CUBAN–AMERICAN RADIO WARS

Ideology in International Telecommunications

HOWARD H. FREDERICK

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Dedicated to the memory of
Rose K. Goldsen
sociologist, author, teacher, broadcaster, critic, gadfly

Acknowledgements

The 4-year project resulting in this book reflects the author's deep interest in two seemingly disparate fields: telecommunications and international relations. Increasingly, these two fields have become intertwined as reliable and inexpensive international communication channels have become available to states, nongovernmental organizations, institutions, and individuals. Two people helped me see this connection in the early going. Caren J. Deming and William C. Wente, both of the Broadcast Communication Arts Department, San Francisco State University, supported me intellectually through the preliminary data collection and writing. They, together with Marshall Windmiller of the International Relations Department, rallied me to overcome institutional and political obstacles to this kind of research.

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A Microcosm of Ideological Conflict

Radio broadcasting plays an important role in contemporary international relations. Interstate communication through external radio services at times has had a great impact on the course of international events. Today, throughout the world's radio spectrum, ardent opponents battle for the hearts and minds of attentive publics. This international "war of ideas"[1] shows no sign of abating. Indeed, over eighty countries daily broadcast some 22 thousand hours of international programming to over 250 million listeners throughout the world.[2]

In few regions of the world is this war as intense as it is in the Americas between ideological rivals Cuba and the United States. These two countries are very close geographically but poles apart politically. Separated by only 140 kilometers across the Florida Straits, Cuba and the United States daily engage in this war of ideas. Their radio confrontation is the quintessential conflict between capitalism and communism, between imperialism and revolution, between freedom and liberation.

There are many weapons in this battle. Foremost are the two government-run official external radio services: La Voz de los Estados Unidos de America (Voice of America, hereafter VOA), broadcasting to Cuba and the rest of Latin America in Spanish; and Radio Havana Cuba (hereafter RHC), broadcasting in English to the United States. In addition, clandestine and pirate radio stations have operated illegally on Caribbean islands and in the United States, where the Federal Communication Commission has made no effort to close them down.

As this book went to press, both Cuba and the United States were on the brink of a great escalation of this war of ideas. They announced intentions to bring out the biggest guns in this two-and-a-half-decades war. The United States hoped to launch Radio Marti "to break the Cuban government's control of information in Cuba . . . (and to) tell the truth to the Cuban people."[3] Not to be outdone, the Cuban government was "prepared to give a suitable response . . . (to) their subversive station."[4] Cuba constructed a 500,000-watt station to reach the entire North American continent "to answer every aggression."[5]

Both sides have claimed to adhere to the strictest standards of news objectivity and honesty. Former VOA News Chief Bernard Kamenske stated that "we collect and report the facts—no more, no less."[6] VOA's Charter asserts further that "VOA news will be accurate, objective and comprehensive."[7] On occasion, VOA even has broadcast views in direct conflict with official U.S. policy, as it did, for example, during the debate about the Panama Canal treaties. Cuban broadcasters too have insisted that they present only the objective facts, even to the "detriment of Cuban policy." RHC Director Angel Hernandez said that RHC has no need to lie: "The objective truth is all we need to tell."[8]

This study examines the ideological confrontation between the United States and Cuba as seen in their respective international newscasts. Despite protestations of objectivity on both sides, both news services view world events from unique political, social, and economic, in short, ideological vantage points. In their attempts to woo the opponent's population and to win the hearts and minds of the Americas, both countries emit messages that are rife with competing ideological values about world politics. A case study of these differences as seen in radio broadcasting will illuminate the wider "war of ideas" being waged today on many levels and in many channels.

FOOTNOTES

1. For further reading in the field of international broadcasting and the war of ideas, see particularly: Georgi Arbatov, *The War of Ideas in Contemporary International Relations: The Imperialist Doctrine, Methods and Organization of Foreign Political Propaganda* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1973); David M. Abshire, *International Broadcasting: A New Dimension in Western Diplomacy*, The Washington Papers, vol. 4, no. 35. (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1976); A. Panifilov, *Broadcasting Pirates* (Moscow: n.p.); Julian A. Hale, *Radio Power: Propaganda and International Broadcasting* (Philadelphia: Temple University, 1975); Donald R. Browne, *International Broadcasting: The Limits of the Limitless Medium* (New York: Praeger, 1982); James O. H. Nason, "International Broadcasting as an Instrument of Foreign Policy," *Millenium* (London) 6 (2), 1977): 128–45; Bernard Bumpus, *International Broadcasting*. Documents of the International Commission for the Study of Communication Problems, no. 60. (Paris: UNESCO, 1980); George N. Gordon, Irving Falk, and William Hodapp, *The Idea Invaders* (New York: Hastings House, 1963); Frederick Barghoorn, *Soviet Foreign Propaganda* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964); A. F. Panfilov, *U.S. Radio in Psychological Warfare* (Moscow: International Relations Publishers, 1967); Charles J. Rolo, *Radio Goes to War* (London: Faber and Faber, 1943); Daniel Lerner, *Sykewar* (New York: George W. Stewart, 1951). Y. Zakharov, "International Cooperation and the Battle of Ideas," *International Affairs* (Moscow) (1, January 1976): 85–95.

2. George Jacobs, "International Broadcasting: It's Alive and Kicking on the Short Wave Bands," *World Radio TV Handbook*, (New York: Billboard Publications, Inc., 1979), p. 40.

3.   Statement by Richard V. Allen, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Washington, DC, September 23, 1981.

4.   "Speech by Fidel Castro Ruz before the Union of Cuban Youth, April 4, 1982," quoted in a Statement by Assistant Secretary of State Thomas Enders at the Hearings Before the House Subcommittee on Telecommunications, May 10, 1982.

5.   Interview with Jose Prado, General Vice Director, Radio Havana Cuba, Havana, Cuba, May 4, 1982.

6.   Interview with Bernard Kamenske, News Chief, Voice of America, Washington, DC, April 27, 1979. Mr. Kamenske voluntarily left the VOA in December 1981 amid charges that Reagan appointees were jeopardizing the integrity of overseas news.

7.   United States, Congress, *Public Law 94-350: VOA Charter*, 94th Congress, 2nd session, 1976.

8.   Interview with Angel Hernandez, Director, Radio Havana Cuba, Havana, Cuba, April 9, 1979.

*Radio War Between Cuba and the United States**

This chapter traces the history of the Cuban-American "radio war" through its inception soon after the Cuban Revolution to the 1983 battle over Radio Martí. It concludes with a discussion of what this radio war signifies in the context of international ideological confrontation and with a modest proposal for an alternative to the present radio confrontation. It relies on public documents and interviews with Cuban and American participants in the radio war. This work in no way pretends to be exhaustive; nor are all the documents and statements the author has gathered necessarily truthful and accurate. Time, distance, and ideological differences tend to cloud the memories of past events.

Yet the outline of an intense conflict of opposing belief systems unmistakably emerges. International radio serves as one conduit for this conflict. Though nonviolent in the physical sense, the Cuban-American radio war involves tremendous manpower and physical resources, at times inflicts "damage" on the opponent, and, short of armed conflict, serves as a way for the two antagonists to express their enmity.

THE BATTLE IS ENGAGED: RADIO SWAN

As he began to consolidate his control over the island during the first 2 years after the 1959 revolution, Fidel Castro became increasingly concerned about what he regarded as attempts to sabotage the Cuban people's morale through foreign radio broadcasts.

In particular, he saw the broadcasts from Radio Swan as a U.S. attempt to combat the Cuban revolution. Radio Swan's mediumwave transmitter was located on a barren island 170 kilometers off the coast of Honduras.[1] Owned by the Gibraltar Steamship Company, Swan's three-tower array blanketed the Caribbean area and delivered a powerful signal to the entire Cuban archipelago. Swan

operated at at least 50 kilowatts on 1160 khz, the same frequency as KSL in Salt Lake City.[2]

The President of Gibraltar Steamship Corporation was Thomas Dudley Cabot, of Weston, Massachusetts. Cabot was a banker, former President of United Fruit, and, in 1951, director of the State Department's Office of International Security Affairs. Gibraltar officials admitted that the corporation had not owned a steamship for 10 years.[3] But in May 1960, the firm announced that it had leased land on Swan Island to operate a radio station. Strictly a commercial venture, the station was to broadcast music, soap operas, and news from studios in New York. The Federal Communication Commission, which is required to license all stations operating from U.S. territory, stated that it did not know who owned the island. Such responses raised suspicions about Swan's real ownership and mission.

Meanwhile, World Wide Broadcasting station WRUL (which still operates a shortwave transmitter in Scituate, Massachusetts) announced it would cooperate with Radio Swan. Its programs featured Miss Pepita Rivera, a Cuban exile billed as "Havana Rose." World Wide said Swan would tape and rebroadcast WRUL's programs.[4]

One figure involved in Radio Swan was E. Howard Hunt, later convicted in the Watergate break-in. Hunt disclosed in 1973 that David Atlee Phillips bragged about Swan's achievements in CIA director Allen Dulles's office. Hunt assured the leaders of the counter-revolutionary exiles in Florida that, as soon as the invasion at the Bay of Pigs started, Radio Swan and other stations would start a massive series of radio broadcasts urging the people and army to throw out Castro and come to terms.[5]

In 1960, Phillips located an available 50-kilowatt transmitter in Germany that belonged to the U.S. Army. With the help of the Navy, the transmitter was quickly installed on Swan Island. With studios in Miami, Swan was to be a "black" station, that is, its location and its financing were to be a secret. Staffed by Cuban exiles, its commercial format displayed the "rough" edges that would have characterized a legitimate anti-Castro station. Different Cuban exile groups purchased time on the CIA station to promote their particular viewpoints.[6]

On April 17, 1961, Radio Swan broadcast the following message: "Alert, alert—look well at the rainbow. The fish will rise very soon . . . the sky is blue . . . the fish is red. Look well at the rainbow."[7] These were coded messages informing counter-revolutionaries in Cuba that the CIA-planned Bay of Pigs invasion was about to start. While the Cuban people fought back the invasion, Swan was saying that "a general uprising on a large scale [has been carried out]" and that "the militia in which Castro placed his confidence appears to be possessed by a state of panic. An army of liberation is in the island of Cuba to fight with you against the Communist tyranny. . . . Listen for instructions on the radio, comply with them and communicate your actions by radio. To victory, Cubans."[8]

During the invasion, Swan was on the air 24 hours a day. Even when it was clear that the invasion had failed, Swan continued to broadcast appeals to nonexistent battalions. It ordered various detachments not to surrender and claimed that "help is on the way." After being captured, many mercenaries who heard these broadcasts were bitter at what they felt was misleading information by Swan.

Swan's ties to the CIA have never been conclusively proven. Wise and Ross write that "because it became operationally involved in the Bay of Pigs, [Swan] never enjoyed more than the thinnest of covers."[9] Marchetti and Marks also reach a similar conclusion.[10]

Ultimately, Radio Swan changed its name to Radio Americas (although still broadcasting from Swan Island), and the Gibraltar Steamship Corporation became the Vanguard Service Corporation. But its mission remained the same: to destabilize Cuba.

> It called on Cubans to burn cane fields and to carry matches to be ready for sabotage at all times. It instructed them to go into offices and telephone booths and take the receivers off the hooks to tie up communications. And it urged the people of Cuba to smash as many bottles as possible. The CIA's reported plan was to curtail the island's beer supply by creating a bottle shortage.[11]

EARLY HISTORY OF RADIO HAVANA CUBA

In 1960, Cuban radio and TV charged that the Swan broadcasts were "a new aggression of imperialistic North America."[12] Fidel Castro charged before the United Nations that Radio Swan had been "placed at the disposal of war criminals and subversive groups that are still being sheltered by this country [the United States]."[13]

To combat Swan's influence and to broadcast the message of the Cuban revolution to the Caribbean and to Central and South America, Castro first turned to the extensive mediumwave facilities he had inherited from the Batista regime.[14] He entrusted Antonio Nunez Jimenez to launch the radio attack on Swan.[15] Jimenez owned station CMBN, La Voz del INRA, and was director of the Instituto Nacional de Reforma Agraria (INRA), established in 1959 to undertake land reform. La Voz del INRA stepped up its power to jam Swan's frequency on 1160 KHz. It also broadcast longer each day than Swan. Under the direction of Adrian Garcia Hernandez, La Voz del INRA adopted a popular commercial format with Cuban music, news, radio plays, and even advertising. There were occasional propaganda messages and many long speeches by Fidel Castro.

Similarly, other mediumwave stations began regional propagandizing. On 860 KHz, CMBL combatted Dominican dictator Trujillo's Radio Caribe, which had been rebroadcasting the programs of the Cuban Freedom Committee. CMGS

(Radio Varadero) tried to project its signal to the eastern United States, but was often blocked by a Canadian station.

Only one shortwave transmitter was available in Cuba, COBL (Radio Aeropuerto), broadcasting from Jose Marti airport near Havana on 9833 KHz. It could not be heard well in the United States because of interference from teletype and the 100-kilowatt signal of Radio Budapest on the same frequency.[16] It soon became apparent to Castro that these shortwave and mediumwave stations could not provide a voice strong enough to have an impact on the region.

In early 1960, the Cuban government announced its intent to establish an international shortwave radio service. A proposed transmission schedule was filed with the International Telecommunication Union in Geneva that summer.[17] The station was constructed in late 1960 and early 1961 at Cayo la Rosa near Havana. Swiss transmitters manufactured by Brown Boveri were brought in.[18] The new Cuban station had 120 kilowatts of broadcasting power.[19]

The first public reference to what was to become Cuba's strongest overseas voice was made by Fidel Castro at the burial of victims of an airport attack by rebel Cuban Air Force pilots: "Do you think they can hide their act before the world? No. Cuba already has a radio station transmitting to all of Latin America. Innumerable brothers in Latin America and the whole world are listening to it."[20] Radio Havana Cuba had begun experimental broadcasts in February 1961 and was identified on the air at that time.

Radio Havana Cuba's birth in early 1961 came at a fortunate moment for the Cuban revolution. In April of that year, a CIA-trained force landed at the Bay of Pigs to try to overthrow the Castro government. During the 2 months prior to the aborted invasion, RHC "confronted the slanderous campaign against the Cuban revolution and denounced Washington's preparations to invade our country."[21]

One powerful personality loomed over RHC's birth: Ernesto "Che" Guevara, the Argentine medical doctor who joined Castro's revolution in Mexico and later became an active exporter and martyr of the Cuban revolutionary cause. Guevara knew how great a role broadcasting could play in creating and perpetuating revolution. He had helped to create Radio Rebelde (Rebel Radio) in the Sierra Maestra of eastern Cuba. Radio Rebelde was successful in attracting a large audience with its clandestine broadcasts, while Castro and his troops fought a guerrilla war against the Cuban dictator.[22] Guevara felt that the most effective propaganda medium was radio because:

It can reach the reason and emotions of people. . . . Without a doubt, radio ought to be directed by the fundamental principle of popular propaganda—the truth. It is better to say the truth, though it be small in impact, than to tell a grand lie made of tinsel. Above all, radio should give live news of battles, all types of encounters, assassinations, practical teachings to the civilian populations, and from time to time discourses from the leaders of the revolution.[23]

Radio Havana Cuba's propagandistic goals have never been kept secret. Its purpose was "providing continuity in the work of enlightenment, broadcasting the truth, [and] acting as a spokesman for the Revolution and its ideas."[24] It was to be a "faithful reflection of revolutionary Cuba's process." It would "hit hard at the imperialists, the people's enemies," and offer "its fraternal hand to all those who in one way or another fight for their rights and for emancipation, those who hope to free themselves from exploitation and imperialism."[25] "The essence of RHC's work has been and will always be to unmask imperialism and to alert the peoples of the danger of disunion on the face of its brutal assault."[26]

In other words, Radio Havana Cuba is an avowed, unashamed combatant in the international "war of ideas."

> What we are dealing with is a struggle between two conceptions: information as an ideological-cultural instrument of the imperialist system versus information as a medium for social development, as a mechanism to affirm the identity of the peoples and as an instrument at the service of their cause.[27]

Needless to say, U.S. commentators saw a less charitable purpose in RHC's mission. RHC's message urged Latin American peoples to overthrow their governments and "to follow the example of the Cuban revolution and throw off the yoke of Yankee imperialism."[28] The *New York Times* radio and TV critic Jack Gould said that RHC "follows essentially the political line of Moscow radio and Peiping radio."[29]

In the beginning, RHC's broadcasts were in Spanish and were repeated many times. In mid-evening, there were also broadcasts in English. Later, broadcasts were transmitted in French, Portuguese, Arabic, Guarani, Quechua, and Creole. By 1963, 188 hours were transmitted per week.[30] By the end of the year, RHC's weekly programming had reached 267 hours.[31]

Radio Havana Cuba's transmission had an immediate and large-scale impact. In late 1962, a UPI dispatch said that "it was made known in the United States official circles that a formula is being sought to counteract the propaganda emanating daily from Radio Havana."[32] Nicaraguan dictator Anastasio Somoza is supposed to have said indignantly that he could hear accusations against him "in my own home as if [Radio Havana Cuba] were installed in Managua."[33]

RHC's Creole broadcasts were one of the few voices raised against the Haitian dictatorship:

> Every night they gather around any available radio, often small cheap transistors, to listen to a fellow countryman who sympathizes with their tribulations . . . the news blackout that hangs over the Haitians is effective except for one great loophole, the communist radio broadcasts from Havana which the population avidly soaks up.[34]

During the uprising in the Dominican Republic in 1965, RHC broadcast 24 hours per day to provide Latin America and the world with information about the Dominican resistance to the landing of U.S. Marines. The last message released by the constitutionally elected Dominican government over Santo Domingo Radio and Television was picked up by RHC and retransmitted several times while the fighting lasted. The message urged resistance to the invaders of their "brother country."[35]

By 1963, Cuba held fourth place among Communist international broadcasters in hours per week beamed abroad.[36] By 1965, Cuba was broadcasting an estimated 160 hours per week to Latin America.[37] Programming emphasized the coordination of revolutionary action programs. Relatively simple broadcasts were beamed in Creole to Haiti; guerrilla warfare manuals were read over the air.

More sophisticated programs were beamed to Venezuela and to Chile. Venezuela charged that RHC had fomented riots and had caused enormous damage through sabotage to its oil installations. According to an official report of the Organization of American States, which earlier had expelled Cuba, daily transmissions by RHC encouraged insurgency by the Armed Forces of National Liberation (FALN). Regular broadcasts gave instruction to cadre of the Venezuelan Communist Party (PCV) and messages from the FALN to the people.[38]

Chile was the object of daily broadcasts in which Castro attacked President Eduardo Frei and his Christian Democratic government as "bourgeois reformists." These special programs to Chile and Venezuela were discontinued in 1969, when, according to the *New York Times*, Radio Havana Cuba's "shrill and abrasive tone" was eliminated due to "signs of Soviet influence."[39] Yet its interest in the Chilean political process did not abate. When President Salvador Allende was assassinated and his Popular Unity government overthrown, RHC extended its coverage to 24 hours daily over frequencies throughout Latin America. "In this way all the information on the resistance to fascism and the impressive wave of world solidarity with this brother people was relayed . . . to Chile and to other Latin American countries."[40] One correspondent remembers Fidel Castro's emotional description on Radio Havana Cuba of the overthrow of Allende. A weeping Castro told of how Allende in self-protection had fired the submachine gun Castro himself had given him.[41]

During the summer of 1963, Cuba began the first electronic jamming in the hemisphere. Reportedly, the Russians had provided the jamming device to shield Soviet advisors in Cuba from the Russian-language broadcasts of WBT-AM Charlotte, North Carolina. WBT had begun transmitting mediumwave programs prepared by the then CIA-financed Radio Liberty.[42]

A year later, Cuba began jamming Spanish-language broadcasts from United States mediumwave stations. The noise, sounding much like a whirring buzz saw, jammed VOA transmitters in the Florida Keys, Radio Swan, WGBS Miami (which broadcast news to Cuba), WMIE Miami, and WKWF in Key West.[43] Since 1962, WGBS, WKWF, WWL New Orleans, Radio Caribe from the Do-

minican Republic, and Radio Americas on Swan Island all had been transmitting programs prepared by the Cuban Freedom Committee, founded in Washington by Representative Roman Pucinski (D-IL), who believed that Cubans had been "brainwashed with . . . a hate-America campaign." The Cuban Freedom Committee produced programs intended to respond with the "unadulterated truth."[44]

The Cuban Freedom Committee's slogan, "Sin Libertad La Vida Nada Vale" (Without Liberty Life is Worth Nothing), was the basis of its program content. Programs were prepared with news, commentary, interviews with Cuban refugees, and music. Cuban radio was monitored continuously, and replies to Cuban broadcasts were made throughout a program called "La Verdad Responde" (The Truth Answers). Broadcasts were even designed for the Cuban woman. "Programa Para El Hogar" (Program for the Home) discussed the problems affecting families living under Communism. The purpose was "to expose the Communist system so that their listeners will know how to combat it most effectively. [It stressed] that the strongest force for liberation is the Cuban family, and success depend[ed] on the spiritual moral resistance of each member." Most of the Cuban Freedom Committee programs were in Spanish, but some of the news spots on Radio Americas were in English for the West Indies, and in Cantonese for the once-large Chinese population in Cuba.[45]

Later in the 1960s, Radio Havana Cuba provided a unique service to U.S. anti-war activists. From January 8, 1968 to January 8, 1976, RHC broadcast more than 2,500 programs of the Voice of Vietnam in English.[46] As RHC Director Alfredo Vinas once said, "when the Voice of Vietnam was sent out over our international signal, we felt as ours the suffering and victories of the fighting Vietnamese and their leader Ho Chi Minh."[47]

The Voice of Vietnam followed the example of vitriolic Radio Free Dixie, which used Cuba's mediumwave facilities to exhort revolution among American Blacks. Dedicated to "gallant freedom fighters," Radio Free Dixie was organized by Robert Williams, an American Black leader under indictment for kidnapping in North Carolina.[48] Williams urged Black Americans to burn American cities:

> Black men, organize, find arms and form underground and secret defense forces! The most effective anti-lynch law and force for justice is the power of one gas bomb, the switchblade, the razor, the lye-can and the bullet. Mr. Charlie's days are numbered. It is he who is going to be annihilated. Our cause is just. We are not alone.[49]

These broadcasts lasted 3 hours daily until 1965.[50]

Radio Havana Cuba's greatest competition in the region were and continue to be the Spanish-language broadcasts of the Voice of America (see page 139). Cuban opinion leaders admit that they frequently listen to VOA news and commentaries.[51] Cuban sources indicate that RHC is listened to as much or more

than VOA in Central America. Pedro Joaquin Chamorro, assassinated Director of Nicaragua's opposition newspaper *La Prensa*, once declared that "by nine o'clock in the morning everybody in Nicaragua knows what Radio Havana Cuba said the night before. The Voice of America is very rarely mentioned."[52]

But United States Information Agency (USIA) research found that, during the late 1960s, more people listened to VOA than to RHC. Six percent of a sample of 3053 adult and student, rural, and urban dwellers in three Central American countries listened to RHC several times a week. In comparison, eight percent listened to VOA several times a week. VOA received many more pluses than Radio Havana on "complete news," "truthfulness," and "impartiality."[53]

Yet, during the same time period, the *Miami Herald* reported that "the Rockefeller mission learned that all over Central America and the Caribbean, Cuban radio propaganda wins out over the Voice of America during prime time." Rockefeller told President Nixon that the VOA "must see to it that its programs are more attractive than those of Radio Havana Cuba."[54]

RADIO HAVANA CUBA TODAY

In 1982, Radio Havana Cuba was broadcasting 53 hours daily in eight languages (up from 46½ hours in 1979). The English program is 90 minutes long, and is broadcast 15 hours and 40 minutes a day (12 hours and 40 minutes to America, 2½ hours to Europe, and 1 hour to Africa). The French program is transmitted 6 hours and 20 minutes daily (30 minutes to America, 2 hours and 10 minutes to Europe, and 3 hours and 40 minutes to the Mediterranean and Africa). The Portuguese program is broadcast 3 hours to the Americas and 2 hours to the Mediterranean and Africa. Programs in Quechua, intended for the 16 million Andean Indians of Peru, Bolivia, and Chile, are broadcast 1 hour and 50 minutes daily. Creole for Haiti and the surrounding islands is transmitted 2 hours daily. Arabic is sent to the Middle East 2 hours daily. Guarani, spoken by Paraguayan peasants, is broadcast 1 hour daily.

The bulk of RHC's broadcast time is in Spanish (12 hours and 50 minutes to the Americas, 6¼ hours to the Mediterranean and Africa). RHC utilizes 20 frequencies in the 16, 19, 25, 31, 41, and 49 meter bands.[55] From midnight to 6 AM, RHC transmits on mediumwave (AM) for Central America and the Gulf region. The Soviet Union retransmits RHC's signal in Arabic and French to the Middle East.[56]

Twenty-seven percent of Radio Havana Cuba's broadcast is music. Another 27 percent is news. Forty percent of its air day is general programming. The rest is taken up with announcements, identification, and sign-off. There are 31 newscasts each day, ranging from 3 to 20 minutes in length.[57] There are 5 commentaries on weekdays, 2 on Saturday, and 1 on Sunday.[58] Every day's broadcast leads off with "Today in History," a short remembrance of some historical

event in Cuba's history. After the newscast and editorial, there follows a variety of programs, including "Spotlight on Latin America," "From the Land of Music," "Voices of Revolution," "The Cuban Story," "Latin American Songs," "Socialism: The New World," "Marxist Review," "Philately in Cuba," and "Sports Round-up."

Radio Havana Cuba has a General Administration (Direccion General) headed by a General Director (Alfredo Vinas in 1982) and three General Vice Directors who oversee programming, information and overseas correspondence, and international relations, respectively. Beneath the General Administration are various Divisions (Direcciones) divided in turn into Departments and Sections. For example, the Programming Administration has a Production Department, a Section for Music, and so on.[59]

Like Cubans in most other governmental institutions, the staff of the Radio Havana Cuba are for the most part not members of the Communist Party of Cuba. It is not required of their work that they be members, and, since membership means extra work outside the workplace, most employees at RHC do not belong. That is not to say that they do not adhere to the basic tenets of Communist orthodoxy. Though there are very few members of the Communist Party employed by Radio Havana Cuba, the ideological credentials of its personnel are sterling. There are other ways to ascertain the ideological commitment than membership in the Communist Party. According to Barreras, 100 percent of its 166 workers have fulfilled their individual emulation contracts, and 94 percent have finished with "indices suscritos." They have worked more than 11,000 voluntary hours. In the Socialist Emulation of Cuba, they have been awarded "punteros, Moncadistas, Heroic Traditions and the Centro Promotor."[60]

Newsgathering at Radio Havana Cuba is done by a central bureau which receives Associated Press,[61] EFE (Spain), TASS (Soviet Union), Reuters (U.K.), ANSA (Italy), and Prensa Latina (Cuba). The news is processed by the central news staff and routed in Spanish to the language services. Eighty to ninety percent of the news received is processed in some way—either rewritten, put into archives, or passed on as is. Language departments are free to adapt the news to their particular audiences. For example, the English service to North America will emphasize news of particular interest to listeners in Canada and the United States.

Cuba has clearly defined information policies which originate within the Cuban Council of State and Ministers and the Communist Party of Cuba.[62] Thus, the State and Party issue general guidelines on information. "Our station interprets and applies these policy guidelines . . . But *we*, not the government, conform our information to these guidelines. *We* decide what information to offer."[63] "We are not rabbits. These are not guidelines that change every moment. We share a political line and we interpret this line creatively."[64]

What are the special objectives of the English service to North America? "First, we should give them perspectives about Latin America and about Cuba.

Second, we must give U.S. and Canadian citizens news about events not reported by local U.S. stations." Toward this latter goal, RHC receives numerous North American publications, including: *The (New York) Guardian, The New York Times, Akwasasne Notes, Daily Worker, WIN, NACLA Report, Covert Action.* Also, the Prensa Latina office at the United Nations relays news of U.S. affairs directly to Cuban newsrooms.[65]

Radio Havana Cuba personnel have no accurate way of estimating their audience in the United States. According to RHC General Vice Director Jose Prado, thousands of letters arrive from the U.S. each year. Given the unreliability of communications between the two countries, Prado wonders whether additional letters are not lost en route. There is a twice-weekly program called "Post Office Box 7026," on which RHC's International Correspondence Division reads listeners' letters over the air and answers questions. Based on these letters, RHC Vice Director Hernandez believes that most of the North American audience is young.[66]

A review of the sparse literature on the subject of the American shortwave audience might be helpful at this point. This much-neglected audience has been the subject of only a handful of measurement studies. In 1941, a nationwide survey of 2,902 respondents found that 7 percent of the sample had listened to shortwave from Europe during the pervious week.[67] In 1961, Smith surveyed a Midwest American community of 17,000. Only five out of 204 households listened regularly "for content" at least once a month. His study indicates that U.S. shortwave listenership is limited and that listeners only expose themselves to foreign broadcasts that reinforce already held values, beliefs, and interests.[68]

Eight years later, Smith described a national survey which indicated an American audience of approximately 2 million adults, half of whom had listened at least once a week for the past year. Respondents who had a high interest in current events ranked Radio Havana Cuba second among the most listened stations.[69]

Table 1.   American Shortwave Owners Listening to Station's English Broadcasts, 1975

	At least monthly		At least weekly	
	Percent	Number	Percent	Number
Radio Canada Intl	15.2	3.3 mill.	4.5	0.9 mill.
BBC	13.3	2.9	4.7	1.03
Deutsche Welle	6.4	1.4	2.2	0.48
Radio Moscow	6.1	1.34	1.9	0.41
Radio Havana Cuba	5.9	1.3	1.2	0.2

Source: Radio Canada International, "Shortwave Radio Listening in the United States, Survey II," (New York: Gallup Corporation). Number calculated by present author.

Table 2.   American Shortwave Owners Listening to Station's English Broadcasts, 1977

	At least monthly		At least weekly	
	Percent	Number	Percent	Number
BBC	10.1	1.5 mill.	3.8	.57 mill.
Radio Canada Intl	9.7	1.4	2.9	.43
Radio Havana Cuba	2.7	0.4	1.2	.18

Source: BBC External Broadcasting Audience Research, "Survey in the United States; October/November 1977," (New York: Gallup Corporation, May 1978). Number calculated by present author.

Two surveys by the Gallup Corporation give us more precise data about the American audience for RHC. In a 1975 study commissioned by Radio Canada International, 11 percent of the sample of 3,118 persons claimed to own a shortwave receiver. Thus, total American shortwave receiver ownership could be estimated at something over 22 million. RHC ranked fifth in popularity behind Radio Canada International, BBC, Deutsche Welle (The Voice of West Germany), and Radio Moscow.[70] (See Table 1.) Thus, approximately 200,000 Americans listened to RHC weekly. About 1.3 million Americans listened to RHC at least once a month.

In 1977, the Gallup Corporation carried out a survey for the British Broadcasting Corporation of approximately 6,000 adults in the United States. Seven percent of the sample claimed to have shortwave receivers. Thus, the total potential American audience in this study would be about 15 million. About 180,000 Americans listened to RHC weekly and 400,000 listened monthly in this study.[71] (See Table 2.)

But RHC English service head Guillermo Santisteban is not convinced. He quotes a UNESCO calculation which says that, for every letter, there are 10,000 listeners in the audience. He distrusts the VOA- and BBC-commissioned studies, for whoever pays for the study always comes out on top. "Suppose Gallup had done a study on Nicaragua during Somoza. During that time we had only one or two letters, but afterwards we learned that almost everyone was listening to us."[72]

HISTORY OF VOICE OF AMERICA'S SPANISH SERVICE

Before there was a Voice of America, Latin America was the scene of one of the first engagements of "radio warfare" between Nazi Germany and the United States. Radio Zeesen, the Nazi External Service, broadcast 12 hours daily to Latin America. Zeesen had once paid Mexicans the dubious honor of calling

them "fellow Nordics." More important, Nazis had infiltrated Latin America's broadcasting industry and had promoted "canned programs" which had been "commercialized" in Germany to give them local flavor.[73] The U.S. made little attempt to counter either the signal strength or the political impact of the Nazi propaganda until August 1940, when Nelson Rockefeller became Coordinator of Commercial and Cultural Affairs between the American Republics, later re-named Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs.[74] President Roosevelt organized a coalition of broadcasters to set up a government shortwave service to Latin America. By July 1941, *Business Week* reported that WRUL in Massachusetts was broadcasting 50 kilowatts to Latin America. It was put on the air with $200,000 in contributions from the National Broadcasting Company (NBC), the Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS), Westinghouse Corporation, and others "to counteract the deluge of shortwave propaganda emanating from Europe."[75]

After World War II, the Voice of America, founded in February 1942, strug-gled to stay alive and could find no resources to pursue Latin American program-ming. In 1958, the VOA was broadcasting only 30 minutes a day, repeated once, to Latin America—in English! This constituted less than 1 percent of VOA broadcast schedule.[76]

The Cuban revolution changed all this. Suddenly, right on its doorstep, the United States found an ideological rival for the hearts and minds of Latin Ameri-cans. On March 21, 1960, a scant 15 months after Castro's entrance into Havana, the VOA resumed Spanish-language broadcasts "edited with an eye toward Cuba."[77] In April 1960, Congress authorized the United States Informa-tion Agency (USIA), VOA's parent agency, to use $100,000 of money pre-viously authorized for other purposes for a short-term increase in Spanish-lan-guage broadcasts "to cultivate friendship with the people of Cuba and to offset anti-American broadcasts in that country."[78] Spanish-language broadcasts were beamed 6 hours per day via shortwave transmitters in Greenville, North Carolina.

At the same time in Washington, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) stepped up plans to direct broadcasts to Cuba from an obscure, barren piece of Caribbean island located off the coast of Honduras. Operated under the name of the Gibraltar Steamship Corporation, Radio Swan, named after the island on which it stood, went on the air in summer 1960 (see page 5).

In February 1961, the VOA announced a series of anti-Castro broadcasts to the Caribbean and Central and South America. The first program was a 1-hour documentary called "Anatomy of a Broken Promise." It included five promi-nent anti-Castro exiles, and recited a list of broken promises for free elections and a free press.[79] But before VOA's programming could gain any accumulated effect, one event singularly devasted U.S. propaganda efforts in the region: the Bay of Pigs invasion.

Some hours after anti-Castro insurgents landed on the beaches of Cuba on April 17, 1961, cots were moved into the Latin American service of the Voice of

America. With their broadcast day increased from 2 hours (1 hour of original material, 1 hour of repeat) to 19, the Spanish Branch's 16 employees would need to catch up on their sleep between duties. For 5 days, they broadcast news, commentaries, features, music, and extensive coverage of the United Nations debate. When the debate ended, the schedule was cut to 11 hours daily. News and commentary stressed official pronouncements. Speculation regarding the CIA's role in the invasion was scrupulously avoided.

When the invasion failed and the CIA's role became apparent, the VOA had to retract its previous statements. Then-VOA Director Edward R. Murrow expressed some of the anxiety when he said the VOA was forced to carry the "whole story—Castro's announcement, the self-labelled 'invasion,' the writhing in Washington, the agonies in the United Nations, and even the agonizing reappraisal which a critical aftermath spilled over the Administration."[80]

The Voice of America, and with it the Latin American Division, had been caught off guard. With the expectation of future problems in the region, President Kennedy sought to expand VOA's the Spanish-language services. He added $3 million to the USIA's budget to expand the Latin American service from 6 hours daily, all in Spanish, to 22 hours daily in Spanish and Portuguese. He pointed out that the Communists already were broadcasting 134 hours per week in Spanish and Portuguese and "that broadcasts from Havana are encouraging new revolution in the hemisphere."[81]

By 1962, this expansion had been completed. Early in the year, intelligence sources noticed an increased Soviet military presence in Cuba. President Kennedy called up 150,000 troops. Senators wanted to earmark them for Cuba. The VOA commented that the Soviets had a "lust for power and a disregard for truth."[82] Radio Swan stepped up its broadcasts. The Cuban Freedom Committee placed hours of anti-Castro programs on Florida and Gulf radio stations aimed at Cuba.

In July 1962, Russian arms and men began arriving in Cuba. Included were medium- and long-range intercontinental ballistic missiles. Overflights by U-2 reconnaissance aircraft showed more than 30 missiles. On October 22, President Kennedy broadcast over the VOA and other national media that he was declaring a naval quarantine of Cuba in an attempt to force the Soviets to withdraw the weapons. The world waited for possible nuclear confrontation.[83]

Kennedy and his Press Secretary, Pierre Salinger, called on VOA to broadcast the message to all of Latin America. At the time, VOA was broadcasting only via shortwave to Cuba and the Americas. Any effective radio propaganda campaign needed to be conducted on the mediumwave (AM) band as well. Cuba could be saturated much more densely with American mediumwave signals, which could be picked up on many more receivers there. Before the VOA could set up its own mobile AM transmitters, Salinger devised a plan whereby a powerful network of American commercial AM stations from Florida and the Gulf could flood the Cuban AM band with American reports.

Ten stations immediately volunteered their services and were connected through telephone line patches to the Voice of America in Washington. They included WCKR (10 kilowatts at night), WGBS (10 kilowatts at night), WMIE (10 kilowatts at night), all from Miami; WSB Atlanta (50 kilowatts); WGN Chicago; WWL New Orleans (50 kilowatts); WCKY Cincinnati (50 kilowatts); WRUL Scituate, Massachusetts; WGEL (now KGEI) Redwood City, California. (These latter two were shortwave stations.)[84]

An eleventh station should be mentioned in the service of U.S. government broadcasting to Cuba: Radio Americas, the successor to Radio Swan. Its new owner, the Vanguard Company of Miami, reportedly was operating under the direction of the CIA.[85]

Meanwhile, the VOA tripled its Spanish-language programming via short-wave to 24 hours daily. The number of frequencies also increased from five to eleven. It even broadcast 30 minutes a day in Russian for the Soviet technicians assigned there. The Voice then moved to transmit its signal via mediumwave. Two mobile 50-kilowatt transmitters, each housed in two 20-foot truck trailers and driven by diesel generators, were moved into the Florida Keys, one at Marathon, the other at Tortuga. They were connected via landlines to Washington.[86] This plan of simultaneous commercial and governmental transmissions to Cuba was, according to Coro, part of a "masterplan" designed by prominent engineer George Jacobs.[87] The government transmitters were on 1040 KHz at Tortuga and on 1180 KHz at Marathon. The Tortuga transmitter was on the same frequency as WHO (AM) in Des Moines, Iowa, a 50 kilowatt clear channel station serving the entire mid-section of the country. The WHO management complained of interference with the Tortuga transmitter and eventually got the government to shut it down. (Radio Marti plans to use this same frequency. See page 24.)

But the Marathon transmitter was never shut down. It became the VOA's Cuba-directed transmitter, and has remained to this day the only U.S.-based mediumwave governmental international signal, with a directional antenna at 1140 KHz. For many years, WHAM (AM) of Rochester, New York (also on 1140 KHz) complained in the same way as WHO, but to no avail. This transmitter, now called "Radio Marathon,"[88] "has been interfering with WHAM illegally for 19 years . . . in violation of Federal Communications Commission (FCC) allocations and international treaties."[89] Radio Marathon can be heard throughout Cuba and the Caribbean, and WHAM complains that Cuban jamming of that frequency interferes with its signal. The violation of international treaties referred to is the fact that Radio Marathon was not reported to the International Frequency Registration Board, part of the International Telecommunication Union in Geneva until 1981. It was 19 years old when the United States finally got around to declaring it to that international body.

But to return to the Cuban missile crisis, across the Atlantic the VOA, together with Radio Free Europe and other stations, mounted an 8½ hour barrage

explaining the U.S. position on Cuba. This massive assault used 4,331,000 watts
to try to break through Soviet jamming.[90]

The AM barrage aimed at Cuba lasted through November 1962, and cost the
ten stations involved $175–225,000 in lost air time, for which each received
special commendation from President Kennedy.[91] By December 17, the VOA
also had cut its broadcasts aimed at Cuba from 24 hours to eight.[92]

This intense radio propaganda blast at and about Cuba caused considerable
consternation in the VOA. The VOA is forbidden by its Charter from broadcast-
ing its programs within the United States. This is intended to prevent an Ameri-
can presidential administration from using governmental radio channels to pro-
pagandize itself within the United States. Was the VOA acting illegally in using
domestic AM transmitters for its Cuba-directed broadcasts? No, was the Ken-
nedy administration's answer, because these private stations had volunteered
their services.

But the controversy persisted. Former VOA Chief and USIA Director George
Allen said that the overkill barrage aimed at Castro "actually did more harm than
good . . . and nothing could have helped him [Castro] more."[93] Castro, he said,
was able to claim sympathy as "the target for the largest concentration of
propaganda effort unleashed against an individual since Stalin tried to purge Tito
in 1948."[94]

After the missle crisis, the Cuban–American radio war continued in more
moderate fashion. Cuba broadcast Radio Free Dixie and the Voice of Vietnam
along with its regular Radio Havana Cuba broadcasts. Some of the personnel
from Radio Americas moved under the Voice of America around 1963. VOA's
Cuba-directed programming format was known as "Cita Con Cuba" [Rendez-
vous With Cuba]. It broadcast morning and evening programs of news, features,
Cuban music, and vitriolic commentary. One Cuban author described these
broadcasts as encouraging "counterrevolutionary elements [to make] campaigns
tending to distort the work of the Cuban revolution."[95] In 1968, a program
called "El Show de la Nueva Ola" (New Wave Show) began. It urged youth to
create listeners clubs which, one Cuban believed, would be "converted into
antisocial groups."[96]

A survey of Cuban refugees in 1968 revealed some gratifying figures for
VOA. Eight out of ten of the sample listened regularly to VOA. Seventy percent
said VOA was the most listened to foreign radio station. A like percentage cited
"Cita Con Cuba" as their favorite program. Other favorite foreign stations
included WMIE (R. Continental), Radio Americas, WNYW in New York, and
the BBC. Interestingly, 62 percent of the VOA listeners said they had to listen to
it "bajito" (secretly).[97]

"Cita Con Cuba," staffed primarily by Cuban exiles, continued broadcasting
five hours daily from Marathon Key until 1973. On April 1, 1973, it was reduced
to a half-hour in the evening and a next-morning repeat. On July 1, 1974, the
half-hour repeat was dropped and the time was given to the popular VOA Latin

American program "Buenos Dias, America." In 1974, the Nixon administration concluded that it would be more productive and persuasive "to incorporate the materials carried in that program into the general flow of programming in Spanish to the Hemisphere." At the same time, for budgetary reasons, the VOA reduced its Spanish-language broadcasts to Latin America by 2 hours daily. The "Cita Con Cuba" slot became part of the new 2½ hour evening magazine show called "Buenas Noches, America." Items formerly carried in "Cita Con Cuba" continued within the general service to Latin America.[98] One reason given for the phase out was lack of news to warrant its continuation.[99] In testimony before Congress, U.S. Undersecretary of State Thomas Enders said the reason for dropping the program was because it "was not consistent with the VOA mission."[100]

THE SPANISH SERVICE OF THE VOICE OF AMERICA TODAY

The Spanish branch of the Voice of America is one of 41 languages broadcast daily. The weekly 1983 VOA schedule for all languages lists 981¾ hours, carried over 33 transmitters in the United States and 74 transmitters overseas.[101] VOA broadcasts reach an estimated 70 to 80 million listeners each week.[102]

VOA ranks third among international broadcasters in weekly worldwide transmissions. The leading services are the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, with 2,020 hours per week; the People's Republic of China, with 1,390; Federal Republic of Germany, with 798; and Great Britain, with 712. However, if Radio Free Europe (555) and Radio Liberty (462) are added to VOA's transmissions, total hours of U.S. governmental broadcasts (1,845) are second only to the Soviet Union.[103]

Despite this favorable worldwide figure, the United States lags behind Communist nations and other Western countries in broadcasting efforts to Latin America and the Caribbean. Religious station HCJB, the Voice of the Andes, leads the list, with 427 hours per week, followed by Cuba, 280; BBC, 186; Soviet Union, 133; Federal Germany, 98; Voice of America, 84; China, 67; Albania, 56; South Korea, 56; and Democratic Germany, 54.[104]

The total 1981 VOA budget was $95,987,721, and the estimated 1983 budget was $117,390,000.[105] There were 2266 people in the VOA,[106] including 54 in the American Republic Division (Spanish and Portuguese to Latin America) in Washington and a correspondent each in Mexico City and Rio de Janeiro.[107] The estimated 1983 budget for the American Republics Division was $2,156,285 for the domestic staff and programming, and $307,000 for the overseas bureaus.[108]

Broadcasts to Latin America are transmitted directly from U.S. facilities in Greenville, North Carolina; Delano, California; Bethany, Ohio; and Marathon,

Florida. In addition, broadcasts to the Caribbean basin were also originating from temporary mediumwave facilities in Antigua beginning in April 1982. These Antigua facilities are on a U.S. naval base and operate at 1580 KHz, with a 3-tower array with an azimuth oriented toward Georgetown, Grenada. [109] These Antigua facilities soon will be replaced by a modern automated station. Three additional identical mediumwave stations were to be constructed at Grand Turk and Grand Cayman islands. Alternatively, one of the facilities on Grand Cayman might be placed in Jamaica on a time-sharing basis. The existing station at Marathon will be modernized and automated. [110] The Marathon relay station employs six technicians and was slated for a $263,625 budget in 1983. The Antigua relay budget was to increase from $12,000 in 1981 to $123,000 in 1983. The Cayman, Turk, and possible Jamaica transmitters were scheduled for about $70,000 each in the 1983 budget. [111]

The Voice of America's Spanish branch broadcasts 38½ hours weekly (5½ hours daily—2½ hours in the morning and 3 hours in the evening). Thus, the Spanish branch is fifth in hours of transmission with the VOA, after English, Russian, Chinese, and Arabic.

