . . again. Watergate has also, unfortunately, glamorized the media to a certain extent. On the whole, Watergate tended to shake the news industry and the public. The positive aspects of Watergate, including a more aware public and a more deeply dedicated news profession, will hopefully outweigh the negative aspects.

Credibility has increased, but with it responsibility and expectations have also increased. Current events have caused us consternation as well as self-examination, which is good. One of the best things to come out of Vietnam and the Watergate/Nixon/Agnew stories is the media's concern about itself and the way the news business is being conducted.

WBTV, Charlotte

I think all journalism has come out of the sixties and the first half of the seventies with its reputation in tatters. We have not carried our mistakes with good grace and those mistakes are more evident as the power of the media has come into sharper focus in the past decade. Power has become suspect and, therefore, the media have been suspect. In more than twenty years as a journalist, I can't recall anytime when the credibility of my profession has been as poor and that seems to infect all age groups and all professional lines. Since television is the dominant and more visible medium, I think it has become most suspect. Its confusion over how to present the news most "interestingly" has promoted "entertainment" in the guise of news. Few can handle the challenge of being both interesting and informative. Unfortunately, too many try.

KYW-AM, Philadelphia

Unless and until the networks, including PBS, decide to devote significant amounts of time and money to serious investigative journalism on a regular basis, we will have to live in the half-world of media events, plane crashes, and thirty-second stories on extremely complex situations. The amount of talent currently available for journalism is staggering, and the amount of serious journalism (TV) resulting from the time and money being spent is appalling. A little reporting is a dangerous thing, drink deep or touch not the \_\_\_\_\_. You fill in the blank with whatever news story you heard reported last on television.

WGBY-TV, Springfield, Mass.

News media coverage of Watergate and the Vietnam war does not seem to have had a demonstrable impact on our listeners. Perhaps the reason for this is that issues that cause the kind of polarization that these did seldom do more than confirm the beliefs already held by the public. Some members of our audience believe the news media hounded President Nixon from office and handed victory to the Communists in Vietnam. Others believe the media were the ultimate check and balance and exercised their proper function. Both these groups and others had their opinions before Watergate and the Vietnam surrender, and as events unfolded they only looked for confirmation of those views: naturally, they found it.

Watergate did not start in Washington. It began on the local level, and is continuing on that level all over the country. It's perpetuated by an uninterested public, a distracted news media, and the local-level broadcast journalists who don't have time to ply their trade, because they're spinning records, writing commercials, and making coffee as part of their job.

WRKL, New City, N.Y.

# REPORTS

"The Labyrinthian Digression of A. J. Liebling," by Gerald Weales, **The Sewanee Review**, Fall 1975

A. J. Liebling is best known in these parts as a press critic, but he was also a war correspondent, political reporter, sportswriter, gourmet, memoirist, and profiler of Runyanesque "lowlives." This ambitious discussion of his work is admiring and knowledgeable, crammed with biographical information, literary anecdote, and critical insight. Unfortunately it is also somewhat random and confusing. Weales fails in his intention to make unity out of diversity, but no matter: for Liebling lovers, the uses of diversity are sweet.

"Student Newspapers Are Gaining New Freedom," by Tinney S. Clark, **The Chronicle of Higher Education**, October 6, 1975

Whether to regard the campus paper as a house organ or a full-fledged member of the press is a matter of continuing controversy between student editors and school administrators. Here is an informative review of recent developments in the situation, describing specific cases of conflict, the search for a middle ground between independence and control, and the legal and economic concerns involved. Clark argues that the "benevolent paternalism" which governed the colleges' relations with student newspapers in the past is slowly yielding before federal court free-press rulings, but considering the examples he gives of administration censorship, repression, and hostility, his conclusion is perhaps overly optimistic.

"Confessions of a Cultural Commissar," by John Leonard, **Esquire**, November 1975

Why did the editor of *The New York Times Book Review* quit his job? For the same reason that the chicken crossed the road, says Leonard. By way of explanation, he takes us with lickety-split wit through the history of the American literary establishment, makes a brief detour to deliver a parcel of pithiness about magazines, and lands us in his *Times* clubroom, where covens of publishers, agents, writers, and advertisers conspire to

transform editorial noblemen into cultural bureaucrats. Leonard doesn't answer one of the questions frequently raised during his tenure — that of his qualifications for the job — but he does produce a set of traveling credentials for his new persona as chief culture correspondent for *The New York Times*.

"Television on a Silver Platter," by Don Menie, **IEEE Spectrum**, August 1975

The hottest development in home entertainment since color television is the video disk, but mass acceptance will probably be tied to only one of the new — and incompatible — technologies independently developed by more than a half dozen competing companies. Which one will dominate? In clear language and with helpful illustrations, Mennie explains the various options. He concludes that since each one can legitimately claim technical excellence, the outcome may depend ultimately on the ability to distribute interesting, inexpensive programs, and on marketing finesse.

"Index: FOI Reports"; "Annotated Bibliography," **Freedom of Information Center Reports** Nos. 341 and 344, October 1975

These excellent reference resources cover a rich variety of press topics. The bibliography offers concise descriptions of Center opinion papers, reports, and summary papers; the index provides handy cross listings.

"The Best Sportswriter in Texas," by Larry L. King, **Texas Monthly**, December 1975; "Frrrrrankie Crrrrrocker Puts Black Satin on the Air," by Michele Wallace, **The Village Voice**, October 13, 1975

Good sketches of two originals. William "Blackie" Sherrod has been variously described as the most plagiarized man in Texas, the most consistently outstanding sports columnist in the country, and the greatest journalism teacher in the whole world. With a colorful mix of lively detail and newsroom yarns, King outlines a lovably fierce professional of larger-than-life proportions. Wallace's appraisal of her subject is less enchanted. Crocker is currently

rocking the New York airwaves as disk jockey and program director of WBLS, an erstwhile Harlem station now moved uptown. Cool, enigmatic, and flamboyant, he is, according to Wallace, probably the biggest thing to happen to radio since television. Hyperbole notwithstanding, these profiles are noteworthy for their attention to the power of personality, a scarce commodity in a market of increasing blandness.

**Cable Handbook, 1975-76: A Guide to Cable and New Communications Technologies**, Mary Louise Hollowell, Editor, Publi-Cable, Inc., May 1975

What's happening in cable? This solid paperback presents a good view of the field in a collection of papers, each written by an expert in his subject. An introductory section deals with basic telecommunication technologies, federal regulation, and regional approaches, while an extended discussion considers various aspects of cable TV and public service, including health, minorities, schools, churches, libraries, and museums, as well as funding. The book is enhanced by an annotated list of resources and a useful glossary.

"Image of Women on Television: A Dialogue," by Jean C. McNeil and John F. Seggar, **Journal of Broadcasting**, Summer 1975

Despite sociological jargon ("operationalization") and semantic haggles (what is dominance?), this discussion ranges over some fairly strategic ground. What the average viewer learns about women from television, says McNeil, is "that women just do not exist to the same degree that men do; that they occupy a restricted sex-defined sphere; that they serve primarily as auxiliaries to men; and that all this is as it should be." The ensuing male/female debate is depressingly predictable, but the evidence presented is worth examining.

DANIEL J. LEAB

*Daniel J. Leab is director of American studies and associate professor of history at Seton Hall University.*

# The Lower case



**SKIES OVER NEW YORK CITY:** The Staten Island Ferry ride is no longer a nickel, but yesterday, with sunlit, shadowy clouds and gulls riding the wind, the view was priceless

*The New York Times* 12 4 75

## Toy Gunman Let Out of Custody

*The Post Standard (Syracuse, N.Y.)*  
12/31/75

Joining Wallace on stage were new School Committeewoman Elvira Pixie Palladino and Boston City Councilman Albert (Dapper) O'Neil, both active opponents of court-ordered busing and Wallace's wife Cornelia.

*The Boston Globe* 1 10 76

## Teller Stuns Man With Stolen Check

*The (Philadelphia) Evening Bulletin*  
11 18 75

Referring to the Board of Higher Education, Mr. Zuccetti said:

**REMEMBER THE NEEDIEST!**

*The New York Times* 12 12 75

## Kleppe Swore In New Office

*Florence (Ala.) Times* 10 18 75

## Bach revived at Carter Church

*The Needham (Mass.) Times* 12 11 75

## Silent Teamster gets cruel punishment: Lawyer

*The Home News (New Brunswick, N.J.)* 12 15 75

JACKSON IS ONE OF 10 ANNOUNCED CANDIDATES FOR THE NOMINATION. HE SAID IN WASHINGTON TODAY WILL RUN STATEWIDE IN THE PREFERENTIAL BEAUTY CONTEST PRIMARY AND WILL DECIDE BY JANUARY FIRST IN WHICH DISTRICTS TO FIELD DELEGATE SLATES.

UPI Radio wire 12 03 75

## Ford departs Peking, no change in ties

*The Des Moines Register* 12/5/75

## Prostitutes appeal to Pope

*Eugene (Ore.) Register-Guard*  
12 18 75



*What's in a name?"* Romeo and Juliet

Great names can also be great trademarks.

*"Good name in man or woman...is the immediate jewel of their souls..."* Othello

And great trademarks can be as valuable to you as they are to the companies that own them. Because they help ensure that when you ask for something you get what you asked for.

*"Speak the speech I pray you, as I pronounced it to you..."* Hamlet

So, in order to protect yourself, and us, please use Xerox as a proper adjective and not as a verb or noun. Thus, you can copy on the Xerox copier but you can't Xerox something. You can go to the Xerox copier but not to the Xerox.

*"Zounds! I was never so bethump'd by words..."* King John

We don't want to bethump you with words; please just use our name correctly.

**XEROX**

XEROX® is a trademark of XEROX CORPORATION.