The Spanish-language service reaches an estimated 3.6 million listeners in 18 Latin American countries. While there are no statistics on the audience in Cuba, former Spanish branch Chief Guy Farmer believes it to be substantial. [112] From letters and from visitors' reports, he believes that many people, especially youth, listen to the Voice. According to Cuban officials, many Cuban leaders start their day with the news from the Voice of America. [113]

The morning show, "Buenos Dias, America" (6:30–9:00 A.M. EST), has been hosted for the last two decades by Jose Perez "Pepe" Del Rio, whose congenial personality has made the show so popular that it is even rebroadcast on many stations in the hemisphere. "Buenos Dias, America" is a radio magazine show with news, music, interviews, special reports, sports, human interest features, scientific reports, historical news, and frequent reports from numerous special correspondents in the United States and Latin America.

The evening show, "Buenas Noches, America" (7:00–10:00 P.M. EST), also utilizes the magazine format. The first hour consists of the standard 15 minutes of news, plus two regular segments, "Noticiero Grafico" (Voice in the News/Actualities) and "Escenario Norteamericano" (U.S. Scene). The next 2 hours feature rotating emcees presenting news, commentaries, analyses, and special features. The evening show is generally more formal than the morning program.

News is the single largest portion of the day's programming, and accounts for 25 percent of all broadcast time. Originating from the Central VOA Newsroom, news is broadcast for 10 minutes on the hour and 5 minutes on the half hour during the morning and evening broadcasts. The news is updated occasionally but remains essentially the same throughout each show. "Virtually every part of

our broadcast is news-related," stated former Spanish branch Chief Guy Farmer. "Every survey we have made indicates that the main reason people listen to our shortwave Spainsh broadcasts is our news."[114]

The VOA newsroom is one of the most sophisticated in the world. Video monitors hang from the ceilings as wire services spew forth paper. One correspondent specializes in Latin American events, but the news is first written in English and then is sent to the various language branches for translation. Occasionally, the Spanish branch will suggest a news item to be included, but the news-gathering process is centralized in the main newsroom for all the language services. Thus, one-quarter of the Spanish branch's broadcast time, namely the news, is essentially out of its hands.

The integrity of the VOA newsroom has been a subject of concern for many years. The present VOA Charter, which mandates objective news, was wrestled from Congress in 1976, largely through the efforts of the indefatigable former News Chief Bernard Kamenske. Regarding truth in VOA news, he stated: "We report facts; we collect only facts." Asked what ideological position the VOA newsroom might ever espouse, Kamenske stated: "Our only ideology is the irrepressible idealism of the American people. Where we violate that, we have no right to call ourselves the *voice* of America."[115]

Supporters of this concept are disturbed by what they see as efforts to make the Voice a global mouthpiece for Administration efforts to rally international support for stronger anti-Soviet policies. Their fears were intensified with the highly controversial appointment of Philip Nicolaides, a former Houston radio commentator and contributing editor of *Conservative Digest*, to be VOA Deputy Program Director for commentaries and news analysis. The appointment was hailed as a turning point in VOA history by conservatives, who agreed with his well-publicized conception of the Voice of America as the nation's first line of defense in the East–West struggle. But Nicolaides was soon ousted, and it is not yet clear where this internal VOA conflict will result.[116]

The VOA is forbidden to broadcast programs that deal exclusively with the affairs of Cuba except as they relate to international foreign policy. Indeed, the author's content analysis study of 2 week's news on the Voice of America in 1979 substantiates that point. There was only one news item in the sample that treated Cuba.[117]

But the Voice continues to carry Cuba-oriented materials outside of the news:

Among the program materials used in the regular Spanish-language programming in the first half of 1980, for example, were interviews with Cuban political prisoners Huber Matos and Emilio Rivero and with a broad cross-section of Cuban refugees in Costa Rica, Peru, Key West, Miami, Elgin Air Force Base, Fort Chaffee, and Indiantown Gap, Pennsylvania. Developments involving Cubans in Angola and Ethiopia are reported to Cuba, as developments in Cuba are reported to Africa. News analyses, commentaries, editorial opinion packages, and special reports and documentaries appear regularly and on special occasions.

Evidence through the years—the latest coming from the recent influx of refugees—suggests that Cuban listeners have indeed used VOA Spanish as a chief source of information about the outside world, about the United States, and about developments in and concerning their own country. It is not the *form* that has been important to them, but the *substance* of the broadcasts. And it has been, from the VOA point of view, just as important to keep the rest of the Hemisphere informed regarding Cuban developments as Cuba itself. Creating a separate broadcast "for Cubans only" would in no way increase the supply or availability of appropriate broadcast materials, but could rather be interpreted as a special propaganda campaign, less credible and even dismissable.[118]

Any description of the Spanish branch would be incomplete without mentioning the extensive reboadcasting and local radio placement of VOA programs in Latin America. For years the VOA has had the policy of feeding free programs, often the "back half" (after the news and commentary), to local stations in Latin America. These are taken by 40 percent of all radio stations in 17 countries.[119] Some stations, quite to the consternation of the VOA, even run commercials among the programs!

In addition, the Spanish branch transmits a daily 1-1/2-hour Correspondent Feed to United States Information Agency offices. These are placed 3,000 times daily on more than a thousand stations during prime time. In Colombia, for example, 200 of 280 stations carry VOA correspondent reports and/or package programs (at least once weekly). VOA research indicates that "there may be a twenty- or thirty-to-one multiplier factor in listenership through local placement."[120]

The Spanish branch receives about one thousand letters each month. Much of it is directed to the "Club de Oyentes" (Listeners' Club), which responds over the air. According to Farmer, the Branch recieved 40 letters from Cuba in January 1979, and 52 letters from Cuba in March 1979.[121]

ANTI-CASTRO CLANDESTINE BROADCASTING

Cuban exile organizations in South Florida and elsewhere are also continuing regular broadcasts directed against the Castro government. They broadcast from mobile or hidden transmitters on unassigned frequencies typically between 7000 and 7100 KHz. Their names reflect the diversity and sometimes competitiveness of their backers: Radio Trinchera (Trench Radio), La Voz Cristiana de Cuba (Christian Voice of Cuba), La Juventud Progresista Cubana (Cuban Progressive Youth), La Voz de Alpha 66 (run by the noted terrorist organization), Radio Abdala, Radio Libertad Cubana. The Federal Communication Commission has taken no action to suppress these clandestine and illegal stations.

The most active clandestine pirate station has been La Voz de Cuba Independiente y Democratica (La Voz del CID). Established in Caracas in October 1980,

and with offices in Miami, Washington, and Chicago, CID broadcasts from five shortwave transmitters which, CID claims, are all located outside U.S. territory. One of its transmitters has been identified as Radio Clarin, a Dominican station. In 1983, CID announced that it intended to augment these transmitters with four more shortwave outlets and one AM outlet. CID believes its programming provides the Cuban audience "with ideological ammunition." It compares the current U.S.–Cuban standoff to the radio war in Hungary in 1956, in Czechoslovakia in 1968, and in Poland in the 1980s. In addition, CID's broadcasting effort is directed at the Cuban armed forces to create "a renewal of consciousness about their role as defenders of the real interests of the Cuban people, rather than supporters of a nonpopular regime." Beyond just Cuba, CID's programs are also broadcast to Caribbean and Central American areas to "counter Communist subversive and disinformation campaigns."[122]

RADIO MARTI VS. "RADIO LINCOLN"

By late 1981, officials of the International Communication Agency (ICA, in 1982 renamed the United States Information Agency, USIA) were telling Congress of the need to hone the Agency into a "cutting edge" of foreign policy implementation. At the heart of this move was a campaign known as "Project Truth," authorized in outline by President Reagan and the National Security Council in August 1981.

The goals of "Project Truth" were to refute "misleading Soviet propaganda and disinformation" and to "underline the Soviet threat" to world stability and security. At the same time, Project Truth intended to emphasize the commitment of the United States to promote peace "from a position of strength."[123]

ICA Director Charles Z. Wick directed an interagency committee to coordinate Project Truth. Wick had no illusions about the challenge he faced. He told the National Council of Community World Affairs Organizations: "We are at war . . . We are in a war of ideas with the Soviet Union."[124]

Within this new political climate, but separate from ICA, the Reagan administration, in September 1981, announced plans to launch a "Radio Free Cuba," known as Radio Marti. National Security Advisor Richard V. Allen asserted that:

[Cuba's] leaders have kept the Cuban people ignorant of [Cuba's] campaign of international violence by systematic manipulation of information. . . . The Administration has decided to break the Cuban government's control of information in Cuba. . . . Radio Marti will tell the truth to the Cuban people about their government's mismanagement and its promotion of subversion and international terrorism.[125]

The decision to name the station after Jose Marti was not without some irony, for Marti was one of the most outspoken anti-imperialist and anti-American writers in the late nineteenth century. Poet, revolutionary, journalist, and articu-

late representative of Cuban middle-class radical nationalism, Marti believed that an independent Cuba would pose a threat to U.S. interests in the Caribbean. He tirelessly publicized and raised money among Cubans in the United States for the Cuban independence struggle against Spain. He returned to Cuba to join the fight against Spain and died in a skirmish in 1895.

Marti's name is venerated by Cubans on both sides of the Florida Straits, but, as every Cuban knows, he deeply distrusted the U.S. On the day before his death he wrote to a friend:

> I am in daily danger of giving my life for my country and duty. It is my duty— inasmuch as I realize it and have the spirit to fulfill it—to prevent, by the independence of Cuba, the United States from spreading over the West Indies and falling, with added weight, upon other lands of Our America. All I have done up to now, and shall do hereafter, is to that end. . . . I have lived inside the monster and know its entrails—and my weapon is only the slingshot of David.[126]

Fernandez Retamar, Director of the Center for Marti Studies, told a group of Americans: ''Only a government that has demonstrated such repeated evidence of its ignorance can commit such a stupidity of taking the very name of the greatest anti-imperialist we have had. . . .''[127] Even the *Washington Post* editorialized its disapproval of the choice of Marti's name.[128]

To be fair, though, Jose Marti was a philosopher and political writer whose views often transcend simple anti-Americanism and reach a level of general horror against hegemony. The Presidential Commission on Broadcasting to Cuba has rightly pointed out that Marti ''was passionately dedicated to the truth, to democracy and freedom, and to the independence of Cuba from foreign dominance from whatever source. . . . He is perhaps the only such symbol to all Cubans.''[129] As Cuban-American National Foundation Director Frank Calzon pointed out in Congressional testimony, Marti's support of democratic principles puts him at odds with the present regime in Cuba. Marti once wrote:

> The continuous, frank and almost brutal debate of open political life strengthens in man the habit of expressing his opinion and listening to that of others. There is great benefit in living in a country where active coexistence of diverse beliefs prevents a timorous and indecisive state to which reason dissents and where a single and unquestionable dogma prevails.[130]

Though the concept of a surrogate Cuban domestic radio service had its origins in ''Cita Con Cuba'' (see page 20 above), the Radio Marti concept seems to have had its beginning before the Reagan election victory. Perhaps the first mention was in the so-called ''Santa Fe Report'' of the Council for Inter-American Security. It called for the

> establishment of a Radio Free Cuba, under open U.S. government sponsorship, which will beam objective information to the Cuban people that, among other things, details the costs of Havana's unholy alliance with Moscow. If propaganda

fails, *a war of national liberation against Castro must be launched.* [Emphasis added.][131]

Later in 1980, the Campaign for a Democratic Majority, headed by Senators Henry M. Jackson and Daniel P. Moynihan, published a study advocating "a Radio Free Cuba of the intelligence, imagination, and skill of Radio Free Europe."[132]

In the spring of 1981, a member of Reagan's transition team floated the idea of a special broadcasting service to Cuba as part of an aggressive foreign policy approach. Kenneth L. Adelman proposed that the VOA broadcast special programs for Cubans that would include "the casualty rates of Cuban troops in Africa and their discontent at being there, and the declining fortunes of Cubans at home." He also suggested broadcasting reports about Cuban refugees in Florida, about the economic difficulties on the island, and World Bank statistics showing a net decline in Cuba's per capita income since 1960. "Twenty years after the revolution," Adelman wrote, "stringent rationing continues, the economy is declining and unemployment is on the rise. In sum, there is grist enough for a public diplomacy campaign toward Cuba, should policy makers adopt a more confrontational approach."[133]

In June 1981, Senator Jesse Helms proposed to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that "any program of the United States Government involving radio broadcasts to Cuba . . . shall be designated as 'Radio Free Cuba.'"[134] The Inter-American Press Association (IAPA), which expelled Cuba in the early 1960s,[135] brought pressure to bear on the U.S. At its 37th General Assembly in Rio de Janeiro in October 1981, IAPA passed a resolution "to encourage free journalists to make every effort to bring about the end of the news blackout for the people of Cuba, and support any means that would help achieve that objective." The conservative Heritage Foundation stated that "direct radio broadcasts to Cuba, independent of the Voice of America, should be increased to 24-hour service."[136]

These moves led to a July 1981 meeting at the State Department where representatives of various concerned agencies examined the various options available for a stepped-up radio broadcasting offensive aimed at Cuba. In September 1981, National Security Advisor Richard V. Allen announced the Administration's intent to launch Radio Martí "to break the Cuban government's control of information in Cuba . . . [and to] tell the truth to the Cuban people."[137]

On September 22, 1981, President Reagan signed Executive Order 12323, creating the Presidential Commission on Broadcasting to Cuba.[138] The Executive Order directed the Commission to examine such issues as possible program content, information gathering, writing and editing needs, staffing requirements, legal structure for a broadcasting organization, proposed legislation, budgets, and the location, structure, and function of possible broadcasting facilities.

The Commission had a decided conservative and anti-Castro complexion. It was headed by F. Clifton White, a public relations specialist in Connecticut. White ran Senator Barry Goldwater's presidential campaign in 1964 and was a senior advisor to the Reagan campaign. Another Commission member is USIA Director Charles Z. Wick. A lawyer and former Hollywood music promoter, Wick once told Congress that Communist agents were influencing U.S. media. He raised $15 million for the Reagan campaign and is a close personal friend of the President.[139]

Two Cuban-Americans served on the Commission. Jorge Luis Mas Canosa was president and chief executive officer of Church and Tower of Florida, Inc., a Miami-based firm of engineering contractors. He lobbied hard for the Radio Free Cuba idea. Known to be a close advisor to Senator Paula Hawkins (D-FLA), Mas Canosa only became a U.S. citizen in 1981 when it became essential for his appointment as a commissioner.[140] The other Cuban-American was Dr. Tirso del Junco, Chairman of the California Republican Party.

The most conservative credentials on the Commission came from personalities long-known as supporters of rightwing causes in the U.S. One was Joseph Coors, President and Vice Chairman of Joseph Coors Brewers, whose nomination to the Federal Communication Commission never reached the floor of Congress because of advance opposition. Coors helped launch the Heritage Foundation with $300,000, and has donated about $2.5 million yearly to conservative causes. Another commission member was millionaire recluse Richard Mellon Scaife, whose philanthropies have supported scores of New Right organizations including the Heritage Foundation and Georgetown Center for Strategic and International Studies. Scaife owned Forum World Features, exposed in 1975 as a CIA-sponsored operation.[141]

Experienced communication professionals included: Herbert Schmertz, Mobil Oil's vice president for public affairs, who developed the company's aggressive campaign of op-ed-like newspaper ads and newscast-like TV commercials; William B. Bayer, outspoken conservative political editor and news commentator for WINZ(AM) Miami; and George Jacobs, noted broadcast engineer, who has long served both the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty.

Rounding out the Commission was former Senator Richard F. Stone, who told the House Foreign Affairs Committee that it is "our moral duty" to give the Cuban people freedom of information. The Commission's staff was headed by career foreign service officer George Landau, and includes Yalè Newman, former director of the American Republics Division of the Voice of America.

In addition to the Commission, a nonprofit entity called Radio Broadcasting to Cuba, Inc. was created. It would serve the same role for Radio Marti that the Board for International Broadcasting did for Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. Its three Board members were Midge Decter Podhoretz of the Committee for a Free World; Robert Walter Zimmerman, former Foreign Service Officer; and

William P. Stedman, Jr., retired ambassador. Such an entity would allow the station to receive private funds before it is authorized by Congress.

The goals of Radio Marti, as explained the the enacting legislation (H.R. 5427), stated that:

> It is the policy of the United States to support the right of the people of Cuba ''to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers,'' in accordance with Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.[142]

Its specific goals were to provide an alternate, reliable source of information concerning Cuba's domestic and international policies and actions which, according to the Commission, the Cuban people were lacking; to provide the information necessary for the Cuban people to make informed judgments on these policies and actions and to try to hold their government more accountable; and to provide news and analysis that is not manipulated by the state but is objective, accurate, credible, relevant, and timely.[143]

The Reagan Administration disavowed any belligerent or propagandistic role for Radio Marti. The station intended to exert pressure over the long term, not to incite disaffection in the short run. In testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Thomas Enders stated ''it would be immoral, irresponsible to set a people against a government that monopolizes the means of coercion.'' Conditions in Cuba were ''provocation enough,'' he said. Radio Marti's role was to ''give Cubans the means they now lack to know what kind of society has been imposed on them.'' Enders compared Radio Marti to the operation of Radio Free Europe (RFE), which he said had changed the political climate in Poland over the long run.[144]

Nevertheless, Enders declared that Radio Marti would not broadcast propaganda: ''We will not succeed in attracting an audience in Cuba if we offer them propaganda. If there are false reports, the listeners will react. If false reports continue, they will turn off. . . . So it must be a creature of no political tendency, of no action group, of no vested interest.'' On the contrary, Enders said he expected that Radio Marti would have to work years, as did Radio Free Europe, to earn its audience.

During this period, the only fundamental opposition to the Radio Marti concept arose from a few commerical broadcasters whose motivations Radio Marti supporters questioned. Since its frequency was most threatened, WHO-AM in Des Moines by default led the way for growing commercial broadcasters' concern about the economic effects and harm to emergency preparedness frequencies that Cuban interference could cause. For the most part, Congressional testimonies did not address the government's underlying motives for Radio Marti. Two university professors, John D. Nichols of Pennsylvania State University and William LeoGrande of The American University, asked questions that addressed

these motives. Reps. Thomas Harkin (D-IA) and Ronald Dellums (D-CA), among others, discussed Radio Marti in terms of Caribbean foreign policy. Indeed, during the floor debate in August 1982, Harkin submitted amendment after amendment to try to stall the bill. His amendments included changing the name from Radio Marti to: "The $17.7 Million Boondoggle Duplicative Radio Broadcasting to Cuba Act"; and "the John Foster Dulles Cold War Mentality Memorial Radio Broadcasting to Cuba Act." In a serious vein, one of Harkin's amendments would have withheld funds until the Government Accounting Office had investigated the possible improper use of government money *to build Radio Marti's antennas before the station was even approved by Congress.*

The question of these antennas became a heated issue. Plans were to use one 50-kilowatt transmitter located at Saddlebunch military reservation in Florida. Another transmitter of greater power was to be located later somewhere in the Caribbean, perhaps on Cayman, Turk, Jamaica, or Antigua. Technical studies by the Federal Communication Commission and the Department of Defense indicated the best frequency for Radio Marti to be 1040 KHz. The Presidential Commission also recommended consideration of additional frequencies in order to make Cuban jamming of Radio Marti broadcasts more difficult.

Although Congress had not yet voted the funds for Radio Marti, the U.S. Navy began construction of four 250-foot transmitting antennas for the station 12 miles north of Key West, Florida.[145] The construction infuriated the Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Timothy Wirth (D-CO). Wirth and Iowa Representative Thomas J. Tauke wrote to Assistant Secretary of State Enders that "the expenditure of any funds for the construction of facilities for the purpose of making Radio Marti operational without the passage of authorizing legislation would be illegal."[146]

According to Department of Defense plans, the tower could be both Radio Marti's transmitter and serve a classified Defense function, presumably to allow the Department of Defense to seize Radio Marti's facility in times of crisis. According to a House Appropriations Committee internal document, when the Radio Marti proposal ran into lengthy delays in Congress, the Secretary of Defense directed the Navy to proceed with construction "because DOD could not wait any longer to get a facility for its 'classified' function."[147]

During the legislative battle, the Presidential Commission continued to plan its programming strategy for Radio Marti. Of the 168 staff positions recommended, 148 were program-related. Personnel would be drawn from the ranks of professional broadcasters and newspersons with special emphasis on Hispanic, including Cuban, backgrounds. The station was to begin with 14 hours a day (9 hours plus 5 hours of repeats) of news commentaries, and entertainment programming. News would include information about Cuban domestic and international affairs which was unreported or underreported in the Cuban mass media. For example, news of casualties and costs in Cuba's Angola and Ethiopia interventions were intended "to enable the Cuban people to have the means by which

they can hold their own government to some degree accountable [because] the Cuban people are deprived of the means of . . . influencing policies of their government."[148]

Based on the successful experience of VOA's lively emcee, Pepe Del Rio, Radio Marti would be anchored by a personality who would introduce segments and produce program continuity. Programming would include political dramatizations, or radio docudramas, about Cuban history, political events, culture, and literature. Great emphasis would be placed on sporting events, both in Cuba and the United States. Economic issues would deal with the Cuba domestic economy and with Cuba's economic relations around the world.

One of Radio Marti's greatest tasks was to gather timely and reliable information about events inside Cuba. After all, Radio Marti's predecessor, Cita Con Cuba, was cancelled for lack of reliable information.[149]

According to the Presidential Commission, the station would follow the standards of the U.S. professional press. The station's information "journalistically will be responsible, will be comprehensive, and will be verifiable."[150] The standards cited in the Interim Report of the Presidential Commission on Broadcasting to Cuba were:

> The news must be accurate, objective, timely, interesting and relevant to the concerns of Cuban listeners. Materials . . . should be thoroughly verified by news personnel as to facts and sources, as well as to avoid any suggestin (sic) of bias or sensationalism. Confirmation by two independent sources is required when facts appear to be in doubt. Clear attribution to the source is required when the information content clearly constitutes opinion or can be considered partial or self-serving.[151]

Radio Marti's programming plan stated that the news department would subscribe to six wire services—Associated Press, United Press International, Foreign Broadcasts Information Service, Reuters, EFE from Spain, and Caribbean News Agency. However, only two of these news agencies had correspondents in Cuba. Reportedly, Radio Marti had contacted the European offices of news agencies who had correspondents within Cuba to inquire whether their staff might be willing to cooperate. At least one news agency, the Spanish EFE, categorically refused to cooperate.[152] Associated Press had no representation in Cuba, though it exchanged its news wire with the Cuban Prensa Latina agency in Mexico City. FBIS had monitoring posts in South Florida, where it picked up Cuban broadcasts. Caribbean News Agency concentrated strictly on English-speaking Caribbean countries, and rarely carried news on Cuba.

Popular entertainment programs would attract the listeners and draw them to newscasts and commentaries. Romance-filled "radionovelas" (soap operas) from Mexico, Venezuela, and Colombia, unavailable in Cuba, might be popular on Radio Marti. Among the other suggested programs were: recorded excerpts of Castro's past speeches on political and economic pledges he has not kept; politi-

cal satire programs on contemporary Cuban life; a radio drama series on the history of the Cuban family covering several generations. The New York Yankees and Los Angeles Dodgers franchises offered their Spanish-language broadcasts free of charge to the government. Popular American music, now available from many Miami stations, could also draw a substantial youth audience. According to the Presidential Commission, "entertainment features . . . should help expose Cuban listeners to the spontaneity, creativity and diversity of free societies."[153]

All of this caused a great deal of concern in Cuba about the intrusion of Marti's signal. Cuba prepared both domestic and international responses. On the domestic side, Cuban radio and TV expanded local and national public affairs and news coverage. The daily "Revista de la Manana," a morning magazine-format show, expanded to 6 hours. Such expansion was due in part to the competition from Radio Marti to provide more "hard news."

But the most dramatic Cuban response for North Americans would be the launching of a new 500-kilowatt superstation, dubbed by some Cubans "Radio Lincoln," which could reach the entire United States. This new station would not only produce interference with U.S. stations operating on that frequency, but would generate adjacent channel interference up to four channels from its frequency. Its programs were to include popular south-of-the-border music, news of minority struggles in the U.S., baseball, and, of course, Communist commentaries on U.S. "adventurism" overseas and repression at home. Much of the programming would be in English and receivable on ordinary AM radios. Hispanic-Americans might find programs directed at them in Spanish on immigration issues, farm labor struggles, Central American news, and musical-cultural programs. Black Americans and poor Whites might also hear programs designed to create dissatisfaction.

Cuban communication experts were quick to point out that such a station is an enormous drain on their scarce resources. They preferred not to engage in an escalated radio war. But Radio Marti was seen as such an overt act of aggression that it demanded a considered response of high production quality and a high investment in equipment and electrical energy.

This Cuban concern about an escalated radio war is belied by the fact that Cuba announced plans for two 500-killowatt superstations in 1979, long before Radio Marti was conceived. Cuba seems to have used Radio Marti as an excuse for something it intended to do all along.

THE INTERFERENCE WAR

Intimately connected with the growing radio war was the so-called "interference war." This refers to the growing amount of unacceptable signal disruption caused by radio transmitters that operate on the same or nearby frequencies.

Interfering channels, known as incompatibilities, make it difficult or impossible for listeners to comprehend messages. For U.S. commercial broadcasters this is doubly vexing, because the lost signal quality and reach also means lost advertising revenue. To put this rather technical discussion into perspective, a brief overview of AM, or mediumwave, signal propagation is in order.

AM radio allocations are subject to international agreements established through the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) in Geneva, and are supplemented by regional agreements. By international agreement, the AM channels extend from 535 KHz to 1605 KHz. Each AM radio station is allocated a 10-KHz bandwidth,[154] thus allowing 107 AM channels. Radio waves are propagated outward from the transmitting tower. Normally they radiate in a perfect circle, but a directional antenna can conform the waves to desired contours. The AM wave travels both through the ground and the sky. In practice, AM ground waves can cover a radius of 15 to 120 kilometers from the transmitter, depending on transmitter power, the frequency of the channel, the conductivity of the soil, the amount of interference present, and other factors. Sky waves of AM stations reach far beyond this radius, and can be heard by receivers located 200 to 25000 kilometers from the transmitter. Sky waves depend on the ionosphere, and are most reliable at night when the sun does not distort the ionosphere.

Because Cuba and the United States are so close (140 kilometers separates them), for years they have had to coordinate their frequency assignments to minimize mutual interference. Cuban and American radio systems grew up side by side. Indeed, some of Cuba's radio infrastructure was designed and built by American broadcasters.[155] By the 1940s, both systems were thriving and increasingly interfering with one another and with other Caribbean and North American countries.

In 1950, under the pre-revolutionary government, Cuba agreed to a U.S. plan called the North American Regional Broadcast Agreement (NARBA). Signatories were the United States, Canada, Mexico, Cuba, the Bahamas, and the Dominican Republic (which never ratified it).[156] NARBA divided the 107 channels of the AM band into local, regional, and clear channels, and specified power limits for each. The U.S. received 24 unduplicated clear channels and 19 shared clear channels; Canada received 6 and 4, respectively; Mexico, 7 and 5; and Bahamas, 1 and 0. Cuba ended up with one unduplicated and one shared (with Canada) clear channel to service the entire 700-mile long island.[157]

At the time NARBA was first signed, according to Coro, the Cuban delegates were neither capable engineers nor skilled negotiators. "The possibility of expansion of Cuban radio in 1959 [the year of the Cuban revolution] was next to zero." This was because Cuba accepted an interference standard (26 decibels between the desired and undesired stations, or a 20:1 ratio) that put it at a disadvantage. At a 20:1 ratio, if there were a 50-kilowatt station in Nashville, the Cuban station on the same frequency could broadcast only 250 watts at night.

"So the development of Cuban radio broadcasting was blocked by the presence of a very large number of U.S. stations radiating high intensity signals to here."[158]

Despite its status as a treaty signatory, Cuba did not abide by the terms of NARBA. Exactly when Cuba began ignoring NARBA is uncertain. Some claim that Castro never really abided by its terms, while others say that it has only been since 1980 that interference has become a significant problem. In addition to unintentional interference, Cuba has been deliberately jamming a Miami station (WQBA) for 13 years. This station broadcasts the viewpoint of the Cuban exile community in Florida in Spanish.[159] In 1980, Cuba gave the required one year's notice of its intent to withdraw from NARBA, an action that took effect in November 1981.

Canada and Mexico also have felt the same domination of U.S. signals. As a result, Cuba, Canada, and Mexico have announced their intention to abrogate the NARBA agreement. Of course, bilateral negotiations have continued on all sides, for there is a built-in incentive to reach agreement. No one wins when an interference war escalates.

Mutual benefit was the apparent goal that even arch-antagonists Cuba and the United States seemed to have chosen until late 1981, when the two issues—Radio Marti and interference—collided. Bilateral meetings had been working amicably to resolve these problems. But the announcement of Radio Marti in September 1981, and the clash over frequency changes at the ITU Regional Administrative Radio Conference on Medium Frequency (MF) Broadcasting in the Western Hemisphere (also known as the "Rio Conference") wrecked these good faith efforts.

In 1979, as part of its preparations for the "Rio Conference," Cuba had submitted to the ITU a list of 188 operating and planned stations. Under the abrogated NARBA agreement, Cuba could operate as many as 174 AM stations, although only 75-80 were on the air at that time. Thus, the number of on-air stations would have more than doubled. Power levels would have increased substantially too. Two were to be huge 500-kilowatt superstations that could be heard as far away as Alaska and Hawaii.

A National Association of Broadcasters' study predicted that over 200 U.S. AM radio stations in 34 states and the District of Columbia would experience interference and reduced listening areas under the proposed Cuban inventory. Formerly clear channels would lose their entire nightime coverage. Thirty-seven clear channels would lose large portions of their service areas.[160] In particular, the two 500-kilowatt stations, operating on 1040 KHz and 1160 KHz as indicated by the Cubans, would reduce the service area of the two U.S. "clear channel" stations on those frequencies drastically.[161]

Whether Cuba actually intended to implement all these changes was questionable. One factor weighing against such plans was the amount of electricity required for these stations. According to engineer Michael Rau of the National

Association of Broadcasters, the input power for a radio station is approximately twice that of the output. The proposed and operating radio stations listed by the Cubans would require a total of 5.4 megawatts of power.[162]

Yet Cubans seemed determined to go through with this plan. Cuban Deputy Foreign Minister Ricardo Alarcon told the *Washington Post* that Cuba would respond with stepped-up transmissions that would block commercial programming in the United States.[163] A Congressional memorandum stated that "Cuba will definitely jam Radio Marti if and when it goes on the air. . . . Cuba has the capability to carry out its threat to jam U.S. radio broadcasts."[164]

Florida broadcasters have complained for years about Cuban interference. The South Florida Radio Broadcasters Association reported that at least 20 stations were experiencing Cuban-caused interference.[165] At least nine received FCC permission to increase their power as a countermeasure. Others were stymied because a power increase would damage the signal of another United States station, or because of the high cost of instituting such a change. Technically, the U.S. also violated the NARBA treaty with these power increase authorizations.

Interestingly, during the months that the 97th Congress was considering the Radio Marti bill, the National Association of Broadcasters avoided going on the record in opposition to the legislation. Aside from demonstrating that over 200 U.S. stations would be affected if Cuba implemented its announced frequency inventory, former NAB President Vincent T. Wasilewski did not fundamentally object to Radio Marti. He simply stressed his concern regarding the interference, existing and potential.

To be fair, Cuban broadcasters also experienced considerable interference from U.S. and other Caribbean radio stations. The protection ratio was not sufficient to safeguard full utilization of many assigned Cuban frequencies. For example, WCAU from Philadelphia drowned out a Cuban station in Santi Spiritus. KMOX from St. Louis made its frequency unusable to the Cubans. According to Coro, the U.S. AM system is so well engineered that it "solves some of its incompatibilities between its own stations (especially nighttime) . . . by beaming its signals to the south (to Cuba) so as to be able to accomodate more stations in the U.S."[166]

One American reporter described the Cuban side of the story:

> As the dial spins down the AM band [in Havana], WTOP from Washington announces beach traffic conditions on the Bay Bridge. . . . Half a dozen other American commercial stations came in clearly. . . . A Southern evangelical preacher brings me the message of Moses and the Burning Bush. Then Miami's WGBS reminds the radio audience of how Americans loved "My Favorite Martian."[167]

In summer 1981, U.S.-Cuban negotiations briefly appeared on the verge of breaking the impasse. Both sides offered technical solutions to many of the

incompatibilities. During the second bilateral meeting in Washington in August (the first had been in Havana in April), the *New York Times* leaked a report that the U.S. was planning a "Radio Free Cuba."[168] Publicly, it did not perturb the Cuban negotiators.

But just before the Rio Conference, Richard Allen's announcement left the Cubans no room for graceful maneuvering. The Cubans submitted a long list of changes to their original inventory, changes that appeared detrimental to U.S. stations and beneficial to other Caribbean broadcasters. The U.S. delegation successfully argued against the Cuban proposal and it was rejected. In the last week of the conference, the Cuban delegation walked out, denouncing the United States because of the plans for Radio Marti, U.S. operation of Radio Marathon (which the Cubans termed illegal), and the successful U.S. effort to prevent Cuba from making the 48 changes.

The U.S. delegation reportedly was surprised at the Cuban move, since neither Radio Marti nor Radio Marathon had arisen previously as an issue. The Cubans claimed that they had three meetings with U.S. delegates at which the U.S. demonstrated no interest in eliminating or limiting Radio Marathon broadcasts; the U.S. delegates at the conference were quoted as saying that the issue was never raised.[169]

Clearly, the interference issue is a two-way street. As Kalmann Schaefer, Assistant on International Communications to the FCC Chairman, told the House Foreign Affairs Committee: "The choice is stark: mutual accomodation or chaos." There is a built-in incentive for neighbors to resolve these differences. But the Radio Marti proposal inflamed the underlying mutual distrust to the point where bilateral negotiations were broken off.

As a result of the walkout and withdrawal from NARBA, Cuba was no longer bound by any AM broadcasting agreement and could operate in whatever manner it chose. At the same time, other countries were not required to protect Cuban radio stations from interference. Cuba notified the ITU that it intended to make the 48 unilateral changes which were blocked by the United States at Rio.[170] The Cubans apparently began implementing some of the changes included in the 1979 plan during 1980 and 1981, but more changes have occurred since the Rio conference. The clear-channel station operating at 1160 KHz (KSL, Salt Lake) began experiencing measurable interference from a Cuban station.

In late summer 1982, when it appeared that Congress might soon pass the Radio Marti bill, Cuba let go an electronic volley that WHO General Manager called the "first firing of a radio war." Cuba broadcast a jamming signal on five frequencies for 4 hours on August 29, 1982. Officials from WHO in Des Moines said they had calls from listeners in Texas, Missouri, Tennessee, and Iowa saying the WHO signal was being wiped out or affected by the Cuban broadcast. Another two volleys were put on on clear channel frequencies assigned to WMAQ (Chicago) and KSL (Salt Lake). Two other frequencies disrupted were regional channels used by a variety of lower-powered stations across the United States.[171]

RADIO MARTI: DENOUEMENT OR DEMISE?

Confronted by the reality of possible economic disaster as demonstrated by the August 1982 Cuban jamming, U.S. commercial broadcasting interests and Senate supporters of American business forged a compromise that eventually gutted the Radio Marti concept. This 4-hour Cuban pre-emptive electronic strike moved the National Association of Broadcasters (NAB) finally to oppose the bill.

As Fall recess approached in the 97th Congress, the House of Representatives overwhelmingly approved authorization for the establishment of Radio Marti. It instructed the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA), and not the Federal Communication Commission, to select a frequency for the station. In this bill, Radio Marti would have resided administratively with Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty under the Board for International Broadcasting. But Nebraska Democratic Senators Edward Zorinsky and James J. Exon threatened to filibuster the bill and thereby to tie up other pending legislation in the waning days of the "lame-duck" session. The Radio Marti bill became a proverbial "dead duck."

But when the 98th Congress convened in January 1983, Reagan administration supporters of Radio Marti quickly submitted a new bill to both houses. The new bill restricted Radio Marti to using only the 1180 KHz frequency in the commercial AM band. Additionally, it could lease time on commercial and noncommercial stations on this band, use 535 and 1605 KHz (both just outside the band), or any available shortwave frequency. However, it did not include compensation for lost revenues due to Cuban jamming.

During the consideration of the new bill the National Association of Broadcasters first publicly expressed its fervent opposition to Radio Marti. NAB's President Edward O. Fritts said that a Radio Marti on "any" AM commercial frequency was "potentially detrimental" to the entire AM radio system in North America. It could "spawn a radio war" in which U.S. broadcasters would be "devastated."[172]

Further, the bill would allow joint use of the 1180-KHz frequency by both the Voice of America and Radio Marti. It would even have permitted Radio Marti to substitute for VOA or become part of VOA. In May 1983, Dante Fascell's (D-FLA) International Operations Committee attached an amendment of $5 million in compensation to American broadcasters affected by Cuban retaliatory jamming. Both the Senate and House foreign affairs committees passed the bill in this form.

But just at this time, through intense lobbying efforts by commercial broadcasting interests, Senators Claiborne Pell (D-CT) and Zorinsky, both opponents of the original legislation, proposed a new bill that would expand VOA's Cuba-directed service by over 14 hours on the Marathon frequency. A similar measure was introduced in the House of Representatives. On August 3, 1982, the Senate, fearing parliamentary disruption and fully aware of the effect of the Cuban pre-

emptive jamming the previous Fall, approved the Zorinsky-Pell bill. The House followed suit on September 3. The Reagan administration was not pleased, but Reagan signed the bill into legislation anyway.

The compromise bill established a Cuba service within the Voice of America that would be responsible for broadcasting 14 hours a day of news and information to Cuba. It established a $5 million fund to reimburse broadcasters for costs, whenever incurred, for mitigating interference with Cuban signals. The bill actually authorized more than the original Radio Marti proposal: $14 million in FY 1984 and $12 million in FY 1985. Nor did it restrict the Cuba Service totally to 1180 KHz. It allowed the simultaneous use of frequencies above and below the commercial band, and permitted the service to lease time from nongovernmental shortwave stations. One provision was directed at dissuading the Cubans from engaging in any more pre-emptive or retaliatory jamming: The new service could lease time on AM stations in the commercial band if jamming or interference on 1180 KHz increased by more than 25 percent.

The VOA's new Cuba Service would be distinguished from the other Latin American service already on the air. It would not be unlike the "Cita Con Cuba" program which the VOA broadcast to Cuba until 1974. The new service would operate under a director appointed by the USIA director and would report directly to the head of the USIA as well as to the director of the VOA. The bill also created a bipartisan nine-member board within the Office of the President—the Advisory Board for Radio Broadcasting to Cuba—which would be appointed by the President with Senate consent.

A RE-EVALUATION AND A MODEST PROPOSAL

Clearly, the Reagan administration was disappointed in its inability to set up a "surrogate" Radio Free Cuba. However, given the historical record, this must be seen as only a temporary setback. What was the fundamental purpose of Radio Marti? Fears have been expressed that a true intent of Radio Marti was to destabilize Cuba. As Professor LeoGrande noted in his Congressional testimony:

> We should not fail to mention the possibility, however remote, that Radio Marti may be part of a wider effort aimed at overthrowing the Cuban government by force of arms. . . . Given the Reagan Administration's obvious preoccupation with and animosity towards Cuba, and its stated intention to restore covert action to the arsenal of foreign policy instruments, one cannot dismiss the possibility that Radio Marti is intended to play the same role as Radio Swan was two decades ago.[173]

To be sure, no one in the Reagan administration has ever stated these goals in so many words, though members of the highest levels of government have in the past implied that this was the purpose of such a station (see "Santa Fe" Report,

page 25). In public statements, the administration disavowed any belligerent or propagandistic role for Radio Marti. As Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Thomas O. Enders stated, "it would be immoral [and] irresponsible to set a people against a government that monopolizes the means of coercion." Conditions in Cuba were "provocation enough." Radio Marti would "give Cubans the means they now lack to know what kind of society has been imposed on them."[174]

But in private conversations, administration officials had quite another thing to say about Radio Marti's goals. One source close to WHO-AM (Des Moines) claimed that a member of the Special Advisory Staff to the Deputy Under-Secretary of Defense for Policy, Fred Ikle, told WHO officials that the establishment of Radio Marti was "an international game of chicken, and the U.S. will not blink." He told them that, by setting up Radio Marti, the U.S. would be "drawing a line across which Castro will know he cannot step without paying for it." Cuban interference, he added, would be a violation of international law, and the U.S. would then have the legal justification for going in and "*surgically removing*" their transmitters. Kenneth R. Giddens, former director of the Voice of America and a consultant helping to set up Radio Marti, reportedly told WHO it should be "proud to be on the front lines" of this effort, which was characterized as a battle for freedom. He suggested their reluctance indicated a lack of patriotism.

The Administration was trying to create a Radio Free Cuba in the image of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, that is, to effect changes in the Cuban government over the long run. In reality, though, Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty, and Radio Free Asia (now defunct) were set up in the 1950s precisely to "liberate" the peoples of Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, and China. Their CIA financing was kept secret until 1971.[175]

In the 1950s, these stations operated as voices of an aggressive foreign policy in an attempt to destabilize the governments at which they were directed. When "liberation" proved unfeasible, these operations conformed their messages to the new U.S. policy objectives, long-term "liberalization" of these governments. Their programming was intended to provide an alternative "home service," which would provide otherwise banned news and entertainment. Through "cross-reporting" techniques, news of liberalizations or improvements in living standards (by Western criteria) were relayed from one "enslaved" nation to the other, and thus created discontent. Someone reasoned that, if Hungarian workers achieved a more liberal labor agreement, Polish workers would then push for similar concessions.

Since 1974, Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty have operated under the oversight of and funding from an independent government monitoring agency, the federally-chartered Board for International Broadcasting, Inc. This gives these stations a measure of autonomy from the Executive branch. Radio Liberty broadcasts to the Soviet Union and targets "the narrow but politically important

Soviet dissident community.''[176] Radio Free Europe broadcasts to the other nations of Eastern Europe. It tries to appeal to the entire population of these countries. According to Adelman, ''55 percent of adults in Poland and Romania—and a third to a half in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria—tuned into RFE at least once a week. During a crisis, the listenership may soar to a staggering 80 percent of those over 14 years old.''[177]

Radio Free Europe is credited by the Reagan Administration and others with important assistance to the opposition in Eastern Europe, particularly Poland, during the past decades. This view is corroborated by a recent European report:

> Knowledgeable observers of Eastern Europe and the communist leadership are certain that events in Poland would have taken a different course if the populace in Silesia, Warsaw and Poland had not been kept constantly informed by Western radio stations (including the VOA, RFE, and the BBC and *Deutsche Welle*) about the developments in Gdansk and Szczecin.[178]

This, then, is the model that the Reagan administration had regarding broadcasts to Cuba. But the analogy of the current situation in Eastern Europe (particularly Poland) and Cuba is faulty. Further, the model is based on a discredited, though appealing, theory of communication.

The analogy with Poland simply does not hold up. Communism was imposed on Poland against the will of its people. Cubans, on the other hand, brought about a revolution against a hated dictatorship without outside intervention. Even during the worst of economic and social times in Cuba, the Cuban government has enjoyed a legitimacy and support never equalled in Poland. The Solidarity movement and Polish nationalist sentiments in general are directed against the Soviet Union, and thus serve to undermine the Polish government's link with its main outside supporter. Cuban nationalism, on the contrary, is anti-U.S., which strengthens its links with its outside supporter. No institution in Cuba can rival the historic importance of the Polish Catholic Church as an institutional and ideological rival to the regime. Finally, while the Polish government has exacerbated tensions by responding to popular disaffection with empty promises, the Cuban government has acted pragmatically to defuse discontent with real reforms, honest explanations, and sincere efforts to the extent of its capabilities.[179]

In addition, the analogy with Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty is based on an outmoded communication theory. The ''hypodermic model'' of communication and persuasion posits that the communicator need merely fill his or her electronic syringe with carefully crafted messages, and inject them into the target population, to achieve a particular communication effect. Most international propaganda and communication research in the pre-1945 era was based on this model. In the post-World War II era, communication researchers began to see that mass communication does not take place in such a linear, cause-and-effect environment. Other factors mediate the intended response. The audience is not a passive

recipient but rather processes incoming information. The particular social and cultural circumstances of the recipient, the attitudes and opinions they might have regarding the message, the particular environment in which they hear the message, the way in which the message comes to them: All of these factors suggest that the viewer, reader, or listener selects or rejects, internalizes or acts upon, available messages based on complex psychological and social processes.

For example, people typically avoid messages that are dissonant with existing beliefs and would cause some internal tension ("cognitive dissonance"). Alternatively, people actively seek out or readily accept information that confirms existing beliefs or opinions. In international propaganda, it seems that the recipients would not actively seek out information that diverges from pre-existing beliefs or ideologies. Instead, they would seek out and listen to information that confirms or reinforces their beliefs. Radio Marti, as a voice of the United States government, probably would not be widely listened to in Cuba. Cubans already listen to U.S. radio. By and large, they have a faith and trust in their own government, and they do not find the news coming from present U.S. stations to be credible on Cuban affairs.

Indeed, as U.S. diplomats stationed in Havana have pointed out, Radio Marti could well have had precisely the opposite effect from what was intended.[180] Historically, Fidel Castro's most effective political appeal has been to rally nationalist sentiment to resist attacks and threats from the United States. The defeat of the CIA-backed mercenaries at the Bay of Pigs in 1962 is still used by Castro as a propaganda tool. In Cuba today, one sees billboards proclaiming "Use the Spirit of the Bay of Pigs to Graduate from the Ninth Grade" or "Use the Spirit of the Bay of Pigs to Harvest a Bumper Sugar Crop." The U.S. economic blockade is used constantly in Cuba's propaganda overseas to support its image of the North American "warmonger." Negative and propagandistic programming on Radio Marti might similarly have served to stimulate Cuban nationalism and to enhance the Cuban regime's legitimacy.

If Radio Marti succeeds in creating discontent in Cuba, there will be substantial costs to the United States. One of the Cuban government's most effective mechanisms for managing discontent has been simply to export it to the United States. According to the Congressional Research Service, the total costs associated with the influx of 125,000 Cubans during 1980–81 was over $739 million, or $5,914 per emigrant.[181]

For those people, the present author included, who are working to bring Cuba and the United States closer together, what is needed is not a radio voice that pits confronting ideologies against each other. What we need is a radio service that acts as an interpreter or arbitrator of opposing ideologies, one that affirms the legitimacy of both systems and works for greater understanding between Cuban and American people.

What we need is a *Radio Romero*, a broadcast voice of reconciliation and coexistence named after the life and work of the great assassinated Salvadoran

Archbishop Oscar Romero. Romero stood for human rights and for the dignity of the people in the face of incorrigible governments. He fought valiantly to overcome injustice and condemned the violence of all sides. No better symbol of peace and hope could be found for such an endeavor.

Radio Romero would broadcast from international waters in the Gulf from a ship equipped with a 100 kilowatt transmitter on the AM band. Its message would be a progressive voice in support of peaceful and democratic change in the Americas. Its youth-oriented format of popular music and progressive news would capture the minds of attentive publics in Cuba, Florida, the U.S. Gulf states, Mexico, and Central America. Radio Romero's potential is based on the firm belief that the majority of the Cuban and U.S. audience has a disposition to peace rather than war, to conciliation rather than confrontation, to coexistence rather than tension. If this is true, then such a broadcast voice can indeed have an impact: To reinforce the striving of the Caribbean and North American peoples for peace, justice and security.

FOOTNOTES

*A major part of this chapter was published originally in *The Critical Communications Review*, Vol. II, Vincent Mosco and Janet Wasco (Eds.) (Norwood, NJ: Ablex Publishing Corporation).

1. Swan island had been claimed by the United States since 1863, when then-Secretary of State Seward awarded a certificate to the New York Guano Company. In 1856, the U.S. government had enacted a law allowing the President to issue a certificate to any American citizen who discovered phosphates on an unclaimed island. In the 1920s, Honduras attempted to assert its sovereign claim on the island, but it was thwarted by United Fruit Company, which harvested coconuts there. In the 1970s, Honduras pressed its claim for sovereignty over the Swan Island. The U.S. secured the right to maintain a weather station and radio beacon there. Radio Swan reappeared in 1975, broadcasting from San Pedro Sula, the second largest city in Honduras. It continues to transmit propaganda against Cuba and to laud Chile.

2. Interview with Professor Arnaldo Coro Antich of the Cuban Institute of Radio and TV Broadcasting, Havana, Cuba, May 5, 1982. Coro reports that the Swan transmitter was eventually sold to Venezuela as a 1-million watt transmitter, thus belying reports that it was only 50,000 watts.

3. David Wise and Thomas B. Ross, *The Invisible Government* (New York: Random House, 1964), pp. 328 ff.

4. Wise and Ross, p. 318.

5. E. Howard Hunt, *Give Us This Day* (New Rochelle, NY: Arlington House, 1973), p. 164.

6. Peter Wyden, *Bay of Pigs: The Untold Story* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1979), pp. 22–23, 118.

7. Wise and Ross, p. 56.

8. Ibid., p. 57. Wyden believes that these messages meant nothing to the Cuban

underground. "They were gibberish composed in David Phillip's propaganda shop to build an ambiance of conspiracy." Wyden. p. 209.

9.   Ibid., p. 335.
10. Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks, *The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence* (New York: Knopf, 1974), p. 135.
11. Wise and Ross, p. 336.
12. "Cuba Sees 'Aggression.' Charges Swan Island Broadcasts 'Piracy' by U.S.," *New York Times*, September 15, 1960. p. 12.
13. Tom Kneitel, "Radio Swan: The Thorn in Castro's Side," *Popular Electronics*, March 1961, p. 52.
14. In 1956, UNESCO reported that Cuba was operating 135 radio transmitters. UN-ESCO, *World Communications: Press, Radio, Film, Television*, 3rd ed. (Paris: UNESCO, 1956), p. 102.
15. C. M. Stanbury, "Castro's Radio Voice," *Popular Electronics*, March 1961, p. 53.
16. Ibid.
17. Howard I. Blustein, Lynne Cox Anderson, Elinor C. Betters, Deborah Lane, Jonathan A. Leonard, and Charles Townsend, *Area Handbook for Cuba* (Washington, DC: American University, Foreign Area Studies Division, 1971), p. 285.
18. R. Hart Phillips, "Cuba Completing New Radio Voice," *New York Times*, February 13, 1961, p. 13.
19. Jerry Redding, " 'Castro-ating' the Media: The Consolidation and Utilization of Cuban Broadcasting by Fidel Castro," *Educational Broadcasting Review* 5 (June 1971): 40.
20. "Statement by Antonio Perez Herrero, Substitute Member of the Political Bureau and Member of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba, During the Celebration of the Twentieth Anniversary of the Founding of Radio Havana Cuba," in *XXth Anniversary of Radio Havana Cuba* (Havana: Editora Politica, 1982), p. 8.
21. "Speech Delivered by Isidoro Malmierca, Member of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba, on the Anniversary of the Founding of Radio Havana Cuba," *XV Anniversary of Radio Havana Cuba* (Havana: Department of Revolutionary Orientation of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba, 1977), p. 4.
22. For a history of Guevara's involvement in Radio Rebelde, which still exists in Cuba, see Ricardo Martinez Victores, *7RR: La Historia de Radio Rebelde [7RR: The History of Rebel Radio]*, (Havana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, 1979).
23. Ernesto Che Guevara, *La Guerra de Guerrillas [Guerrilla Warfare]*. (Havana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, 1978), pp. 148-9. (Unless otherwise noted, all translations are by the present author.)
24. Malmierca, p. 4.
25. Ibid., p. 8.
26. Perez Herrero, p. 9.
27. Ibid., p. 15.
28. Phillips, p. 13.
29. Jack Gould, "Radio-TV: New Short-Wave Voice of Fidel Castro," *New York Times*, April 19, 1961, p. 79.

30. David D. Burks, "Cuba Under Castro," *Headline Series*, No. 165 (New York: Foreign Policy Association, June 1964), p. 42, quoted in Ronald F. Marryott, "Cuba-Venezuela: A Triumph Over Subversion," M.A. Thesis, The American University, Washington, DC, 1965, p. 24.

31. Organization of American States, *Report Submitted by the Special Committee to Study Resolutions II.1 and VIII of the Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs* (Washington: Pan American Union, 1963), p. 20.

32. Malmierca, p. 5.

33. Ibid.

34. Ibid. p. 9.

35. Ibid., pp. 9–10.

36. "Reds Add 700 Hours of Radio Propaganda," *Broadcasting*, February 18, 1963, p. 112.

37. Jon D. Cozean, Karen Krymis, Deborah Hitt, and Mariana Arensberg, *Cuban Guerrilla Training Centers and Radio Havana: A Selected Bibliography* (Washington, DC: The American University, Center for Research in Social Systems, October 1968), p. 22.

38. Quoted in Ronald F. Marryott, "Cuba-Venezuela: A Triumph Over Subversion," M.A. Thesis, The American University, Washington, DC, 1965, p. 24.

39. "Cuba Tones Down Overseas Radio," *New York Times*, August 24, 1969, p. 25.

40. Malmierca, p. 13.

41. Stephen Esrati, "Listening to the World," *New York Times*, January 19, 1978, p. C9.

42. Redding, p. 41.

43. "Cuba Said to 'Jam' 6 U.S. Stations," *New York Times*, April 14, 1964, p. 14.

44. "U.S. Outlets Answer Cuban Propaganda," *Broadcasting*, June 4, 1962, p. 70.

45. Cuban Freedom Committee, *A Powerful Voices of the Cuban Freedom Committee Cover Cuba and Latin America* (Washington: Cuban Freedom Committee, 1962).

46. Cozean et al., p. 19.

47. "Palabras Pronunciadas por Alfredo Vinas, Director General de Radio Habana Cuba, en el Acto de Celebracion del 20 Anniversario de la Fundacion de Radio Habana Cuba" [Words Spoken by Alfredo Vinas, Director General of Radio Havana Cuba at the Celebration of the Twentieth Anniversary of the Founding of Radio Havana Cuba], in *XX Anniversario de Radio Habana Cuba* (Havana: Editora Politica, 1982), p. 19.

48. Tad Szulc, "Radio Free Dixie in Havana Praises Negro 'Revolt' in South," *New York Times*, October 8, 1962, p. 1.

49. Cozean et al., p. 25.

50. Ibid., p. 23.

51. Interview with Luis Mas Martin, Director of Radio Rebelde, Havana, Cuba, April 7, 1979; and Interview with Jose Benitez, Union of Cuban Journalists, May 6, 1982.

52. Malmierca, p. 11.

53. United States Information Agency Research Service, *VOA and Radio Havana Audiences in Central America*, Doc. E-7-68 (Washington: United States Information Agency, Office of Research and Assessment, February 29, 1968; declassified following June 22, 1973), p. 11.

54. Quoted in Malmierca, p. 11.

55. Radio Habana Cuba, "Frecuencias y Horarios de Transmisiones: En Vigor desde de 2 de Noviembre de 1981 Hasta el 28 de Febrero de 1982," [Frequencies and Transmission Schedule: In Effect from November 2, 1981 to February 28, 1982], (Havana: Radio Havana Cuba, 1982).

56. RHC General Vice Director Jose Prado reports that, in exchange for Cuba's retransmission of Radio Moscow, the Soviet Union and Cuba trade allocated frequencies so that RHC can reach Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. The Cuban State Radio Committee, and not Radio Havana Cuba, makes this arrangement. Interview with Prado, May 4, 1982.

57. Interview with Hernandez, April 9, 1979.

58. Interview with Prado, May 4, 1982.

59. Interview with Prado, May 4, 1982.

60. Araclides Barreras, "Radio Habana Cuba y Su Lucha Contra el Mentira," [RHC and Its Struggle Against Lies/, *Trabajadores /Workers*], September 6, 1977, p. 8. The Socialist Emulation system in Cuba is a productivity campaign that pits fellow workers in friendly competition (thus emulation) to reach higher work outputs. The Punteros, etc. are titles or levels of worker achievement.

61. By the terms of the U.S. economic blockade of Cuba, no financial transactions may take place between parties in the United States and Cuba. Associated Press and Prensa Latina exchange their wire services in Mexico.

62. Cuba was the first developing country to fully articulate its cultural and informational policies. See Lisandro Otero, with the assistance of Francisco Martinez Hinojosa, *Cultural Policy in Cuba* (UNESCO: Paris, 1972).

63. Interview with Prado, May 4, 1982.

64. Interview with Pedro Martinez Pirez, Director of Information, Radio Havana Cuba, Havana, Cuba, May 4, 1982.

65. Interview with Guillermo Santisteban, Chief, English Language Division, Radio Havana Cuba, Havana, Cuba, May 4, 1982.

66. Interview with Hernandez, April 9, 1979.

67. For a report of this survey, see Harwood L. Childs, "America's Short-Wave Audience," in *Propaganda by Short-Wave*, Harwood L. Childs and John B. Whitton, eds. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1942), pp. 303–345. .

68. Don D. Smith, "Is There a U.S. Audience for International Broadcasts," *Journalism Quarterly* 39 (Winter 1962): 86–87.

69. Don D. Smith, "America's Short-Wave Audience: Twenty-Five Years Later," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 33 (Winter 1969/70): 544.

70. Radio Canada International, "Shortwave Radio Listening in the United States, Survey II, 1975," (New York: Gallup Corporation).

71. BBC External Broadcasting Audience Research, "Survey in the United States: October/November 1977," (New York: Gallup Corporation, May 1978).

72. Interview with Santisteban, May 4, 1982.

73. John B. Whitton and John H. Herz, "Radio in International Politics," in *Propaganda by Short Wave*, eds. Harwood L. Childs and John B. Whitton (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1942), pp. 23, 31–32.

74. Julian A. S. Hale, *Radio Power: Propaganda and International Broadcasting* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press 1975), p. 101.

75. "Latin Serenade: U.S. Giants All Set to Go to Town on Hemisphere Shortwave," *Business Week*, July 19, 1941, p. 32.
76. "Voice of America's $17 Million Pitch for Truth," *Broadcasting*, January 6, 1958, p. 40.
77. R. Hart Phillips, "American Flyer Downed by Cuba," *New York Times*, March 22, 1960, p. 1.
78. "Fund Bill Approved; Aids Urban Renewal," *New York Times* April 8, 1960, p. 20.
79. "U.S. Plans Broadcasts," *New York Times*, Febraury 13, 1961, p. 13.
80. E. W. Kenworthy, "Murrow Decries Alabama Strife," *New York Times*, May 26, 1961, p. 25.
81. Jack Raymond, "3 Senators Urge a Cuba Warning in Call-up Plan," *New York Times*, September 13, 1962, p. 1.
82. Ibid.
83. In an ironic sidelight, just 2 hours after the Kennedy announcement, Radio Moscow (in its Spanish language broadcasts) was accusing the United States of building a secret nuclear intercontinental missile base in the jungles of Paraguay! R. T. Hartman, "Propaganda Falls Short in Moscow," *Washington Post*, October 25, 1962, p. A6.
84. "Commercial Stations Magnify Voice; Ten Outlets Carry President's Speech," *Broadcasting*, October 29, 1962, p. 34.
85. "Eleventh Station," *Broadcasting*, October 29, 1962, p. 5.
86. "Voice of America to Demobilize Ten Commercial Stations," *Broadcasting*, November 12, 1962, p. 42. Coro believes that the Tortuga transmitter was in fact at Sugar Loaf Key. His transcriptions of the Voice of America for 1962 show an identification stating "This is the Voice of America transmitter at Sugar Loaf Key signing off." Interview with Professor Arnaldo Coro Antich of the Cuban Institute of Radio and TV Broadcasting and the Institute of Foreign Affairs, Havana, Cuba, May 5, 1982.
87. Interview with Coro, May 5, 1982. I have not been able to find independent corroboration of this charge.
88. "Radio Marathon" is a misnomer because it has never since its inception in 1962 originated its own programming. It was and still is a relay or repeater station receiving its audio feed via landlines from the VOA studios in Washington. Some Cubans speak of a Radio Marathon in Miami. They refer to the VOA studios in Miami which in turn routes its material to Washington for broadcast.
89. Letter of William F. Rust, Jr., Rust Communications Group, Inc., owner of WHAM, to Sol Taishoff, Editor of *Broadcasting* November 3, 1981, published in "Radio Station WHO: 'The Voice of the Middle West,' Des Moines, Iowa," Materials submitted to the House Subcommittee on Telecommunications, May 10, 1982, p. 117.
90. "'Voice' Reports Success Over Jamming in Europe," *New York Times*, October 26, 1962, p. 20.
91. "Voice of America Helpers Figuring Up the Cost," *Broadcasting*, November 26, 1962, p. 58.
92. "Voice Disbands Remaining Crisis Hookup; Some Cuban Exiles Charge Censorship of News," *Broadcasting*, December 17, 1962, p. 60.

93. "Brickbats and Roses for USIA," *Broadcasting*, August 12, 1963, p. 46.

94. Quoted in Hale, p. 101.

95. Rafael Fernandez Moya, *La Propaganda y La Guerra* [Propaganda and War] (Havana: Editorial Arte y Literatura, 1977), p. 248.

96. Ibid.

97. United States Information Agency, Office of Research and Assessment, "Foreign Radio Listening in Cuba as Indicated by Refugee Interviews," Document E-9-68, June 19, 1968; declassified 6-22-73. (Washington: United States Information Agency, 1968).

98. United States Information Agency, "Memorandum: Infoguide Re VOA Program Cita Con Cuba," December 4, 1974, reprinted in U.S., Congress, House, Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations, *International Broadcasting: Direct Broadcast Satellites, Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations, House of Representatives, October 23, 1981*, 97th Cong., 1st sess., 1981, pp. 93–94.

99. U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Government Operations, *International Shortwave Broadcasting and Direct Broadcast Satellites: Voice of America, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Radio Marti, Twentieth Report by the Committee on Government Operations*, H. Rept. 97–398, 97th Cong., 1st sess., 1981, p. 23.

100. U.S., Congress, House, Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, *Departments of Commerce, Justice and State, The Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1983*, Part 6, 97th Cong., 2nd sess., 1982, p. 567.

101. U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, *Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, The Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1983, Part 6, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, The Judiciary, and Related Agencies of the Committee on Appropriations*, 97th Cong., 2nd sess., 1982, p. 116.

102. R. P. Straus, "When U.S. 'Tells It Like It Is' on Broadcasts Overseas," *U.S. News and World Report*, June 12, 1978, p. 55.

103. Donald R. Browne, *International Broadcasting: The Limits of a Limitless Medium*, (New York: Praeger, 1982), p. 358. Data are for December, 1979.

104. U.S., Congress, House, *Radio Broadcasting to Cuba Act, Report Together With Dissenting and Additional Views to Accompany H. R. 5427 including Cost Estimate and Comparison of the Congressional Budget Office*, H. Rept. 97–479, 97th Cong., 2nd sess., 1982, p. 4.

105. Committee on Appropriations, p. 116.

106. Ibid., p. 120.

107. Ibid., p. 124–125.

108. Ibid., pp. 131–132.

109. Interview with Coro, May 5, 1982.

110. Committee on Appropriations, p. 116.

111. Ibid., p. 134.

112. Interview with Guy Farmer, Chief of Spanish Branch, American Republics Division, Voice of America, Washington, DC, April 27, 1979.

113. Interview with Luis Mas Martin, Director of Radio Rebelde, Havana, Cuba, April 7, 1979; and Interview with Jose Benitez, Union of Cuban Journalists, May 6, 1982.

114. Interview with Farmer, April 27, 1979.

115. Interview with Bernard H. Kamenske, Chief of News, Voice of America, Washington, DC, April 27, 1979.

116. See Murray Marder, "Propaganda Role Urged for Voice of America," *Washington Post*, November 13, 1981, p. A1; "Voice Aides Try to Underscore 'Integrity' of News Product," *Washington Post*, December 22, 1981; John M. Goshko, "Controversial Nicolaides is Leaving Post at VOA," *Washington Post*, January 20, 1982; Charles Fenyvesi, "I Hear America Mumbling: Why the Voice of America Won't Win Any Emmys This Year," *Washington Post Magazine*, July 19, 1981, p. 21 ff; Tom Bethell, "Propaganda Warts: What the Voice of America Makes of America," *Harper's*, May 1982, pp. 19–25; Jonathan Friendly, "Voice of America to Broadcast More Opinion," *New York Times*, July 11, 1982, p. 4; Robin Grey, "Inside the Voice of America," *Columbia Journalism Review*, May/June 1982, pp. 23–30.

117. Howard Frederick, "Ideology in International Broadcasting: Radio Warfare Between the Voice of America and Radio Havana Cuba," *Potomac Review: Journal of History and Politics* (Washington) (21, Spring/Summer 1981): 39–59.

118. "VOA Broadcasting to Cuba," (Informational leaflet.) (Washington: Voice of America, June 1980).

119. Hale, p. 102.

120. Interview with Farmer, April 27, 1979.

121. Ibid.

122. "Are We Killing Castro?" *New York Times*, March 13, 1983, p. 22E. (Advertisement)

123. "Memo Outlining 'Project Truth' Campaign," *Washington Post*, November 10, 1981, p. A11.

124. Murray Marder, "Administration Moving to Sharpen Tone of U.S. Information Programs Abroad," *Washington Post*, November 10, 1981, p. A10.

125. Statement by Richard V. Allen, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Washington, DC, September 23, 1981.

126. Jose Marti, "Carta a Manuel Mercado" [Letter to Manuel Mercado], in *Marti*, ed. Fernandez Retamar (Montevideo: Biblioteca de Marcha, 1970), pp. 135–136.

127. Interview with Fernandez Retamar, Director, Center for Marti Studies, Havana, Cuba, May 3, 1982.

128. "Cuban Liberty, American License," *Washington Post*, July 4, 1982. (Editorial)

129. Presidential Commission on Broadcasting to Cuba, *Interim Report: May 24, 1982* (Washington: Presidential Commission on Broadcasting to Cuba, 1982), pp. 1–2.

130. "Testimony by Frank Calzon, Executive Director of the Cuban-American National Foundation Before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, March 3, 1982.

131. The Committee of Santa Fe, Council for Inter-American Security, L. Francis Bouchey, Roger Fontaine, David C. Jordan, Lt. General (ret.) Gordon Sumner, authors; Lewis Tambs, editor. *A New Inter-American Policy for the Eighties* (Washington: Council for Inter-American Security, 1980), p. 46. Note: Roger Fontaine became the National Security Council's Latin America specialist. Lewis Tambs became Ambassador to Panama. Lt. General (ret.) Gordon Sumner, Jr. became special advisor to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs.

132. Hugh Thomas, *Coping with Cuba* (Washington: Campaign for a Democratic Majority, 1980), p. 13.

133. Kenneth L. Adelman, "Speaking of America: Public Diplomacy in Our Time," *Foreign Affairs* 59 (4, Spring 1981): 932. Adelman became U.S. Deputy Representative to the United Nations.

134. Bernard Gwertzman, "U.S. Considering Special Radio Broadcasts to Cuba," *New York Times,* August 27, 1981, p. A7.

135. See Mary A. Gardner, "The Evolution of the Inter American Press Association," *Journalism Quarterly* 42 (4, Spring 1965): 547–556.

136. "Removing Soviet Influence from Cuba," *National Security Record* (The Heritage Foundation), No. 35, 1981, p. 3.

137. Statement by Richard V. Allen, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Washington, DC, September 23, 1981.

138. Presidential Commission on Broadcasting to Cuba, "Executive Order 12323, September 22, 1981, in *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents* 17 (39, 1981), p. 1019.

139. Elisabeth Bumiller, "The Wick Whirlwind: Reagan's ICA Chief Brings Hollywood Hustle to Washington," *Washington Post,* May 11, 1982, p. B9.

140. Helga Silva and Eston Melton, "Radio Marti Leader Finally Becomes U.S. Citizen," *Miami Herald,* January 31, 1982, p. 2 B.

141. Karen Rothmyer, "The Mystery Angel of the New Right," *Washington Post,* July 12, 1981, p. C1.

142. *Radio Broadcasting to Cuba Act, p. 1.*

143. *Interim Report,* p. 3.

144. Statement by U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Thomas Enders Before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, March 3, 1982.

145. Guillermo Martinez and Jay Ducassi, "Radio Marti Towers Provoke Suspicions," *Miami Herald,* June 16, 1982, pp. 1A, 19A; Guillermo Martinez, "Transmitter Near Key West Intended for Radio Marti?" *Miami Herald,* June 16, 1982; Larry Fruhling, "Congressmen Suspicious of Navy's Radio Station," *Des Moines Register,* June 16, 1982; "U.S. Is Said to Build Antennas for Radio to Transmit to Cuba," *New York Times,* June 17, 1982; Bernard Weintraub, "Dispute Over Broadcasts to Cuba Intensifies," *New York Times,* June 27, 1982.

146. Letter by Thomas J. Tauke and Timothy E. Wirth to Thomas O. Enders, June 11, 1982.

147. Jim VanWagenen, "Memorandum for Chairman Joseph P. Addabbo Re: Radio Marti," June 18, 1982.

148. Enders, pp. 4–5.

149. United States Information Agency, "Memorandum: Infoguide Re VOA Program Cita Con Cuba," December 4, 1974, reprinted in U.S., Congress, House, Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations, *International Broadcasting: Direct Broadcast Satellites, Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee of the Committee on Government Operations, House of Representatives, October 23, 1981,* 97th Cong., 1st sess., 1981, pp. 93–94.

150. Nina M. Serafino, Marcia S. Smith, and David R. Siddall, "Radio Marti," Prepared in Response to an Inquiry from the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, [Congressional Research Service], June 28, 1982, pp. 10–11.

151. Presidential Commission on Broadcasting to Cuba, *Interim Report: May 24, 1982* (Washington: Presidential Commission on Broadcasting to Cuba, 1982), pp. 1–2.

152. Interview with Mariana Ramirez-Corria, Cuban Institute of Radio-TV Broadcasting, Havana, Cuba, May 6, 1982.

153. *Interim Report: Radio Marti Program Policy Guidelines,* p. 4.

154. At the 1981 ITU Conference in Region 2, a proposal was rejected that would have put the Western Hemisphere on a 9-KHz spacing, the standard which the rest of the world uses. See "Ray of Hope from 9 KHz Meeting," *Broadcasting,* July 13, 1981, p. 24; and "AM Future on the Table at Rio," *Broadcasting,* November 9, 1981, p. 38.

155. Oscar Luis Lopez, *La Radio en Cuba: Estudio de su Desarrollo en La Sociedad Neocolonial* [Radio in Cuba: A Study of its Development in a Neocolonial Society], (Havana: Editorial Letras Cubana, 1981).

156. The U.S. and Mexico had a separate agreement.

157. Sydney W. Head, *Broadcasting in America: A Survey of Television and Radio,* 3rd edition (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1976), p. 41.

158. Interview with Coro, May 5, 1982.

159. The details of Cuban interference, intentional and unintentional, were discussed in several sets of Congressional hearings during 1981. See the hearings before: House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on International Operations (June 1981 and June 1982); House Committee on Government Affairs, Subcommittee on Government Information and Individual Rights (October 1981); and House Committee on Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on Telecommunications (May 1982).

160. National Association of Broadcasters, *Cuban Interference to United States AM Broadcast Stations* (Washington: National Association of Broadcasters, 1982).

161. WHO (Des Moines) and KSL (Salt Lake), respectively.

162. Serafino et al., p. 51.

163. Christopher Dickey, "Cuba Vows War of the Airwaves to Counter U.S. 'Radio Marti', *Washington Post,* August 18, 1982, p. A16.

164. Memorandum to Chairman Neal Smith Re: Radio Broadcasting to Cuba, Inc. (Radio Marti), June 10, 1982.

165. "AM Future on the Table in Rio," *Broadcasting,* November 9, 1981, p. 44. In an internal International Communication Agency memorandum of June 1981 from Anna Case to Mr. Haratunian, Deputy Director of the VOA, entitled "Jamming of Medium Wave in Caribbean," it was noted that Cuban jamming of Radio Marti alone would affect radio stations in Mexico, Central America, and northern South America. But, it goes on, the United States will be seen as responsible, since it originated the signal. Quoted by Rep. Thomas Leach, *Congressional Record— House,* August 3, 1982, p. H5018.

166. Coro, July 16, 1982.

167. "WTOP Fades, WSM Twangs in Havana," *Washington Post,* August 18, 1982, p. A16.

168. Gwertzman, p. A7.

169. "Cuban Walkout Finishes Off Hope of AM Conference Success in Rio, *Broadcasting,* December 21, 1981, p. 30.

170. "The Lingering Cuban Problem," *Broadcasting,* January 25, 1982, p. 84.

171. "Cuba Accused of Waging 'Radio War'," *Washington Post*, September 2, 1982, p. E14.

172. "Hawkins Marti Bill Would Restrict Station to Marathon's 1180," *Broadcasting*, February 28, 1983, p. 46.

173. William LeoGrande, Director of Political Science, The American University, before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, March 4, 1982.

174. Enders, March 4, 1982.

175. See James R. Price, "Radio Free Europe—A Survey and Analysis," (Washington: Congressional Research Service, March 22, 1972), p. 1; Kenneth L. Adelman, "Speaking of America: Public Diplomacy in Our Time, *Foreign Affairs* 59 (4, Spring 1981): 921; and Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks, *The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1974), p. 135.

176. Adelman, p. 930.

177. Ibid.

178. Rudolf Stamm, "Foreign Broadcasts to Eastern Europe, *Swiss Review of World Affairs*, December 1980, p. 31.

179. These are a summary of Professor William LeoGrande's remarks before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, March 4, 1982.

180. "U.S. Diplomats in Cuba Dissent on Radio Plan," *New York Times*, October 29, 1981, p. A3.

181. Charlotte J. Jones, Analyst in Social Legislation, Education and Public Welfare Division, Congressional Research Service, in a letter to Representative Thomas Harkin, dated August 6, 1982.

Ideology in International Communication

If Mao was correct in saying that "power grows out of the barrel of a gun," ideology is the force that triggers that gun.[1]

A HEMISPHERE OF IDEOLOGICAL CONFLICT

This century has seen an intense period of ideological conflict. Exacerbated by global nuclear confrontation and abetted by instantaneous communication, the ancient battle of opposing belief systems has grown in scale to become one of the most consuming and expensive means of conflict today. Nations devote huge resources to promote their particular views of the world and to win over (at times through coercive means) people of other nations—all in the name of ideology.

Today's two major opposing political-economic ideologies, capitalism and communism, each have systematized sets of ideals rooted in seemingly rational, commonly intelligible, "self-evident" patterns of thinking. Each puts forward material and moral goals for its society. Each emphasizes values to guide individual lives. Each provides systems to satisfy basic human needs and to accumulate resources for future prosperity. Irreconcilable though they may be, capitalism and communism both may rightly claim to be champions of human achievement in this century, for each has elevated the standard of living in societies where it has predominated.

In the Caribbean today, two competing political systems are fighting a "war of ideas." Cuba and the United States embody conflicting conceptions of democracy. Cuba draws from the tradition of the Rhode Island "Frame of Government" of 1641, wherein *poder popular* (popular power) means that popular interests are exercised by direct democracy, a process which reaches to the very roots of society. The United States, the paragon of liberal democracy, draws on the Hamiltonian model, wherein the interests of minority elite classes are paramount and are safeguarded by a representational structure favoring these classes.

The ideological apparatuses that generate and reflect a society's ideological content are pervasive and numerous. As will be demonstrated, the gatherers and transmitters of ideological propaganda both reflect and create the ideological content of their respective national systems. In this study we treat two opposing radio voices, the Voice of America (VOA) and Radio Havana Cuba (RHC). As receptors and emitters of ideological messages, these two state-run news services represent case studies of the broader ideological conflict between their parent systems.

MATERIALIST THEORY: A BRIEF OVERVIEW

To understand the analysis that follows, it is necessary to outline the theory on which it is based. At any given time, productive capabilities of a people depend upon three factors. First and foremost are the talents, skills, and knowledge of the people, in short, their human resources (HMR). In turn, through labor, these human resources employ available technology (TCH) to transform raw materials, or natural resources (NTR). These are known as the three *material forces of production* (MFP) and might be presented as follows:

$$HMR + TCH + NTR = MFP$$

The material forces of production are unique to a given location and time. They compromise the way people eke out their material subsistence from the environment. Each of these factors of production can vary greatly depending on the particular constellation of historical–cultural circumstances. The evolution of humankind for the last 5,000 years is ample evidence for this. Agricultural societies were possible only when human knowledge (HMR) about seeds, together with the plow (TCH), were used to till fertile river valleys (NTR). Hunter-gatherer societies developed the collective knowledge of the hunt to the point of employing spears on available bounty. In industrial society, highly skilled workers use sophisticated production machines on raw materials imported from the farthest reaches of the earth to produce the fruits of their labor. Each stage in our human development—hunter–gatherer, agricultural, slave, feudal, capitalist and socialist societies—has a unique and empirically identifiable set of HMR + TCH + NTR.

Further, these unique constellations of material forces of production have led to different and identifiable ways of people relating to one another. Master to slave, wage laborer to employer, lord to serf, worker to management: All express the way that people have come together to produce and exchange the means of life and subsistence. These relations are known as the *social relations of production* (SRP). This part of the theory might be represented by:

$$MFP \rightarrow SRP$$

These SRP pervade economic life and provide the analyst with a cross-system form of comparison. For example, in any given social system, how is property held? By whom and with what right of progenitorship? How is labor recruited, channelled to the production line, and compensated? How and by whom is the surplus product of the worker captured and reallocated to future production?

Together, the material forces of production and the social relations of production constitute the *economic structure of society* (ESS). Thus:

$$MFP \rightarrow SRP, \text{ and } MFP + SRP = ESS$$

Assembling these three areas of activity into a comprehensive model, we have Figure 1.

Further, Marx postulated that the economic structure of society shapes the *superstructure of society* (SSS), which comprises all intellectual, social, and political life, including religion, philosophy, morality, modes of thought, and systems of governance and authority, among other things. In brief, the way people make their living molds their mental conceptions and all the supporting institutions that make up society.

It follows that change in the economic structure of society (ESS) brings about transformations in the social superstructure (SSS). The defeat of the feudal ruling class by the bourgeoisie, for example, not only opened the way for the material forces of production to develop in the direction of capitalism, but it also brought

Figure 1.   Marxist Methodology in Operation. The Main Causal Relationships Are Depicted Running Upward, But with Downward Reciprocal Relations Also Present. (Note: I am indebted to the Stanford economist John Gurley for his elucidation of Marxist fundamentals. This diagram and the preceding outline are adapted from his book *Challenges to Capitalism: Marx, Lenin, and Mao* (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1979), pp. 8–16.)

down the entire system of feudal values, ideas, and institutions (homage, fealty, manorial indenture, etc.).

Together, these three components—material forces of production (MFP), the social relations of production (SRP), and the superstructure of society (SSS)—make up what is called a given *social formation* (SFM). In Marx's *Preface to a Critique of Political Economy* there is the famous passage which summarizes this theory, which "became the guiding principle of [his] studies":

> In the social production of their existence, men inevitably enter into definite relations, which are independent of their will, namely relations of production appropriate to a given stage in the development of their material forces of production. The totality of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which arises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the general process of social, political and intellectual life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but their social existence that determines their consciousness.[2]

This is not a mechanistic or deterministic process. Its premises are based in the real lives of "real individuals, their activity and their material conditions under which they live, both those which they find already existing and those produced by their activity."[3] The material forces of production develop through human labor: Human skills are acquired. Technology evolves through human ingenuity to fit ever-changing needs. Natural resources are found and captured. As people grow and change in their world, they develop new ways to adapt and change the world even more. People thus *make their living and themselves at the same time*. Social evolution is thus a continual unfolding of potential. History is not the development of ideas, Marx and Engels say, but rather the development of the material forces of production. The formation and evolution of ideas is explained by these underlying changes.

THE MATERIALIST VIEW OF IDEOLOGY

This, no more and no less, is the basic outline of the materialist conception of human society. All else is derived from these assumptions, which many dispute but which are doubtless more verifiable than divine intervention.

Human ideas and human ideology too stem from these fundamental bases. To see how this operates, let us return to the our model (Figure 1). Every social formation (SFM = MRP + SRP + SSS) constitutes a social totality comprised of three levels. As Althusser outlines them:

> In any given society men participate in *economic production*, whose mechanisms and effects are determined by the structure of the relations of production; men

participate in *political activity*, whose mechanisms and effects are regulated by the structure of class relations (class struggle, law and the state).

These same men participate in other activities, religious activity, moral philosophy, etc., be it in an active manner, by means of conscious practice, or be it in a passive and mechanistic way, through reflections, judgements, attitudes, etc. These last activities constitute *ideological activity*, are sustained through voluntary and involuntary adherence, conscious or unconscious of an ensemble of representations and religious, moral, juridical, political, aesthetic, philosophical, and other beliefs which form what is called the ideological level.[4]

So we might posit that the social formation consists of three levels (material relations of production, the social relations of production, and the superstructure of society), each of which becomes apparent through human activity.

Thus:

$$\text{Social Formation (SFM)} \quad \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{SSS} \rightarrow \text{IDEOLOGICAL ACTIVITY} \\ \text{SRP} \rightarrow \text{POLITICAL ACTIVITY} \\ \text{MRP} \rightarrow \text{ECONOMIC ACTIVITY} \end{array} \right.$$

Further, like the political and economic levels, the ideological level is "objective reality, independent of the individuals subordinated to it." The representations that make up any given social formation's ideology are not "verified knowledge" of the world. They may contain elements of knowledge, but they are always integrated with and subordinated to the system that created them. "Just as they grow as 'economic animals' and 'political animals,' we can say that men also grow as 'ideological animals.' . . . Men who do not recognize political, economic and social realities in which they live and act, in which they are forced to complete the task assigned to them by the division of labor, cannot live without guiding themselves by a certain *representation* of the world and their relations with it."[5] It is precisely the social formation's ideology that appears as a certain *"representation of the world"* which "ties men to their state of existence and with each other in the division of labor as well as with the justice or injustice of their fate in life."[6]

This tying together of human beings with their condition and with each other is a basic component of any social formation's ideology. As Antonio Gramsci has said, "The problem is that of preserving the ideological unity of the entire social bloc which that ideology serves to cement and to unify."[7] As Alvin Gouldner has reiterated, "each ideology presents a map of 'what is' in society; a 'report' of how it is working, how it is failing, and also how it could be changed. Ideology is thus a call to action—a 'command' grounded in social theory."[8]

Ideology is thus a system of representations that is intelligible not in its individual elements but through its structure. It is made up of representations, images, themes, signs, symbols. But if these are considered in isolation, the outlines cannot emerge: "It is their *system*, their *method of arranging and*

combining themselves which give them meaning; it is their *structure* which gives them meaning and function.[9]

To draw in our earlier discussion of the social relations of production (SRP), societies always exist under a social tension brought about by the division of human beings into different classes: "Society has hitherto always developed within the framework of a contradiction— in antiquity the contradiction between free men and slaves, in the Middle Ages that between nobility and serfs, in modern times that between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat."[10] These contradictions emerge from the tension in the social relations of production. They reach the consciousness of human beings before they can be solved in practice. They thus are formed into distorted solutions in the mind. As Marx and Engels repeat, "The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas." The class that controls the material forces of production (MFP) also controls the means of mental production and generates ideological representations to becloud and confuse the exploited classes' perception of their exploitation. Ideology, then, is an outgrowth of human inability to perceive actual material conditions.[11] Ideology hides the real contradictions of the social formation.

The dominant classes of a social formation use ideology for two complementary social purposes. First, ideology functions to guarantee the "unity of men among themselves in the ensemble of the forms of their existence, the *relation* of those individuals with the task that the social formation assigns them."[12] Thus, ideology above all assures the domination of one class over the others and the economic exploitation that guarantees it preeminence, making the exploited accept their place in life as based in divine fate, "natural" law, or moral ordination.

But Althusser goes on to point out that ideology is not used only as a "grand deceit" invented by the exploiter to maintain dominant class relations. It is "useful also to the *individuals of the dominant class* to recognize one another as subjects of the dominant class and to accept the domination that they exercise over the exploited as if it were willed by God, fixed by nature, or assigned by some moral right."[13] The "grand deceit" of ruling ideologies has two functions: It makes the exploited accept their fate as "natural," and it acts on the consciousness of the ruling class to help them to see that their class domination and exploitation of other classes is "natural" as well.

What techniques does the ruling class use to do this? In particular, how do the media of mass communication help reproduce social relations? Armand Mattelart has outlined several ways in which the capitalist social formation does this. (Of course, we could also describe the way in which other social formations do the same thing.) For one, like every product of labor, "media undergo a process of fetishization. . . ."[14] A fetish is an unreasoning mental leap which changes the forms of attachments humans have to objects.

> Living people are metamorphosed into "things" (factors of production) and things are given life. Thus money "works," capital "produces." . . . Capitalism creates

> a body of fetishes to confirm its rationality of social domination. . . . The fetish of
> communication conceals the repressive and manipulative power behind the domi-
> nant technology of dissemination (a veritable new *productive force*) and charac-
> terizes it as a force of liberation and happiness.[15]

As Marx elaborated, our understanding and consciousness of the world is drawn by fetishism to focus on things rather than on relations between people (SRP). This is known as "commodity fetishism":

> From the moment that men in any way work for one another, their labour assumes a
> social form . . . the mutual relations of the producers, within which the social
> character of their labour affirms itself, take the form of a social relation between the
> producers.
>   The existence of the things qua commodities and the value relation between the
> products of labor which stamps them as commodities, have absolutely no connec-
> tion with their physical properties and with the material relations arising
> therefrom.[16]

Another way that media perpetuate ideology is through mystification. People "participate in the reproduction of the apparatuses of domination without realiz-ing that they are making themselves accomplices in their own exploitation."[17] Mystification is "a process of information control by which a person cannot identify self-interests."[18] Just as the authority of respected persons can mystify voters, consumers, and children, so too do the media of mass communication have this power. Media can assert as true that which does not correspond to reality, *and they are believed.*

So a given social formation, in order to perpetuate itself and its class domina-tion and to assure State power, must reproduce itself. As we have outlined above, that means it must reproduce its material forces of production (MFP) and perpetuate its social relations of production (SRP). Since the exploited classes are framed within the social relations which are the result of their own activity, labor can only reproduce these social relations time and again. This is known as reproductive practice and is determined by the social relations of production. Again Althusser:

> Reproduction of labour power requires not only a reproduction of its skills, but
> also, at the same time, a reproduction of its submission to the rules of the estab-
> lished order, i.e., a reproduction of the submission to the ruling ideology for the
> workers, and a reproduction of the ability to manipulate the ruling ideology cor-
> rectly for the agents of exploitation and repression, so that they too will provide for
> the domination of the ruling class "in words."[19]

The ruling classes set up institutions to accomplish this. Althusser calls them Ideological State Apparatuses (ISAs). Just as ideology is divided into relatively autonomous arenas, so too the apparatuses that reproduce this ideology are divided by theme or content area:

- the religious ISA (the system of the different Churches),
- the educational ISA (the system of the different public and private "Schools"),
- the family ISA,
- the legal ISA,
- the political ISA (the political system, including the different parties),
- the trade-union ISA,
- the communications ISA (press, radio and television, etc.),
- the cultural ISA (Literature, the Arts, sports, etc.).[20]

In this elaboration, we may assign letters to these ISAs and arrive at a more detailed outline of the superstructure of society (SSS) (see Figure 2).

Though they operate in different realms, the diverse ISA messages are unified by an overarching, mutually reinforcing conception of society.

As Althusser eloquently describes the French social formation's ideological refrain:

> This concert is dominated by a single score . . . the score of ideology of the current ruling class which integrates into its music the great themes of the Humanism of the Great Forefathers, who produced the Greek Miracle even before Christianity, the Glory of Rome, the Eternal City, and the themes of Interest, particular and general, etc., nationalism, moralism and economism.[21]

The ISAs, in whatever social formation they exist, contribute to the overall reproduction of the superstructure of society (SSS) and thus the social relations of production (SRP). Each ISA has a specific area that it treats. For example, the communications ISA in the capitalist social formations "cram[s] every 'citizen' with daily doses of nationalism, chauvinism, liberalism, moralism, etc., by means of the press, the radio and television."[22]

The theory of ideology, as we employ it here, posits that human beings are limited in their rationality by their ideological biases, which operate to shape the contents of scientific and social endeavor. Further, no matter how self-serving or biased its views seem to an outsider, the very essence of ideology is that its views are perfectly self-evident and honest from the viewpoint of the expositer. Ide-

$$SSS = \boxed{\begin{array}{c} \text{(ISAs)} \\ \text{RISA, EISA, FISA,} \\ \text{LISA, PISA, TISA,} \\ \text{CISA, ETC.} \end{array}}$$

Figure 2. Composition of the Superstructure of Society.

ology is the collective expression of individually held preconceptions and mis-
conceptions of the political and social nature of the world which are inculcated
by the ruling superstructure. Ideology explains "complex social phenomena with
a view to directing and simplifying sociopolitical choices facing individual and
groups."[23] Ideology, then, constrains individual political actors to finite value
boundaries that *resist being overstepped.*

In the same way, and this has great relevance to our study of Radio Havana
Cuba and the Voice of America, ideology leads an entire social formation to
espouse certain cherished ideals to competing social formations. To be vital, a
given ideology must encompass a pattern of thinking that "bring[s] into sub-
missive unity all the realms of human endeavor that bear upon the functioning of
the system."[24] In other words, to be safe from incursion by other belief systems,
an ideology must cover all aspects of society from metaphysics to natural sci-
ence. It must be able to withstand all challenges to its premises or conclusions,
lest it suffer the fate of its superceded ancestors.

Ideology, then, is a shared structure of representations (images, sign, sym-
bols, etc.) communicated uniformly throughout the members of a given social
formation. Obversely, the geographical frontiers of that ideology come at a point
where people do not acknowledge the veracity of those shared representations
and where communication of shared symbols breaks down.[25]

Ideology establishes a set of criteria for resemblance among members of a
group. People who share an ideology are able to perceive their unity and to
distinguish themselves from "ideological aliens," peoples whose representa-
tions they find invalid. Further, ideologies are meaningless without opponents.
As Finlay has said of organizations, we might say of social formations: "In
groups with an overriding ideological orientation, enemies are an integral part of
the organization's immediate and long-range problems of survival, maintenance
of group solidarity, and fulfillment of plans."[26] The most common ideological
perimeters are those of the social formation. The most common conflict between
social formations is ideological conflict.

A THEORY OF INTER-IDEOLOGICAL STATE PROPAGANDA APPARATUSES

For all its explanatory power and theoretical elegance, all of the Ideological State
Apparatuses (ISAs) in the Althusserian model operate at the sub-national level.
This study proposes to take the Althusserian model and elevate it to the transna-
tional level. For if our world is engaged in a contentious competition between
opposing ideologies, then there must be apparatuses that operate at the inter-
social formation level (i.e., between and among social formations) to win the
"hearts and minds" (superstructural loyalties) of people in opposing nation-
states. It is at this "inter-ideological" level that the present author posits the

$$SSS = \begin{array}{|l|} \hline \text{(ISAs)} \\ \text{RISA, EISA, FISA,} \\ \text{LISA, PISA, TISA,} \\ \text{CISA, ETC.} \\ \hline \end{array} \rightarrow \text{IPSA}$$

Figure 3.   The Influence of the Ideological State Apparatuses (ISAs) on the Inter-Ideological Propaganda State Apparatuses (IPSAs).

existence of the Inter-Ideological Propaganda State Apparatuses (IPSAs), and we might posit as in Figure 3.

The superstructure of society (SSS) is composed of various ideological state apparatuses (ISAs), representing ruling class interests in such fields as law, education, and religion. In aggregate, these ISAs affect the Inter-Ideological Propaganda State Apparatus (IPSA), which is that sector of the social formation that directs the "war of ideas" against other social formations. Thus, a change in the dominant message of one or more of the ISAs can and has had a significant impact on the message transmitted abroad by the IPSA.

International behavior is a consequence of the superstructure of social formations. As Gramsci has said,

International relations intertwine with these internal relations of nation-states, creating new unique and historically concrete combinations. A particular ideology, for instance, is born in a highly developed country, is disseminated in the less developed countries, impinging on the local interplay of combinations.[27]

As the media of international telecommunication have developed over the past four decades, there has been, in the words of the Soviet foreign relationist Georgi Arbatov, "a steadily deepening reciprocal penetration of ideology and foreign policy . . . which had formerly not been so closely connected and mutually dependent."[28] The architect of the realist school of foreign policy, Hans Morgenthau, concurs: "Any foreign policy . . . is bound to be overlain by an ideology that intends to justify morally and rationalize intellectually that foreign policy."[29]

And so it is. Throughout the world today the struggle between and among social formations is being played out at every level of analysis: economic, political and ideological. When two social formations meet in conflict, there are three levels of confrontation. As shown in Figure 4, we have two social formations, SFM1 and SFM2, in conflict. SFM1 is hostile to SFM2. In other words, SFM1, through its SSS, and particularly through its IPSA, attempts to influence the SSS of SFM2. SFM1's ideological activity is directed at the SSS of SFM2. Given the mutual and reciprocal relations between the three parts of any social

SFM1   SFM2

ideological

SSS1 ——————(IPSA)——————→ SSS2

rivalry

political

SRP1 ————————————————→ SRP2

rivalry

economic

MFP1 ————————————————→ MFP2

rivalry

Figure 4.   A Model of Ideological Con-
flict

formation, SFM1 hopes thereby also to affect the SRP and MFP of SFM2 by
changing its SSS.

To bring this model down to the real world of this study, if SFM1 = USA,
part of the IPSA of SFM1 is the Voice of America. It attempts to influence the
ideological system of the Cuban social formation, and thereby to affect the social
relations of production in Cuba, namely the present Castro regime. It is this
interaction that is the focus of analysis of the present study. If SFM1 = CUBA,
then that institution is Radio Havana Cuba. Radio Havana Cuba similarly tries to
persuade the U.S. ideological superstructure of *its* rectitude, and thereby hopes
to change the nature of U.S. social relations.

U.S. AND CUBAN IDEOLOGIES

Following this elaboration of a general theory of ideology in international rela-
tions with particular reference to the Voice of America and Radio Havana Cuba,
it is important to see how ideology is manifested in their parent polities, the
United States and Cuba.

Contemporary American ideology, in the view of the Swedish sociologist
Gunnar Myrdal, embraces the ideas of the essential dignity of the individual
human being, the fundamental equality of all persons, and certain inalienable
rights to freedom, justice, and fair opportunity.[30] Since World War II, the
American creed has added to this sense of mission a sense of "world responsibil-
ity." Americans wish to redeem the world, not as master but as model. As Henry
R. Luce put it in a widely read editorial in 1941:

It is time to accept wholeheartedly our duty and our opportunity as the most
powerful and vital nation in the world and in consequence exert upon the world the
full impact of our influence, for such purposes as we see fit and by such means as
we see fit.[31]

American ideology even has been expressed in anti-imperialist rhetoric. The United States seeks no colonial empires. America is exceptional and can not be judged by criteria applied to other nations. Unfortunately, in the words of Arthur Schlesinger, "we came to construe the American creed as requiring our direct entry into the inner lives of foreign countries in order to straighten out lesser breeds and set them on the road to salvation."[32]

The belief that America was the anointed protector of world liberty gained even greater credence as a result of the perceived threat of its chief competitor, communism. Such a belief was corroborated by the genuine tyranny of the Stalinist period in Russia and soon became solidified in the "cosmic proposition that communism was a changeless unalterable, monolithic doctrine of total control and total evil."[33]

One study of 200 years of American ideology concludes that the two-party democratic political system and the ideological apparatuses each has spawned have remained remarkably durable. "There have been few changes in ideology, even over two centuries . . . if Thomas Jefferson were to be brought back to life today, he would have little difficulty seeing where he belonged."[34]

Indeed, there are certain *core tenets* of American ideology that have remained exceptionally stable. For instance, private ownership of productive forces (except human capital) is a core tenet. Laissez-faire economic policy was a core tenet for a long time, but it proved not to be durable. The basics of American ideology could carry on without adherence to laissez-faire, though some modification of the internal logical structure of the ideology was required. The depression of 1929–1934 created great dissonance at a material level regarding the notion that capitalism produced constant progress and growth under laissez-faire conditions. At the ideological level, this dissonance was manifested in Keynesianism—which proved not incompatible with core tenets and was allowed to replace (or at least to compete actively with) the laissez-faire tenet.

Ideologies are not merely structures of tenets, but also include definitions of the scope of debate. That is, they set parameters within which non-core tenets may be opened for challenge and replacement with new tenets that serve a better social function, i.e., reduce ideological dissonance. In the U.S., the debate between Keynesianism and laissez-faire was one such replacement. In the Soviet Union, the debates over whether imperialism leads inevitably to war, and whether peaceful coexistence was possible, were other such examples.

Over the years, U.S. foreign policy seems to perform better when the people are welded in a common ideological struggle. In World War II, the call was to free the world from fascism. The resolve was high and the result was success. In contrast, when ideological resolve has been missing, such as during the Vietnam War, foreign policy has been led into inescapable quagmires and stalemates.

As to the near-term future, there are several themes in contemporary American ideology that could serve as rallying cries for action: To achieve political and religious liberty for all; to eradicate global poverty and redistribute wealth; to

stamp out totalitarianism; to conquer the world; to assure world peace; to assure freedom of speech and movement for people around the world; to establish free market conditions everywhere; to eliminate racial prejudice.

Turning now to Cuba, to say that Cuban ideology is Marxist is at once a truism and a misperception. Regarding the former, Cuban revolutionary theorist Ernesto "Che" Guevara, when asked whether Cubans were Marxists, replied: "There are truths so evident, so much a part of people's knowledge, that it is useless to discuss them. One ought to be 'Marxist' with the same naturalness with which one is 'Newtonian' in physics or 'Pasteurian' in biology."[35]

Yet the Cuban revolution was not originally Marxist, nor does it adhere strictly to Marxist orthodoxy. It began as a liberal, constitutionalist reaction to dictatorial abuses. Fidel Castro's defense speech at his 1953 trial for conspiracy and armed insurrection at the Moncada barracks is filled with appeals to social ethics, complaints about violations of civil liberties, and promises for equitable redistribution of wealth.[36] Much of the ideology apparent in Castro's speech is similar to that of a liberal Democratic U.S. President.

Even after the revolution and the successful entry into Havana on January 2, 1959, the revolution was defined in the same humanitarian terms. Castro was a reformer with plans to eliminate political terror and corruption and to confront Cuba's severe economic problems. Castro assured property owners and capitalists that he did not oppose free enterprise. He promised elections and a free press. On May 21, 1959, in a televised speech to the nation, Castro summarized his political outlook:

> Our revolution is neither capitalist nor communist! We want to liberate man from dogmas, and free his economy and society, without terrorizing or binding anyone. We have been placed in a position where we must choose between capitalism which starves people, and communism which resolves the economic problem but suppresses the liberties so greatly cherished by man. . . . Our Revolution is not red, but olive green, the colour of the rebel army that emerged from the heart of the Sierra Maestra.[37]

But by April 1961, just prior to the Bay of Pigs invasion, most Cuban agriculture, industry, commerce, and transportation had been collectivized. Fidel referred for the first time to a "socialist revolution carried out under the noses of the Yankees."[38] When asked by Matthews about his having gone back on "democratic reforms," Castro is quoted to have said, "Yes, that is true. . . . Every revolutionary movement . . . proposes the greatest number of achievements possible. . . . No program implies the renunciation of new revolutionary stages, of new objectives. . . . I told no lies in the Moncada speech. . . . That was how we thought at the moment."[39]

When they took power in 1959, Cuban revolutionaries had a variety of ideologies without a unified doctrine or strategy. There was, undoubtedly, a consensus on opposing the United States and Cuba's privileged classes. But there does

not seem to have been agreement on the form of economic and political organization that could achieve these ends.

What pushed Castro and others to embrace Marxism has been explained as a result of the intransigence and pressure on the part of the United States: "The Revolution was waged against the system of power which existed for six decades. Given the key role of the United States in the power structure, the Revolution inevitably led to conflict between Cuba and the United States."[40]

With the declaration that the revolution was indeed Marxist, profound ideological changes began to occur in many aspects of Cuban life. As Richard Fagen has pointed out, the Cuban revolution necessitated a revolutionary change in the ordinary Cuban's ideology. The Cuban masses had to "reorder their belief systems and their lives in the service of the revolution." This resocialization of attitudes, motivations and worldview called for "the transformation of Cuban man into revolutionary man."[41]

The new ideology maintained that the social, economic, and political institutions inherited from the Batista regime were fundamentally unjust, immoral, and not equal to the task of national development. The new leadership saw itself charged with the task of seizing the instrumentalities of power, defining the new order, and then using the full resources of the state to bring the new order into being. The masses would have to follow the leadership's dictates and endure the many sacrifices of national reconstruction. Prior attitudes of every Cuban were under attack by the new ideology. To say that the process was difficult is an understatement; indeed, 10 percent of the Cuban population left the country rather than submit to the changes that were immanent.[42]

Change took place in almost all spheres of the society. The system of private land ownership was replaced by collective property ownership. Education was nationalized, made free to all Cubans regardless of class, and infused with revolutionary socialist rhetoric, theory, and practice. Mass media were nationalized. The repressive and corrupt political system of Batista was replaced by its antipode, Castroite communism. The U.S. presence receded rapidly as dependence on North American market interests was replaced with a special dependence on the Soviet Union. The rigid class structure was replaced with a supposedly classless and egalitarian society. Sexism and racism were combatted vigorously. Perhaps the only major relic of pre-Castro Cuba was the country's near-total reliance on sugar.

In the economic and political arenas, Cuban ideology conceptualized national development in a way that was heretical by Marxist standards. Marx believed that capitalism was a necessary stage to build the productive capacity of the economy. Capitalism would overcome scarcity but would then fall prey to its own inherent contradictions and would make way for socialism. But in Cuba, and most of the developing world, this was not the case. Capitalism had not produced the "take-off" point toward socialist development. Instead, Castro propounded the notion of "simultaneous development" of both the productive

forces and cooperative social relations. In this sense, Cuban communism differs markedly from Marxist orthodoxy.[43]

In the realm of human motivation, Cuban ideology maintains that men and women are not incorrigible, powerseeking beings. Progress does not have to come about, as in the capitalist world, through egotism, selfishness, and competition. Whereas humans are free to compete under capitalism, under socialism humans are free to cooperate and to add to the collective good. Humans are capable of learning new ways of communicating and collaborating. They can develop a critical consciousness about their role in society and their nation's role in the world. They need not be motivated by avarice, or, as Castro has said, "dollar signs." It is possible to create a new human relationship in which people are "capable of thinking of other human beings, [people] who are willing to deprive themselves in order to give, instead of giving themselves by depriving others."[44]

One of the main characteristics of present-day Cuban ideology is its confrontation with the U.S. Indeed, one must wonder if Cuban ideology would be so vital without the continual self-identifying contact with an alien belief system only 90 miles away. Describing Cuban culture in the ideological confrontation, Hart Davalos proclaims:

> Against the distortion and deceit, against the most refined and complex forms that our enemies wield in the broad cultural sector, we must refine daily our own weapons. . . . In this era in which we live we struggle for peaceful coexistence among nations . . . not for ideological coexistence. We must prepare ourselves for the ideological debate.[45]

Contemporary Cuban ideology expresses a variety of themes unified under the expression "deeds, not fine words."[46] Cubans express solidarity with "other peoples' just causes." This means Cubans are ready to support through deeds such concepts (as they define them) as human dignity, national independence, and territorial sovereignty. They abhor racism and other kinds of ethnic discrimination, such as Zionism. They express an internationalist consciousness that compels them to be involved, sometimes militarily, in a variety of national liberation movements around the world.

Castro claims Cubans do not "impose our system or our ideology on anyone . . . we don't try to export our radicalism on anyone"; that all it provides is an example to other revolutionary societies. "We will never be opportunists. Cuba is firmly anti-imperialist, anti-colonialist, anti-neocolonialist, anti-racist, anti-Zionist, anti-fascist . . . . These principles are part of our thinking . . ." Cuban ideology supports: Vietnam, Arab national liberation, Zimbabwe, South African liberation, the Cape Verde Islands, Grenada, Nicaragua, the Saharan People's Republic (the Polisario Front), Namibia, Kampuchea, Korean unification, Puerto Rican independence, Panamanian sovereignty over the canal, Be-

lize's right to freedom from Guatemalan interference, and Bolivian access to the sea, among other themes.

As to the near future, there are several themes in contemporary Cuban ideology that could serve as dominant themes: Freedom from poverty, ill-health, and illiteracy; guaranteed social services, such as day-care and education; human dignity and human rights in the face of exploitation; economic freedom instead of "bourgeois" personal liberties; eradication of imperialism; redistribution of wealth according to common patrimony; eradication of racism; sovereign control over national resources; superiority of socialism over capitalism.

IDEOLOGY IN CUBAN AND U.S. INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTING

Having described the broad outlines of Cuban and United States ideologies, how are their particular Inter-Ideological Propaganda State Apparatuses (IPSAs), namely the Voice of America and Radio Havana Cuba, affected by their respective ideological systems?

Throughout the past 25 years, international broadcasting has been one of the prime vehicles of U.S. and Cuban ideological strategy around the world. What has been the character of this mutual and reciprocating influence in the United States and in Cuba?

The United States' two most famous propaganda instruments during the Cold War were Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberation (after 1963 called Radio Liberty). Both stations were covertly financed by the CIA so that the U.S. government could claim that it was not controlling or financing them. Broadcasts were violently anti-communist and anti-Soviet. Soviet charges that Radio Free Europe broadcasts helped to incite the Hungarian uprising in 1956 are not without justification.[47] With the repression of the revolt, the dream of rolling back Soviet power was shattered, as were unrealistic expectations of the United States' radio propaganda war. There is no doubt that these broadcasts had fueled Hungarian rebels' expectations of American help, which the U.S. government was unwilling or unable to provide.

The Voice of America, of course, had a different function in the ideological broadcast confrontation. VOA was the official voice of the U.S. government, and thus was tied more closely to the ideological tenor within the State Department and the Executive. VOA was, and still is, the most audible voice of U.S. social formation around the world.

This formation was articulated in 1954, when, at the height of the Cold War, the United States Information Agency (USIA) commissioned a study of underlying "premises of propaganda." This report, declassified only in 1976, lists the basic tenets of U.S. ideology as understood within the VOA and the USIA. First, regarding communism's views and objectives:

1. The Communists seek to show the U.S. as an imperialist power desirous of waging war on the rest of the world and run by people who do not understand Europe, are hysterical of Communism, and need war or heavy defense to save a "rotten economy."

2. All opportunities are seized to demonstrate that the U.S. does not practice the democracy it preaches—that it is a "class nation." All violations of civil liberties and minority rights are magnified. . . .

3. Capitalist countries, particularly the U.S., are headed for economic disaster. War is necessary to save the U.S. from another depression. . . .[48]

The report goes on to list the eight ideological themes that U.S. radio propagandists ought to put forward:

1. Americans are nice people.

2. America is generous and altruistic. U.S. self-interest is enlightened.

3. America is democratic. Americans believe in freedom of thought. In a democratic U.S., all races and creeds live happily together. . . .

4. Americans believe in freedom for other people. The government and people have never swallowed heavy-handed colonial policies. The U.S. is not an imperialist power.

5. American life has a spiritual quality. USIA must build respect for the ethical values and high moral quality of American aims, overcome the foreign stereotypes of U.S. society as completely dominated by materialism and self-interest.

6. Americans are a cultured people. . . .

7. The U.S. economy is successful. America's material well-being rests on its freedom. American capitalism is unique . . . .

8. America is a peaceable country.[49]

Though much has changed in the 30 years since this was written, the tenets sound remarkably current. American ideology has been remarkably consistent for 200 years as it withstands new challenges to its premises and seeks to repel alien ideologies.

For Cuba too, the central vehicles for both this confrontation and the consolidation of ideology within the country were the mass media. Within 2 years, the Cuban revolution had nationalized all print and broadcast media. Radio and television were transformed "into educational instruments through which the masses were both *informed* and *formed*."[50] They were to play a "decisive role in the ideological struggle."[51]

Radio Havana Cuba's role today is the subject of much commentary and criticism. It is clear that Cubans see overseas radio broadcasts as important weapons in the international war of ideas. They help Cuba overcome the information blockade imposed around it by its neighbor to the north, and give it a cultural outlet of high production quality to disseminate its programs throughout Latin America, North America, Europe, and the Middle East. RHC's programming stresses Cuba's achievements, while at the same time excoriating its en-

emies, most particularly the United States. Its role in the ideological struggle is best illustrated in a resolution on the mass media which was adopted by the First Congress of the Cuban Communist Party in 1965:

> Overseas radio broadcasts are highly important to our Revolution. As the ideological struggle against imperialism sharpens, they represent a powerful weapon against enemy campaigns and diversionist efforts in the international arena.
>
> Together with this role in the ideological struggle, overseas radio transmission permits the dissemination of our culture and cultural expression of the brother peoples of the socialist camp, of Latin America and the Caribbean and other countries of the so-called Third World.
>
> These transmissions should stress publicizing our objectives, achievements and the daily advances of our people in the task of building socialism, spreading Leninist concepts and strengthening links to listeners in all continents.[52]

IDEOLOGY IN NEWSGATHERING

Now, having established the pervasive role of ideology in international communication, and having outlined the particular ideologies that operate in the United States and Cuba, we turn to another of this study's main theoretical concerns: the interplay of ideology and newsgathering, especially within the newsrooms of the Voice of America and Radio Havana Cuba. Both of these services claim to report world events with the strictest standards of objectivity and honesty. Yet even the casual listener can pinpoint a turn-of-phrase or an emphasis that betrays unique ideological viewpoints.

Within the newsroom, real men and women with real ideological biases sift daily through the deluge of incoming messages with the intent of selecting some and rejecting others for further transmission to their audiences. There simply is not enough air time to report everything. White's classic "gatekeeper" studies showed that only 10 percent of the wire copy received at the editor's desk of a Midwestern newspaper made it through to print. Further, the same stories passed through many hands prior to reaching the editor, so that the cumulative effect was even more startling. When questioned about why some stories survived while others were thrown in the waste basket, the editors' comments included such reasons as "not interesting . . . goes on all the time . . . propaganda . . . he's too red . . . B.S."[53]

All news collectors operate within a fundamentally ideological context that compels them to select certain news events as important, and to reject, or simply not to recognize, others. As a result, there is no such thing as nonideological newsgathering. Neither the so-called "free press," which relishes its notion of the "truth," nor the so-called "controlled press," which reports only "historical facts," can claim to have a monopoly on objectivity.

To be sure, objectivity is one of the pillars of Western journalism. It is the

moral and practical goal of an entire profession. In schools of journalism and in newsrooms around the world, the requisite of objectivity is stressed as a way of describing reality. In the eyes of the Western public, and in the eyes of the journalist as well, news selection requires an objective treatment of life's complexities and controversies.

But the underlying theoretical notion of this study is that the process by which a newswriter or an editor selects and disseminates news is fundamentally biased. The process of relative emphasis in international radio news expresses an ideological perspective which serves the unique social and political role of that medium within its society. There is no way for a journalist to escape the fact that

all news are views. . . . all editorial choice patterns in what and what not to make public (and in what proportion, with what emphasis, etc.) have an ideological basis and a political dimension rooted in the structural characteristics of the medium.[54]

What are the basic postulates of journalistic objectivity, and why are they false?[55] Objectivity presumes three things: First, it insists that there exists "out there" some exterior reality which can be described "such as it is" by someone with the proper training or innate insight. Second, objectivity implies that this person can penetrate to the essence of that reality and discern what is newsworthy and what is not, what is primary and what is secondary, what is essential and what is superfluous. Third, objectivity requires that the journalist not allow him- or herself to pass judgement on the news event. The normative evaluation of the event lies with the news consumer (the reader or listener), not with the newsgatherer, who is the "mere" transmitter of reality. Objectivity presupposes the elimination of the journalist's subjectivity. The journalist's role is simply to select among the many what is important, and to convey this without bias to the reader.

Why must we dispute this widely held attitude? In the first place, the notion that there exists "out there" some external reality that can be perceived without distortion is conceptual error. The only reality we know is one filtered through our unique set of "perceptual screens" created for us by our culture, society, and past experiences; in short, by our ideology. This set of screens, what Boulding has termed the "image," insures that "there are no such things as 'facts.' There are only messages filtered through a changeable value system."[56] This ideological value system is deeply ingrained and operates unquestioningly. Self-evident and unquestioned values of this kind are what make up one's ideological belief system. This mechanism is uniquely human, historical, and cultural; it corresponds to each individual's context in history and place in society. The reality we perceive is a humanization of reality conditioned by time, circumstance, material forces of production, and social relations of production. No description of reality can escape these fundamental constraints.

As a consequence of this mechanism, a journalist necessarily *selects only*

certain events, characterizes *only them* as newsworthy, and gives *only them* certain prominence. The journalist, to be sure, has a commitment to truth—rather, truth as he or she perceives it. But this perception of reality is the confluence of unique individual and societal interests, circumstances, and values.

In sum, a journalist's description cannot be confined to objective reporting. By the nature of news selection, he or she becomes the transmitter of ideological judgements. In no way should one impute false motives. Journalists are for the most part dedicated and honest. But the very essence of ideology is that news judgement is colored by hidden values. In the American press system, for example, there is a remarkable ideological homogeneity, despite the continual protestation that the American press includes diverse viewpoints. As Noam Chomsky has asserted, there is not one journalist, not a single syndicated columnist, who is a self-professed socialist. "From the ideological point of view, the mass media are almost one hundred percent 'state capitalist.'"[57] Similarly in Cuba and the Soviet Union, there is no journalist who is not a Marxist-Leninist.

FOOTNOTES

1. Leo Cherne, "Ideology and the Balance of Power," *The Annals of the American Association of Political and Social Science* 442 (March 1979): 47.
2. Karl Marx, "Preface," *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy,* Maurice Dobb, ed. (New York: International Publishers, 1970), pp. 20–21.
3. Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *The German Ideology, Part 1, with Selections from Parts Two and Three, Together with Marx's "Introduction to a Critique of Political Economy,"* C. J. Arthur ed. (New York: International Publishers, 1970), p. 42.
4. Louis Althusser, "Teoria, Practica Teorica, y Formacion Teorica. Ideologia y Lucha Ideologica." *Casa de las Americas* (Havana) (34, January–February 1966): 19. Emphasis changed. Translation by the present author.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid., p. 20.
7. Antonio Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci,* Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith, eds. and trans., (New York: International Publishers, 1971), p. 328.
8. Alvin W. Gouldner, *The Dialectic of Ideology and Technology: The Origins, Grammar and Future of Ideology* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976), p. 30.
9. Althusser, "Teoria . .," p. 20. [Emphasis in original.]
10. Marx and Engels, p. 116.
11. Many American workers consider themselves middle-class and identify with management more than with trade unionism! In the same way, Cuban citizens think they have freedom of expression and discount any evidence of press controls.
12. Althusser, "Teoria . .," p. 22.

13. Althusser, "Teoria . .," p. 22. [Emphasis in original.]

14. Armand Mattelart, *Ideologies and the Revolutionary Movement*, trans. Malcolm Coad (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1980), p. 7.

15. Ibid., pp. 7–8.

16. Karl Marx, *Capital: A Critique of Political Economy*, ed. Frederick Engels, Vol I. (New York: International Publishers, 1967), pp. 71–72.

17. Mattelart, p. 12.

18. T. R. Young, *Red Feather Dictionary of Socialist Sociology*, 2nd ed., s.v. "mystification" (Red Feather, CO: Red Feather Institute, 1976), p. 79.

19. Louis Althusser, "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes Toward an Investigation), in Louis Althusser, *Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays*, pp. 127–86. (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1971), pp. 132–33.

20. Althusser, "Ideology . .," p. 143.

21. Ibid., pp. 154–155.

22. Ibid., p. 154. To get a flavor of the pervasive impact of the ISAs, here is Althusser's vivid description of the French EISA: "It takes children from every class at infant-school age, and then for years, the years in which the child is most 'vulnerable,' squeezed between the family State apparatus and the educational State apparatus, it drums into them, whether it uses new or old methods, a certain amount of 'know-how' wrapped in the ruling ideology. . . . Around the age of sixteen, a huge mass of children are ejected 'into production': these are the workers or small peasants. Another portion of scholastically adapted youth carries on: and, for better or worse, it goes somewhat further, until it falls by the wayside and fills the posts of small and middle technicians, white-collar workers, small and middle executives, petty bourgeois of all kinds. A last portion reaches the summit, either to fall into intellectual semi-employment, or to provide, as well as the 'intellectuals of the collective labourer,' the agents of exploitation (capitalists, managers), the agents of repression (soldiers, policemen, politicians, administrators, etc.) and the professional ideologists (priests of all sorts, most of whom are convinced 'laymen'). (Althusser, "Ideology . .," pp. 155–6.)

Note bene: Althusser later apologizes to the few teachers who attempt to turn out a few students aware of their conditions in life: "They are a kind of hero. But they are rare. . . ." (p. 157.)

23. Julius Gould and William L. Kolb, *A Dictionary of the Social Sciences* (New York: Free Press, 1964), p. 315.

24. Thomas Remington, *The Origins of Ideology* (Pittsburgh University Center for International Studies, University of Pittsburgh, 1971), p. 2.

25. This is basically a communication-based definition of ideology. Thanks to Karl W. Deutsch, "The Impact of Communications Upon the Theory of International Relations," in *Theory of International Relations*, ed. Abdul Aziz Said (Englewood Cliff, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1968), pp. 77–82.

26. David J. Finlay, Ole R. Holsti, and Richard R. Fagen, *Enemies in Politics* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1967), p. 10.

27. Gramsci, p. 182.

28. Georgi Arbatov, *The War of Ideas in Contemporary International Relations: The Imperialist Doctrine, Methods and Organization of Foreign Propaganda* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1973), p. 13.

29.   Hans Morgenthau, "The Organic Relationship Between Ideology and Political
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30.   Gunnar Myrdal, *An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democ-
       racy* (New York: Harper & Brothers, Publishers, 1944), pp. 1:3–26.

31.   Henry R. Luce, "Editorial," cited by Richard J. Barnet, *Roots of War: The Men
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       1971), p. 18.

32.   Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., "Ideology and Foreign Policy: The American Experi-
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       (New York: Cyrco Press Inc., Publishers, 1978), p. 118.

33.   Ibid., p. 130.

34.   Robert Kelley, "Ideology and Political Culture from Jefferson to Nixon," *Ameri-
       can Historical Review* 82 (3, 1977): 558.

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36.   Fidel Castro, *History Will Absolve Me!* (New York: Lyle Stuart, 1961).

37.   Fidel Castro, *Fedel Castro Speaks*, ed. M. Kenner and J. Petras (Harmondsworth,
       U.K.: Penguin Press, 1969), p. 114.

38.   Ibid.

39.   Fidel Castro, *Fidel Castro Speaks on Marxism-Leninism* (New York: Fair Play for
       Cuba Committee, 1962), p. 64.

40.   Maurice Zeitlin and Robert Sheer, *Cuba: Tragedy in Our Hemisphere* (New York:
       Grove Press, 1963), p. 12.

41.   Richard R. Fagen, *The Transformation of Political Culture in Cuba* (Stanford, CA:
       Stanford University Press, 1969), p. 2.

42.   One should note, though, that the Cuban revolution was essentially bloodless,
       unlike other societies that have undergone this transition.

43.   Arthur MacEwan, "Ideology, Socialist Development and Power in Cuba," *Pol-
       itics and Society* 5 (1, 1975): 67–82.

44.   Fidel Castro, "Creating Wealth With Political Awareness, Not Creating Political
       Awareness with Money or Wealth," in *Fidel Castro Speaks*, ed. M. Kenner and J.
       Petras (Harmondsworth, U.K.: Penguin Books, 1969), p. 271.

45.   Armando Hart Davalos, "La Cultura en la Confrontacion Ideologica," *America
       Latina* (Moscow) (4, 1977): 64.

46.   These themes are taken from Fidel Castro, "Speech Before the Movement of
       Nonaligned Nations," Havana, Cuba, Spetember 3, 1979.

47.   James O. H. Nason, "International Broadcasting As an Instrument of Foreign
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48.   Leo Bogart, *Premises for Propaganda: The USIA's Operating Assumption in the
       Cold War*, abridged by Agnes Bogart (New York: Free Press, c 1976), pp. 83–84.

49.   Ibid., pp. 89–90.

50.   Jose Antonio Portuondo, "Los Intelectuales y la Revolucion," *Cuba Socialista*,
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51.   Cesar Escalante, "Lo Fundamental en la Propaganda Revolucionaria," *Cuba So-

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52. "Speech Delivered by Isidoro Malmierca, Member of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba, on the Anniversary of the Founding of Radio Havana Cuba," *XV Anniversary of Radio Havana Cuba* (Havana: Department of Revolutionary Orientation of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba, 1977), p. 16-17.

53. David Manning White, "The 'Gate Keeper': A Case Study in the Selection of News," *Journalism Quarterly* 27 (1950): 386.

54. George Gerbner, "Ideological Perspectives and Political Tendencies in News Reporting," *Journalism Quarterly* 41 (1964): 495.

55. I am indebted for this discussion to a working document presented at the First Conference of the Leftist Journalists held in Santiago de Chile in April 1971. It appears for the first time in English as: Revolutionary Left Movement (MIR), "On Journalism and Objectivity," in *Communication and Class Struggle: I. Cap-*

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56.   Kenneth Boulding, *The Image: Knowledge in Life and Society* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1956), p. 14.

57.   Noam Chomsky, "Ideological Conformity in America," *The Nation,* January 27, 1979, p. 77.

Content Analysis in the Study of Ideology

Inferences relative to the ideologies that operate in the newsrooms of the Voice of America and Radio Havana Cuba that are made in this book are based on analysis of various content dimensions of concurrent VOA and RHC newscasts.

Analysis of the content of communication can provide both descriptive and predictive data on human behavior. Content analysis is an empirical research tool that has developed into a methodology of its own in response to the needs of mass media societies for a verifiable monitoring technique for communication contents. Yet content analysis, as practiced in the Western mass media societies by the positivist tradition, has come under scrutiny from critical communication scholars[1] who have warned that it is a class-bound, ahistorical technique based on false theoretical and philosophical premises. These scholars assert that the technique does have merit, however, when certain epistemological considerations are taken into account. This chapter examines content analysis in the light of critical social theory. Its goal is to examine both the critical and the positivist research orientations in order to illuminate the analysis of ideological content and to strengthen the application of content analysis to the present problem.

We begin with a brief historical view of the development of content analysis in the West and in Eastern Europe. Next, we examine the classical, positivist definition of the technique, and then move to examine that definition, using concepts and arguments of critical social thought. Next, we survey relevant content analysis studies undertaken by communication researchers in both the Eastern European, realist tradition as well as Western Europeans and North Americans who have been influenced by the so-called Frankfurt School of Critical Sociology.[2] Finally, we conclude with a synthesis and recommendations for this study.

To be precise in my use of these terms, I use the terms "positivist" and "realist" in the senses suggested Keat and Urry:

For the positivist, science is an attempt to gain predictive and explanatory knowledge of the external world. To do this, one must construct theories, which consist of highly general statements, expressing the regular relationships that are found to exist in the world. These general statements, or laws, enable us to predict and explain the phenomena that we discover by means of systematic observation and experiment. To explain something is to show that it is an instance of these regularities; . . . It is not the purpose of science to get "behind" or "beyond" the phenomena revealed to us. . . . There are no necessary connections in nature; there are only regularities. . . . The realist shares with the positivist a conception of science as an empirically-based, rational and objective enterprise, the purpose of which is to provide us with true explanatory and predictive knowledge of nature. But for the realist, unlike the positivist, there is an important difference between explanation and prediction. And it is explanation which must be pursued as the primary objective of science. To explain phenomena is not merely to show they are instances of well-established regularities. Instead, we must discover the necessary connections between phenomena, by acquiring knowledge of the underlying structures and mechanisms at work. . . . Thus, for the realist, a scientific theory is a description of structures and mechanisms which causally generate the observable phenomena, a description which enables us to explain them.[3]

THE HISTORY OF CONTENT ANALYSIS: EAST AND WEST

A substantial scientific literature has developed over many years on the analysis of content of communication messages. In 1952, Berelson systematized the technique, but content analysis had a considerable history before that time. The rise of content analysis to methodological respectability is due largely to its elaboration by Harold D. Lasswell and associates during World War II as a tool of propaganda analysis.[4] Political research using propaganda materials accounted for nearly 25 percent of all empirical content analysis studies during the 1940s.[5] Yet Dovring cites the content analysis of propaganda as early as the seventeenth century by Swedish clerics who were trying to expose and prove the heretical beliefs of a dissident sect.[6]

Content analysis as an identifiable social research tool had its birth around the turn of the century within the political economy of the United States. Barcus has surveyed over 1700 content analysis studies going back to the 1890s. He has chronicled how the method served the quest for increasing shares in the expanding market for readers at the turn of the century. In the first quantitative study of newspaper content, Speed compared New York dailies for the years 1881 and 1893 to assess whether the increase in gossip and scandal material, and the decline in coverage of literature, science, and religion, had an effect on circulation.[7] Newspapers were the raw material wherein content analysts could easily demonstrate the relationship between improved production possibilities and the mass appeal of different textual formats.

So, between propaganda analysis and market appeal analysis, content analy-

sis, like other Western communication science, followed the exigencies of the commercial marketplace and the world political scene. Like its sister, survey research, content analysis quickly developed in sophistication because of the availability of commercial funds. Like audience effects research, demographic profiles, public policy analysis, and other research domains, content analysis, to extend Schiller's word's, "paralleled and undergirded the corporate system that financed most of it."[8]

The development of mass paperbacks, radio, and film and television widened the range of objects for content analysis study. Several excellent research manuals and symposia facilitated its acceptance.[9]

Even though content analysis had been used in the West for over 80 years, and Lenin himself had personally undertaken content analyses,[10] Eastern European communication science has been slower than the West to formulate a theory and practice of content analysis. Because of a virulent state-supported anti-intellectualism during the Stalin era and the bourgeois background of many university faculties, all social science experienced unprecedented repression. Sociology and social psychology, from which content analysis sprang in the West, were "for Marxism superfluous." Such methods as opinion polls, surveys, and content analysis were forbidden, since, it was argued, "in socialism opinion is not researched, it is formed."[11]

Only Kruschchev's denunciation of Stalinist orthodoxy began to relieve the pressure. By 1964, there was a change. A conference of social scientists organized by the Academy of Sciences of the USSR called for the "old-fashioned dogmatism of Stalinist days to be replaced by a more flexible policy in which at least a limited objectivity would be permissible."[12]

Even before this time in Poland, significant content analysis research was well under way. Pawel Dubiel summarized research to date in his article "Content Analysis of the Press in Poland, 1947–1963."[13] Other important studies appeared in the early 1960s in Poland.

By 1969, fully three decades after its elaboration in the West, content analysis found its place in the pages of the Soviet journal *Voprosy Filosofii* (Problems of Philosophy).[14] In 1970, the first country-wide sociological seminar on content analysis was held in Novosibirsk. In 1973, a similar conference took place in Moscow. In 1977, a collective of authors from the Journalism Department of the Karl Marx University in Leipzig prepared a monograph on the purpose and function of content analysis.[15]

THE CLASSICAL DEFINITION AND ITS CRITIQUE

Content analysis is basically the methodological application of the classical Lasswellian communication model "Who says what in which channel to whom with what effect?"[16] Specialists who measure the "says what" engage in con-

tent analysis. Content analysis applies systematic and replicable procedures to analyze messages in order to: (a) simply describe the content, or (b) make inferences or predictions about the other elements in the communication process, mostly commonly about the source or the receiver.

The analysis of communication content might be outlined as in Figure 5.

One widely accepted definition of content analysis was formulated in 1952 by Bernard Berelson:

> Content analysis is the research technique for the objective, systematic and quantitative description of the manifest content of communication.[17]

Berelson insists on *objectivity:* each step must be so formulated that no error or bias creeps into the design that might reflect the subjective predisposition of the researcher. He stipulates that the description be *quantitative:* if an attribute cannot be counted, it is not present. Finally, he restricts analysis only to *manifest* content of the message.

But these three prerequisites—objectivity, quantitative analysis, manifest content—immediately present epistemological problems from the viewpoint of critical social thought. Let us examine each in some detail.

For Berelson and other scientists of the positivist tradition, the litmus test of whether content analysis is objective or not is the following question: "Can other analysts, following identical procedures with the same data, arrive at similar conclusions?"[18] What objection can we have to this? For one, there is no such thing as objective truth that is perceivable by an unbiased social scientist. All research is rooted in the unique and unreplicable circumstances (material forces of production plus the social relations of production) of the scientist and his/her discipline. In particular, political ideology derives from the interests of the social class to which one belongs. Such class interests are the result of the material conditions that prevail in that society. Truth and objectivity are historically conditioned, and class-bound ideology is inevitable. As Lenin said, "Histor-

Content analysis can be used . . .

| to make inferences about any element in the communication process | ← | by objectively and systematically identifying specified characteristics of the message. |

| Source | → | Encoding Process | → | Channel | → | Message | → | Decoding Process | → | Receiver |

Figure 5. The Use of Content Analysis in Making Inferences. Ole Holsti, *Content Analysis for the Social Sciences and Humanities* (Reading, MA: Addision-Wesley Publishing Company, 1969), p. 25.

ically conditioned are the circumstances under which we make progress in our knowledge of the essence of things."[19]

The closest thing approaching the truth is the sum of relative truths. "Human thought then by its nature is capable of giving, and does give, absolute truth, which is composed of the sum-total of relative truths."[20] Interestingly, Lenin's views are not too far from those of John Stuart Mill and Thomas Jefferson in this regard. Bourgeois or libertarian theory also holds that no single individual can have a monopoly on truth. The only way to guarantee that something resembling truth arises is by guaranteeing a free "marketplace of ideas." The "self-righting process" encourages the widest range of "relative truths"—from the Ku Klux Klan and the Nazi Party to the Communist Party—to be debated in the forum of public opinion. The truth will out among the competing and many times cacophonous voices.

Realist social science is just as guilty as its sister in the West, positivist social science. "True believers" of all social research traditions continue to maintain the undisputed scienticity of their respective approaches. Even Marx and Engels give no ground here. As noted above, ideology meant "false consciousness," one that did not adhere to the ideology of the most progressive classes. But why should this not be equally true for Marxism-Leninism? Was it not also a consequence of unique socio-historical circumstances? Why should it have greater claim to objectivity? Why should content analysis as practiced by Eastern European scholars be any more objective than that of positivists in the West?

Further, Marxists believe that content analysis rests on a false philosophical premise—Freudian depth psychology—particularly in relation to sign formation. A sign is a word or "signal" that stands for something in experience. The word "house" stands for a generalized experience that humans have with four-walled, roofed structures. In Western linguistic psychology, the sign is really shorthand for a unique concept of a house that *resides in the mind*. It exists separately from the material world, and its meaning resides in the world of ideas.

But to the materialist, this is reversed. Signs (and all cognitive processes, for that matter) are not ideas within the mind but *direct* manifestations of the material world. Everything that exists—language, religion, psychology, emotion, even knowledge—comes into being as a result of material causes, not mental processes. To the Marxist, individual cognition and sign formation are social facts. They are reflections, copies, photographs, mirror-reflections of real things and processes of nature.[21] Signs are not created by the mind but "are conditioned above all by the social organization of the participants involved and also by the immediate conditions of their interaction."[22] Signs in themselves are neutral; the same language can be used by peoples of opposing ideologies. But signs are the "base" that forms the social lens through which ideological meaning is refracted. The base supports the "superstructure," which refers to legal, political, religious, aesthetic, or philosophic—in short, ideological—forms.

Thus, content analysis of words (signs) in the Marxist purview cannot be used

objectively to infer psychic processes. It can, however, contribute to an objective understanding of social, "superstructural" phenomena. For example, the tendency in the West to use content analysis to analyze cognitive processes of individual decision-makers is subjectivist and idealist. It is more appropriate from a theoretical standpoint to examine the ideological structure of the society to make inferences about the social relations of production.

Further detracting from the objectivity of content analysis is the class nature of language. The chief fault of the positivist and idealist approach to language that characterizes Western content analysis is that "it separates thought from language and language from the history of people."[23] Language and ideology are inextricably connected. A knowledgable reader of international news knows within a few sentences what class interest or ideology is being represented. "The deposed ruler" and "the overthrown tyrant" may describe the same person, but they employ different attitudes toward his demise. "Language does not lie; on the contrary, it is the truth of the ideology it expresses."[24]

Words are selective storehouses of ideological values. People who think in one language have a common history, have lived through common experiences, and have common values by sharing a religion, etc. Ruling classes who share the same language also share an ideology. People live in a language. As Descartes might have said, *loquo ergo sum*. Words are the currency which flows through and determines the nature of human relationships. One need only to think of the ideological connotations of race, civilization, fundamentalism, development, terrorism, totalitarianism, human rights, etc. to gain insight into this phenomenon.

In sum, Berelson's litmus test for objectivity betrays a muddle-headed devotion to an absolute truth that is discoverable through replicability. No science is so universal that it can make sweeping cross-system comparisons across time. Even in physics, the grandest of sciences, what one day appears to be indisputable theory the next day may be discredited. In fact, the theory of physics is also a creation of a unique situational (planetary) context, the same complaint one so often hears expressed about the social sciences. Newtonian mechanics, for instance, was (and is) one such verified grand theory. For centuries, the mechanistic view of physics explained and predicted complex physical phenomena that take place in our particular corner of the universe. Yet the theory of relativity demonstrated that, *at best,* Newtonian physics explains only a small portion of galactic experience. Its validity extends only as far as our Earth's particular time, space, energy, and mass, all of which stand in unique and unreplicable relation to one another and to the rest of the universe.

Einstein's notion that there is no objective place to stand in the physical universe has had a profound effect in the social sciences. Newton once proclaimed that he achieved his breakthroughs only because he stood on the shoulders of giants (Copernicus, Galileo, Kepler, and others). But those giants were

also earthbound beings whose particular space-time context necessitated a particular physical theory.

"QUANTITIVITY" AND LATENT CONTENT

Suspicions of the subjective predisposition of the researcher have led in the West to an over-reliance on quantitative methods. Kracauer reacts critically to Berelson's second basic postulate, namely that the description be quantitative.[25] Quantification offers no iron-clad guarantee for the accuracy and validity of content analysis results. Those content analysts who process their data rigorously and mathematically may miss important meanings in the text. Kracauer insists that the analyst must give *qualitative* considerations special prominence.

The danger of the over-quantification ("quantativity"), according to Kracauer, is that the analyst will miss complex relationships, such as ideology, in the interest of isolating countable data. The analyst cannot see the forest for the trees, because "his rigidly atomistic data are likely to preclude inferences as to the way in which the data are interrelated."[26]

Kracauer echoes the teaching of gestalt psychology in that the whole of the individual text elements determine the direction of the entire text. Indeed, the whole sometimes moves "in a 'direction' at variance with what a computing of the directions of [its individual] elements would yield. In such cases, *precise quantification used alone will actually encourage inaccurate analysis*" (emphasis added).[27]

Thus, Kracauer criticizes Berelson's dictum that content analysis is objective, systematic, and reliable only to the extent it is quantitative. The requisite of quantification necessarily restricts content analysis to *manifest* content, that is, content that cannot be interpreted in different ways. For example, Berelson suggests a continuum along which various messages can be placed according to whether an audience might get the same understanding from them (see Figure 6).[28] At the one end would be a news report of a train wreck, from which most literate members of an audience would glean the same understanding: wreckage, carnage, disruption. At the other end would be an abstract modern poem subject to varying, individual interpretations. Presumably, according to Berelson, there


Figure 6. The Manifest–Latent Continuum

would be a point L' beyond which the "latency" of the message (the diversity of interpretations) would be too great for reliable content analysis.

This is a particularly salient point in considering the newscasts of the Voice of America and Radio Havana Cuba. There are news reports, such as the following, for which there can be little misunderstanding of the facts and which presumably Berelson would place at Point M:

> RADIO HAVANA CUBA, April 14, 1979. A dozen people threw bottles containing their own blood at the walls of the Pentagon in Washington to protest nuclear arms development in the United States. The demonstrators also carried placards reading [unintelligible] of death outside the window of U.S. Secretary of Defense Harold Brown's office.

> VOICE OF AMERICA, April 14, 1979 (translated from Spanish): The world's Christians today are preparing to celebrate one of the most joyful celebrations of the year, the Sunday of Resurrection. During the celebrations of Holy Friday, Pope John Paul II led the procession carrying a wooden cross during ceremonies where the faithful carried torches as part of the observation of the crucifiction of Christ. These ceremonies were carried out in the ruins of Old Rome in the Coliseum.

Yet these items, presumably at or about point M, *do indeed* lend themselves to diverse, latent interpretations. Some U.S. listeners might very well question the motivation that gave prominence on RHC to the protest at the Pentagon. Similarly, a Cuban listener might see the religious news item on the VOA as an attempt to undermine the atheist orientation of the Cuban regime.

But Kracauer asserts that *qualitative* content analysis *can* handle multiple connotations of diverse interpretations. Qualitative content analysis is more interested in patterns and wholes than in frequency counts:

> Qualitative analysis by definition differs from quantitative analysis in that it achieves its breakdowns without special regard for frequencies. What counts alone in qualitative analysis—if the verb is permissible in a context which defies counting—is the selection and rational organization of such categories as condense the substantive meanings of the given text, with a view to testing pertinent assumptions and hypotheses. These categories *may* or *may not* invite frequency counts.[29]

Kracauer criticizes the process which isolates meaning into atomistic data. Words, sentences, themes, and motifs also exist in a context. It is not sufficient to include individual text elements within isolated categories. According to Kracauer, the categories must be constructed in such a way that they deal "with the structure as a whole, i.e., the linkage, manifest or latent, which makes the atomistic units a gestalt."[30] "Gestalt" in this sense means a *configuration of elements, a structure, a pattern, or a matrix,* much like what Althusser calls the system and structure of ideology.[31] Determining frequency of occurence within categories is less important than conceptualizing with the help of categorical

summaries an overall pattern (a structure). How often the individual elements appear in the text is less important than the clustering into matrixes, defined as "collection of text elements under one unifying concept that accords with the data."[32] This kind of analysis is similar to the "matrix formulations" proposed by Barton and Lazarsfeld in their study of the function of qualitative analysis in empirical social research:

> Such a formula capable of summing up in a single descriptive concept a great wealth of particular observations may be called a matrix formulation. This definition covers the notion of a "basis pattern of culture," a "theme," an "ethos," a "Zeitgeist" or "mentality of the time," a "national character," and on the level of an individual person a "personality type."[33]

Before reaching a methodological synthesis, it is important to examine how realist communication researchers in Central and Eastern Europe have dealt with latent content.

CONTENT ANALYSIS IN MARXIST COMMUNICATION SCIENCE

In Marxist theory, content analysis is less than rigorous unless it serves consciously a scientific ideology. It must be used instrumentally, i.e., in relation to the societal context. To the Marxist, the content analysis becomes concrete only to the extent that it fulfills "its ideological obligation to criticize capitalist society."[34]

Despite the many criticisms of the philosophical, theoretical, and technical faults of positivist use of content analysis, there has been a general willingness among Eastern European communication researchers to adapt and develop the technique. Korobeinikov asserted that the methods of content analysis could play an important role in understanding social processes. He believed that the study of these methods could enrich Soviet sociology.[35]

To see how realist communication researchers have applied these methodological considerations in their research, the present author reviewed some 30 content analysis studies which appeared in communication publications in Eastern Europe during the period 1973–1978.[36]

It is quickly apparent that content analysis is used for instrumental purposes, for example in advising editors and media producers who make ideological decisions. Drastich's results were "helpful to the editorial borad" of the Slovak *Sport* magazine in promoting athletic education.[37] Kubiak, Filas, Gerula, Krupska, Mos, and Zielinski analyzed letters to the editor of the *Krakow Gazette* to describe their writers' motivations, social tensions apparent in the letters, and the newspaper's responses.[38] Brandt analyzed editorials in seven Democratic

German dailies to see if their subjects were consistent with Party directives.[39] Splichal analyzed over 9,000 messages received by Radio-Television Ljubljana to determine which types of messages were then retransmitted by these media.[40] Zachejova scrutinized selected Slovak illustrated weeklies to see to what extent the content diverged from editorial policies.[41]

There was also a great concern among these studies for the socialization process. Maliszewski and Rusinek looked at hero roles presented in the Polish youth press to ascertain how modern socialist values were being disseminated,[42] while Stojak did the same on Serbo-Croatian comic books.[43] Splichal reviewed Yugoslav TV "interpretive news" to find out which content characteristics produced positive and which produced negative attitudes toward Yugoslav politics.[44] Maslyk considered how the factory newspaper of the Warsaw metal works was satisfying the informational needs of its workers.[45]

Several studies used content analysis in a comparative fashion to describe the differing ideological content of foreign and domestic news. Myslinski delved back into Polish history to describe the difference in coverage of turn-of-the-century socialist and conservative newspapers.[46] Dubiel analyzed book reviews that appeared in *Journalism Quarterly* (US), *Publizistik* (FRG), and *Zeszyty Prasoznawcze* (Poland) to determine whether those communication journals were open to alternative ideological viewpoints.[47] Lewartowska described the coverage of Poland in *Le Monde, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,* and *International Herald Tribune* and of France, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the United States in *Trybuna Ludu,* the leading Warsaw daily.[48]

The categories used in these studies are frequently the same as those used in the West: geographical region covered; subject classifications, such as the economy or defense. The units of measurement are also similar: words, themes, frequency, etc. But there is no hesitation to use such "value-laden" categories as sensationalist, capitalist, or enemies of the state. Inferences based on content characteristics can range deeply into the mind of the sender or into the motivations of the receiver.

CONTENT ANALYSIS IN THE WEST

Few Western content analysts have treated ideology as a research interest. Few content analyses have compared news content across social formations. Few have used international radio news as their samples. But many fine studies of various content dimensions of newspapers and periodicals have laid the analytical ground work in the fields, and have suggested techniques applicable to this study.

Perhaps the earliest relevant study examined over 1,000 news items in American newspapers from 1914 to 1917. The study indicated the amount of war news coming from each belligerent nation, the channels furnishing the news, the

subjects treated, the appeals presented, and the extent to which the news was likely to modify American attitudes toward the war. Quantitative measures included origin of the story, channel, date, length, and prominence of display.[49]

During World War II, Lasswell suggested that content analysis might be used on news in the print media to monitor the "world's attention." Content analysis, he believed, would reveal the relative prominence (frequency) of, and could evaluate, selected political symbols, including names of leaders, nations, policies, and the like. This led to the Revolution and Development of International Relations (RADIR) study, in which editorials from "prestige" newspapers of five countries were analyzed for the period 1890 to 1949.[50]

Davison analyzed the content of four newspapers published in December 1946 in the Soviet sector of Berlin. He divided front page items into world areas, and judged the coverage of each as favorable, neutral, or unfavorable. In addition, he categorized dominant themes. In a conclusion relevant to the present study, he asserted that "news . . . is not selected primarily according to 'news value' but is carefully chosen [according] to predetermined themes."[51]

In another study, Ginglinger used White's technique of value analysis on international editions of the *Reader's Digest*.[52,53] Using a catalogue of 50 values, she found that *Reader's Digest* ranked high in economic, political, and moral values, but low in playful and social values.

Bush created "A System of Categories of General News Content" which could be used as subject matter categories for United States newspapers. Though widely validated at the time, some of his categories are outdated or socially meaningless today (for example, "COMMUNISM IN THE USA—News of the activities of Communists—proved or suspected—political activities, investigations, trials," and "CUTE CHILDREN."[54]

Garver used content analysis to discover the propaganda approaches used by the Soviet Union and the United States in their supposedly "nonpropagandistic" pictorial magazines, *USSR* and *America Illustrated*, respectively. Articles were coded for subject and theme. The Russian magazine emphasized sports and geography, while the American publication used more material on agriculture and living standards.[55] Column measurement was the sole measurement of Root's analysis of coverage of Cuba and India in newspapers of Calcutta and Hamburg.[56] Hart added to this a measure of headline classification in his treatment of English and U.S. dailies.[57] Ardoin and Hall,[58] in a rare content analysis of radio news, used Osgood's method of evaluative assertion analysis to discover whether there were any differences in "negative attitude intensity" between Soviet and Chinese English-language broadcasts on the U.S. role in Vietnam.[59]

Budd developed an "attention score," which was a measure of prominence of U.S. news in Australian newspapers. It gave each news item points based on headline size, position on the page, length of the item, and page on which it appeared.[60]

In an interesting critique of news objectivity, Merrill used six "bias categories" to assess how *Time* magazine had stereotyped three U.S. presidents. He analyzed verbs (Did Truman quip, state, or snap?), adjectives (Was Kennedy serene, tall, or monotonous?) as well as adverbs, the overall context, *Time's* outright opinions, and the bias evident in the photos. He concluded that *Time* was (a) clearly anti-Truman, (b) strongly pro-Eisenhower, and (c) neutral or moderate toward Kennedy.[61]

Two studies by Gerbner have investigated the question of ideology in news. In 1961, he analyzed the coverage of the United Nations General Assembly in the *New York Times* and Hungary's *Nezszabadsag*. The *Times* highlighted procedural moves, gains, threats, and conflicts, while the Hungarian newspaper emphasized method over substance, tensions over solutions.[62] In 1964, Gerbner produced his "Ideological Perspectives and Political Tendencies in News Reporting." He analyzed a supposedly nonpolitical event in France: the unintended fatal shooting of a student by his teacher. Using a procedure he called "proposition analysis," in which message samples of nine French newspapers were screened to determine the basic propositions advanced by each, Gerbner showed that the French press did not escape from politics and ideology in its coverage.[63]

Dovring analyzed texts as diverse as sixteenth century Vatican pronouncements and speeches by Hitler and Castro. He posited that one can "tell in what ideological and political setting the communication takes place: by examining the particular constellation of units of self-identification, symbols used for demands, and concepts that refer to one's opposition.[64]

Arora and Lasswell did an extensive survey of the role of ideology in the elite press of India and the United States. They examined the front pages of the *New York Times* and the *Times of India* for the period 1950 to 1958. They counted the number of different spokespeople and classified them by occupation. They surveyed the focus of attention (whether the events were of a domestic or an international character) and the value expressing self-image, as well as those pertaining to the images of others.[65]

A very few studies in the West have dealt with ideology directly. Coles undertook a fascinating content analysis of the ideology apparent in another kind of medium, adult basic education reading texts.[66] His purpose was to see if these readers convey more than "pure reading" concepts. One hundred-fifty stories, representing grades one through three, were selected. Frequency scores were tabulated for race, sex-roles, occupations, domesticity, and personality traits of the characters. Four ideological concepts were investigated: "hegemony of interests" (denies separate class interests, sees business, government, labor, and the public working together toward common goals); "blaming the victim" (explains a social problem by attributing cause to shortcomings of the victim); "individualism" (emphasizes "I-ness" rather than "we-ness" in solving problems); and "happy consciousness" (promotes the present social system as rational and satisfying). Conclusions included: Sexism and racism abound. Wom-

en and non-Whites are presented in subordinate roles. Characters are conformist, uncritical, and unaware of social ills. They have a faith in agencies of authority and exude "happy consciousness." These texts express concepts which support dominant groups.

Simon applied cause and solution categories to the quantitative identification of ideology apparent in any type of communication containing ideological content. Coders assigned scores based on a casual code, i.e., whether the social problem being addressed is blamed on deviant individuals or government bureaucracy ("conservative"); on special interests or undemocratic accumulation of power ("liberal"); or on capitalist economy or values ("socialist"). Coders also assigned a score on a solution code, i.e., whether the social problem can be solved by streamlining bureaucracy or extending social controls ("conservative"); by legislative reform or regulation ("liberal"); or by redistributing wealth ("socialist").[67]

Another investigator to use computers to tackle the content analysis of ideology is Cary. He tested hypotheses concerning patterns of emphasis upon Marxist-Leninist ideology apparent in Soviet history, geography, and social science texts. He entered his entire text on the computer and sorted the words alphabetically. Then he manually flagged those words which in his judgement explicitly referred to Marxist-Leninist ideology. Such words as "revolution" and such short phrases as "dictatorship of the proletariat" had presumed ideological meanings. The words and phrases were verified by checking them in Soviet political and philosophical dictionaries. Finally, the resulting dictionary of 83 words and phrases was searched throughout the text for frequency of occurrence. He concluded that ideological references occur with greater frequency as the grade level goes up in Soviet history, geography, and social science texts.[68]

TOWARD A SYNTHESIS

Krippendorff's definition leads toward a synthesis by correcting some of the objectionable aspects of Berelson's, while at the same time heeding Kracauer's pleas for addressing context:

> Content analysis is a research technique for making replicable and valid inferences from data to their context.[69]

Krippendorff allows that "messages do not have a single meaning." In fact, "a message may convey a multitude of contents even to a single receiver."[70] Second, "meanings need not be shared." Intersubjective agreement "exists only regarding the most obvious or 'manifest' aspects of communications, or only for a few people that happen to share the same cultural or sociopolitical perspective."[71] Third, since people must use symbolic communications to con-

vey messages about phenomena not directly observed, "the vicarious nature of symbolic communications . . . forces a receiver to make inferences from sensory data to portions of this empirical environment. This empirical environment is what we refer to as the *context of the data*."[72] This recalls our previous discussion of ideology as a system of representations, images, themes, signs, and symbols. It is their arrangement and combination—their structure—which gives them meaning. This structure occurs within unique and empirically identifiable socio-historical contexts.

In an elaboration of this point, which specifically addresses the subject of this study, Krippendorff illustrates the importance of context in relation to analyzing "enemy broadcasts," which are "part of a real but inaccessible political process involving a civilian population, its governing elite, the military, and the socio-political-economic conditions of the country. By the analyst's choice, the actors in this process constitute the context of the broadcasts."[73]

FOOTNOTES

1. "Critical" communication research can be distinguished from "conventional" communication research. Conventional research has also been referred to as value-free, positivist, or empiricist research. These approaches tend to place an inordinate emphasis on atomistic concepts and on quantification, at the expense of uncovering societal macroconnections. Conventional communication research arose as a response to industrial society's need for empirical data to monitor the cost-benefit impact of communication on mass populations. To use Lazarsfeld's distinction, this type of research was administrative and policy-oriented. (See Paul F. Lazarsfeld, "Remarks on Administrative and Critical Communications Research," *Studies in Philosophy and Social Science* 9 (1, 1941): 2-16. Critical research, in contrast, "deals with communication as a social process; second, it studies media institutions not in isolation but with and in terms of other institutions, and within the wider social context (nationally and internationally); and third, it conceptualizes research in terms of structure, organization, professionalization, socialization, participation, and so on." James D. Halloran, "The Context of Mass Communication Research," in *Communication and Social Structure: Critical Studies in Mass Media Research*, Emile G. McAnany, Jorge Schnitman, and Noreene Janus, eds. (New York: Praeger, 1981), p. 28.

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Research Methodology

RESEARCH DESIGN

This study uses two news services that, at least from noncontent indices, would appear to have divergent ideological viewpoints. The Voice of America's Spanish-language service, directed at Cuba and the rest of Latin America, is operated by the United States Information Agency (USIA) on behalf of the foreign policy goals of the United States government. Radio Havana Cuba's English-language program similarly serves as Cuba's governmental voice to North America.

This study makes inferences about the ideologies that operate in the newsrooms of the VOA and RHC on the basis of a systematic analysis of various content dimensions of concurrent VOA and RHC newscasts from the years 1979 and 1982. The flow of analysis may be displayed schematically (see Figure 7).

All communication is composed of six basic elements: a *source* or sender, an *encoding process* which results in a *message*, a *channel* of transmission, a *recipient* of the message, and a *decoding process*. Content analysis of the message may be used to make inferences about other elements of the communication process. The investigator may analyze a message to make inferences about the characteristics of the message itself, about the causes or sources of the message, or about the effects of the message. This study examines the proposition that:

> Sources with characteristic A are likely to produce messages with attributes *w* and *x*, whereas those with characteristic B are likely to produce messages with attributes *y* and *z*.[1]

Characteristic A is the prevalent ideology in the VOA newsroom; characteristic B represents the ideology operating in the RHC newsroom. Thus, message attributes differ according to ideological orientation. In other words, analysis of various content dimensions of the respective newscasts of the VOA and RHC allow inferences about the ideologies operating within the newsrooms of those stations.

Content analysis can be used . . .

Figure 7. Content Analysis for Making Inferences About Ideology. (After Ole R. Holsti, *Content Analysis for the Social Sciences and Humanities* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1969), p. 25.)

QUALITATIVE OR QUANTITATIVE?

This study has chosen four ways of analyzing the ideological content of these newscasts. They range along the qualitative–quantitative continuum from very qualitative to moderately quantitative. The results of each method will be evaluated in terms of its contribution to making inferences about the ideologies operating in the Voice of America and Radio Havana Cuba newsrooms. On the quantitative side, thematic (subject) and coverage (countries, regions, economic and political alliances covered) categories assigned by bilingual coders are analyzed for statistical measures of association and significance. Frequency of occurrence is tabulated and compared over time. Computer-generated lists of ideologically laden key words are analyzed for patterns of meaning, particularly regarding intersocial volition in their linguistic environments. A descriptive review of the sample periods' news examines the overall coverage patterns of the two stations. Finally, unexpected observations and intuitive reading of the data complement the more rigorous procedures.

HYPOTHESES TO BE TESTED

There are two theories (or subtheories) of the previous discussion of the role of ideology in international communication pursued in this study. Each yields different hypotheses.

> **Theory A:** Due to their divergent ideological orientations, Cuban and U.S. international newscasts display differences in various dimensions of content and coverage.

Hypothesis A1: There is a significant difference between the stations in thematic content of the newscasts for each sample period.

Hypothesis A2: There is a significant difference between the stations in the countries covered in each sample period.

Hypotheses A2.1–A2.3: There is a significant difference between the stations in regions, economic alliances, and political alliances that are covered. (These variables are recoded variables of the country variable.)

Hypothesis A3: VOA and RHC news items of the same thematic content display differences in countries covered.

Hypotheses A3.1–A3.3: VOA and RHC news items of the same thematic content display differences in regions, economic alliances, and political alliances covered.

Hypothesis A4: VOA and RHC news items covering the same countries display differences in thematic content.

Hypotheses A4.1–A4.3: VOA and RHC news items covering the same regions, economic alliances, and political alliances display differences in thematic content.

Theory B: A government's ideological orientation changes during transitions, such as elections or overthrow, and thus the ideological content of international newscasts changes through such transitions.

Hypothesis B1: There will be a difference in VOA thematic content and country, region, political alliance, and economic alliance coverage between the 1979 sample and the 1982 sample (Carter-to-Reagan transition).

Hypothesis B2: There will be no difference in RHC thematic content and country, region, political alliance, and economic alliance coverage between the 1979 sample and the 1982 sample (Castro regime has remained).

ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

To begin the analysis, one must define the "primitives."[2]

Data are easy to come by; their context is inaccessible. Data make up the surface which the researcher wants to penetrate. They are "one-way" in that the researcher has no means of corrective feedback to alter the data, and thus is forced to study them unobtrusively.

In the present case, the data to be studied are the respective transcribed broadcast newscasts of the VOA and RHC for a sample 3-week period. Although the researcher has had access through interviews with the sources of the broadcasts (the newswriters themselves), his intrusion in their empirical environment had no influence or impact on the data themselves.

The *context* relative to which data are analyzed must be made explicit. Needless to say, there are many contexts within which RHC and VOA newscasts could be analyzed, from atmospheric conditions to the rhetorical environment. In this study, that context is the ideology operating within the newsrooms of the two stations, as elaborated in Chapter 2.

The *analyst's interest and knowledge* determine the way in which inferences are made. The present author has close knowledge of the sources of the data, having visited both radio stations on repeated occasions. He also has a predisposition to materialist explanations, and has thus cast his analytical construct in terms of realist theory. Though ideology may change over time and may differ according to sociocultural location, one thing remains constant: overarching and simplifying ideological beliefs that are products of unique economic, and thus social, cultural, political, and historical, circumstances.

The *target of analysis* is what the analyst wants to know about, and is located in the variable portion of the context. The target of this study is to identify contents of communication that distinguish the ideological orientation of the VOA and RHC, one from another.

In such a study, the task is to make *inferences* from data to the context, and to justify these inferences in terms of the knowledge about the stable factors in the system of interest. This is done by means of an operational theory, in this case, the theory of ideology as outlined in Chapter 2. This theory postulates that stations appear as independent variables and that distinguishable ideological contents of communication appear as dependent variables.

It is important to specify the kind of evidence needed in the *validation* of the results of this study. This allows us to see whether the findings are "within the ballpark" of empirical plausibility or whether they have slid off into some tangential theoretical construction that follows no rules of correspondence back to realty. In this case, we are making inferences and by definition have no direct evidence about ideology in the newsroom. (Indeed, this type of investigation is the raison d'être of content analysis.) In our case, we must rely on non-media content indices of validity, such as the descriptions of the ideological beliefs of the United States and Cuba as outlined in Chapter 2.

SELECTION OF SAMPLE

The two opposing radio voices in the Cuban-American radio war were monitored. Broadcasts of VOA's Spanish service were recorded on audio tape from April 6–15, 1979, and from March 19–April 1, 1982. RHC's English broadcasts were similarly recorded from April 3–16, 1979, and from March 19–April 3, 1982. After considering equipment breakdown and the desire to have a sequential sample, the week of April 7–14, 1979, and the 2 weeks of March 19–April 2, 1982, were selected as the sample for this study.

The RHC newscast is presented repeatedly without change or updated information throughout its entire broadcast schedule, so there was no problem in selecting a representative newscast. However, VOA's newscasts vary from hour to hour and from morning to evening, depending upon such things as late-breaking news, staff changes, and time pressures. Therefore, only the first newscast of each broadcast day, transmitted at 6:30 A.M. Eastern Standard Time, was selected for analysis. This newscast was as long or longer than other VOA newscasts of the same day. VOA news personnel had the longest lead-time to prepare it. Further, Cuban broadcasters told the author that they listen to this particular newscast as part of their daily news diet. It is heard in Cuba at 7:30 A.M., local time.

The RHC and VOA newscasts were transcribed in their respective languages and were repeatedly checked for accuracy against the original tapes. However, there were occasional lapses of intelligibility caused by poor reception conditions on different days. The transcripts therefore include ''(unintelligible)'' to indicate missing text.

SEPARATION OF NEWS ITEMS

News items often seem to run together. Often, a single big news story will have several components to it from different reporters in different locations, attributing their information to different sources in different governments. For example, a news story about the Middle East might report the events in Beirut, then switch to the reaction by the Israeli government in Jerusalem and/or by protestors on the streets of Israel. This might be followed by news from Washington or Damascus, with a reaction from the Soviet Union. An event that took place during the Falklands/Malvinas conflict might originate in Buenos Aires, report events from eyewitnesses aboard British naval ships in the South Atlantic, switch to reactions in Washington, and conclude with a live interview in London. Given this situation, a regimen for separating them was developed. Any change in place or news actor indicated a different item. When the place or news actor remained the same, words such as ''meanwhile,'' ''in related news,'' ''for his part,'' ''mientras tanto,'' ''entre tanto,'' and ''en otros hechos'' indicated the start of a new news item. All otherwise ambiguous separations were left as one item. All items (including headlines, nonnews items such as station I.D.s, and news items) were labelled consecutively to indicate source, date, and rank order as follows: RHCXYYZZ-N or VOAXYYZZ-N, where RHC and VOA stand for the two station names, X stands for the month of the newscast, YY for its day, and ZZ for the year. N stands for the rank order of the news item. Thus, RHC41479-5 represents the fifth item in Radio Havana Cuba's newscast of April 14, 1979. All headlines were designated ''1,'' with a following letter to indicate the headline's ordinal position. Thus, VOA50182-1C represents the third headline of Voice of

America's newscast of May 1, 1982. (Headlines were not included in the analysis.)

THEMATIC CATEGORIES

The author modified Bush's categories for the classification of general news content.[3] The resulting list of categories covered the broadest range of international radio news themes and was defined to minimize overlap. The thematic categories used were:

1. DOMESTIC GOVERNMENTAL ACTION News about actions of a government (city, state, province, or nation-state), the legislative process, and the actual execution of laws. Statements by leaders of intent to act. Domestic elections. Actions by a president or parliament of a largely domestic nature. EXCLUDED: (2) DIPLOMACY/FOREIGN RELATIONS, (4) PEACE/DISARMAMENT, (10) JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS, (5) ARMS/MILITARY/DEFENSE, (13) ENERGY, (14) NUCLEAR ENERGY, (11) HUMAN AND CIVIL RIGHTS.

2. GOVERNMENTAL DIPLOMACY/FOREIGN RELATIONS News of diplomatic relations between and among nations, including official activities of ambassadors or representatives, summit conferences, state visits, receptions, and other activities in the conduct of foreign relations. Official sanctions of one or more nations against another nation that *fall short of actual armed hostilities.* Statements about another nation or of intent to act against another nation. Foreign aid. EXCLUDED: Nongovernments, see (3) NGO/FOREIGN RELATIONS.

3. NONGOVERNMENTAL (NGO)/FOREIGN RELATIONS News of activities of subnational or supernational organizations not normally classified as sovereign governments. Included are the United Nations, Arab League, the Nonaligned Countries Movement, international labor organizations, national liberation movements, etc. May be composed of governments (such as the United Nations) or national organizations (such as Amnesty International), but in either case it does not have power of enforcement. Note: This category means to include both nongovernmental *and* what is commonly understood as inter-governmental organizations.

4. PEACE/DISARMAMENT News of peace initiatives, ceasefires, truces, arms control talks, peace negotiations, disarmament negotiations.

5. ARMS/MILITARY/DEFENSE News of activities of defense departments of nations. Development or sales of conventional or nuclear arms. Military maneuvers *short of conflict* (for example, training). EXCLUDED: (6) WAR, (7) REBELLION.

6. WAR Actual hostilities between two or more nations or news of damages

or injuries during recent hostilities. Also provocations, incursions. *Must involve armed force.*

7. REBELLION News of actual or threatened armed (or at least violent) action taken against a government *by a national liberation movement or other large armed group* (10 or more people) from within the government's borders. EXCLUDED: (8) TERRORISM.

8. TERRORISM Violent action(s) *by an individual or small (less than 10 people) group,* often aimed at primarily nonmilitary personnel, either inside or outside a government's borders, for the purpose of advancing a rebellious cause and/or attracting attention to that cause. Assassination of political figures.

9. POPULAR PROTEST Actions (*usually nonviolent*) by citizens against their or another government, or against other institutions. Demonstrations, strikes, and other popular protest activities. Actions in support of others carrying out such activities. EXCLUDED: (16) LABOR protest.

10. JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS News of pleadings, trials, review of civil or criminal suits, official investigations, executions carried out by legally installed governments. EXCLUDED: (11) HUMAN AND CIVIL RIGHTS.

11. HUMAN AND CIVIL RIGHTS News of repression or denial of individual liberties, unfair jailings, beatings, torture, or trial of political dissidents. Unfair actions against civilians by police or military. Suspension of constitutional rights by a government. News of political refugees. Prison conditions, press restrictions. EXCLUDED: (10) JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS, (12) COMMON CRIME.

12. COMMON CRIME News of criminal acts or arrests of a common nature such as theft or fraud. EXCLUDED: (11) HUMAN AND CIVIL RIGHTS.

13. ENERGY News of energy costs, production, and distribution. Electrical, coal, petroleum, or solar. Governmental attempts to regulate energy use. EXCLUDED: (14) NUCLEAR ENERGY.

14. NUCLEAR ENERGY News of energy production through nuclear fission and related support activities such as reprocessing of spent fuels. News of activities of nuclear power plants. Governmental acts on nuclear energy. EXCLUDED: Accidents at nuclear power plants. See (18) ACCIDENTS/DISASTERS. EXCLUDED: Nuclear weapons. See (5) Arms-Military-Defense.

15. ECONOMIC ACTIVITY News of business, finance, and trade. News about fluctuations of prices, inflation, and unemployment.

16. LABOR Major conflicts, strikes, walk-outs. Minor events such as elections, contract settlements, grievances.

17. AGRICULTURE News of farming or farm-related matters such as equipment or business aspects of food production. EXCLUDED: Rise in farm prices. See (15) ECONOMIC ACTIVITY.

18. ACCIDENTS/DISASTERS News involving natural or human-made disasters or accidents with loss of life and/or property damage.
19. SCIENCE/SPACE News of the natural and social sciences involving theory, inventions, and innovations. News of space, research, voyages by manned or unmanned spacecraft. News of medicine or medical discoveries. EXCLUDED: (17) AGRICULTURE, (14) NUCLEAR ENERGY.
20. RELIGION News about churches and religious sects. News of religious holidays and festivities. Statements on religion by church leaders.
21. EDUCATION News of schools, universities, trade schools, achievements, or activities of students or student organizations. EXCLUDED: Student protest activities. See (9) POPULAR PROTEST.
22. ARTS/CULTURE/SPORTS News of cultural events and entertainment, including all sports, literature, drama, architecture, museums, music, film, television.
23. NON-NEWS ITEM Station identification, sign-on or sign-off, introduction of newscasters, etc.
24. OTHER UNCLASSIFIABLE Items which cannot be placed in any of the above categories.

These thematic categories were pre-tested and found reliable ($=.91$) in a previous study.[4]

COUNTRY, REGION, AND ALLIANCE CLASSIFICATION

Items were identified by country or countries treated.[5] When no country was mentioned, the item was placed in an "Unclassified" category. If more than two countries were mentioned in the news item, only the first two countries mentioned were coded. Items involving subnational or supernational organizations, such as Amnesty International or the United Nations, were classified as "NGOs—World Organizations." For accuracy and simplicity, headlines and station identifications were also categories, but they were not included in the statistical analysis.

Country data were recoded into geographical regions. Regions included North America, South America, Caribbean/Central America, Western Europe, Eastern Europe, Middle East, Far East, Southeast Asia, South Asia, Oceania, Africa, and Unclassified. Further, certain political and economic alliances of interest were included. These included the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Warsaw Treaty Organization, the Non-Aligned Countries Movement, Organization for Economic Development (OECD), Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON), Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Caribbean Economic Community (CARICOM), Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA), and the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).

FREQUENCY AND TIME CALCULATIONS

For each of these categories, a frequency of occurrence table was generated. Additionally, a time score (length in seconds) was tabulated for each item and for each total newscast. Additionally, the time (length) score was cross-tabulated by computer with the thematic categories, country classifications, regional classifications, and alliance classifications to give a measure of the relative time (emphasis) devoted to each category. Scores are reported in this study as frequency scores and as "percent of total coverage." In items mentioning two countries (see "Separation of News Items," page 99), each "country-mention" was given the item's full time value. Thus, the totals for the simple description of total time of the sample may not agree with the totals of the items in the other measure.

SELECTION AND TRAINING OF CODERS

Three bilingual coders were selected from respondents to an ad in the *Washington Post* to conduct the thematic coding. All read daily newspaper coverage of world affairs and were fluent in Spanish and English. The advertisement read under "Help Wanted—Part Time":

SPANISH—Bilingual newspaper readers to assist in media study. Brief training in NW Washington, 10–20 hours work in your home. Respond by letter to. . .

Coders were regular readers of newspapers. They included one Jamaican, one United States citizen, and one Mexican, all post-baccalaureate students studying in the Washington, D.C. area. Asked for political affiliations, the coders characterized themselves as Republican-conservative, Independent-liberal, and Independent-conservative.

Coders met together for a 3-hour training session. The purpose of the experiment was explained, though the word "ideology" was never mentioned. The "Thematic Categories" were gone over in detail, and examples were demonstrated using an overhead projector. After all coders' questions were answered, the coders coded a random sample of 20 news items on data sheets. These responses were discussed as a group, and modifications in the categories were allowed.

Each coder was then sent home to work on his/her data set. Each coder coded a common data set of 59 randomly selected news items, so that the final test of intercoder reliability could be made. The remainder of the news items were divided equally among the coders (two-thirds of the remainder of each). Thus, each news item was coded by 2 or 3 coders.

INTERCODER RELIABILITY

Two tests of intercoder reliability were made. First, reliability was computed as the ratio of coding agreements to the total number of coding decisions. For three coders:

$$R = \frac{3 \ (C1,2,3)}{C1 + C2 + C3}$$

where C1,2,3 is the number of category assignments all three coders agreed on, and C1 + C2 + C3 is the total of category assignments made by all three coders.[6]

Using this formula, the coefficient of reliability was as follows:

Between coders 1 and 2: 0.54
Between coders 1 and 3: 0.58
Between coders 2 and 3: 0.58
Among all three coders: 0.41

This formula has been criticized, however, because it does not account for chance agreement among and between coders.[7] Also, it does not take into account the number of categories in a category set. (The fewer the categories, the higher the agreement.) Scott has developed an index of reliability (pi) which corrects for the number of categories and the probable frequency of their use:[8]

$$pi = \frac{\% \ observed \ agreement \ - \ \% \ expected \ agreement}{1 \ - \ \% \ expected \ agreement}$$

Expected agreement by chance is determined by finding the proportion of items falling into each category set (expressed in hundredths of the whole), and summing the squares of those proportions.

Using Scott's pi, the coefficient of reliability was:

Between coders 1 and 2: 49% above chance
Between coders 1 and 3: 54% above chance
Between coders 2 and 3: 52% above chance
Among all three coders: 35% above chance

Even considering that the category set contained 24 discrete categories, the experimenter was only minimally satisfied. In the statistical analysis that follows, the data of coders 1 and 3 were used for maximum reliability. In any case, this 54 percent reliability figure taints the coding of themes only.

COMPUTER SORT ANALYSIS

An alphabetical tally of all words in the sample was made. The computer generated the frequency of occurrence of these words. But frequency counts and alpha-sorts take words out of their original linguistic environment and make their context-dependent meanings no longer recognizable. So the analyst chose to use the Key-Word-In-Context (KWIC) approach, which does just the opposite.[9] It listed the occurrences of selected words, together with the linguistic environment (context) in which they occurred, and gave the researcher an idea of how each key word was used. The following examples are necessarily abbreviated because of the page width, but the originals had a 40-character window on either side of the key-word.

in El Salvador. The	regime	is being blamed for the
tories. The Israeli	regime	has increases its repress
es between rebel and	regime	troops were also reported
a list issued by the	so-called	Salvadorean anti-comm
the creation of the	so-called	Central American Democra
occupation forces and	so-called	administrative autonomy
resolution that world	peace	is threatened by regional
ion between forces of	peace	and democracy and those
uan's contribution to	peace	and socialism, unity among

Item references to the original document were maintained. The KWIC program was written in PL/1. It excluded a number of articles and prepositions to save computer time and to reduce the output overload.[10]

FOOTNOTES

1. Ole R. Holsti, *Content Analysis for the Social Sciences and Humanities* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1969), p. 25.
2. Krippendorff provides an excellent six part framework. See Klaus Krippendorff, *Content Analysis: An Introduction to Its Methodology* (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publication, 1980), pp. 26–28.
3. Chilton R. Bush, "A System of Categories for General News Content," *Journalism Quarterly* 37 (1960): 206–210.
4. Howard H. Frederick, "Ideology in International Broadcasting: A Content Analysis of Voice of America and Radio Havana Cuba Newscasts," M.A. thesis, San Francisco State University, May 1981. Note: This reliability figure was not corrected for chance. (See below.)
5. The list of countries was taken from John Paxton, ed., *The Statesman's Year-Book: Statistical and Historical Annual of the States of the World for the Year 1982–1983* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982).

6.   Richard W. Budd, Robert K. Thorp, and Lewis Donohue, *Content Analysis of Communication* (New York: MacMillan, 1967), p. 68.
7.   E. M. Bennett, R. Alpert, and A. C. Goldstein, "Communication Through Limited Response Questioning," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 18 (1954): 303–308; Holsti, p. 140; Krippendorff, p. 135.
8.   W. A. Scott, "Reliability of Content Analysis: The Case of Nominal Scale Coding," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 19 (1955): 321–325. See also R. C. Angell, Vera S. Dunham, and J. D. Singer, "Social Values and Foreign Policy Attitudes of Soviet and American Elites," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 8 (1964): 330–491.
9.   Krippendorff, p. 122.
10.   The following Spanish and English words were excluded from the KWIC analysis: a, to, at, al, ayer, yesterday, de, of, del, el, the, he, ella, she, ellos, they, como, how, fue, was, fueron, were, ha, has, han, have, hoy, today, e, and, y, durante, while, during, en, in, into, entre, between, es, is, ese, this, esta, estan, are, este this, la, the las, lo, it, los, no, not, o, or, para, for, pero, but, por, for, by, que, that, se (ref. pronoun), ser, be, sera, will be, sobre, above, on, son, are, su, his, hers, its, sus, theirs, tambien, also, un, una, one, an, tuvo, had, tuvieron, had, ahora, now, todavia, still, ya, already, con, with, VOA, RHC, all single letters of the alphabet (e.g., a, b, c), and all numbers.

Findings

In order to understand the tables and calculations that follow, a general survey of what took place in the world during the sample periods will prove helpful. This summary includes the major news events as seen by VOA's Spanish service and RHC's English services. It is apparent that what took place during the sample periods had a different meaning for RHC than it did for VOA.

MAJOR EVENTS AS SEEN BY RADIO HAVANA CUBA

April 7–14, 1979

In Cuban Affairs

- Bulgarian Head of State Todor Zhivkov arrived in Cuba for an "official and friendly visit" with Cuban leader Fidel Castro. Zhivkov remained in Cuba during this entire week. He was welcomed by crowds at Jose Marti Airport. He toured the countryside with Castro. In Cienfuegos, he inaugurated a Bulgarian-financed sprinkler factory. On the Isle of Youth, he visited the prison where Castro spent 2 years before being sent into exile. Zhivkov and Castro signed a lengthy communique pledging cooperation in a wide range of technical and cultural areas.
- Cuba held the second election in its history for positions in the People's Power Assembly. Ninety-six percent of the eligible voters turned out. One official said that the lack of turnout in capitalist elections showed that those people mistrusted their elections, unlike the Cuban people, who placed complete faith and trust in their elected officials. Cuban religious leaders expressed their support for the elections. Meanwhile, a Cuban jazz group was touring the United States.
- Cuban exile leaders in Florida reiterated their support for rapprochement with the Castro government, and condemned terrorist attacks on supporters of that movement. Those who opposed the dialogue with the Castro government

were "nothing more than merchants of death who have been crushed by
history." Cuban exile leaders in Spain also decried the "kneecapping" and
kidnapping of supporters of those working toward reunification of Cuban
families.

- Cuban governmental representatives travelled abroad with invitations to
heads of state to attend the Sixth Summit Conference of the Nonaligned
Countries Movement, to be held in Havana in September 1979. Bulgaria and
the Soviet Union launched a manned spacecraft that "acted with precision"
during an unsuccessful linkup attempt with another space laboratory.

In Southeast Asian Affairs

- Vietnam and China, each charging recriminations, postured toward negotia-
tions on a border dispute in which, according to RHC, Chinese
"hegemonists" had "usurped" Vietnamese territory.
- The Chinese decision to renounce the friendship treaty with the Soviet Union
provoked indignation among "people who love peace." China, RHC said,
had betrayed socialism "in order to win crumbs from the imperialist
banquet."
- RHC portrayed the Vietnamese in an heroic struggle to reject hegemony.
Cuban workers rallied in blood drives to support the homeless orphans of
China's aggression.
- RHC cited Albanian reports that China had been sending arms to South
Africa.
- A Japanese report said that wall posters had begun to appear in Peking
protesting the lack of freedom in China.
- Kampuchean government forces moved against counterrevolutionary forces
in the countryside.

Middle East News

- In Iran, the Ayatollah Khomeini asserted that the U.S. was trying to de-
stabilize the regime, that Iran hoped to develop friendly relations with all
nations, including the Soviet Union.
- Executions of corrupt and treasonous officials were carried out throughout
Iran.
- Khomeini and others announced plans to form a constitution and to hold
elections. Ethnic and women's rights would be protected.
- Iran called back its military men training in the United States.
- Thousands of people demonstrated in support of the government, and
800,000 illiterates had signed up for reading lessons in Iran.

News of the Americas

- The Grenadan prime minister charged that the overthrown dictator Eric Gairy was recruiting mercenaries among the underworld in the United States.
- Guyana offered aid to Grenada's new revolutionary government.
- The Jamaican prime minister arrived in Moscow for an official visit and expressed the conviction that the Soviet Union will always be on the side of those seeking a new international economic order.
- U.S. Congressman Ronald Dellums called for an investigation into the murder of two pro-independence youths in Puerto Rico.
- The UNESCO General Director arrived in Jamaica for talks on educational cooperation in the region.
- St. Vincent was in a state of emergency due to a volcanic eruption.
- Students demonstrated in Chile.
- Bolivian repression tightened on the eve of national elections.
- Journalists in Peru undertook a hunger strike to protest press censorship.
- Members of the Chilean "fascist junta" arrived in China for a state visit.
- People continued to disappear in Argentina and Uruguay.
- Repression in Guatemala was on the rise.
- Several hundred Salvadorean workers were kidnapped and taken to Saudi Arabia to build a military complex.
- A Venezuelan anthropologist charged that U.S. missionaries were destroying indigenous Indian culture.
- Brazilian authorities returned the body of a miner who had stolen a pack of cigarettes.
- Israelis were helping to modernize the Guatemalan intelligence service.
- In Nicaragua. Sandinista guerrillas captured and held the town of Esteli and engaged loyalist troops in Rivas.
- Government forces in Nicaragua bombed the rebels, while President Somoza, on vacation in the United States, claimed he was crushing the insurgents.
- A Nicaraguan rebel group visited the United States in search of support.

News of the United States

- In the United States, new radiation leaks were discovered at the Three Mile Island nuclear reactor. Pregnant women were warned to stay away. A mass demonstration was held to protest environmental contamination. Nuclear Regulatory Commission officials admitted that they did not know how to resolve the dangerous situation within the plant.
- Thousands of people massed in Philadelphia to protest lack of rights by Blacks and other ethnic minorities.

- Progressive organizations encouraged the U.S. to ratify a treaty on individual liberties.
- Sabotage struck the aircraft carrier John F. Kennedy, while a chemical train derailed near Nashville and a tornado rocked Kansas.
- In Washington, demonstrators threw bottles of their own blood against the Pentagon to protest nuclear arms development.
- In New York, police attacked striking milk delivery drivers.
- A U.S. court ordered a Puerto Rican revolutionary to prison.

Middle East Events

- Arab nations condemned Egypt for its treaty with Israel and expelled it from the Arab League, whose headquarters were moved from Cairo to Tunis. The Iraqi foreign minister arrived in Havana to explain the move.
- "Zionist barbarous" aggressors carried out new attacks on refugee settlements in Lebanon. Israel inflicted mass punishment on one Palestinian village.
- The Palestinian news agency reported that the "the militant Palestinian people" would not be intimidated by Carter or his "pawns Sadat or Begin."
- A meeting between top Algerian and Soviet officials has led these countries to grow closer.
- In Kabul, thousands of Afghanis demonstrated their support for the April revolution.
- The Yemeni prime minister arrived in Bulgaria for an official visit.

African Affairs

- Rhodesian terrorists attacked and nearly killed leading Black nationalists in Zambia, where an international solidarity conference was taking place.
- The world press condemned the assassination of a leading Black nationalist in South Africa, which executed 150 people during the past year. Black gold miners were on strike.
- Nigeria and Angola signed an agreement to increase their economic relations.
- Nigeria and Hungary agreed to increase their scientific cooperation while the Rumanian president arrived in Angola for an official visit.
- Angola charged that South Africa bombed its territory.
- Uganda announced the creation of a provisional government, while Idi Amin was reported still to be resisting his overthrow from somewhere in the country.
- Cuban medical brigades in the Congo reported that they had "won the respect, admiration, and love of the Congolese people."
- Morocco and Zaire conferred on mutual defense.

- A Mozambican court handed down death sentences to people accused of infiltrating from Rhodesia.

March 19–April 2, 1982

Central America

- The biggest news of this sample period was the ongoing crisis in Central America.
- Four Dutch journalists were killed by Salvadorean army troops. They had been riding in a clearly marked car, but their names had appeared on a death list. Protest poured in from around the world on the journalists' murders. The Salvadorean archbishop called for an investigation into the deaths. Their bodies were shipped to Holland for burial.
- The Salvadorean government and opposition forces clashed in preparation for U.S.-sponsored elections. All opposition forces and many foreign leaders denounced the elections as being a U.S. attempt to legitimize the Salvadorean regime of Napoleon Duarte. The FMLN accused Washington of stepping up military operations and said that "neither the phoney elections nor a coup can save the junta." San Salvador was under a virtual state of siege, with buses and phone lines cut by the guerrillas. The FMLN surrounded army troops in Morazan, blocked access to San Vicente, and fought Army troops in Usulutan. Guerrillas even attacked the Presidential palace in San Salvador. The elections took place with the U.S. embassy playing a key role in helping the right-wing groups organize a coalition to oust the previous government. According to RHC, the elections were clearly fraudulent, given the reports of right-wing buses taking voters to different polls and of missing voting lists. World-wide protest poured in about the phony elections. The United States called the elections a "great achievement for democracy." Five rightist parties announced a governing coalition with Roberto D'Aubuisson as head. D'Aubuisson has been implicated in the assassination of the previous Salvadorean archbishop and in the organization of death squads.
- A former CIA agent said that events in El Salvador bore "a strong resemblance to the role played by the agency in preparation for the massive U.S. intervention in Vietnam."
- The U.S. has made a pact with Argentina and other Latin American nations to invade El Salvador. Argentinian troops were already in Honduras.
- In Honduras, workers, students, and trade union members demonstrated against U.S. and Honduran intervention in El Salvador.
- The Honduran Communist Party charged that the U.S. planned to install military bases. A delegation of State Department officials was in Honduras looking for airbases to devote to the effort against the Salvadorean guerrillas.

- Nicaragua charged that Honduras had kidnapped a Nicaraguan diplomat working in the Honduran capital.
- Nicaragua called for the United Nations to convene an emergency meeting of the Security Council in the face of an immanent attack by the United States. The U.N. convened that meeting, and Nicaragua claimed that it was ready to talk directly with the United States. The United States, it claimed, had rejected closer relations. Numerous countries supported Nicaragua's charges in the United Nations.
- In preparation for war, Nicaragua declared a state of emergency and called for patriotic contributions to cover defense costs.
- The Women's Continental Meeting for Peace and National Independence in Nicaragua heard a long list of speakers from all over the world condemn the United States for its aggressive policy in Central America.
- The Nicaraguan Interior Minister said that U.S. intervention would mean the "vietnamization" of all Central America.
- Counterrevolutionary bands stepped up attacks against Nicaragua.
- Honduras was charged with conducting an air raid. Honduran attacks were seen as confirmation of the United States' aggressive designs.
- Counterrevolutionaries attacked border posts in Nicaragua and the Sandinista army cracked down on them. Despite these hardships, Nicaragua announced that it had increased its exports of coffee, cotton, sugar, beef, and other commodities.
- Barricada, the government-supported newspaper in Nicaragua, said that the opposition newspaper, La Prensa, was moving in a direction that would force the government to take a harder line against it.
- In Guatemala, a "self-styled" group of military officers headed by General Efrain Rios Montt overthrew the government. The new regime outlawed political and trade union activities and arrested officers of the former government charging them with embezzlement and corruption. Mexico and other countries expressed their regret over the coup, but the United States recognized the new government. The U.S. is trying to change the regime's image and facilitate aid to the new ruling clique.
- Guatemalan rebel armed forces attacked government positions around the country.
- The guerrillas said the U.S., the ruling class, and the large landowners are using the Guatemalan army for profit.
- Family members said that their relatives are being kept in a concentration camp in El Peten department in Guatemala.
- The U.S. embassy in Guatemala was attacked by rifle fire and bombs.
- Mexico stepped up its mediation role in Central America. Its foreign minister flew to Cuba for an official visit. Mexico, he said, understood Nicaragua's request for an emergency Security Council meeting. He then flew to Nicaragua and to Washington in an effort to promote dialogue.

- The Mexican president's plan for negotiation in Central America drew the support of the Italian press.
- In the Security Council, Mexico supported the need for closer U.S.–Cuban relations.
- In Southwest Mexico, a volcanic explosion left over 100 people killed.
- Panama demanded payment of $17 million for earnings on the Panama Canal. It took over complete administration of the Canal.
- Panamanian newspapers criticized the appointment of Lewis Tambs as the new U.S. ambassador, because he was an author of the Santa Fe report.
- The president of Costa Rica rejected the U.S.'s aggressive stance toward Nicaragua, while some Costa Ricans were charging that a U.S. military base was being set up in their country in the Alta Talamonca mountains.
- The leader of the Costa Rican Peoples Vanguard Party was bombed, and mass protests took place against government-imposed price hikes.
- Grenada held talks with the Venezuelan president and rejected accusations in a Trinidad-Tobago daily that the international airport being built in Grenada was a security threat to neighboring countries.
- The former Jamaican prime minister, Michael Manley, head of the People's National Party, was in Havana to meet with Fidel Castro.
- The U.S. president's advance crews were in Kingston, Jamaica, to make preparations for Reagan's visit.
- In the Dominican Republic, the Communist Party charged that the CIA and the Dominican secret service wanted to kill its leaders.

United States Affairs

- In the United States, Catholic women occupied Immigration and Naturalization offices to protest the deportation of Salvadorean immigrants to El Salvador.
- Ronald Reagan held talks with the so-called Central American Democratic Community (Costa Rica, Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala), while Representative Mervin Dymally said that Reagan planned to turn Central Ameri.a into a war zone.
- Democratic senators called the Reagan Central American plans "just a smokescreen" for getting more aid to the Salvadorean regime.
- The White House and Congress were preparing heavy campaigns against efforts toward a negotiated solution in Central America.
- The Carribean Basin Initiative, one of the Administration's plans, was not an aid plan: it was an incentive to private business.
- Only 6 percent of the American people supported Reagan's interventionist policy against El Salvador.
- Senator Kennedy was outspoken in his criticisms of Reagan's foreign and military policy.

- The House of Representatives approved millions of dollars for Radio Marti, a radio station to be directed at Cuba.
- The International Sociological Association meeting in the United States expressed its concern about the U.S. threat to Nicaragua. Three thousand university faculty signed a petition to Reagan condemning U.S. intervention.
- Senator Pryor called the Reagan administration's plans to manufacture chemical weapons insane.
- President Reagan ruled out any freeze in the production of nuclear weapons.
- A NATO task force on nuclear weapons met in Colorado to discuss Soviet Prime Minister Brezhnev's proposal for a halt to installing medium-range missiles in Europe.
- Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty, and the Voice of America received new staff and budget increases.
- Defense Secretary Weinberger was on an official visit to Japan.
- A new anti-Cuba terrorist camp was set up in Florida.
- The U.S. space shuttle was launched.
- The Reagan administration insisted that all governmental contacts with the press must get prior approval.
- A bill in the Senate would prohibit journalists from revealing the names of secret agents even if that information came from public sources.

Middle East News

- Israeli police attacked Palestinian demonstrators on the West Bank who were protesting the removal of Palestinian mayors from their posts. A curfew was imposed. Palestinians then undertook a general strike.
- The Israeli Parliament debated censure motions on Israel's occupation policy.
- The U.N. Security Council held a meeting to debate the situation on the West Bank.
- Two million Palestinians observed the "Day of the Land" to protest Israeli policies.
- The Arab League voted to give aid to Palestinians resisting the Israelis on the West Bank.
- U.S. troops were added to the present buffer force in the Sinai.
- Israel began its second stage in the integration of the Golan Heights into Israel proper.
- U.S. military aid was seen arriving for the Lebanese army, while artillery barrages were exchanged between the Lebanese Phlange and supporters of Suleiman Franjieh.
- North Yemeni troops, with the aid of Saudi Arabia, were ready to attack South Yemen.
- Iran and Iraq reported growing losses in their conflict.
- The Iraqi president proposed a commission to determine who started the conflict, while Iran began its "victory offensive."

Latin American News

- The Chilean regime arrested four people and charged them with belonging to the Communist Party. They were confined to Northern Chile.
- Jouranlists in Chile received threats due to a story about corruption in the business community.
- In Chile, armed people attacked a car dealer and stole money.
- The secret police in Chile arrested other people of the Revolutionary Left Movement. Still others were arrested for demonstrating against the regime's economic policies.
- In Bolivia, the airport personnel were on strike for wage increases. Banking workers, airport workers and other trade union people were on strike, while bomb blasts were heard in the capital.
- The Bolivian Workers Confederation staged a 48-hour strike against the strict economic measures imposed by the International Monetary Fund.
- In Peru, police and army posts in Ayacucho were attacked. Electric and rail service were disrupted.
- Dozens of bombs exploded during a blackout in Lima.
- A Peruvian senator said poverty was the root cause of the events in Ayacucho.
- The Colombian president called for an interamerican force to stop Cuban and Nicaraguan arms to El Salvador.
- Numerous clashes were reported between government troops and M-19 guerrilas in Columbia.
- M-19 took over a church and a theater in Bogata to protest the Salvadorean elections.
- A death squad in Columbia announced it intended to kill M-19 people in prison.
- The Ecuadorian president arrived in Columbia for an official visit.
- The Venezuelan president met the Ecuadorian president on an official visit.
- Brazil announced that it would set up a naval base on a remote Atlantic island.
- Brazil's foreign minister was in China for official talks.
- The head of Trinidad and Tobago's oil field workers said the U.S. oil companies would be nationalized.
- Argentina announced it would sell arms to Nicaragua.
- Renault Argentina laid off 4000 workers due to the recession.
- The Argentine General Labor Confederation called a strike against the recession and government economic policy. In a violent crackdown, the government arrested 2000 people in the strike.
- In Surinam, the government announced that the recent coup attempt was led by people who were in close contact with the Dutch embassy. The state of siege was lifted, and the military government announced that a new civilian government would be formed.

European Affairs

- The Polish Parliament held its twentieth regular session.
- Newswriters in Poland proposed a new union "based on respect for socialism," while the Polish journalists association was disbanded because of its support for "anti-socialist" activities.
- Citizen committees were working to solve many social problems.
- New documents were revealed that demonstrated the subversive activities of the Solidarity union.
- Warsaw treaty maneuvers took place in Northeast Poland.
- General Jarulzelski travelled to the German Democratic Republic for an official visit. The Polish and Democratic German communique condemned U.S. intervention in Poland's internal affairs.
- Telecommunications restrictions imposed during the national emergency were lifted.
- In the Soviet Union, the World Congress of Trade Unions blasted U.S. foreign policies.
- Foreign Minister Gromyko said the Brezhnev peace initiative had created "confusion and alarm" among some people. A visiting Federal German peace group condemned Washington's rejection of Brezhnev's proposal.
- Brezhnev said the socialist allies are the main obstacles to those promoting war.
- The Soviet defense minister was on an official visit to India.
- Unemployment was up, with 10.8 million unemployed in the European Economic Community. Federal Germany had the highest increase.
- The French prime minister was in Federal Germany.
- There were demonstrations in Sweden, Spain, and Denmark against U.S. policy in Central America.
- The four Dutch journalists murdered in El Salvador were buried in Holland.
- Portuguese workers marched and struck against unemployment.
- Turkey purchased new American combat planes.
- The Bulgarian National Assembly opened.
- The U.S. was to build 70 silos in Federal Germany for the upcoming deployment of Cruise and Pershing II missiles.
- The British foreign secretary was in Israel on an official visit.
- Two British soldiers were shot in Northern Ireland.
- The Socialist International meeting in Bonn reaffirmed its commitment to detente and disarmament.

African Events

- The U.N. Apartheid Committee was on a visit to Angola.
- Angola complained to the U.N. Security Council about the South African

enclave being created in Angolan territory, while the Socialist International condemned South African incursions into Angola.

- Algerian army officers were sent to Chad at the request of the government.
- Zimbabwean security forces uncovered a South African spy ring in the Prime Minister's office. Lesotho said South African agents were in the country.
- South Africa appeared able to launch nuclear artillery shells with equipment manufactured with U.S. assistance.
- Ghanaian officials were on an official visit to the Soviet Union.
- The Mozambican president was given a medal of honor by Bulgaria.

Asian Events

- A French envoy was in India to discuss bilateral relations.
- The Soviet defense minister arrived in India for an official visit.
- The Indian Communist Party accused the U.S., China, and Pakistan of acting against India's peace and security. It said world peace was also threatened by U.S. plans in Central America.
- The Bangladeshi government was toppled by a military coup. All political activity was outlawed and political figures were put in jail. Hundreds were arrested and the new regime went after public officials for corruption.
- The International Organization of Journalists called for stepped up struggle against apartheid.
- Moroccan intransigence regarding the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic was blocking the Organization of African Unity.
- The Coordinating Bureau of the Nonaligned Movement approved the agenda for the upcoming summit meeting in Baghdad.

MAJOR EVENTS AS SEEN BY THE VOICE OF AMERICA

April 7–14, 1979

News from Iran

- Iran continued to execute former officials of the overthrown Shah. They were found guilty of putting down anti-Shah demonstrations and were charged with corruption and treason.
- Iran expressed its hope to have good relations with both the United States and the Soviet Union, but Iran asked that the U.S. replace the current ambassador to Tehran because of his close connections to the Shah.

In the United States

- The United States suspended economic aid to Pakistan in the wake of that country's refusal to accept international nuclear safeguards. A huge bomb

blast at a dynamite factory in Rawalpindi destroyed an entire city block and broke windows kilometers away.

- Nuclear technicians at the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant continued their attempts to cool down the reactor. A small radiation leak was detected but was judged insignificant. President Carter declared that there was nothing to fear in respect to contamination of agricultural production around the plant. Carter named a commission to investigate the accident at the power plant and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission ordered corrective measures be taken at other plants.
- President Carter received praise and criticism on his new energy policy to lift the controls on domestic crude oil production and to impose a tax on windfall profits.
- The American secretary of state and the Soviet ambassador continued meeting to discuss the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty and it was reported that little remained to be done before it would be ready for signatures. But some Senate leaders were leaning toward opposing the treaty. Meanwhile, Soviet and American officials moved toward agreement on limiting outer space warfare.
- U.S. unemployment was down, but President Carter warned that a recession would make that figure rise again. U.S. truckers were on strike.
- The U.S. government expelled two South African military attaches as a reprisal for a similar action taken against U.S. officials whom South Africa had accused of espionage and had expelled.
- The U.S. vice-president was in Norway and Iceland on an official visit and to see where his family had come from.
- Oscar awards were given to two anti-Vietnam war films, *The Deerslayer* and *Coming Home.*

Latin American News

- Peru extended police powers "to guarantee social peace" in wake of that government's decision to close ten Peruvian magazines.
- The State Department declared that the House of Representatives had not acted in the national interest in suspending economic aid to Panama.
- The Bulgarian chief of state concluded a 5-day official visit to Cuba that should give new impulse to Bulgarian–Cuban relations.
- The U.S. announced a relief program for the storm-battered island of St. Vincent.
- In Nicaragua, the National Guard sent in more troops to try to dislodge hundreds of guerrillas in Esteli. Government forces used bombers and tanks, while President Somoza, on vacation in the United States, was visiting his son at the University of Kansas.

Middle East Affairs

- In the Middle East, Egyptian President Sadat announced a referendum on the peace treaty with Israel as well as a debate in the Parliament.
- Israeli and Egyptian military officials were to meet to implement the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the Sinai.
- Carter asked Congress for speedy approval of his request for additional economic aid for Egypt and Israel.
- Aid to Syria was cut off because of the country's opposition to peace efforts.
- Israel denied reports that it would build new Jewish settlements in the West Bank.
- Egypt insisted that the Palestinians must be part of any peace process. But Jordanian King Hussein called for a new Middle East peace initiative because the United States was no longer a neutral arbiter in the region.
- Kuwait raised its crude oil price, and Iran and Saudi Arabia were expected to follow suit.

In Asian Affairs

- Vietnam charged that the Chinese invasion of its border territory was the greatest act of aggression since World War II. But Vietnam later received a Chinese delegation sent to begin negotiations.
- Cambodian Khmer Rouge forces loyal to the overthrown regime continued their resistance to Vietnamese-backed troops of the new Kampucheann government.
- The International Olympic Committee discussed admitting China and expelling Taiwan.

In Europe

- Elections began in Great Britain, and Conservative Party leader Margaret Thatcher was expected to win.
- Christians prepared to celebrate Easter.

African News

- Rhodesian planes bombed guerrilla camps deep in Zambia. The Rhodesian Prime Minister declared that Soviet officials have taken control of guerrilla camps in Zambia. The object of the attack, nationalist leader Joshua Nkomo, pledged to revenge the Rhodesian raid.
- In Uganda, Tanzanian soldiers and exile Ugandans confronted troops loyal to Idi Amin. Invading troops controlled all routes to the capital. Libyan forces

withdrew. Four foreigners posing as journalists were charged as mercenaries and executed. Rebels finally took control of Uganda as Amin fled. A provisional president arrived from Tanzania and declared his principal task was to reconstruct the country.

March 19–April 1, 1982

Central American News

- Four Dutch journalists were killed in El Salvador in fighting between army troops and guerrillas. They had been threatened by far-right groups. The Salvadorean president tried to assuage the fear of other jouranlists covering the country and predicted more violence before the national elections.
- Leftist guerrillas dynamited buses, police quarters, the water utility, and polling places.
- The leader of the Catholic church laid the blame on the guerrillas and government troops for the wave of violence.
- Six Salvadorean political parties campaigned for elections as the U.S. sent a delegation to observe the process. No single Salvadorean party won a majority vote. But five rightist parties announced that they were trying to form a coalition; the U.S. said it did not intend to mediate among the political parties.
- The Venezuelan president said his government would reevaluate its policies toward El Salvador after the elections.
- The U.S. State Department affirmed that the Cuban president personally has ordered an increase in arms to the guerrillas to disrupt the upcoming elections in El Salvador.
- A member of the ruling junta said that Nicaragua is ready to hold peace talks with the United States on Central America.
- Nicaragua requested and received a special Security Council meeting to consider its allegation of an immanent invasion by the United States.
- The Mexican foreign minister visited Nicaragua after talks with the Cuban president.
- In the Security Council, Mexico said Nicaragua and the U.S. would hold high-level talks in Mexico City.
- The Nicaraguan government arrested 28 counterrevolutionaries and expelled them from the country.
- The U.S. government strongly deplored the expulsions of the Jehovah's Witnesses from Nicaragua.
- The Guatemalan government was overthrown in a military coup. It suspended the constitution, dissolved congress, abolished political parties, and declared invalid the results of recent presidential elections.
- The American embassy in Guatemala was attacked with automatic fire.

- A U.S. citizen who had farmed in Guatemala for 8 years was shot by unknown assailants in northern Guatemala.
- Honduras protested to the Organization of American States about presumed border violations by Nicaragua.
- In Honduras, a Nicaraguan alleged that the Nicaraguan ambassador heads a spy ring of 40 agents.
- Foreign ministers from Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Honduras met in Washington to discuss the Central American situation.
- Panama took over new judicial powers in the Canal Zone.
- The Italian foreign minister called on European nations to play a more active role in finding solutions to the region's problems.
- An arms cache was uncovered in the house of the Costa Rica Communist Party head.
- Several people were killed or injured in a fire that consumed the Mexican National Film Theater.
- Costa Rican beef was prohibited from U.S. markets after contaminated meat was found.
- A Haitian freighter sank off Florida with a loss of 20 lives.
- In Mexico a volcanic eruption in the southern part of the country killed and injured many.
- The U.S. Congress was beginning hearings on the Caribbean Basin Initiative. The U.S. president said the funds would go to countries threatened by grave economic problems, by external forces and internal violence.
- The House of Representatives approved the establishment of a new radio station called Radio Marti to be directed against Cuba.
- The State Department refused to confirm or deny reports that the U.S. had sent an envoy to Havana.
- The U.S. president said that he continued to oppose any negotiations with leftist guerrillas in El Salvador.
- More than 20,000 demonstrators marched near the White House to protest U.S. policy toward El Salvador.

Latin American Affairs

- More than a million people demonstrated in Buenos Aires to demand that the government give information on people who have disappeared since 1973.
- An Argentine human rights activist was given the Nobel Peace Prize.
- The Argentine police arrested hundreds protesting the economic policy of the government.
- Brazil and China have agreed to collaborate in having closer relations after a visit to China by the Brazilian foreign minister.
- The Brazilian president said nothing would impede the construction of "authentic democracy" in his country.

- Brazilian authorities put down a prison revolt in Sao Paolo.
- The Bolivian government declared a state of emergency during floods over two-thirds of the country.
- The Bolivian labor confederation announced a general strike to protest government economic measures and price increases.
- The Ecuadorian president began an official visit to Colombia.
- A Colombian airliner crashed, killing all aboard.
- The Interamerican Development Bank was meeting in Colombia and announced it had loaned a record sum to Latin American countries. At the meeting, the U.S. said the Bank should share the task of development with the private sector.
- Argentina denied a British accusation that one of its merchant marine ships had landed on the South Georgia island. Argentina dispatched a naval ship to assist the sailors.
- British television reported that a nuclear-powered submarine was on its way to the Falklands.

Middle East Affairs

- Protests continued on the West Bank of the Jordan as Arab villages prepared to declare a general strike to protest the dissolution of a neighboring village council. Several persons were killed or injured in continuing protests. Schools and businesses were closed as a general strike was declared. Israeli Arabs also protested the dissolutions. The U.S. president expressed his profound concern about the violence.
- The U.N. Security Council agreed to a Syrian request for a general debate on the situation in the West Bank.
- The Arab League called for Arab aid to West Bank villages.
- Israeli forces imposed a curfew on three villages.
- The Israeli defense minister lifted the military blockade of four Moslem villages in the Golan. The Middle East envoy said that Israel would obey the current ceasefire in southern Lebanon.
- The U.S. Defense Department asked Congress for authorization to sell tanks and combat planes to Egypt.
- OPEC agreed on new prices to keep the price of oil high amidst a saturated market for petroleum.

News of the United States

- The American arms negotiator returned from Geneva to counsel against a nuclear freeze.

- The defense secretary stated that talks to reduce large strategic arms would begin the following year.
- The U.S. told its NATO allies that it was in the final stages of preparing a negotiating position on reducing strategic arms, and NATO defense ministers reaffirmed their support for President Reagan's proposal on nuclear missiles in Europe.
- The President told an audience that the U.S. must stop the unprecedented increase in Soviet military capacity while another official urged Western allies to restrict credit to Moscow.
- The U.S. president signed a Congressional resolution urging the Soviet Union to end human rights abuses. He also declared that the Soviet economy is particularly vulnerable due to high military expenditures.
- The space shuttle take-off was delayed briefly due to mechanical problems, and the landing site was changed due to flooding in California. In space, it exercised the remote arm, which will place and retrieve satellites. It landed in New Mexico after 8 days in space.
- General Motors and the industry labor union agreed on a new contract that saves the company money and gives the workers job security.
- The inhabitants around Mt. St. Helens returned to their homes after two eruptions.
- The U.S. president declared parts of flood-striken Indiana a disaster zone.
- *On Golden Pond* won an Oscar.

European Events

- The German chancellor's party was soundly defeated in local elections. Meanwhile, he and the British prime minister met in their series of regular discussions.
- French voters dealt leftist candidates another series of defeats in local elections.
- The Italian president arrived in Washington on an official visit.
- Protest demonstrations took place in West Germany against U.S. policy in El Salvador.
- European Economic Community leaders met in Brussels.
- A special French commission was formed to investigate an explosion that destroyed a train.
- The Polish military leader arrived in East Berlin and "was received as a hero for the military repression that he imposed on his country."
- The Polish army accused the military government's opponents of trying to organize an armed resistance movement and arrested youths accused of activities against martial law.
- The Polish government announced the formation of a new association for

Polish journalists after the old one was abolished. The leader of the old association said that martial law was a mistake.

- The Polish archbishop announced the Pope's visit might be postponed.
- In a religious event of special interest, the daughter of Lech Walesa was baptized; Walesa was in prison. Walesa's wife said the government has offered them the chance to emigrate.
- The Polish National Assembly met to consider aid to private farmers, who produce three-fourths of the country's food, while the Soviet Union increased its economic aid.

Asian Affairs

- Public acts in the U.S., Europe, and Asia were planned for the Day of Afghanistan to underscore opposition to the Soviet invasion. In Florence, Italy, an international conference was held in solidarity with the Afghan resistance.
- The U.S. State Department publicized evidence of Soviet use of chemical weapons in Laos, Kampuchea, and Afghanistan.
- Iranian troops began an important offensive against Iraqi forces.
- The U.S. State Department said it was talking with Israel about reports that the Israelis were sending arms to Iran.
- An Islamic seminar in Sri Lanka decided to make an effort to end the Iran–Iraq war.
- The Iraqi president said his forces had retreated in a reorganization movement.
- The Iraqi third secretary in Beirut was killed instantaneously in a fire attack on his car.
- A bomb exploded in a largely Moslem provincial capital in Thailand.
- No one was hurt in a bomb blast at the U.S. consulate at Bombay, India.
- South Korea and the U.S. agreed on measures to strengthen their capacity to resist aggression from the north.
- The Bangladeshi army chief assumed control of the country in a military coup and promised to hold free elections after the present crisis. Ex-ministers were arrested and accused of corruption and abuse of power.
- China indicated that it was assuming an "attitude of expectation" regarding the Soviet president's call for better relations.
- The U.N. Fund for Population Control said that the world is at the edge of economic disaster due to overpopulation and depletion of natural resources.
- Pravda called for a constructive U.S. response to the Soviet proposal to limit nuclear arms.
- The Soviet president issued a call to China to end the two decades of hostility between the two nations.

* Rumors were circulating in Moscow that the Soviet president had been hospitalized.

DESCRIPTION OF SAMPLE

The two services had marked differences in the average amount of time spent on each newscast during the sample (see Table 3). The Voice of America's average

Table 3.   Newscast Lengths and Number of News Items

	Radio Havana Cuba			Voice of America		
Date	Length (seconds)	N of items	Mean length	Length (seconds)	N of items	Mean length
1979						
Apr 7	986	32	30.8	813	15	54.2
Apr 9	1190	34	35.0	575	11	52.3
Apr 10	1189	39	30.5	648	17	38.1
Apr 11	—	—	—	634	13	48.7
Apr 12	1103	28	39.4	485	16	30.3
Apr 13	1228	37	33.2	—	—	—
Apr 14	1182	29	40.8	714	14	51.0
1979 Total	6878	199	34.6	3869	86	45.0
Mean	1146	33		645	14	
1982						
Mar 19	1062	38	27.9	608	13	46.7
Mar 20	994	30	33.1	—	—	—
Mar 21	—	—	—	621	15	41.4
Mar 22	1126	41	27.5	621	17	36.5
Mar 23	760	30	25.3	688	16	43.0
Mar 24	938	31	30.3	700	16	43.8
Mar 25	1028	36	28.6	738	21	35.1
Mar 26	878	38	23.1	634	16	39.6
Mar 27	930	28	33.2	738	17	43.4
Mar 28	—	—	—	605	12	50.4
Mar 29	947	40	23.7	556	14	39.7
Mar 30	935	33	28.3	621	15	41.4
Mar 31	1015	42	24.2	708	18	39.3
Apr 01	1002	38	26.4	663	17	39.0
Apr 02	962	34	28.3	—	—	—
1982 Total	12577	459	27.4	8501	207	
Mean	967	35		659	16	41.1
Grand Total	19455	658	29.6	12370	293	42.2

newscast was 645 seconds long in the 1979 sample and 654 seconds in the 1982 sample, while Radio Havana Cuba's average newscast length was 1146 seconds in the 1979 sample and 967 seconds in the 1982 sample. RHC's average newscast was 78 percent longer in 1979 and 47 percent longer in the 1982 sample than the VOA's. VOA averaged 14 news items daily during the 1979 sample and 16 items daily during the 1982 sample, while RHC averaged 33 items daily in the 1979 sample and 35 in 1982. Thus, RHC carried more than twice as many news items as VOA. The mean news item lengths for VOA were 45.0 seconds in the 1979 sample and 41.1 in the 1982 sample (two-tailed probability = 0.00) and for RHC 34.6 in the 1979 sample and 27.4 in the 1982 sample (two-tailed probability = 0.045).

A computer alphabetical sort of the entire sample was undertaken. The total sample for RHC was 38,439 words (13,210 in the 1979 sample and 25,229 in the 1982 sample), and for VOA, 21,978 words (6,839 in the 1979 sample and 15,139 in the 1982 sample) (see Table 4).

FREQUENCY MEASURE

Among the 951 news items on both services during both sample periods (658 for RHC and 293 for VOA), there were 1367 "country-mentions." (As pointed out in the methods section, each mention of a country in a news item was given the item's full time value; see Table 5). RHC had 967 country-mentions in 658 items for both sample periods (that is, about 48% of all items treated two or more countries). VOA carried 401 country-mentions in 293 items (that is, 39% of its items covered two or more countries).

One striking difference was in the number of individual countries treated. RHC covered 64 different countries in 1979 and 75 in 1982 (including Nongovernmental Organizations as one country). VOA covered only 30 countries in the 1979 sample and 44 in the 1982 sample. Over both sample periods, RHC covered 86 countries and VOA covered 57 countries. RHC covered, on a daily basis, 15 countries in the 1979 sample and 14 countries in the 1982 sample. VOA

Table 4.   Number of Words in Sample Newscast

	Radio Havana Cuba (English)	Voice of America (Spanish)
1979	13,210 words	6,839 words
	3,080 different words	2,024 different words
1982	25,229 words	15,139 words
	4,381 different words	3,788 different words
TOTAL	38,439 words	21,978 words

covered, on a daily basis, only 7 countries in the 1979 sample and 6 countries in the 1982 sample. Across both sample periods, RHC covered 6 and VOA 3 countries on a daily basis (see Table 6).

The frequency of country-mention analysis shows that each radio service covered news about its own country predominantly. However, RHC covered affairs of its adversary, the United States, with great regularity (it was the most covered nation in the 1982 sample), while VOA mentioned Cuba rarely. In 1979, news coverage of the ongoing trials, executions, and revolution in Iran appeared with about equal frequency in both services. The foreign policy of the Soviet Union, and Sandinista efforts in Nicaragua to overthrow Somoza, were also concerns common to both stations.

In 1982, events concerning the United States and El Salvador (separately and together) predominated in both services, followed by the situation in the Israeli-occupied West Bank of the Jordan. Both stations also covered events in Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs) and Poland on more than a daily basis.

Among the differences in country coverage, in the 1979 sample VOA covered the overthrow of Idi Amin and subsequent events in Uganda on a daily basis, while RHC relegated the Uganda situation to half that frequency. RHC covered the Vietnam–China border dispute and the resultant negotiations with three items per day. This event was not covered at all on the Voice of America. RHC emphasized Nongovernmental Organizations in the 1979 sample; at least three items per day dealt with organizations as diverse as the United Nations and the Organization of Solidarity with the Peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America (OSPAAAL). VOA gave almost no coverage to these groups. Finally, RHC covered events concerning Bulgaria (the Bulgarian chief of state was visiting Cuba), South Africa, Chile, Afghanistan, Jamaica, and Peru on a daily basis, while VOA gave little or no attention to these countries.

In 1982, RHC covered Central American countries other than El Salvador extensively, and focussed considerable attention on Andean countries Colombia and Peru. VOA treated the Soviet Union at least daily, while RHC's coverage of the Soviet Union fell below a daily rate.

In terms of frequency of regional coverage (see Table 7), Cuba predominantly covered affairs of the Caribbean and Central America in the 1979 sample (20.6%) and 1982 (36.0%). VOA covered North America predominantly in the 1979 sample (26.8%) and 1982 (25.7%). RHC covered, with decreasing frequency, events in Africa (12.5%) and the Middle East (10.1%) in the 1979 sample, and North America (17.8%) and South America (11.4%) in the 1982 sample. VOA followed with the Middle East (19.5%) and Africa (14.6%) in the 1979 sample, and the Caribbean/Central America (19.7%) and the Middle East (13.0%) in the 1982 sample. Chi square calculations showed a significant difference for each sample period between the two radio services in their coverage of regions. Rotated to test for a difference within stations over the two sample periods (whether, for example, RHC's regional coverage differed between 1979

Table 5. Countries by Frequency of Mention

Radio Havana Cuba		Voice of America	
Frequency	**Country**	**Country**	**Frequency**
1979			
37	Cuba	United States	33
26	United States	Iran	10
20	PR China	Soviet Union	8
17	Vietnam	Uganda, Nicaragua, Egypt,	6
15	Soviet Union, NGOs	Israel/Occ Territory	
11	Iran	*(Above here treated daily)*	
10	Bulgaria		
08	Nicaragua, Chile	Rhodesia	05
07	Israel/Occ Territory, South Africa	Peru	04
06	Afghanistan, Jamaica, Peru	PR China, Zambia, NGOs, Tanzania	03
	(Above here treated daily)	Pakistan, Vietnam, FR Germany	02
05	Kampuchea, Angola, Grenada, Zambia	Kampuchea, France, Bulgaria, Iceland, Norway, Kuwait,	01
04	Rhodesia	South Africa, Cuba, Panama,	
03	Laos, Lebanon, Nigeria, Uganda, Argentina, Egypt, Guyana, Spain	St. Vincent, Jordan, Tanzania, United Kingdom, Vatican City	
02	Pakistan, Jordan, Mozambique, Guatemala, Brazil, Venezuela		
01	India, PDR Korea, Malaysia, Nepal, Singapore, FR Germany, German DR, Hungary, Rumania, Yugoslavia, Cyprus, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, PDR Yemen, Algeria, Cameroon, Congo, Gabon, Morocco, El Salvador, Panama, St. Vincent, Bolivia, Uruguay, Canada, Mexico, Sao Tome, Sudan, United Arab Emirates		
1979 Totals			
289	Country-mentions	Country-mentions	115
64	Countries covered	Countries covered	30
15	Covered daily	Covered daily	07
1982			
94	United States	United States	69
78	El Salvador	El Salvador	29
55	Nicaragua	Israel/Occ Territory	18
36	Cuba	Poland, Soviet Union	17
33	Guatemala		
27	Mexico	Nongovernmental organizations	13

Table 5. *(Continued)*

Radio Havana Cuba		Voice of America	
Frequency	Country	Country	Frequency
25	Israel/Occ Territory	(Above here treated daily)	
21	Poland	Nicaragua	10
20	Nongovernmental organizations	Argentina, United Kingdom	09
17	Colombia	Guatemala, Iraq, Mexico	08
15	Peru	Iran	07
13	Argentina, France, Honduras	Bangladesh, Italy	05
	(Above here treated daily)	Costa Rica	04
12	Soviet Union	Afghanistan, Cuba, Bolivia,	03
11	Costa Rica	Brazil, FR Germany, PR	
09	Chile, Iraq, Panama, Nether-	China, Colombia, Jordan	
	lands	Ecuador, France, German DR,	02
08	Bolivia, FR Germany, South	Honduras, Netherlands,	
	Africa	Panama	
07	Italy, Lebanon, Vietnam	Belgium, Egypt, Haiti, India,	01
06	Angola, Ecuador, Iran	RO Korea, Lebanon, Niger,	
05	India, Namibia	Philippines, Syria, Thailand,	
		Tuvalu, Vatican, Venezuela,	
		Unclassified	
04	Bangladesh, Brazil, PR China, Dominican Rep, St. Lucia, Surinam, United Kingdom		
03	Algeria, German DR, Grenada, Portugal, Spain, Uganda, Venezuela, Unclass.		
02	Bulgaria, Jamaica, Japan, Mozambique, Sweden, Syria, Yemen Arab Republic		
01	Belgium, Bermuda, Bhutan, Canada, Chad, Czechoslo-vakia, Denmark, Ethiopia, Ghana, Haiti, Ireland, Kampuchea, PDR Korea, Lesotho, Libya, Morocco, Pakistan, Rumania, St. Vincent, Thailand, Tonga, Turkey, Uruguay, PDR Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zimbabwe.		

1982 Totals

678	Country-mentions	Country-mentions	286
75	Countries covered	Countries covered	44
14	Covered daily	Covered daily	06

1979 and 1982 Totals

967	Country-mentions	Country-mentions	401
86	Countries covered	Countries covered	57

Table 6.   Countries Treated on a Daily Basis:
1979 and 1982

Radio Havana Cuba	Voice of America
Cuba	United States
United States	Israel/Occupied Territory
Nongovernmental Organizations	Soviet Union
Nicaragua	
Israel/Occupied Territory	
Peru	

Table 7.   Region by Frequency of Mention

Radio Havana Cuba			Voice of America	
Frequency	Percent	Region	Percent	Frequency
1979				
28	9.5	North America	26.8	33
26	8.8	South America	3.3	04
61	20.6	Caribbean/Central America	7.3	09
05	1.7	Western Europe	5.7	07
29	9.8	Eastern Europe	7.3	09
30	10.1	Middle East	19.5	24
21	7.1	Far East	2.4	03
27	9.1	Southeast Asia	2.4	03
10	3.4	South Asia	1.6	02
00	0	Oceania	0	0
37	12.5	Africa	14.6	18
22	7.4	Unclassified	8.9	11
	CHI SQUARE = 52.5	(10 DEGREES OF FREEDOM)	SIGNIF = 0.00	
1982				
123	17.8	North America	25.7	77
79	11.4	South America	7.0	21
249	36.0	Caribbean/Central America	19.7	59
52	7.5	Western Europe	7.7	23
40	5.8	Eastern Europe	12.0	36
54	7.8	Middle East	13.0	39
07	1.0	Far East	1.7	05
09	1.3	Southeast Asia	0.3	01
11	1.6	South Asia	3.0	09
01	0.1	Oceania	0.3	01
30	4.3	Africa	0.3	01
37	5.3	Unclassified	2.3	28
	CHI SQUARE = 65.9	(11 DEGREES OF FREEDOM)	SIGNIF = 0.00	

and 1982), RHC's chi square was 131.9 (11df), with a significance level of 0.00. VOA's chi square was 60.3 (11df), with a significance level of 0.00. Thus, not only were the stations different one from another in regional coverage, but each displayed a significant difference between its 1979 and its 1982 sample periods.

In coverage of political alliances (see Table 8), in 1979 RHC focussed more than half its coverage (52.0%) on countries in the Nonaligned Movement. VOA, too, paid a great deal of attention to the Nonaligned countries (37.4%), followed closely by coverage of its NATO allies (31.7%). In 1982, RHC gave predominance to countries with no (or another) political alliance (41.3%), and VOA did the same (37.3%). (The reason that both stations increased coverage of countries with no—or another—political alliance in 1982 was that El Salvador, Guatemala, and Israel—none currently members of the three major tested political alliances—had so much coverage.) RHC followed with coverage of the Nonaligned Movement (32.1%), while VOA followed with news of its NATO allies (30.3%). Chi square calculations showed a significant difference between the two radio services in their coverage of political alliances. Rotated to test for a difference over the two sample periods, RHC's chi square was 48.7 (3df), with a significance level of 0.00. VOA's chi square was 16.8 (3 df), with a significance level of 0.00. Thus, not only were the stations different one from another in coverage of political alliances, but each displayed a significant difference between its 1979 and its 1982 sample periods.

In coverage of economic alliances (see Table 9), chi square calculations showed a significant difference between RHC and VOA. When it covered a country with one of the five tested alliances, VOA predominantly covered the

Table 8. Political Alliance by Frequency of Mention

Radio Havana Cuba			Voice of America	
Frequency	Percent	Political Alliance	Percent	Frequency
1979				
31	10.5	North Atlantic Treaty Organization	31.7	39
28	9.5	Warsaw Treaty Organization	7.3	9
154	52.0	Nonaligned Countries Movement	37.4	46
83	28.0	Other or no political alliance	23.6	29
	CHI SQUARE = 28.4	(3 DEGREES OF FREEDOM)	SIGNIF = 0.00	
1982				
145	21.0	North Atlantic Treaty Organization	30.3	91
39	5.6	Warsaw Treaty Organization	12.0	36
222	32.1	Nonaligned Countries Movement	20.3	61
286	41.3	Other or no political alliance	37.3	112
	CHI SQUARE = 29.9	(3 DEGREES OF FREEDOM)	SIGNIF = 0.00	

Table 9.   Economic Alliance by Frequency of Mention

Radio Havana Cuba		Economic	Voice of America	
Frequency	Percent	Alliance	Percent	Frequency
1979				
33	11.1	OECD	31.7	39
99	33.4	COMECON	9.8	12
2	.7	ASEAN	0.0	0
15	5.1	CARICOM	0.8	1
24	8.1	LAFTA	3.3	4
123	41.6	OTHER OR NO	54.5	67

CHI SQUARE = 50.9   (5 DEGREES OF FREEDOM)   SIGNIF = 0.00

1982				
151	21.8	OECD	30.3	91
92	13.3	COMECON	14.0	42
01	0.1	ASEAN	0.7	02
09	1.3	CARICOM	0.0	00
102	14.7	LAFTA	9.7	29
337	48.7	OTHER OR NO	45.3	136

CHI SQUARE = 16.6   (5 DEGREES OF FREEDOM)   SIGNIF = 0.0052

OECD countries in 1979 (31.7%) and 1982 (30.3%). RHC split its coverage between COMECON countries in the 1979 sample (33.4%) and OECD countries in the 1982 sample (21.8%). However, both services covered predominantly countries with another (or no) economic alliance. Rotated to test for a difference over the two sample periods, RHC's chi square was 79.7 (5df), with a significance level of 0.00. VOA's chi square was 10.6 (5df), with a significance level of 0.0585. Thus, the stations were different one from another in coverage of economic alliances, but RHC displayed a significant difference in coverage of economic alliances between its 1979 and its 1982 sample periods, while VOA did not.

Thematic category was also analyzed as to frequency of mention (see Table 10). For both services, the predominant thematic category was Governmental Diplomacy/Foreign Relations. (See "Thematic Categories," above). Typically, this category accounted for more than one-quarter of total coverage by frequency of mention. The second most covered theme in VOA's newscasts was Domestic Governmental Action, mostly of the U.S. government. For RHC, the second most covered theme over the two sample periods was Nongovernmental Organization/Foreign Relations, followed closely by Domestic Governmental Action (largely *not* about the Cuban government). VOA covered Peace and Disarmament issues two to four times more than RHC, while RHC covered Rebellions up to three times more than the VOA. Also, RHC covered news of Popular Protests

Table 10.   Thematic Category by Frequency of Mention

Radio Havana Cuba			Voice of America	
Frequency	Percent	Theme	Percent	Frequency
1979				
16	8.0	Domestic Government Action	14.0	12
59	29.6	Govt Diplomacy/For Relations	14.0	12
17	8.5	NGO Foreign Relations	1.2	1
5	2.5	Peace and Disarmament	10.5	9
2	1.0	Arms–Military–Defense	2.3	2
12	6.0	War	7.0	6
13	6.5	Rebellion	8.1	7
6	3.0	Terrorism	0.0	0
13	6.5	Popular Protest	0.0	0
11	5.5	Judicial Proceedings	7.0	6
8	4.0	Human and Civil Rights	1.2	1
0	0.0	Common Crime	0.0	0
0	0.0	Energy	7.0	6
2	1.0	Nuclear Energy	0.0	0
4	2.0	Economic Activity	5.8	5
5	2.5	Labor	1.2	1
0	0.0	Agriculture	0.0	0
8	4.0	Accidents–Disaster	8.1	7
5	2.5	Science–Space–Medicine	1.2	1
0	0.0	Religion	1.2	1
1	0.5	Education	0.0	0
5	2.5	Arts–Culture–Sports	2.3	2
7	3.5	Nonnews item	8.1	7
0	0.0	Unclassifiable	0.0	0
1982				
50	10.9	Domestic Government Action	9.7	20
128	27.9	Govt Diplomacy/For Relations	25.1	52
48	10.5	NGO Foreign Relations	2.4	5
11	2.4	Peace and Disarmament	5.3	11
21	4.6	Arms Military-Defense	2.4	5
20	4.4	War	3.4	7
60	13.1	Rebellion	4.8	10
14	3.1	Terrorism	2.9	6
39	8.5	Popular Protest	7.2	15
5	1.1	Judicial Proceedings	2.4	5
22	4.8	Human and Civil Rights	6.3	13
2	0.4	Common Crime	1.0	2
0	0.0	Energy	0.0	0
0	0.0	Nuclear Energy	0.0	0
10	2.2	Economic Activity	3.9	8
9	2.0	Labor	1.9	4
0	0.0	Agriculture	1.0	2

(continued)

Table 10.   *(Continued)*

| Radio Havana Cuba | | | Voice of America | |
Frequency	Percent	Theme	Percent	Frequency
5	1.1	Accidents–Disaster	4.8	10
1	0.2	Science–Space–Medicine	6.8	14
4	0.9	Religion	1.0	2
1	0.2	Education	0.0	0
2	0.4	Arts–Culture–Sports	0.5	1
5	1.1	Nonnews item	6.8	14
2	0.4	Unclassifiable	0.5	1

more than the VOA (which carried none at all in the 1979 sample). VOA greatly increased its coverage of Human and Civil Rights in the 1982 sample, while RHC covered this category about the same. VOA carried much more news of Accidents/Disasters than did RHC.

Chi square calculations, which might have demonstrated the statistical difference between the two stations in their coverage of themes, could not be judged reliable because of the high percentage of cells with an expected frequency of five percent or less. To increase expected cell frequency, the chi square test was performed only on the top eleven thematic categories in either sample period. Not only were the stations different in thematic coverage one from another, but each station differed in thematic content from one sample period to the other.

LENGTH AS MEASURE

The measure of length (time in seconds) is expressed here as percent of total coverage (category length divided by total length). In terms of percentage of total coverage (see Table 11), in the 1979 sample, RHC concentrated on events in Cuba; 24 percent of its total newscasts dealt with Cuba alone or Cuba and one other nation. (Each "country-mention" was given the item's full time value. Thus, the sum of all values would exceed 100%.) News concerning the United States or the Soviet Union (10% each) was next in predominance followed by Bulgaria (9%), China (9%) and Vietnam (8%). The coverage of Nongovernmental Organizations amounted to 6 percent. Interestingly, predominance of Cuba as a news topic receded to only 10 percent during RHC's 1982 sample, when the U.S. became the center of attention (21%), followed by El Salvador (16%), Nicaragua (15%), and Nongovernmental Organizations (7%).

VOA predominantly followed news concerning the U.S. during both samples; more than a third of all coverage concerned the U.S. alone or in its dealing with another nation. In 1979, Iran (12%), Uganda (8%) and Nicaragua (8%) all

claimed a good share of the VOA's newscast time, followed by Israel (7%) and
Egypt (7%). In 1982, El Salvador (15%) was second in importance followed by
the Soviet Union (11%) and Israel (9%).

Coverage of the Caribbean and Central America dominated RHC's regional
coverage (percentage of time the news item treated one or more countries in that
region) for both periods (39% and 57%—see Table 12), while North American
coverage led the regional coverage of the VOA for both sample periods (40% and
38%). RHC's coverage of North America (for all practical purposes, the United
States) more than doubled in 1982, while its coverage of African affairs dropped
(from 20% to 5%). VOA's concern for events in the Caribbean and Central
America more than doubled over the sample periods (13% to 29%), while its
attention to events in Africa dropped precipitously (from 25% to 1%). RHC's
increase in Caribbean and Central American coverage was accompanied by drops
in almost every other region. VOA's increase in Caribbean and Central Ameri-
can coverage was accompanied by increases in coverage of most other catego-
ries, but a great drop in coverage of Africa.

In coverage of political alliances as a percentage of total time (see Table 13),
for both periods RHC devoted a major portion of its newscast time (79% in the
1979 sample, and 55% in the 1982 period) to news of one or more countries in
the Nonaligned Movement. Next followed NATO countries (13% in the 1979
sample, and 31% in the 1982 sample), and then Warsaw Treaty Organization
countries (21% in the 1979 sample, but 8% in the 1982 sample). However, its

Table 11.   Countries by Percent of Total Time (Above 5%)

Radio Havana Cuba		Voice of America	
Percent	Country	Country	Percent
1979			
24	Cuba	United States	40
10	United States	iran	12
10	Soviet Union	Uganda	08
09	Bulgaria	Nicaragua	08
09	PR China	Israel/Occupied Territory	07
08	Vietnam	Egypt	07
06	Nongovernmental Organizations	Soviet Union	06
1982			
21	United States	United States	36
16	El Salvador	El Salvador	15
15	Nicaragua	Soviet Union	11
10	Cuba	Israel/Occupied Territory	09
07	Nongovernmental Organizations	Nongovernmental Organizations	07
07	Israel/Occupied Territory	Poland	07
06	Guatemala		

great coverage of Iran in the 1979 sample brought its Nonalignment Movement coverage to 60 percent. VOA's interested in the countries of the Nonaligned Movement dropped noticeably to 20 percent in the 1982 sample.

In coverage of economic alliances as a percentage of total time (see Table 14), over both sample periods, when it covered a country with one of the five tested economic alliances, VOA focussed predominantly on OECD countries (46% in the 1979 period, and 47% in the 1982 period), while RHC's focus shifted from COMECON countries in the 1979 sample (59%) to OECD countries in the 1982 sample (32%). Neither service concerned itself with CARICOM countries.

In terms of thematic content as a percentage of total coverage (see Table 15), it is apparent that Governmental Diplomacy/Foreign Relations predominated on

Table 12. Region by Percent of Total Time

Radio Havana Cuba, Percent	Region	Voice of America, Percent
1979		
12	North America	40
11	South America	04
39	Caribbean/Central America	13
02	Western Europe	07
21	Eastern Europe	07
16	Middle East	26
10	Far East	03
12	Southeast Asia	03
02	South Asia	04
00	Oceania	00
20	Africa	25
10	Unclassified	09
CHI SQUARE = 52.5	(10 DEGREES OF FREEDOM)	SIGNIF = 0.00
1982		
27	North America	38
16	South America	11
57	Caribbean/Central America	29
10	Western Europe	11
08	Eastern Europe	19
12	Middle East	16
01	Far East	03
03	Southeast Asia	01
03	South Asia	04
01	Oceania	01
05	Africa	01
10	Unclassified	00
CHI SQUARE = 65.9	(11 DEGREES OF FREEDOM)	SIGNIF = 0.00

Table 13. Political Alliance by Percent of Total Time

Radio Havana Cuba, Percent	Political Alliance	Voice of America, Percent
1979		
13	North Atlantic Treaty Organization	47
21	Warsaw Treaty Organization	07
79	Nonaligned Countries Movement	60
40	Other or no political alliance	29
1982		
31	North Atlantic Treaty Organization	47
08	Warsaw Treaty Organization	19
55	Nonaligned Countries Movement	29
58	Other or no political alliance	52

both services. The second most covered category on VOA was Domestic Governmental Action, but interestingly RHC turned next to Nongovernment Organizations/Foreign Relations (which the VOA covered minimally), followed then by Domestic Government Action. RHC coverage of War dropped between the sample periods (from 7% to 4%), while its coverage of Rebellions increased (from 6% to 13%). On the VOA, War and Rebellion both dropped, while coverage of Terrorism and Popular Protest both rose from no coverage at all in the 1979 sample. In the 1979 sample, both services covered the Judicial Proceedings in Iran, and their coverage of that category dropped by 1982.

Table 14. Economic Alliance by Percent of Total Time

Radio Havana Cuba, Percent	Economic Alliance	Voice of America, Percent
1979		
13	OECD	46
59	COMECON	11
01	ASEASN	00
09	CARICOM	02
10	LAFTA	04
60	OTHER OR NO	80
1982		
32	OECD	47
23	COMECON	23
01	ASEASN	01
02	CARICOM	00
20	LAFTA	13
75	OTHER OR NO	62

Table 15.   Thematic Category by Percent of Total Time

Radio Havana Cuba, Percent			Voice of America, Percent	
1982	1979	Theme	1979	1982
11	08	Domestic Government Action	11	10
29	30	Govt Diplomacy/For Relations	17	24
13	09	NGO Foreign Relations	02	02
04	03	Peace and Disarmament	09	07
04	01	Arms–Military–Defense	02	03
04	07	War	09	03
13	06	Rebellion	10	05
02	05	Terrorism	00	03
07	05	Popular Protest	00	07
01	05	Judicial Proceedings	09	02
04	03	Human and Civil Rights	02	06
01	00	Common Crime	00	01
00	00	Energy	08	00
00	01	Nuclear Energy	00	00
02	02	Economic Activity	04	01
02	02	Labor	01	02
00	00	Agriculture	00	01
01	03	Accidents–Disaster	08	03
01	03	Science–Space–Medicine	01	08
01	00	Religion	01	01
01	01	Education	00	00
01	02	Arts–Culture–Sports	02	01
01	03	Nonnews item	05	05
01	00	Unclassifiable	00	01

RHC's news used 19 of the 24 thematic categories in the 1979 sample, and 21 categories in the 1982 sample. VOA used 17 in the 1979 sample, and 21 in the 1982 sample. Only RHC covered news themes of Terrorism, Popular Protest, Nuclear Energy, and Education in the 1979 sample. VOA was the only station to cover Energy and Religion during both periods, and Agriculture during the 1982 sample. Neither station covered Common Crime (see Table 16).

ROTATED PRESENTATION

Breaking down the top subject categories by countries covered for both sample periods (see Table 17), we see first that each news service covered its own government's Diplomacy/Foreign Relations predominantly. (Percentages in parentheses indicate overall percentage of total time covered on that station.) In-

Table 16.   Thematic Categories Covered
by One or Neither Station

	Radio Havana Cuba	Voice of America
1979		
	Terrorism	Energy
	Popular Protest	Religion
	Nuclear Energy	
	Education	
1982		
	Education	Agriculture

Covered by Neither Station

1979
Common Crime
Agriculture

1982
Energy
Nuclear Energy

deed, 42% of VOA's coverage of this category dealt with the United States. Next for both services was Nicaragua.

The War category found VOA's news overwhelmingly concerned with countries in Africa, while RHC's War coverage included Vietnam, Iran, Iraq, and Israel. Interestingly, little coverage on RHC (5%), and no coverage on VOA, treated the Central American countries as a war story.

Indeed, Central America was primarily a Rebellion for both services. RHC's Rebellion news focussed primarily on Nicaragua (19%), El Salvador (26%), and Guatemala (19%), with some mention of Colombia (9%) and Peru (6%). VOA also treated Nicaragua (35%) and El Salvador (25%) as rebellions, as well as Israel/Occupied Territories (20%) and Kampuchea (7%).

The countries covered for Human and Civil Rights displayed interesting patterns. The human and civil rights situation in Poland was a concern for RHC (13%) and VOA (26%), exceeded by the VOA only in regard to Israel/Occupied Territories (30%). Next in attention on VOA was Iran (20%), the Soviet Union (9%), and Guatemala (9%). In contrast, RHC focussed on human and civil rights violations in Argentina (10%), Guatemala (8%), Chile, China, and Jordan (all 5%), while the VOA covered none of these. VOA, on the other hand, covered human and civil rights violations in Iran (20%) and the Soviet Union (9%), while RHC covered neither of these.

Both services focussed a great deal of attention on Iran's Judicial Proceedings

Table 17. Thematic Coverage by Country by Percent of Total Time, 1979 and 1982 Combined

Radio Havana Cuba		Theme	Voice of America	
Percent	Country		Country	Percent
(29%) Governmental Diplomacy/Foreign Relations (23%)				
12	Cuba		United States	42
11	Nicaragua		Nicaragua	06
09	United States		Italy	05
06	Mexico		United Kingdom	05
05	Bulgaria			
(5%) War (5%)				
16	Zimbabwe/Rhodesia		Tanzania	31
13	Vietnam		Zambia	16
10	Angola		Argentina	14
10	Israel/Occupied Territory		Iran	14
10	Iraq		Zimbabwe/Rhodesia	14
06	Iran			
05	Nicaragua			
05	Zambia			
(11%) Rebellion (7%)				
26	El Salvador		Nicaragua	35
19	Guatemala		El Salvador	25
09	Colombia		Israel/Occupied Territory	20
06	Peru		Kampuchean	07
(4%) Human and Civil Rights (5%)				
13	Poland		Israel/Occupied Territory	30
10	Argentina		Poland	26
08	Guatemala		Iran	20
08	Israel/Occupied Territory		Soviet Union	09
05	Jordan		Guatemala	09
05	China			
05	Chile			
(2%) Judicial Proceedings (4%)				
23	Iran		Iran	67
22	Saudi Arabia		United States	16
20	United States			
09	Mozambique			
(3%) Peace/Disarmament (7%)				
21	Vietnam		United States	55
18	Nicaragua		Soviet Union	16

Table 17.   *(Continued)*

Radio Havana Cuba		Theme	Voice of America	
Percent	Country		Country	Percent
18	United States		Egypt	13
11	Nongovernmental Organizations			
08	Soviet Union			
		(7%) Popular Protest (5%)		
14	Nicaragua		Israel	27
11	United States		Afghanistan	18
10	Chile		Argentina	16
08	El Salvador		Guatemala	11
07	Bolivia		United States	08
05	Guatemala			
		(10%) Domestic Governmental Action (11%)		
14	Cuba		El Salvador	30
13	El Salvador		United States	16
12	United States		Uganda	10
10	Nicaragua		Bangladesh	07
06	Bulgaria		Peru	05
06	Iran			

(1979 trials and executions). RHC followed next with South Africa (22%) and the United States (20%), while VOA next treated the United States (16%).

In terms of Peace and Disarmament coverage, the VOA led this category with the United States (55%), while RHC led with Vietnam (21%). RHC followed with Nicaragua (18%), the United States (18%), Nongovernmental Organizations (11%), and the Soviet Union (8%).

For the VOA, Popular Protest occurred most significantly in Israel (27%), followed by Afghanistan (18%), Argentina (16%), Guatemala (11%), and the United States (8%). For RHC, centers of Popular Protest were in Nicaragua (14%), the United States (11%), and Chile (10%), followed in decreasing emphasis by El Salvador (8%), Bolivia (7%), and Guatemala (5%).

El Salvador was treated by both services for its Domestic Governmental Action; in 1982 this concerned largely the electoral campaign. VOA focussed a great amount of attention on El Salvador (30%) in this regard. Next in Domestic Governmental Action emphasis, the VOA covered the United States (16%), Uganda (10%), Bangladesh (7%), and Peru (5%). RHC covered Cuba's Domestic Governmental Action (14%), followed by El Salvador (13%), the United States (12%), Nicaragua (10%), Bulgaria (6%), and Iran (6%).

Table 18 lists these same thematic categories with the leading region, political

Table 18. Thematic Coverage by Region and Alliance by Percent of Total Time (1979 and 1982 Combined)

Radio Havana Cuba			Voice of America	
Percent	Country	Theme	Country	Percent
	(29%) Governmental Diplomacy/Foreign Relations (23%)			
40	Caribbean/Central America		Western Europe	43
52	Nonaligned Movement		NATO	55
35	No Economic Alliance		OECD	56
	(5%) War (5%)			
34	Africa		Africa	61
60	Nonaligned Movement		Nonaligned Movement	82
68	No Economic Alliance		No Economic Alliance	76
	(11%) Rebellion (7%)			
62	Caribbean/Central America		Caribbean/Central America	62
49	Nonaligned Movement		Nonaligned Movement	48
80	No Economic Alliance		No Economic Alliance	95
	(4%) Human and Civil Rights (5%)			
30	Caribbean/Central America		Middle East	48
53	No Political Alliance		No Political Alliance	39
52	No Economic Alliance		No Economic Alliance	65
	(2%) Judicial Proceedings (4%)			
46	Africa		Middle East	53
47	Nonaligned Movement		Nonaligned Movement	74
63	No Economic Alliance		No Economic Alliance	80
	(3%) Peace/Disarmament (7%)			
21	Southeast Asia		North America	54
49	Nonaligned Movement		NATO	54
39	No Economic Alliance		OECD	55
	(7%) Popular Protest (5%)			
31	Caribbean/Central America		Caribbean/Central America	27
42	No Political Alliance		No Political Alliance	45
45	No Economic Alliance		No Economic Alliance	50
	(10%) Domestic Governmental Action (11%)			
42	Caribbean/Central America		Caribbean/Central America	30
49	Nonaligned Movement		No Political Alliance	40
43	No Economic Alliance		No Economic Alliance	58

alliance, and economic alliance treated. In coverage of Governmental Diplomacy/Foreign Relations, RHC focussed on countries of the Caribbean and Central America belonging to the Nonaligned Movement and to no (or another) economic alliance, while VOA treated Western European, NATO, and OECD members.

RHC's War coverage centered on Nonaligned African countries with no (or another) economic alliance. VOA's War coverage was similar. Both services predominantly covered Rebellions in Caribbean and Central American countries of the Nonaligned Movement.

But the two stations' coverage of Human and Civil Rights differed. RHC concentrated on the Caribbean and Central America, while the VOA focussed on the Middle East (in both cases, countries with no—or another—political or economic alliance). Judicial Proceedings found the RHC taking up Nonaligned African countries, while the VOA dealt with the nonaligned Middle East.

News of Peace and Disarmament negotiations showed a striking difference. RHC took up Nonaligned Southeast Asia (primarily Vietnam), while the VOA focussed on NATO/OECD/North America (namely the United States). But they did not split on coverage of Popular Protest: Both treated Caribbean and Central American countries of no (or another) political and economic alliance. Finally, on events of Domestic Governmental Action, both stations focussed on Caribbean and Central American countries, but RHC covered Nonaligned Movement members of this region, while VOA covered those with no alliance.

Turning now to which Thematic Categories were used for the leading countries (see Table 19), one pattern emerged: Governmental Diplomacy/Foreign Relations was the overwhelmingly favored category for all the leading countries on both stations. In many cases, Domestic Governmental Action followed in prevalence. It is interesting to note the cases that deviated from this norm. In coverage of Cuba, RHC frequently (29%) covered Nongovernmental Foreign Relations. VOA covered Science–Space–Medicine of the United States (18%), while Cuba did likewise for the Soviet Union (25%). Interestingly, VOA covered Peace and Disarmament issues of the Soviet Union (44%) more than its Domestic Governmental Action or Governmental Diplomacy/Foreign Relations. Regarding Poland, RHC saw the situation there largely in terms of its Government Diplomacy/Foreign Relations, while VOA concentrated on Poland's Human and Civil Rights issues. Also of interest was that VOA saw Poland as a Religion story (the only time that Religion placed highly as a thematic category).

RHC saw Vietnam both as engaged in War and carrying out Peace and Disarmament talks. Regarding Israel/Occupied Territories, VOA treated it as a Rebellion, Popular Protest, or Human and Civil Rights story, rather than as Governmental Diplomacy/Foreign Relations. On the other hand, RHC treated Israel/Occupied Territories first as Governmental Diplomacy/Foreign Relations, and then as War and Human and Civil Rights.

Central America provided a veritable litmus test dividing the two services.

Table 19. Thematic Categories Used for Selected Countries (Countries Above 5% Total Coverage; N of Items > 5)

Radio Havana Cuba		Country	Voice of America	
Percent	Theme		Theme	Percent
		Cuba		
34	Governmental Diplomacy–Foreign Relations		N less than 5	
29	NGO Foreign Relations			
14	Domestic Government Action			
12	Terrorism			
		United States		
28	Governmental Diplomacy–Foreign Relations		Governmental Diplomacy–Foreign Relations	29
14	Domestic Government Action		Science–Space	18
13	NGO Foreign Relations		Peace–Disarmament	13
		Soviet Union		
29	Governmental Diplomacy–Foreign Relations		Peace–Disarmament	44
25	Science–Space–Medicine		Domestic Government Action	18
12	Popular Protest		Human–Civil Rights	15
			Governmental Diplomacy–Foreign Relations	13
		Poland		
27	Governmental Diplomacy–Foreign Relations		Human–Civil Rights	29
24	Human–Civil Rights		Governmental Diplomacy–Foreign Relations	20
20	Domestic Government Action		Religion	15
			Domestic Government Action	11

People's Republic of China

53	Governmental Diplomacy Foreign Relations	N less than 5
14	Human–Civil Rights	
11	Popular Protest	

Vietnam

29	Governmental Diplomacy Foreign Relations	N less than 5
25	Peace -Disarmament	
24	War	
14	NGO Foreign Relations	

Israel/Occupied Territories

26	Governmental Diplomacy–Foreign Relations	Rebellion	25
23	War	Popular Protest	25
13	Human–Civil Rights	Human–Civil Rights	25
13	NGO Foreign Relations	Governmental Diplomacy–Foreign Relations	13

El Salvador

43	Rebellion	Domestic Government Action	58
20	Domestic Government Action	Rebellion	30

Guatemala

55	Rebellion	Terrorism	30
12	Popular Protest	Popular Protest	28
10	Human–Civil Rights	Human–Civil Rights	22
09	Mozambique		

(continued)

Table 19. *(Continued)*

Radio Havana Cuba		Country	Voice of America	
Percent	**Theme**		**Theme**	**Percent**
		Nicaragua		
34	Governmental Diplomacy–Foreign Relations		Rebellion	52
21	Rebellion		Governmental Diplomacy–Foreign Relations	28
13	NGO–Foreign Relations			
10	Domestic Government Action			
		Iran		
31	Domestic Government Action		Judicial Proceedings	53
29	Judicial Proceedings		Human–Civil Rights	18
18	War		War	14
15	Governmental Diplomacy · Foreign Relations			
		Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs)		
64	NGO–Foreign Relations		Economic Activity	52
14	Governmental Diplomacy–Foreign Relations		NGO Foreign Relations	26
			Governmental Diplomacy–Foreign Relations	11

RHC saw El Salvador and Guatemala predominantly as Rebellions, but treated Nicaragua principally from the perspective of Governmental Diplomacy/Foreign Relations. VOA, in contrast, focussed overwhelmingly on El Salvador's Domestic Governmental Actions, saw Guatemala as a Terrorism/Popular Protest/Human and Civil Rights story, and treated Nicaragua above all as a Rebellion.

In coverage of regions (see Table 20), Governmental Diplomacy/Foreign Relations also predominated, often followed by Domestic Governmental Action. But here again there were data which did not conform to this pattern. RHC saw South America as above all a Rebellion and Popular Protest, while VOA dealt with that continent in terms of Government Diplomacy/Foreign Relations. This trend was reversed in the Caribbean/Central America region. RHC saw that region as Governmental Diplomacy/Foreign Relations, while VOA saw it as a Rebellion. For the VOA, Eastern Europe was as much a Human and Civil Rights story as it was Governmental Diplomacy/Foreign Relations. The Middle East was a War story to RHC, but to the VOA it was Judicial Proceedings and Human and Civil Rights. Africa was a war story for VOA, but Governmental Diplomacy/Foreign Relations for RHC.

Again, in coverage of political alliance (see Table 21), the Governmental Diplomacy/Foreign Relations—Domestic Government Action pattern holds. A few data were noteworthy. VOA saw the Warsaw Treaty Organization as much as a Human and Civil Rights theme as Governmental Diplomacy/Foreign Relations. RHC covered the Nongovernmental Foreign Relations of the Nonaligned Movement, while VOA focussed on War, Rebellion, and Judicial Proceedings of the Nonaligned Movement.

In coverage of economic alliances, the same pattern holds (see Table 22). VOA saw COMECON as much a Human and Civil Rights story, and closely followed its Peace and Disarmament and Popular Protest stories. On the other hand, RHC looked into COMECON's Nongovernmental Foreign Relations. RHC saw LAFTA's Rebellion, Popular Protest, and Labor unrest, while VOA focussed more on Accidents and Disasters and Domestic Governmental Action by LAFTA members.

KEY-WORD-IN-CONTEXT (KWIC) ANALYSIS

Using an elaborate computer program, a Key-Word-In-Context (KWIC) analysis was undertaken. This program listed each word in the sample (excluding articles and conjunctions) in its linguistic environment. Thus, for example, all occurrences of the word "peace" (RHC) and "paz" (VOA) were printed out with the surrounding linguistic context also displayed (see sample in Chapter 4). Each word was indexed for ready access to the news item in which it appeared.

Table 20. Region by Thematic Categories

Radio Havana Cuba		Voice of America		
Percent	Theme	Region	Theme	Percent

North America

35	Governmental Diplomacy–Foreign Relations		Governmental Diplomacy–Foreign Relations	30
11	Domestic Government Action		Science–Space–Medicine	17
			Peace–Disarmament	12

South America

18	Rebellion		Governmental Diplomacy–Foreign Relations	30
13	Popular Protest		Domestic Government Action	15
12	Governmental Diplomacy–Foreign Relations		Popular Protest	12
			War	11
			Labor	10

Caribbean and Central America

33	Governmental Diplomacy–Foreign Relations		Rebellion	29
18	Rebellion		Domestic Government Action	22
14	NGO Foreign Relations		Governmental Diplomacy–Foreign Relations	13
22	Domestic Government Action			

Western Europe

30	Governmental Diplomacy–Foreign Relations		Governmental Diplomacy–Foreign Relations	57
15	Popular Protest		Domestic Government Action	15

Eastern Europe

44	Governmental Diplomacy–Foreign Relations		Governmental Diplomacy–Foreign Relations	23

| 20 | Domestic Government Action | Human–Civil Rights | 22 |
| 12 | Science–Space–Medicine | Domestic Government Action | 13 |

Middle East

23	War	Judicial Proceedings	20
21	Governmental Diplomacy–Foreign Relations	Human Civil Rights	17
15	NGO Foreign Relations	Governmental Diplomacy–Foreign Relations	14
		Rebellion	10
		Popular Protest	05

Far East

| 56 | Governmental Diplomacy - Foreign Relations | N less than 5 |
| 12 | Human–Civil Rights | |

Southeast Asia

38	Governmental Diplomacy–Foreign Relations	N less than 5
18	Peace–Disarmament	
18	War	

South Asia

27	Rebellion	Popular Protest	40
25	Domestic Government Action	Domestic Government Action	27
23	Governmental Diplomacy–Foreign Relations	Accident–Disaster	15
12	Popular Protest	

Africa

33	Governmental Diplomacy–Foreign Relations	War	69
33	War	Domestic Government Action	27
19	Judicial Proceedings	

Table 21. Political Alliance by Thematic Categories

Radio Havana Cuba		Political Alliance	Voice of America	
Percent	Theme		Theme	Percent
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)				
28	Governmental Diplomacy–Foreign Relations		Governmental Diplomacy–Foreign Relations	33
11	Arms–Military–Defense		Science–Space–Medicine	15
10	Domestic Government Action		Peace–Disarmament	11
10	Popular Protest			
Warsaw Treaty Organzation (WTO)				
45	Governmental Diplomacy–Foreign Relations		Governmental Diplomacy–Foreign Relations	23
20	Domestic Government Action		Human–Civil Rights	22
12	Science–Space–Medicine		Peace–Disarmament	16
			Domestic Government Action	13
Nonaligned Movement (NAM)				
33	Governmental Diplomacy–Foreign Relations		Governmental Diplomacy–Foreign Relations	17
13	NGO Foreign Relations		War	18
11	Domestic Government Action		Rebellion	13
11	Rebellion		Judicial Proceedings	12
			Domestic Government Action	12
Other (or No) Political Alliance				
20	Governmental Diplomacy–Foreign Relations		Domestic Government Action	14
16	Rebellion		Governmental Diplomacy–Foreign Relations	12
14	NGO Foreign Relations		Rebellion	11

Table 22. Economic Alliance by Thematic Categories

Radio Havana Cuba		Economic Alliance	Voice of America	
Percent	Theme		Theme	Percent
		OECD		
28	Govermental Diplomacy–Foreign Relations		Govermental Diplomacy–Foreign Relations	33
11	Arms–Military–Defense		Science–Space–Medicine	15
11	Popular Protest		Peace–Disarmament	11
10	Domestic Government Action			
		COMECON		
38	Govermental Diplomacy–Foreign Relations		Govermental Diplomacy–Foreign Relations	20
15	NGO Foreign Relations		Human–Civil Rights	19
14	Domestic Government Action		Peace Disarmament	16
			Popular Protest	13
			Domestic Government Action	11
		ASEAN		
		No occurrences		
		Caribbean Economic Community (CARICOM)		
91	Govermental Diplomacy–Foreign Relations		N less than 5	
		Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA)		
21	Govermental Diplomacy–Foreign Relations		Govermental Diplomacy–Foreign Relations	33
13	Rebellion		Accident–Disaster	13
12	Popular Protest		Domestic Government Action	12
10	Labor		Popular Protest	10
		Other (or No) Economic Alliance		
23	Govermental Diplomacy–Foreign Relations		Domestic Government Action	14
19	Rebellion		Rebellion	14
15	NGO Foreign Relations		Govermental Diplomacy–Foreign Relations	12

Administration—Administracion. An "administration" in international news usually refers to the executive officials of a government or an institution. RHC preferred the word "administration" when referring to the United States. For example, "the Reagan administration's economic and military policy" (RHC32282-21). Other administrations on RHC included the Israeli civilian administration, Costa Rica, and the Panama Canal. VOA limited its use of the word to the Israeli civil administration in the West Bank.

Authorities—Autoridades. The word "authorities," as used in international newscasts of RHC and VOA, meant a group of governmental officials having the power or right to enforce laws and orders. RHC saw authorities exercising such power in India, Nicaragua, the U.S., Israel, Bangladesh, Panama, Surinam, Kampuchea, Puerto Rico ("colonial a-"), South Africa ("racist a-"), Nigeria, Morocco, South Carolina, and Vietnam. Thus, the term "authorities" was used by RHC for a wide variety of friends and enemies. There was no distinction as to favor or disfavor. Such divergent world actors as South Africa and Vietnam were referred to in the same sense.

VOA used this word to describe governmental officials from countries as diverse as Israel, Honduras, France, Argentina, and Bangladesh. VOA never used "authorities" to describe governments inimical to the United States.

Capitalism—Capitalismo. Capitalism, the social and political system based on private ownership of the means of production, was rarely mentioned. RHC contrasted the advantages of socialism over capitalism (RHC40979-2), the low turnout of voters in capitalist countries and the mistrust people have in capitalist elections (RHC40979-3). VOA did not use this word in the sample.

Clique—Camarilla. A "clique" is defined as a small, exclusive circle of people. In international news, a "clique" is an unrepresentative small set of leaders. RHC reserved this appellation for the ruling circle of leaders in Guatemala, China, and South Africa. In RHC ideological parlance, a clique is a derogatory name reserved for only the most perfidious opponents. VOA never used this expression in the sample.

Communist—Comunista. Radio Havana Cuba limited itself in using "communist" to official Communist Parties. These included the Communist Parties of Argentina, Honduras, Venezuela, Britain, Austria, Chile, Vietnam, India, the Dominican Republic, France, Italy, and Bulgaria.

VOA, for the most part, used the word "comunista" to describe the Soviet ruling party. It also once referred to the case of the Costa Rican Communist Party leader in whose house weapons were found (VOA32882-14). Finally, it reported a "communist insurgency" in Thailand (VOA31982-4).

Constitution—Constitucion. A "constitution" is a system of fundamental laws and principles of a government, written or unwritten. Both stations referred to coups in Bangladesh and Guatemala as examples of suspension or cancellation of the country's constitution. RHC reported on new constitutions inaugurated in Iran and Peru. Both stations reported that El Salvador had elected a provisional government until the new constitution could be brought in. Regarding Poland, RHC said that "national accord [is] based on the constitution" and a new journalists organization was proposed "based on respect for the constitution and socialism" (RHC31982-27 and 28). VOA reported that, under martial law, the Polish parliament was passing amendments to the constitution (VOA32682-14). Thus, for both stations, a constitution was a symbol of respect for a government's legitimacy. Suspension or renunciation of a constitution signified withdrawal of legitimacy or abrogation of political rights. However, a constitution could be amended to suit new political conditions.

Democracy (Democratic)—Democracia (Democratica). "Democracy" is used frequently in the political rhetoric of both the United States and Cuba. Both nations claim to adhere to principles of democracy. RHC often used "democracy" to describe its allies around the world: "The forces of peace and democracy" (RHC33082-10) were those forces confronting South Africa. "Organizations for peace, democracy and freedom" (RHC 33182-26) were protesting the U.S. deployment of nuclear missiles in Europe. "The world's progressive and democratic forces" (RHC32082-25) were called upon to step up the fight against apartheid. Vietnam was the "bulwark of the world's revolutionary, progressive, and peaceful movement" (RHC33082-17). On the other hand, Cuba's opponents were treated pejoratively in this regard. Colombia was described as a "so-called democratic country" (RHC 32982-24). The "so-called Central American Democratic Community" (RHC32482-5) was a reference to El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, and Costa Rica. Guatemala was using its intelligence network to investigate "those citizens considered to have democratic ideas" (RHC41279-26). The protest movements of Cuba's ideological rivals were often described as "democratic": U.S. protestors "belonging to democratic organizations" (RHC40979-25); the Chinese "movement for democracy and human rights" (RHC40979-16). To RHC, democracy seemed to mean more than government elected by the people. "Democratic" forces were often also described as "progressive" or "revolutionary."

RHC used the adjective "Democratic" to refer to governments such as the German Democratic Republic and and the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. It also referred to progressive organizations such as the Guatemalan Democratic Front Against Repression (RHC40179-34) and the not-yet-sovereign Saharan Arab Democratic Republic (RHC32082-26).

VOA's use of "democracy" was limited largely to the elections in El Sal-

vador. Elections were the "first step to democracy" (VOA32982-3). El Salvador would lose its democracy if the ruling party were ousted (VOA33182-3). "Any division of power in El Salvador must be based on democratic elections" VOA32682-3). The Central American Democratic Community's "sole objective is to defend and support democracy in the region" (VOA32582-16). VOA used the adjective "Democratic" to describe parties in the United States and El Salvador.

Dictatorship (Dictator)—Dictadura (Dictador).   A dictatorship is usually a government ruled by a chief-of-state with absolute and/or arbitrary power and authority. RHC saw the former Grenadan leader Eric Gairy as an "overthrown dictator" and former Nicaraguan ruler Anastasio Somoza as a "fascist dictator." El Salvador was a "violent and brutal dictatorship," while "dictatorships in Central America" threatened Mexico's security (RHC32682-14). VOA did not employ this word.

Elections—Elecciones.   RHC covered election campaigns in Cuba, Iran, Bolivia, Zimbabwe, and El Salvador during the sample periods. The Cuban elections showed the "confidence of the Cuban citizen [in their elections] and the mistrust of people in capitalist elections" (RHC40979-3). Elections in Rhodesia were "neo-colonial maneuvers" (RHC41479-6). The elections in El Salvador were subjected to considerable adjectival abuse: "phoney" (RHC32482-4), a "hypocritical farce" (RHC32582-2), an attempt "to fool world opinion" (RHC32083-12), an "anti-democratic maneuver" (RHC32282-13), "rigged" (RHC32282-16), "fraudulent" (RHC32982-1B), and "staged" (RHC32282-16).

VOA covered election campaigns in El Salvador, France, and Germany. VOA's coverage of the Salvadorean elections expressed great concern that leftist guerrillas might disrupt the elections. Forty foreign observers were present to "ensure impartiality" (VOA32882-2). Elections in El Salvador were "a first step toward democracy" (VOA32982-2). In other elections, voters in France "dealt liberal-left candidates another series of defeats" (VOA32982-14). Voters in Lower Saxony (FRG) gave the Social Democratic Party "a resounding defeat" (VOA32282-15). On the VOA, elections defeated leftism, liberalism, and social democracy.

In other uses of "election," the leader of the Bangladeshi coup promised free elections (VOA32582-8). The new Guatemalan leaders declared "the results of [previous] presidential elections null and void" (VOA32682-5). Israel's decision to permit West Bank municipal elections was a long-overdue measure" (VOA32682-8).

Freedom—Libertad.   Freedom (also referred to as "liberty" in English) is one of the most frequent words in common political discourse. RHC reported

that the political freedom of Argentine lawyers was abridged when they were put in jail (RHC41379-36). Chile lacked freedom of expression (RHC41379-34). Wall posters appeared in China to protest the limitation of "political freedom" (RHC40979-16). Organizations for "peace, democracy, and freedom" demonstrated in Italy against U.S. nuclear missiles (RHC33182-26). The Mozambican President was given a Bulgarian honor on behalf of his "contributions to the freedom, independence, progress, and peace of the peoples" (RHC33182-35). Constitutional enforcement of democratic liberties such as prohibition of arrest without warrant was suspended in Peru (RHC40779-25). Thus, on RHC, freedom encompassed a broad range of individual liberties. But it also was meant to include organizations and individuals who demonstrated their solidarity with anti-nuclear, anti-colonialist, and anti-imperialist struggle.

On the VOA, the Polish government "decided not to grant provisional freedom" to Lech Walesa (VOA32182-11). The State Department called the deportation of the Jehovah's Witnesses from Nicaragua a "flagrant violation of freedom of expression and religion" (VOA32282-6). The Afghani people were fighting "to reclaim their freedom from Soviet occupation" (VOA32282-6). The Soviet Union had violated human rights such as "religious freedom, the right to emigrate freely, [and freedom] for Soviet Jewry" (VOA32382-14). Thus, on VOA freedom predominantly encompassed religious liberty and freedom of movement and emigration.

Government—Gobierno. A government exercises authority, direction and control over a nation-state; it is a legitimate system of political administration. On both stations, states of all political persuasions were referred to as governments. On RHC, these included Nicaragua, Poland, Costa Rica, Germany, Brazil, Ethiopia, Bangladesh, United States, Japan, Argentina, and Angola. Even states with inimical political ideologies were referred to as governments: the Begin government, the Pretoria government. On VOA, governments included El Salvador, the United States, Nicaragua, Argentina, Poland, and the Netherlands.

Guerrilla—Guerrilla. A "guerrilla" is usually a member of an irregular armed force making surprise raids against regular military forces or civilian targets. RHC reported guerrillas fighting in Guatemala, El Salvador, Peru, and Colombia. VOA's guerrillas were fighting mostly in El Salvador to disrupt elections. One mention was made of Palestinian guerrillas in southern Lebanon (VOA31982-10).

Hegemony—Hegemonia. "Hegemony" typically refers to dominance, particularly that of one nation in a league or confederation. In modern Marxist parlance, it also refers to the predominance of one social system or ideology over another. China received the main brunt of this charge on RHC: Vietnam faced "new attacks stemming from China's hegemony and expansionism"

(RHC32782-29). China pursued "anti-socialistic and hegemonistic policies" (RHC41079-15). It carried out "acts of genocide to pursue their hegemonistic aims" (RHC41379-28). China "degenerated into anti-communism, hegemonism, expansionism, and decadence" (RHC40779-7). VOA did not use this word in the sample.

Insurgency—Insurgencia.   VOA spoke of a communist "insurgency" in Thailand (VOA31982-4) and reported that Cuba and Nicaragua were giving aid to "leftist insurgents" fighting against the Salvadorean government (VOA32182-4). RHC did not use this word in either sample period.

Liberation—Liberacion.   Liberation typically refers to the forcible release from foreign or enemy occupation and domination. RHC reported that the Vietnamese people demonstrated that nothing "can stop those who want to liberate themselves" (RHC33082-17). In the United Nations, Cuba insisted that it had the "right to help any nation's liberation" (RHC32782-3). Liberation struggles were underway in Grenada, Palestine, El Salvador, Guatemala, South Africa, Rhodesia, Uganda, and Puerto Rico. VOA never employed this word in the sample newscasts.

Marxist—Marxista.   RHC used "Marxist" only twice during the sample periods. The United States was accused of "trying to contain Marxist expansion in the Western hemisphere" (RHC33082-19). China had betrayed "Marxism-Leninism and revolution" (RHC40979-2). VOA's only mention came when the U.N. ambassador said that the "United States has a moral obligation to oppose Marxist-Leninist movements anywhere in the world and particularly in the Caribbean" (VOA32882-2).

Peace—Paz.   VOA's primary concern for peace was in Central America and the Middle East. Peace was a "process," as in the Camp David "peace process" (VOA32782-9). When linked with other descriptors, it appeared as "peace, security, and cooperation" (VOA33082-6). People in Afghanistan were also fighting for peace (VOA32182-6).

RHC employed the word peace many more times than VOA. It spoke of "peace and stability" along the Vietnam-China border (RHC40979-12, RHC41279-5); "peace and disarmament" (RHC41079-10); "peace and socialism" (RHC41079-15, RHC32682-37); "national liberation and peace" (RHC41279-2); "peace and solidarity" (RHC32082-16); "peace based on justice and dignity" (RHC32782-9); "peace and friendship" (RHC33082-18); "peace and detente" (RHC31982-25); "peace and coexistence" (RHC33082-13); "forces of peace and democracy" (RHC33082-10). RHC also referred to the "so-called peace treaty" signed "separately" and "unilaterally" between Egypt and

Israel (RHC41379-11, RHC41079-24, RHC41479-27). The Chinese decision to renounce the friendship treaty with the Soviet Union is a betrayal of the "cause of peace" (RHC41079-15).

It is apparent that RHC had a broader conception of peace than VOA. VOA limited itself to peace in the sense of a ceasefire, truce, or cessation of hostilities. RHC's vision of peace included many other components, including disarmament, justice, and dignity.

Power—Poder. In RHC's international news, a "power" meant a nation possessing influence, force, or authority over other nations. "Western powers" collaborated with the Rhodesian regime (RHC41379-3). "Western powers and transnational corporations" played a sinister role in the "crimes committed by the racist [South African] regime" (RHC41479-25). "Western imperialist powers" had supplied arms for use against Zambia (RHC41279-15). In addition, power was also something that a coup leader takes: "A military triumvirate took power in Guatemala" (RHC32782-20). Counterrevolutionaries in Surinam were planning to take power (RHC32582-30).

VOA did not use "power" in the sense of "Western powers." However, VOA news often expressed the meaning of taking power or "taking the reins of power" (VOA32782-10). The division of power must be based on democratic elections and can "come only through the consent of the people" (VOA32682-3). Power was also something that one could abuse (VOA32782-10, VOA32882-11).

Puppet—Titere. A "puppet" was a derogatory reference to a person or a state whose actions and ideas are controlled by another. RHC reported that the CIA "staged a shoot-out with South Vietnamese puppet forces" (RHC32282-12). It quoted a Bolivian report that "the time has passed when [the U.S.] could just land its Marines or install its puppet governments in other countries" (RHC33082-07). Nigeria was reported pushing "the international community to abstain from recognizing any puppet government" in Zimbabwe (RHC40979-20). VOA never used this word.

Rebellion (Rebel)—Rebelion (Rebelde). In 1979, RHC's only reference to "rebels" was a report that Nicaragua forces were bombing rebel positions. Otherwise, anti-Somoza forces in Nicaragua were described as "Sandinistas." However, in 1982, Salvadoran and Guatemalan rebels were often quoted as battling government forces. Usually "rebel forces" were contrasted with "regime forces."

VOA saw "rebel officials" in the Guatemalan army (VOA32482-3). "Rebels" in El Salvador were receiving shipments of arms (VOA32682-4). On the VOA, "guerrillas" was the preferred term for the rebels in El Salvador.

Regime—Regimen.   A "regime" is usually defined as any political or social order. However, in international newscasting, a regime was typically a disfavored government. For example, RHC used "regime" to describe: El Salvador, the Somoza government, Israel, the Pinochet government, Guatemala, Bolivia, and the United States ("the Washington r-"). When a regime was overthrown to favor those interests supported by Cuba, the regime was transformed into a government. Thus, the Gairy "regime" (RHC40779-21) in Grenada became the Bishop "government" (RHC41279-25). Other regimes included: the South African racist regime (RHC40779-8), the racist Rhodesia regime (RHC41379-3), the tyrannical Vorster regime (RHC41279-14), the fascist Chilean regime (RHC41279-28), the overthrown regime of the Shah of Iran (RHC41379-28). In referring to the right of Kampuchea to have a seat in the United Nations, a Laotian official "recalled that the United Nations was made up of sovereign states and not of ghost regimes" (RHC41279-7).

VOA only referred to regimes twice: The "martial law regime" in Poland (VOA31982-5, VOA32182-11); and the former Guatemalan regime of Romero Lucas Garcia (VOA33082-7). Both of these references were negative.

Rights—Derechos.   "Rights" are moral, lawful, and inalienable claims to power, privilege, or freedoms. Rights can be upheld or infringed. RHC reported a number of rights that must be upheld: Cuba has the "right to help any nation's liberation" (RHC32782-3). "All nations have the right to peace and security" (RHC33082-2). Palestinians have a "right to an independent and sovereign state" (RHC33082-30). "South African workers were fighting for their rights" (RHC31982-25). Voting was "an inalienable right" (RHC40779-4). "Women have the same rights as men" (RHC40779-17). Thousands of people in the U.S. protested the "lack of rights held by Blacks and other ethnic minorities in the United States" (RHC40979-25). Human rights were violated in El Salvador, Guatemala, Argentina, Colombia, and elsewhere.

In addition, the "right" was often another word for conservative or reactionary political forces. El Salvador's newly elected government coalition was repeatedly referred to as "right" or "ultra-right." Lebanon, Chile, and Guatemala were also characterized as "right-wing."

VOA's use of "rights" encompassed the right to emigrate freely (VOA32382-14, VOA32482-13), the right of a martial law ruler to designate a new president (VOA32482-3), the right of expression, assembly, and movement (VOA32582-9). Human rights were referred to only in Argentina and the Soviet Union. "Rightists" were mentioned only in El Salvador.

Ruling—Gobernante.   "Ruling" was used to described those forces in a political or social system which govern, predominate, or control that system. On RHC, the coup in Guatemala "is only a switch in military rulers" (RHC32682-12). The "ruling classes" in Guatemala used the army for their own

purposes, and the "ruling classes" in that country have increased differences in the armed forces (RHC32282-32). "Ruling" is not limited to adversaries, though: "Mexico's ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party," the "ruling Dominican Revolutionary Party."

On the VOA, "ruling" referred to the military leaders in Bangladesh, the governing party in El Salvador, the coalition of right-wing parties that came to power in El Salvador, and to the Polish military government.

Socialism—Socialismo. On RHC, socialism was mentioned often; communism is mentioned only in connection with official political parties. Socialism was mentioned in the same breath with "national independence" (RHC32782-29), "respect for the constitution" (RHC31982-27), "peace" (RHC32682-37), and "independence" (RHC41079-16). "Fraternal" and "internationalist" were also mentioned in this connection. The advantages of socialism over capitalism were apparent to anyone "comparing Cuba with the established Latin American countries living under capitalism (RHC40979-2). VOA's only reference to socialism cited a Soviet leader's remark that "Peking's approval of imperialist foreign policy contradicts the interests of socialism" (VOA32682-10).

Sovereignty—Soberania. "Sovereignty" means an independent political system with secure borders and free from foreign penetration of any kind. "The United Nations is made up of sovereign states, not of ghost regimes" (RHC41279-7). "The Chinese clique" is threatening Laos's "independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity" (RHC41079-16). "All democratic and peace, independence and sovereignty-loving forces" should express their solidarity with the Vietnamese people (RHC41479-4). Sovereignty was often mentioned in the same context as independence, self-determination, and territorial integrity. VOA did not use this word.

Terrorism—Terrorismo. "Terrorism" is one of the most value-laden words in modern political discourse. One nation's freedom fighters are its opponent's terrorists. Usually, terrorists use violence to intimidate, subjugate, or overthrow a government. On RHC, "terrorists" were operating in the Guatemalan Army (RHC32582-11), El Salvador (RHC33182-10), Honduras (RHC32582-6), and against Nicaragua (RHC32982-21) and Mozambique (RHC41479-24). The former Grenadan leader Eric Gairy was reportedly making contacts with the "terrorist group Condor" (RHC40779-21). Cubans working for reconciliation between exiles and the Castro government were "repeated targets of terrorist actions" (RHC40979-5).

On the VOA, the American president called for measures against "international terrorism" (VOA32482-16, VOA325-15). In particular, he referred to the Italian Red Brigade "terrorists" who kidnapped an American military officer.

Tyranny (Tyrannical)—Tirania (Tiranica). "Tyranny" characterizes a government or a ruler who uses oppressive, cruel, and unjust measures against the people. On RHC, such an epithet was reserved for "tyrannical Vorster [South African] regime forces" (RHC41279-4), the pre-Castro Batista tyranny" (RHC1079-2), "the overthrown [Kampuchean] tyrant" Pol Pot (RHC41079-12), and "tyrant [Nicaragua leader] Anastosio Somoza (RHC41379-10). VOA did not employ this word.

The Meaning of the Cuban–American Radio War

WHAT THE FINDINGS SHOW

The Cuban–American radio war has been underway for over 20 years. This 3-week news sample uncovered a great body of data, but these data must be seen as only the barest slice of time in this competition for the hearts and minds of the hemisphere. Further, international radio broadcasting is but a small part of U.S.–Cuban enmity. The VOA and RHC are only two Inter-Ideological Propaganda State Apparatuses (IPSAs) deployed at the service of their parent superstructures.

Despite this caveat, the outlines of broad ideological conflict clearly emerged. Analysis of the ideological content of concurrent U.S. and Cuban international newscasts illustrated the overall pattern of U.S.–Cuban antagonism. It also led to numerous inferences and generalizations about international ideological confrontation elsewhere.

This chapter begins with a commentary on the narrative description of what was happening in the world according to the Voice of America and Radio Havana Cuba newscasts. It goes on to summarize and critique the major trends as revealed in the quantitative cross-tabulations and category coding. Finally, it looks at the Key-Word-In-Context analysis for expression of ideologically laden words.

The Sample Weeks in Review revealed some interesting patterns common to both radio services. For example, both services seemed to value technological achievements, and reported on these frequently. It is interesting to note that the first sample period, April 7–14, 1979, coincided with a national technological trauma in the United States, the breakdown of the nuclear reactor at Three Mile Island. This event was highlighted on the VOA and treated by several items on RHC. The safety of the surrounding population was a concern for both stations, but neither questioned the need for nuclear power. The technological imperative of nuclear energy production was never in doubt.

A further illustration of this emphasis on technology was space exploration. The U.S. space shuttle and the Soviet orbiting space laboratory were the subjects of many reports. Space news was never sullied by discussion of its costs or of possible weapons applications. Technology seemed to be a symbol of prestige in the international war of ideas. Even in failure, technological achievements were emphasized. The Soviet–Bulgarian flight crew "acted with precision" after an unsuccessful orbit linkup operation (RHC41379-8).

Another common pattern that emerged from these data was the fact that RHC and VOA largely agreed on the way world actors behaved. At the national level, they established or broke off diplomatic relations. They exchanged friendly visits and signed communiques. They hosted official meetings and made rhetorical complaints in international fora. Representatives shuffled back and forth to promote dialogue. Nations subverted one another through covert means and used terror tactics to sabotage reconciliation efforts. On the individual level, heroes were honored, martyrs were mourned and exploited for propaganda purposes, and heads rolled during coups.

The international war of ideas pitted "hegemonists" against the lovers of peace and freedom. Ruling classes conspired overthrows and revolutions. Mass publics, sometimes manipulated and fomented by their country's enemies, demonstrated their solidarity to one or another cause. Rulers purged dissidents and imprisoned rivals. Retaliation raids and reprisals punished insurgents and perpetrators of violence, while repression put down internal rebellions. To combat one another, nations used military might. At the same time, they groped toward arms control and ceasefire talks as fearful publics watched and signalled approval or disapproval. In times of peace, nations elected leaders under various guises of democracy.

Interestingly, the acts of human individuals rarely stood out. A medical brigade assisted the wounded in Africa. A dissident in South Africa died under torture. The wife of Lech Walesa had a baby while her husband was in jail. But for the most part, individual personalities were de-emphasized in these newscasts. These newscasts were primarily about actors whose political or social roles could be filled by any number of individuals.

Each side in this ideological confrontation blamed the other for intransigence and extolled its own peacemindedness and flexibility. VOA reported that NATO ministers met in Colorado to talk about halting Soviet nuclear superiority (VOA32482-12). It reported that Soviet armaments programs had given the Soviet people a lower standard of living (VOA32582-11). In parallel, RHC reported that "people in Washington . . . should consider the consequences of sustained efforts to achieve military superiority" (RHC32082-15). Such mirror-images were also apparent in coverage of Poland, Nicaragua, and Afghanistan.

Needless to say, the Sample Weeks in Review revealed some noteworthy differences. For instance, VOA highlighted news of religion. Christians were preparing to celebrate Easter (VOA41479-14). Nicaragua deported 18 Christian

missionaries (VOA32182-2), and Lech Walesa's daughter was baptized (VOA32182-11). Political overtones were easily apparent in such coverage. The only coverage of religion on RHC was a report that the Cuban Ecumenical Council supported the results of the national elections in Cuba (RHC40979-4). But here too, political import was obvious.

Another difference was the stations' handling of critical views. VOA routinely carried news critical of overall U.S. policy objectives. Thousands in the U.S. demonstrated against U.S. policy in El Salvador (VOA32882-3). A Nobel laureate fasted in Washington for peace in Central America (VOA32982-4). U.S. senators opposed the President's price controls on oil (VOA41179-7). RHC, in contrast, gave no coverage to internal dissension. Instead, it highlighted criticism in the United States. RHC covered many anti-war, pro-labor, and anti-imperialist demonstrations in the United States. Some demonstrations, such as the police beating of milk truck drivers in Brooklyn, were doubtless not covered by many other media (RHC41279-21).

RHC was also not forthcoming on other issues. While the VOA was busy reporting the early skirmishes in the incipient Falklands/Malvinas war (VOA32382-13, VOA32882-5, VOA33182-5), RHC had nothing to say. As it turned out, this was a complex problem for Cuban foreign policy—whether to support a right-wing military regime or a European imperialist.

Let us turn now to some of the more significant findings in the quantitative measures of content. Both services devoted about one-quarter of their broadcast time to news. Though RHC's average newscast was much longer than VOA's, the most striking difference was apparent not in the length but rather in the number of individual countries each service treated in the sample. RHC covered events in 64 different countries in the 1979 sample and 75 countries in the 1982 sample, while VOA covered only 30 in 1979 and 44 in 1982. RHC, on a daily basis, followed the affairs of 15 countries in 1979 and 14 in 1982, while VOA limited its daily attention to only seven nations in 1979 and six in 1982. Countries as small and underreported as Surinam and Laos warranted repeated attention on RHC. Such a breadth of attention would seem to indicate a broad definition of newsworthiness in the RHC newsroom, one that expressed an orientation toward internationalism and a solidarity with other small and developing nations. Such internationalism was also apparent in the diversity of non-Cuban bilateral relations RHC treated: a Nigerian-Hungarian scientific cooperation agreement, Rumanian-Angolan talks, etc.

VOA's predominant concern was with affairs of the United States, totalling 36–40 percent of broadcast news time. In contrast, RHC covered Cuba only 24 percent in 1979 and 10 percent in 1982. Additionally, each service projected a different image of its parent country. More than one quarter of VOA's coverage of the U.S. dealt with Governmental Diplomacy/Foreign Relations. Next in predominance was Science/Space/Medicine, followed by Peace and Disarmament. RHC, on the other hand, focussed a third of its Cuba news on its Govern-

mental Diplomacy/Foreign Relations, and nearly a third on *Nongovernmental Organization/Foreign Relations*. Domestic Governmental Action constituted only one-seventh of RHC's coverage of Cuba. It would seem that VOA news-writers thought their audience was more interested in U.S. affairs than in any other country. This would suggest a more introspective perceived image in the VOA newsroom. On the other hand, RHC's diverse coverage of dozens of countries would suggest a self-image of more outward involvement.

This difference was further reflected in VOA's coverage of Caribbean and Central American affairs. RHC covered five countries in the region (El Salvador, Nicaragua, Guatemala, Mexico, and Honduras) on a daily basis, while VOA limited its daily coverage only to El Salvador. The Caribbean and Central America led RHC's regional coverage, while North America led VOA's. There was little "War" in the region, however. Nearly a third of VOA's coverage was preoccupied with rebellions in the region, while RHC focussed on the Governmental Diplomacy/Foreign Relations of the area. VOA treated rebellions promi-nantly since they were perceived threats to established order. RHC's focus on Governmental Diplomacy/Foreign Relations, on the other hand, reflected a view that such upheavals were part of the natural course of events.

Another striking difference that lends itself to inferences about ideology was RHC's emphasis on the foreign relations of nongovernmental organizations (8–10% of total coverage and 3 items daily).[1] Included in this category were well-known organizations such as the United Nations, the United Nations Educa-tional, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), and the International Labor Organization (ILO). But it treated also such relatively obscure organiza-tions as the Organization of Solidarity with the Peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America (OSPAAAL), based in Havana, the Coalition for a New Foreign and Military Policy, based in Washington, and the Chilean Committee of Soli-darity with the Anti-Fascist Struggle. At least three items per day dealt with these organizations. In 1979, VOA's only mention in this category was a report on the worldwide escalation of political assassinations issued by Amnesty International. In 1982, VOA had 5 items in this category, as opposed to 48 for RHC. We might infer that Cuban ideology placed greater faith in these organizations' ability to influence international political behavior than did VOA.

Another noteworthy distinction that arises from the data was the difference in the stations' coverage of peace. To begin, in 1979, the Peace/Disarmament category was the third most used thematic category on VOA, covered 9 percent of the time, while RHC covered such news only 3 percent of the time. The difference was less in 1982. Leading VOA's coverage of Peace/Disarmament in 1979 was the SALT II bargaining followed by the Israel-Egypt peace treaty. In 1982, this coverage concerned primarily the Geneva arms negotiations. RHC's only Peace/Disarmament coverage in 1979 included two items: the U.N. Secre-tary General's remarks that Palestinians must be brought into the peace process,

and one item on Vietnam-China border negotiations. RHC did not cover SALT II at all, a rather surprising fact given the breadth of RHC coverage of these superpowers on other issues.

We might expect the two stations' coverage of Human and Civil Rights to be a veritable litmus test in ideological persuasion. But the results were contrary to expectations. Human rights were the cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy during the Carter administration (the 1979 sample). The Reagan government (during the 1982 sample) did not emphasize human rights. Surprisingly, in both sample periods, RHC carried more news items on human rights violations than did the VOA. VOA focussed its concerns on Israel/Occupied Territories, Poland, Iran, Soviet Union, and Guatemala. RHC, in contrast, covered human and civil rights in Poland, Guatemala, Israel/Occupied Territories, Jordan, China, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Chile, El Salvador, Venezuela, Argentina, and Uruguay. Even during the Carter presidency, and especially during the Reagan era, RHC's focus on human and civil rights exceeded VOA's concern.

RHC's coverage of the United States was extraordinary. In 1979, there was a great emphasis on the accident at Three Mile Island, but there was no criticism of nuclear power in general. Next in predominance in 1979 were reports of assorted accidents and disasters ranging from train wrecks to tornadoes, followed by news of popular protests. Clearly, accidents and disasters in the U.S. were newsworthy items to Cuban newswriters. More relevant was the RHC emphasis on strikes, demonstrations, and other manifestations that the American people disapproved of their government's policy. Given Cuba's history of trying to foment Black discontent in the U.S. with Radio Free Dixie, of retransmitting Vietnamese propaganda broadcasts on the Voice of Vietnam, and of encouraging rebellions in other parts of the hemisphere, such coverage by RHC was not surprising. Apparently, Cuban ideology still was looking to the time when a revolution would take place in the U.S.

Some hypotheses proposed in Chapter 4 were confirmed, while others were disconfirmed. Hypotheses A1 to A3.3 were confirmed statistically: There was a significant difference between the stations in thematic content and coverage of country, political alliance, and economic alliance categories. Hypotheses 4 to 4.3 could not be measured statistically, but the rotated presentation of Tables 16 through 21 showed some qualitative differences. Hypotheses B1 and B2 were disconfirmed: Both VOA and RHC displayed significant differences in the thematic and coverage of country, political alliance, and economic alliance categories from the 1979 to the 1982 sample periods. The only exception in this regard was that VOA's coverage of economic alliances did not differ statistically from 1979 to 1982.

Thus, each sample period of each service seemed to be statistically discrete in virtually every measured category. Not even collapsing categories made a difference in this finding. Sampling error may be responsible for this anomoly,

although making the sample large enough to overcome this objection would have overwhelmed the capacities of both the researcher and the computer to store and manipulate such a large corpus of data.

Perhaps the most revealing findings of this study were those of the Key-Word-In-Context (KWIC) analysis. These were qualitative results; indeed, some very interesting inferences could be made from keywords whose limited frequency would have confounded normal statistical analysis. KWIC analysis revealed the linguistic environment in which the ideological war of ideas takes place. It is here that the differences are most apparent to the average listener.

Certain keywords displayed noteworthy semantic differences that reflect the ideological superstructure of the competing social formations. For instance, VOA never referred to its opponents as "authorities," as RHC often did. VOA virtually never referred to the contending economic philosophies of capitalism, socialism, and marxism. RHC, in contrast, never was inhibited from using extremely value-laden words such as "clique," "puppet," or "hegemonist." RHC referred frequently and unabashedly to communism, capitalism, socialism, and Marxism. Yet it never used the word "insurgency."

These differences were greatest when the two stations covered events that dealt with democratic process or human rights. On the VOA, the word "democracy" itself was limited to elections, while RHC used the word in a broader context to include peace, progressivism, opposition to imperialism, and support for revolution. "Freedom" and "liberty," similarly, were used with different meanings. While VOA spoke primarily of freedom as religious liberty and freedom of movement and emigration, RHC included freedom to demonstrate and to oppose instransigent governments. These differences were also seen in the quantitative analysis above. "Peace" too demonstrated these differences. VOA limited itself to the meaning of "ceasefire" and "truce." "Peace" on the RHC encompassed everything from detente to coexistence to stability and disarmament.

The components of ideology which this study has yielded remind us that ideology is a difficult concept to measure. Further, there is always the danger that such measurement leads to incorrect inferences. Non-content indices of Cuban and American ideology, however, do seem to indicate that these few inferences were not in an unexpected direction.

If anything, then, these data have disconfirmed Converse's statement that:

> Belief systems have never surrendered easily to empirical study or quantification. Indeed, they have often served as primary exhibits for the doctrine that what is important to study cannot be measured and that what can be measured is not important to study.[2]

The research design employed here did capture numerous components of ideology. The three-fold methodology of narrative description (Sample Weeks in

Review), cross-tabulation and statistical test of significance, and Key-Word-In-Context analysis has shown that the elements of ideology apparent in the content of concurrent newscasts of the Voice of America and Radio Havana are subject to quantitative and qualitative analysis. These content data do not contradict the non-content indices of Cuban and U.S. ideology outlined in Chapter 2.

RESEARCH TECHNIQUES REVIEWED

This study was able to discern elements of Cuban and U.S. ideology as expressed in international radio broadcasts. But in fairness to future researchers, the three research techniques employed here were not equally efficient in capturing these elements. Much as a rake's teeth can be changed to pull in pebbles of differing sizes, so too different research techniques are able to pull in different data.

The narrative description of the sample periods' news content at the beginning of Chapter 5 was useful simply in getting a grasp on the overall content covered by the two stations. Each news item was placed next to other items from the same country to see what was taking place there according to international radio news: these data were then aggregated by region and alliance categories. A prose narrative of the sample newscasts revealed such things as the emphasis on technology and the stations' common views on how nation-states behave. It also was able to point to differences in coverage patterns between certain prominent nation-states, say, between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Though it did reveal some "hard" data, the narrative description technique is best used to confirm or disconfirm subjective impressions on the part of the investigator. For example, one of the findings of this study was the distinct and obvious difference in the way VOA or RHC handled views critical of its government. VOA routinely carried opposition viewpoints to orthodox ideology, while RHC did not. This kind of finding would have been impossible to achieve using the other two research techniques.

The cross-tabulation and statistical analysis of length, frequency, and coverage categories were more rigorous than the narrative description of content. Such analysis required a greater expenditure of the investigator's and the computer's time and energy. The results, as revealed in the nearly two dozen tables in this work, are emprically more verifiable and lead to a rich area of inference-making. The research methodology elaborated here could be replicated by other investigators if they had the raw data (tapes and transcripts of the original broadcasts). Thematic category coding was somewhat marred by a reliability of 54 percent above chance; 60 to 70 percent above chance would have been more trustworthy. But the other, coverage categories (country, region, and alliances), the frequency measure, and the length measure are all virtually 100 percent reliable. Though some may disagree with certain inferences of this study, the findings themselves are highly reliable.

Another problem that surfaced in the coding was the surfeit of thematic categories. The list of categories was constructed with a view to encompassing the broadest range of themes. As it turned out, some themes were covered minimally, others not at all. This made the chi-square test more difficult, because of the greater likelihood of cells with low expected frequencies. If this study is replicated, it would be better to limit thematic analysis to the first 11 categories and to put all others in one category.

The third research technique in this study was the Key-Word-in-Context analysis. This kind of analysis required an enormous expenditure of human and electronic energy. Over 60,000 words had to be transcribed from tape to computer. The actual KWIC analysis itself took some 20 minutes of central processing unit (CPU) time on an IBM 370 main-frame computer. Yet the resulting huge output was a wealth of important data on ideology in news. Many words were used infrequently. Their significance would have been lost in statistical measures, but when they were lined up side by side in their linguistic contest, they revealed a great number of interesting findings. The use of Key-Word-in-Context analysis is highly recommended in investigating the ideological content of communication.

IDEOLOGICAL INFERENCES AND THE WAR OF IDEAS

What this analysis has shown is that there is a distinct difference in the ideology apparent in the concurrent newscasts of RHC and VOA. This difference is evident on many levels. On the surface, this difference is often apparent to every educated listener of international radio news. Keywords and concepts, certain emphases, themes, and coverage patterns would enable, for example, the average North American within a few minutes to ascertain that RHC's newscasts were inimical to U.S. viewpoints. But this ideological difference is equally obvious at the deeper levels of analysis used in this study. Patterns of narration, co-occurrences of coverage and thematic categories, the linguistic environment of keywords: All of these revealed differences that reflect the ideological composition of the source of these messages.

The most obvious manifestation of the ideological difference between Radio Havana Cuba and the Voice of America was in the news coverage of human and civil rights, violations of personal and collective liberties, and infringements of freedom. In the end, each system through its Inter-Ideological Propaganda State Apparatus (IPSA) proselytizes its cherished organizing principles and supreme values. In the case of the United States and Cuba, these principles and values express conflicting interpretations of democracy and human rights. On the one hand, the United States is the paragon of the liberal tradition of representative democracy. Above all, it cherishes personal freedoms: freedom of expression,

assembly, religion, the press, and so on. These personal liberties were enshrined by the nation's founders in the Bill of Rights. In contrast stands Cuba, which seems to put material and economic freedoms above personal liberties. Cuba's organizing principles and cherished values include freedom from poverty and hunger, access to guaranteed housing, health care and education, and other expressions of collective rather than individual rights.

Mowlana's distinction between the process of media production and distribution is relevant here.[3] Further, it relates well to the distinction between personal liberty and economic freedom. Mowlana points out that in any given society, the producers of mass media messages may be very different from the distributors of that message. For all categories of media analysis—who owns the medium, what kinds of controls there are, etc.—it is important to make this distinction. Communication in society cannot be understood unless these are distinguished.

This distinction is relevant also to this analysis of freedom and liberty. The U.S. view of freedom and liberty is producer-oriented, while the Cuban view is distributor-oriented. U.S. democratic liberalism guarantees the right of newspapers to print, of clergy to preach, of groups to assemble, and of citizens to express. It does not, however, guarantee the right-sharing and equitable distribution of society's benefits.

Cuba, in contrast, has an ideology that promotes the right-sharing of available resources, equitable distribution of goods and services, and collective needs over personal greed. Such an emphasis is distribution-oriented. More emphasis is placed on access to social services than on promoting individual liberties.

A second area of distinct ideological difference as revealed in these findings was the station's view on revolution in the Caribbean basin. Throughout the region today, competing systems of governance are battling for the hearts and minds of opposing populations. Will Nicaragua choose the Cuban model or a more pluralist system? Can El Salvador sustain a U.S.-style democracy based on free elections and freedom from intimidation? Will Jamaica survive the bitter blood enmity of its two major political parties? Will post-revolutionary Grenada become a new Puerto Rico or a new Haiti?

These and many other questions are at the crux of the war of ideas in the Caribbean. VOA and RHC, as delegated IPSAs of their parent systems, fight this out in their differing conceptions of how political progress is achieved. What VOA sees as a rebellion, presumably without legitimacy or popular support, RHC sees as legitimate acts by representative leadership.

In closing, the conclusions of this study might be summarized in six major points.

- The content of the international radio newscasts of the Voice of America and Radio Havana Cuba is one index of the conflicting ideological worldviews of the United States and Cuba. There are of course other data bodies and other

indexes which one might choose to analyze this difference. But this study has shown that the latent, ideological content of communication can surrender itself to rigorous quantitative and qualitative measurement.

- The content of these newscasts is a reflection of the broader U.S.-Cuban enmity. The themes and coverage patterns apparent in the data do not contradict non-content indices of U.S. and Cuban ideological rivalry. In most cases, the ideological content reflects specific domestic and international postures of both governments.
- VOA is not afraid to cover news critical, even inimical, to U.S. foreign policy interests. RHC, on the other hand, produces a much more homogeneous ideological message.
- RHC places great emphasis on the affairs of the Third World and of non-governmental (and intergovernmental) organizations. RHC's coverage of small and underreported countries far exceeds that by VOA. The news-gatherers in Cuba also seem to place greater confidence in the ability of nonstate actors to play an effective leadership role in international relations.
- More than ever, international telecommunications and international relations have become interconnected. The international competition of opposing ideologies has entered a new era. Though radio may be the oldest such medium, we can foresee that direct satellite broadcasting, trans-border computer communications, and other telecommunications technologies will play increasingly greater roles in the international war of ideas. The battle for the hearts and minds of opposing populations will be waged even more ferociously and effectively in the future.
- Clearly, Cuba and the United States are manifestations of two very different, often contradictory, even hostile worldviews. Each presents a model of organizing principles and cherished values to other countries in the region and around the world. Each has succeeded in raising the living standards and well-being of its citizens. Each is trying to propagate its vision of society to the other and to attentive publics in the hemisphere. Barring an unexpected climate of detente, these two powers will continue to meet in contest in the international arena of ideas.

REFLECTIONS ON TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND DEMOCRACY

In these final remarks, I feel an obligation to expand on one aspect of this research that might be overlooked by other investigators: the relationship of telecommunications and democracy. Among this project's findings was that the Voice of America and Radio Havana Cuba express different conceptions of the word democracy. Indeed, the Caribbean basin is currently the site of an intense ideological, political, economic, social, and military struggle between compet-

ing systems of democracy. Two major political-economic ideologies, democratic capitalism and democratic socialism, confront each other daily. Central to this struggle are two governmental radio voices, RHC and VOA which compete for the hearts and minds of over 140 million people in three dozen nations, colonies, and territories in the Caribbean, and another 400 million people south of the Caribbean.

This radio war of ideas is essentially a confrontation between two competing conceptions of democracy. As embodied in the neighboring polities of the United States and Cuba, these two forms of democracy now confront one another as enemies.

This confrontation has its roots in the elaboration of democratic ideals over the last 350 years. The first political contract to embody the word democracy was the Rhode Island "Frame of Government" in 1641:

> This Government . . . is a Democracie, or popular government. It is the Powre of a Body of Freemen . . . to make . . . just laws . . . and to depute from among themselves such Ministers as shall see them faithfully executed between Man and Man.[4]

In Rhode Island, all "qualified" people were directly involved in making laws, but they delegated the faithful execution of those laws to designated ministers. This type of "direct" democracy—the people make the laws, the ministers execute them—is the prototype for today's "people's democracies," including the Republic of Cuba.

The liberal tradition, from which present North American democracy is derived, broke with the Rhode Island model. Its major proponent, Alexander Hamilton, believed that, if such law-making powers were left to the people, the result would be confusion and instability. He favored a representative democracy in which voting was "well secured and the exercise of the legislative, executive, and judicial authorities is vested in select persons." In contrast to the "direct democracy" model, in the Hamiltonian model the people were not to be directly involved in making or executing laws.

To return to the question of who "qualified people" are, I needn't recount the ongoing struggle of women, Blacks, and other disenfranchised groups to participate fully in the democratic process. Indeed, the process of democracy, namely election and limited terms of service, is often taken as more important than who the participants are. This is precisely the reason why democracy was still an unfavorable term only 100 years ago. But bourgeois democracy solved this dilemma. It retained the appearance of legality by fetishizing the democratic process while allowing the question of who would participate to be left to future generations. We can note the emphasis that VOA places on elections as the keystone of democracy.

Cuba and the United States embody these two conflicting conceptions of

democracy. Cuba draws from the tradition of Rhode Island, wherein *poder popular* (popular power) means that popular interests are exercised by direct democracy, a process which reaches to the very roots of society. In the United States, the paragon of the liberal tradition, the interests of the minority elite classes are paramount and are safeguarded by a representational structure favoring these classes.

To heighten this contradiction and to relate it to communication and democracy, let me recount an incident that happened in 1980 at the Caracas conference of the International Association of Mass Communication Research. At the time, the MacBride report had just been released,[5] and was the subject of intense discussions in which the "democratization of communication" figured prominantly. At the end of the conference, the Venezuelan host committee proposed that the next conference, to be held in Paris in 1982, should take up the subject of democratization. The theme of the conference, the Venezuelans moved, should be "Communication and Democracy." At this point, one of the older U.S. participants, a communications professor from a large university, intervened; he felt the Third World had appropriated the word "democracy" for its own ends and had bastardized its true meaning to something akin to "socialism." He, with several other North American yeas, said he could not support the use of this word as the title for the next conference.

Needless to say, other members of the U.S. delegation were outraged at the temerity of a fellow countryman denouncing the use of the word "democracy" in any context. Partially as a result of this confrontation, a group of progressive communication scholars and media practitioners in the United States formed the Union for Democratic Communications (UDC). Of course, the formation of the Union for Democratic Communications has not resolved the two fundamental questions: What exactly is democratization of communication? What would democratic telecommunications technology look like if we saw it?

One philosophical conundrum that must be tackled as a preface to answering these questions is whether technology is inherently value-neutral or value-laden. I take the position that telecommunications technology is imbued with social, economic, or political value by the individual or group that controls the means of media production and distribution. Whoever controls the production and distribution of media messages fills the technology with substance and purpose. In Cuba, the United States, and other countries around the world today, the control and operation of modern telecommunications technologies rest in the hands of the very few state and/or business monopolies who imbue that technology with a set of values that limits choice to prescribed ideological bounds. In the industrailized West, business interests teach their media audiences how to save and invest, spend and earn, consume and produce. In socialist and some Third World countries, state monopolies gag any debate that questions the legitimacy of the ruling elite ideology.

In short, social formations throughout the world use media to reproduce and

perpetuate accepted social organizing principles. These principles are ideological in nature; they also reflect the social relations of production and material forces of production. Of course, much of this media effort is directed within the social formation, but the Inter-Ideological Propaganda State Apparatuses (IPSAs) ensure that sufficient flow is directed externally as well, namely at competing social formations. Given the reciprocal influence of the three levels of activity (ideological, social, and material), international propaganda, through such IPSAs as the Voice of America and Radio Havana Cuba, is aimed at influencing ideological resolve in the opponent.

We need look no further than the period of this research (1979–1983) to see other examples of this. International satellite news flows were often disconnected between the United States and Cuba. Only a score of telephone lines run under the Florida straits to service tens of thousands of calls, and these lines are monitored by Cuban and U.S. intelligence. Passage of persons between the two countries has been subject to repeated bans. From time to time, though, TV transmissions have mobilized both populations. The exodus at Mariel harbor and the storming of the U.S. diplomatic compound in Havana both had instantaneous, dramatic effects. Of course, Radio Marti and Radio Lincoln are concrete examples of this.

It should go without saying that telecommunications technology can serve democratic goals. That it doesn't today is not the result of some inherent determinism but is the result of the values inbued in it by individuals and groups who control it.

What, then, is the essence of democratic telecommunications? It is the control of production and distribution of media messages by the widest possible segment of the population. The people (not the self-elected who wield information for private ends) have the technical knowledge and financial wherewithal to create the content of communication and to transport it via a suitable channel to its appropriate audience. Democratic telecommunications implies that the means of message production and distribution are accessible to the most diverse class, ethnic, social, and cultural interests.

This popular accessibility implies the breakdown of the hierarchy of a state or private elite which, through its control of training, production, and distribution, commands media messages for its ideological ends. It also implies removing obstacles to local control and promoting decentralized and small-scale media channels that can enhance autonomy, self-reliance, and cooperation. It means demythologizing the technology and making it respond to satisfying basic human needs. Democratic communication means reducing the need for transportation, and increasing productivity of the workplace through efficient and reliable interactive communication.

Telecommunications technologies that enhance democracy are those that compel participation in the public sphere. Some technologies, such as television, have a tendency to do the opposite: to privatize experience. They compartmen-

talize and limit the feeling of participation and enfranchisement. They discourage interaction and dialogue. But some technologies compel the audience to act interactively. For example, a public address system predisposes its listeners to come together in a social or political process. The public bus system, really an elaborate communication system, forces the people to act interactively with strangers as if they were neighbors. A private car, on the contrary, seals us off from interacting with the environment. A television can make the act of media consumption a private affair.

A democratic national telecommunications system would be characterized by some or all of the following:

- Control of the means of production by the widest possible segment of the population;
- Financial requirements within reasonable limits;
- Extensive training not required;
- Local decentralization of control enhanced;
- Autonomy and collective self-reliance increased;
- Responsiveness to community needs;
- Interaction and feedback encouraged;
- Messages created by the audience.

Given these prerequisites, here are a few media technologies that I believe could enhance democracy in Cuba, the United States, and around the world.

Telephone and Computer Communications. Telephone and computer communications on the local and long-distance level have the potential of fulfilling many of these prerequisites. The message is produced by the audience. Access points are decentralized. Unlike a train, which the passengers must enter at designated times and places, telephone and computer networks are like a freeway, which allows access and exit at numerous nodes at any time. These networks promote ad hoc networks of information sharing at all levels. Audio and slow-scan TV teleconferencing can make use of these channels and bring together widely dispersed individuals in electronic dialogue. Interactive computer teleconferencing also provides a low-cost medium for real-time or non-real-time electronic meetings.

Community-owned, Listener Supported Radio and Television. With a modest investment and a small budget, some radio stations have shown how high quality, community-oriented programming can generate democratic dialogue. The advent of Low Power Television (LPTV) may have a similar impact. Democratic activists should take advantage of these technologies as they become available.

Cable Access. The technology is increasingly in place to provide access channels to community interests. Typically, the municipal authority granting the cable franchize to a profit-making enterprise insists that one channel be set aside for local access. Interactive cable can overcome the problem of large population size and can promote ''electronic town meetings.'' Each home in the community is wired via cable and has a response pad that connects each family to a central station. Citizens are thus able to indicate their responses to votes, preferences, polls, and other inquiries.

Citizen's Band Radio. One of the most fascinating innovations in the United States has been CB radio. Limited in power to only a few miles, CBs connect one sender to many receivers. In times of crisis and for the simple pleasures of human interaction, CBs have provided a low-cost, audience-controlled medium. One can hope that, some day, satellite-mediated cellular radio might provide this same service to citizens around the world.

International Radio. Shortwave radio signals can travel around the globe and can generally transmit intelligible voice and music. Governments have long understood the impact of this medium. Religious organizations also have proliferated in the shortwave bands, wedging the Word amidst the propaganda. Antinuclear groups, world youth institutions, and human rights organizations could do well to make use of this medium. The present author has advocated a radio voice of peace and reconciliation for the Caribbean, Radio Romero, based on the life and work of the assassinated Salvadorean archbishop Oscar Arnulfo Romero.

Democra-Sat. Most international phone traffic travels via INTELSAT or INTERSPUTNIK, the two global satellite monopolies. At least a dozen nations have or will soon have domestic satellite systems to link their territories. Costs of reception and transmission continue to plummet. In the United States, the Public Service Satellite Consortium has been attempting to aggregate the demand of public sector institutions. As yet, there is no International Democratic Satellite Consortium that could aggregate the demand of democratic interests. For a youth group, say, in France, to have an interactive video teleconference with a youth group in the Soviet Union, difficult arrangements must be made through governmental authorities. We can only speculate what might have transpired in 1980 during the so-called ''hostage crisis'' if religious or student groups in Iran and the United States had been able to carry on an electronic dialogue.

This list of telecommunications technologies of course is only suggestive. One could argue that certain of them could also impede democratic dialogue under certain circumstances. Yet their potential for enfranchisement and political participation is clear. Wide-spread innovation of LPTV, cable access, interactive computing, audio teleconferencing, and other technologies can partially alleviate

the strangehold of state and business telecommunications monopolies. They give democratic activists the means to organize for social change.

In the end, international radio broadcasting, such as was analyzed in this study, must be seen as one of the elder combatants in the international war of ideas. Its history dates back to naval operations during World War I. Its future is secure as long as populations are equipped with receivers capable of picking up foreign broadcasts. But as new telecommunications technolgoies are diffused in mass publics, new arenas of ideological struggle will be created.

FOOTNOTES

1. The thematic category NONGOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION FOREIGN RE-
    LATIONS (see Research Methodology above) was meant to include both tradi-
    tional nongovernmental *and* what are known as inter-government organizations.
2. Philip E. Converse, "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics," *Ideology
    and Discontent,* David Apter, ed. (New York: Free Press, 1964), p. 206.
3. Hamid Mowlana, "A Paradigm for Comparative Mass Media Analysis," in *Inter-
    national and Intercultural Communication,* pp. 474–84, Heinz Dietrich Fischer
    and John Merrill, eds. (New York: Hastings House, 1976).
4. William Finley Swindler, comp. "Frame of Government, Government of Rhode
    Island, March 16–19, 1641." In *Sources and Documents of United States Con-
    stitutions,* pp. 356–7 (Dobbs Ferry, NY: Oceana Publications, 1979.)
5. International Commission for the Study of Communication Problems, *Many
    Voices, One World* (Paris: UNESCO, 1980)

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